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
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History of the philosophy of mind

Robert Blakey



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HISTORY
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND //

EMBRACING THE
OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON MENTAL SCIENCE
FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.

By **ROBERT BLAKEY, A.M.**
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AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE,
ESSAY ON MORAL GOOD AND EVIL, ESSAY ON LOGIC, &c.

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VOLUME I.


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FATHERNOSTER ROW.

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
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
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HISTORY
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1862. Feb. 27

Gray Fund.

4 vols

\$3.00



TO
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ALBERT,

CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

&c. &c. &c.

THESE VOLUMES

ARE

(BY PERMISSION)

MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

BY

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS'S

VERY OBEDIENT,

HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

It is upwards of twenty years since I first formed the intention of writing a work of this description. Having been an ardent cultivator of metaphysical literature from early youth, I often experienced the want of some guide to a knowledge of authors, and their several publications on this species of philosophy; and it occurred to me that a work, which simply brought into one focus the multifarious and scattered elements of speculation which every civilized country possessed, could not fail to prove highly useful, not only to the mere scholar like myself, but even to those more advanced in philosophical knowledge and acquisitions. To form a plan, however, is one thing; but to execute it, another. I soon found the great difficulties which lay in my path. In England it is more arduous to write a history of philosophy, than in any other country in Europe; chiefly from the deficiency of works on the literature of the Middle Ages. Nearly all Continental libraries, even those of

small towns and villages, have more or less of this species of literature; but in England the best libraries in our provincial cities are almost entirely without works of this description. The time required for reading was another obstacle in my way; for more urgent and pressing pursuits engrossed almost every hour I had to spare. In consequence of these and other impediments which it is not necessary to particularize, I have sometimes been compelled to suspend the work for three or four years together; and many a time and oft have I altogether despaired of ever being able to complete it. Circumstances however have at length enabled me to do so; and after a good deal of anxiety, I now present it to the philosophical world, with a firm persuasion that they will act justly towards it, and award me that portion of commendation to which I may be entitled, however small it may be; and to more I have no right to aspire.

There are two modes of writing a history of philosophy. The one is to classify authors under general heads, in conformity with a principle of resemblance or affinity subsisting among their respective speculative opinions. This is called philosophical history. The other is, to follow the order of time, and give a distinct and personal outline of every philosopher's views, in

the precise order in which chronology develops them. Both plans have their respective advantages and disadvantages; and it is a nice point to determine which to prefer. To me, in all the purely historical works of a classified kind that I have seen, there has appeared no small degree of confusion; and this I believe is commonly felt as a great inconvenience by young students, when they enter upon the study of mental science. Generalization on the philosophy of mind ought not to precede observation and instruction, but to follow them. For these and other reasons, I have adopted the order of time, as nearly as the nature of the subject would admit; leaving the reader, except in some few special cases, to select and classify writers according to his own opinions and judgment. The historical or classified arrangement is certainly more dignified and imposing; but I conceive the chronological is better fitted to impart elementary and correct information, and to preserve the mind from many false notions which an arbitrary or imperfect classification is apt to create, in reference to particular authors and their respective systems.

This work is arranged upon a plan somewhat particular. It is almost exclusively confined to mental science. I am not acquainted with any publication precisely of the same kind, with the

exception of Stewart's Dissertation, prefixed to the Encyclopedia Britannica. Every reader knows that, on the Continent, religion, morals, and politics, as well as metaphysics, are comprehended under the general term *Philosophy*. In England, however, we have commonly kept these topics apart from each other; allowing each to rest upon its own basis; and this I consider a better plan upon the whole. It is obvious, notwithstanding, that by adopting it, I have, in a corresponding degree, contracted the sphere of discussion and observation; and, therefore, there must necessarily be less variety in my statements and reasonings than if I had launched freely, on every occasion that presented itself, into matters intimately connected with the fundamental principles of religion, morals, and politics. Not that I have altogether refrained from touching upon these respective branches of knowledge; this it would have been impossible for me to do, had I wished; but on those occasions where a direct reference is made to any of them, it is only in order to illustrate more clearly and pointedly the precise nature and bearing of some particular metaphysical principle or system. My aim has constantly been to furnish a history of *Metaphysical Philosophy*, and nothing more.

I have been desirous of combining some portion

of elementary instruction on the science of mind, in conjunction with the historical sketches and details I have given. This will account for some short chapters or dissertations in several parts of the work, apparently unconnected with the course of simple chronological narration. I trust that, though this method may be considered in some measure novel, it will not be without corresponding benefit, particularly to young students and general readers. I once purposed to make these elementary essays more numerous; but the increasing pressure of purely historical matter did not allow me to follow this course to a greater extent than I have done. A considerable portion of the benefit and pleasure to be derived from a historical sketch of any branch of knowledge, arises from our knowing something of its leading and fundamental principles; and this applies to the science of mind more, perhaps, than to any other.

The same cause which limited those elementary statements and reflexions, operated in curtailing the development and discussion of several systems of metaphysical speculation treated of in the work. It has often been to me a matter of deep regret, that my limits did not allow me to illustrate many interesting and important principles to the extent I desired, in order that they might be comprehensively and accurately understood. This will account, in

many instances, for the imperfect and circumscribed notice of several theories, and their collateral branches; and for the abrupt discontinuance of my remarks, when perhaps a discussion had just reached that precise point at which it became most interesting to the inquirer. Considering the extent of the ground over which I had to travel, and the numerous historical notices required, these imperfections, however much to be lamented, were unavoidable. Fifty, instead of four volumes, would scarcely have sufficed to give any thing approaching to a full view of the different systems enumerated, and to point out all their bearings on each other, and on other departments of human knowledge.

One of the chief designs of this work has been to impart to it a universal character and interest; to make it, in some measure, as interesting to the philosopher of Paris as of London. With this view, a copious account of English and Foreign philosophical publications is given; in order that those who feel an interest in mental pursuits may have as accurate and comprehensive a view of all that has been written on the philosophy of mind, as it was practicable in such a limited publication to afford. To remedy in some degree the imperfection of more extended elucidations and comments, on many foreign authors in particular, lists of their

names and respective various publications will be found in the Notes appended to the work.

I feel myself under great obligations to many philosophical historians, both in my own country and abroad. I cannot, however, enumerate all from whom I have received assistance. Among English treatises, I have consulted Stanley, Cudworth, and Enfield, with some slight advantages. To Dugald Stewart's Dissertation, prefixed to the last edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, I lie under considerable obligations. I am also much indebted to Mr. Hallam; and in perusing his "Literature of the Middle Ages," I have often experienced regret that he has not treated some mental speculations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries at greater length. Every thing he says is so excellent, both in matter and in style, that on many occasions his brevity has been felt as a painful infliction. I tender my acknowledgments to Mr. Lewes for his recent able and useful "Biographical History of Philosophy," though I must add that I cannot concur with the general aim and spirit of his speculative opinions. In examining the systems of philosophy of the present age, Mr. Morell's historical work, which is well entitled to the patronage and commendations it has received, has often been of service to me; and I have felt a peculiar pleasure in the perusal of his writings,

from the circumstance that his opinions and my own have so many points of resemblance. To the French historians I owe much ; especially to De Gérando, Cousin, and Damiron ; and likewise to the labours of Brucker, Ritter, Michelet, and other distinguished German authors.

From the wide range of inquiry I have taken, the varied topics on which I have commented, their innate complexity and diversified aspects, and, above all, from my own imperfections and shortcomings for such an important task, it is probable I may have fallen into errors, both as to matters of fact and of opinion. To candid and dispassionate criticism I cheerfully commit my labours with all their faults ; having every reason to believe, that, as the love of truth has ever been my polar star in their prosecution, the same feeling animates the spirit of criticism of modern times ; and that if correction be needed, it will only proceed from generous and honourable motives ; and prove as beneficial to the receiver, as commendable to the giver.

London, Oct. 1848.

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INTRODUCTION.

PHILOSOPHY is a comprehensive term, and, in its fullest extent, embraces every thing which a man can know and feel. Philosophers are however, like other humbler workmen, obliged to divide their labours in order to ensure more successful and efficient execution; and accordingly we find that, from the first dawn of any thing like science and literature, all knowledge has been classified under three leading divisions; namely, a knowledge of external bodies, of mental faculties or powers, and of moral duties or obligations. In no possible state of human existence can these three branches of thought be conceived in a state of complete isolation or independent operation. There is a bond, an indissoluble union, connecting them; and the precise limits where one ends and another commences, it is impossible to point out with any thing like fractional nicety. But still this consideration does not prevent men from making useful and practical divisions, or from designating them by general terms. It has accordingly been almost universally proclaimed in all ages, that philosophy may be substan-

tially divided into three leading parts ;—what can be known of nature, of God, and of man.

It has commonly been affirmed, that the consideration of visible nature is prior to every other inquiry. Whether this be correct or not, is of little moment to our present purpose. Man is evidently placed in an immense arena, and sees himself surrounded by a universe of infinite extent and variety. He feels the influence of external objects, and in turn exercises his power over them. What is the order and result of this reciprocity of action, is a matter of vital moment to him ; and he therefore institutes inquiries into the laws which regulate the movements and properties of external things. To these he gives the name of *Natural* or *Physical Philosophy*. This science has matter, and its various modifications, for its basis.

This inquiry into material bodies can scarcely be conceived in operation apart from some consideration of the thinking and active principle which conducts and guides it. Here the origin of mental science is placed. It has often been defined, but it is one of those branches of knowledge not susceptible of a formal and concise definition. Speaking generally, it has *mind*, both human and Divine, for its object. Aristotle terms it the *first philosophy*, not only on account of its superiority to all other branches of human wisdom, but also as being prior, in the order of time, to the whole of the arts and sciences. We cannot, however, lay much stress on the theories which attempt to account for the origin of speculative philosophy ; because

it is quite obvious that speculations as to the beginning of things, their nature, and the laws which govern and regulate their existence, must have been coeval with the very first rudiments of human thought. Man is never able to refer to any period in the history of his species, in which there was not some system of philosophy recognised. Every child, and every savage, is a philosopher in his way; and the only difference between the scholar and the boor is, as to the relative degree in which each is able to investigate and arrange the phenomena of existence. Both are, in their respective spheres, placed under the same government, and influenced by the same circumstances and events. But whatever opinion may be adopted on this point, certain it is, that mental science forms one of the three great divisions of human inquiry.

Another division of human thought, containing many important subdivisions, and which is clearly defined, arises from the very first wants and duties of human life. This department of knowledge relates to morals, or the conduct of mankind. In no situation of life can we conceive a total suspension of the principles of morality. The obligations and bonds of connection which subsist between man and those around him, must form the first elements of his knowledge. These, like the physical laws of the universe, are of a fixed, determined, and eternal character. They form the groundwork of *Moral Philosophy*.

The philosophy which springs out of and comprehends a knowledge of mental systems, may be

viewed under several aspects. If we look at it merely through its naked or abstract principles, it is one thing; if exclusively through its practical influence on the condition of human thought in a state of society, it is another thing; and if both these be amalgamated with other branches of physical knowledge, it presents again altogether different features. Yet all possess a solid substratum of truth; and the propriety or obligation of taking any particular view of the philosophy of mind, can only be defended upon comprehensive considerations of what is in accordance with the general interest, judgment, and happiness of mankind.

That it is a condition of human existence that some system of mental speculation should be cultivated, and be made to serve as a ground-work for other necessary and interesting studies, is a position as irrefragably true as important. It is a law of human thought that every thing shall centre in *mind*; in a knowledge of its faculties or powers; and in a thorough acquaintance with all those general conceptions which are incorporated in every intellectual manifestation or state of being. We cannot exile ourselves beyond the sphere of this influence; for if we could, impenetrable darkness and ignorance would be our portion. It is not a matter of choice whether a man shall be ignorant of mental philosophy or not; it is imperative that he should cultivate it, if he is ever to attain a complete knowledge of other sciences. It is the portal through which he must pass to the inner

temple of intellectual treasures. Mental philosophy is not *itself* the sum of all knowledge, but the necessary instrument in the successful prosecution of all other branches of human wisdom. Without it, every man is a child, an intellectual imbecile, and can have nothing valuable or abiding in him. To illustrate this point a little more fully, we shall make a few observations on the indissoluble and dependent connection between certain kinds of knowledge and the philosophy of mind.

We shall not dwell upon the obligations which even physical science lies under to metaphysical pursuits. We may, however, barely remark, in reply to the enthusiastic admirers of the *positive* philosophy, that they are not in a position to mould their own facts, nor to illustrate or methodise their views, even in reference to the simplest phenomena of the external world, nor can their opinions and conclusions be enforced upon the attention of others, without the virtual recognition of principles which have an exclusive relationship with mental science. It is only by stepping beyond the strict limits of their own sphere, as mere collectors of facts and observations, that they can be understood, either by themselves or by others. A system professing to be founded on *facts*, and *facts alone*, is an inconceivable thing to the mind of man. The truth of this may be readily tested by the most superficial consideration of the subject.

Leaving, however, for the present, this part of the subject, we shall direct especial attention to three great divisions of human knowledge; namely, mo-

ality, religion, and politics. A profound acquaintance with all or any of these, must be obtained through the channels of mental science.

The science of morals is of a comprehensive character, and of universal interest. It affects all classes of mankind, from the king to the beggar. All its principles and facts, however, relate to *mind*; they belong to man's internal constitution; they proceed from certain *à priori* suggestions or conditions of the human consciousness, and are not matters which come under the cognizance of the senses, or can be measured or weighed. What is involved in the terms *moral freedom, moral duty, moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral feelings, moral principles, emotions, passions, desires, rewards, and punishments*? Something, undoubtedly, of a purely mental character; which, in order to be effectively analyzed, and brought to open day for the satisfaction of man's reason and interest, requires an intellectual process of the most subtile and refined kind. Here nature cannot be interrogated by material instruments; we must deal with her solely through the means of our internal consciousness, and those habits of inward analysis and deduction which can only be detected and efficiently wielded by the mental philosopher. For a man to write profoundly and correctly on the principles of morals, without a respectable portion of metaphysical learning, would be as impossible as for a man born blind to write intelligibly and philosophically on light and colours.

Theology stands in nearly the same relation as

morality to mental philosophy. The former has to deal with those principles of the mind which constitute the foundation of natural and revealed religion. Here cause and effect, existence, intelligence, wisdom, final causes, and an immense variety of other abstract conceptions of the human understanding, form the ground-work of theological science, and create and support its entire principle of vitality. We have the existence of the Supreme Being, His moral government, the mind's immateriality and immortality, the whole science of morality as contrasted and compared with the morality of the Scriptures, the doctrines of revealed religion considered in relation to the course of nature and the inward suggestions of the human soul; and a thousand other matters, any one of which is sufficient to occupy the active mind of man during a whole life time, in order to fully illustrate and enforce it in all its bearings and ramifications. But in this extensive field of speculation and interest, nothing can be done without a knowledge of mental subjects. Divines may, and in fact do, regulate their acquirements in metaphysical lore according to their individual circumstances, tastes, and mental capabilities; but the theologian is not to be envied who can enter a pulpit, or commit his theological thoughts to the public through the press, totally unacquainted with the general outlines of mental speculations. Indeed this fact is so well understood, that among nearly every class of Christian teachers, it is now an established part of theological tuition, that the candidates for

the office of the ministry shall possess a competent knowledge of metaphysical science, before they can be qualified for holy orders.

Politics as a *science*, not viewed through the medium of *party*, are essentially founded on mental knowledge, and their general principles are of a spiritual or abstract cast. They have also an intimate and necessary relationship with morality and theology. All declarations of personal rights and freedom, allegiance, civil and criminal codes of laws and jurisprudence, or the law of nations, are severally founded on abstract principles of thought, and have their seat in the deep and inward recesses of the soul. We have only to look at the constitutional charters of any state or kingdom, to be convinced of the refined and mental abstractions of which they are composed. The science of jurisprudence, for example, is chiefly constituted of a multitude of recondite maxims, of which, unless a man has some knowledge of metaphysical subjects, and is well acquainted with the rules and principles of abstract reasoning, he can never be able fully to comprehend the justice and soundness, nor their applicability to the state of human affairs.

If such, then, be the intimate connection between these three most important departments of human knowledge, and the philosophy of mind, how necessary and obligatory is it that we should assiduously cultivate it, and should form to ourselves comprehensive views of its nature, limits, purposes, and ends. It ought to constitute an important branch of every young man's education, particularly

if he be destined to pursue any professional occupation. Unless habits of inward reflection are formed and cultivated in early life, and the rules of mental analysis and deduction are familiarised to the mind, it is impossible to rear any great or respectable superstructure of philosophical expertness upon the best and most enlightened systems of public or private tuition. Such systems may make a *full*, but not a *clever* man.

Of late years a lively interest has been awakened in regard to the history of speculative opinions. The European mind has been aroused from a state of comparative apathy, and is now bent on testing every principle and every fact, both by historical evidence and by logical deduction. We are called upon to trace opinions from the most remote periods of time, and to view them in conjunction with institutions and modes of thinking of the present day. This extensive inquiry is considered by various classes of men in different lights, and with different feelings; some with aversion, and some with approval; some with an anxious desire to effect social improvements, and promote knowledge; and some, unhappily, to throw impediments and doubts in the path of human progress. Still, however, powerful sympathies have been awakened; and we may rationally hope that it only requires time, and suitable seasons of calm and dispassionate reflection, to realize important benefits from their exercise.

In Germany the spirit of speculative inquiry

has, for nearly a century, displayed remarkable activity. It has formed one of the leading branches of public education, and conducted its cultivators to distinction and renown. It has been made subservient to the elucidation of every other department of the philosophy of human nature, and thrown a steady light on many problems which had previously been enshrouded in almost impenetrable darkness. In France the same activity has prevailed for nearly the same period. Here, too, speculative philosophy has imparted a higher tone to the general current of literature and scientific investigations, and has been eminently successful in adding to the general stock of rational and enlightened inquiry. Italy has likewise partaken in some measure of the prevailing enthusiasm, and has relaxed the hitherto inflexible severity of austere injunctions against novel doctrines and opinions; and has, consequently, extended the blessings of intellectual liberty among her people. And the same may be remarked of several other continental nations. In proportion as mental philosophy has broken in upon the dull and stupifying routine of antiquated and worn-out systems of education and academical instruction, in the same proportion do we trace a favourable change in the general current of the public mind. The spirit of man feels the salutary influences of unrestricted freedom, and enters upon that state which is most conducive to the full and effective exercise of all its loftier and more ennobling powers and energies.

True it is, that these advantages from the

ardent cultivation of speculative topics, are not invariably obtained without some serious drawbacks and inconveniences. In Germany and France, in particular, there has unquestionably been manifested at intervals a philosophical spirit but little in harmony with the progress of rational knowledge, and the best and most sacred interests of man. The unfettered liberty of thought has in these countries occasionally run into licentiousness. The philosophic mind has degraded itself, and outraged common sense and common feeling. But still we must hold the balance with a steady and even hand. It seems to be one of the necessary conditions of human progress, that no great advances shall be made in the intellectual acquirements of nations, nor in the firm and complete consolidation of those important abstract principles which lie at the root of their civilization, prosperity, and freedom, without some corresponding disadvantages, though of an evanescent or transitory nature. The public mind, long pent up within a narrow sphere, often rebounds beyond its wholesome and natural limits, when its fetters are taken off and all forcible restrictions removed. It revels in the wild and frantic enjoyment of its liberty, and feels but little inclination for the moment to listen to the dictates of soberness and truth. But this feverish state passes over, and seasons of solid thought and reflection succeed, bearing the fruits of real wisdom and matured experience. And an appeal can safely be made to all who have any thing like a competent knowledge

of the general literature of Germany and France, that, amid much speculative inquiry of a questionable kind, and not a little positively unsound and injurious, there is still a very striking improvement manifested in every branch of general information in these countries within the last century, in which abstract reasoning is especially required, and where the human mind is called forth to exercise all its higher powers of rationalistic dexterity. And this advancement in the loftier walks of literature and science, may be fairly attributed to the impetus given to the general intellect, by the ardent study of the principles of mental philosophy.

Mental studies have not been much cultivated in Great Britain for the last three quarters of a century. In Scotland, however, they have maintained a respectable footing; and almost all persons intended for the church, the bar, or public offices of any description, make it a point to go through a regular course of study in metaphysical science. In England it is otherwise. Here it can be scarcely said to form any portion of academical instruction. This may be attributed to many causes. The preponderance of mechanical and commercial pursuits among us, naturally indisposes the great masses of even intelligent and reflecting people to view speculative or purely intellectual investigations with a friendly and encouraging eye. What is material, palpable, and immediately profitable, becomes the grand and engrossing object of interest. The external sources

of enjoyment and happiness prevail over the mental or spiritual; and this sentiment pervades the whole mass of the people, imparting to the national mind a strong material tendency. Again, those who, from inclination and their position in society, were fitted to take a leading part in the discussion and propagation of the principles of mental philosophy, have for more than half a century entertained doubts as to its benefits, chiefly from the circumstance that the mystical and idealistic notions so rankly prevalent in some parts of the continent, might be possibly transplanted into England, and corrupt the mind of the nation, and withdraw it from those important objects on which it ought invariably to rest. That there is something plausible in these apprehensions, must be conceded. But a little further inquiry into the nature of all speculative doctrines, and into the modes and degrees in which they influence the current thought of a people, would certainly have the effect of greatly mitigating, if it did not entirely remove, any such anticipated sources of danger. For how stands the real position of the question? There is no stopping, successfully, the progress of inquiry of a whole nation; if you close any particular avenue of thought, another must be opened in its stead. It becomes, therefore, purely a question as to the choice of evils. If we have eschewed the dangers from mystical and idealistic theories, we have unquestionably encouraged the growth of a cold and lifeless materialism, which operates, in a thousand

unperceived modes, to banish all lofty moral and religious feelings from the minds of men. By an undue encouragement of physical science, with a view to make it supply the whole of the mental wants of the nation, we insensibly, though powerfully, and from the very nature of things, throw the mind of man entirely upon a species of knowledge calculated, when it fully and exclusively engrosses his affections and energies, to limit the powers of his intellect, and to strip them of their most ennobling and glorious attributes. By consequently dwelling on material phenomena, and making mere secondary causes objects of the mind's attention, we gradually descend from the lofty and improving regions of thought, and consider the Supreme Being, and all the wonders of intellectual nature, as only results and modifications of the visible things around us. This is neither a natural nor advantageous mode of procedure. The practical and the theoretical should invariably be conjoined in the intellectual culture of all men; inasmuch as this is the only mode which nature has appointed for steadily preserving a hold on their affections, and preventing them from lapsing into any irremediable state of apathetic indifference, or sordid, unqualified selfishness.

When we come to look narrowly at the influence of physical science on the minds of the masses of the people, we are struck with its limited range, and its cold and evanescent impressions. The laws of the material world seldom occupy more than a

passing moment's reflection; and the improvements which mechanical science may bring to the workman's fire-side, he accepts and uses as a mere matter of course, but never makes them anxious objects of his thoughts or contemplations. He is under an almost instinctive conviction, that it is an affair which does not particularly concern him. And the same thing is true of every other class of society. The elements of thought and reflection are of another cast. They relate to other objects apart from the laws and qualities of material bodies. Does the intelligent mechanic dwell any length of time upon the principles of his art; upon the formulas of the screw, the lever, or the inclined plane? Does he make them the constant objects of his thought and solicitude? By no means. His mind is elsewhere. He lives with his wife, his family, his relations, his countrymen; and, it is hoped, with his God. It is the bonds, the connections, the sympathies, the feelings, the hopes, the fears, the cares, and anxieties, which arise out of the relationship he stands in as a son, a parent, a member of society, and an immortal spirit, which fill the measure of his thoughts, and give life and interest to his existence. What a slender hold have all material agents upon him? What to him the number or nature of the laws which regulate their movements; the great law of gravitation, or the atomic theory of chemical affinities? Scarcely any thing. They touch but very lightly indeed the vital and stirring principles

of his being. They are not the staple articles of his intellectual sustenance and strength. The social, the moral, the political, the domestic ties of life, are the objects of his constant interest and unceasing solicitude. He rests upon intellectual and moral manifestations; and always allows the phenomena of the material world, numerous and wonderful though they be, to hang loosely about him, and never for a moment suffers them to be placed in competition with the claims, obligations, and duties of humanity.

It is not the natural philosopher; it is not the Newtons, the Laplaces, the Davys, however venerable their names may in the abstract be, who most excite the sympathies of mankind, and engross their undivided attention. These are not the household gods which universal humanity sympathetically worships. It is men who develop the principles of mind; who make human nature their study; who unfold the latent thoughts, purposes, and principles of human feeling and action; who distinguish themselves as lawgivers, statesmen, historians, theologians, poets, painters, and writers on the every-day movements and phases of human life. These find kindred spirits in all ages and countries; and enjoy a reputation and fame, founded on infinitely more noble and interesting objects, than those on which rest the cold and formal approbations conferred on the physical philosopher, or the zealous disciple of *positive science*.

We contend, therefore, that the decided predilection for physical science manifested in England, and for the rules and principles of reasoning necessarily involved in and derived from it, is not grounded upon an enlarged conception of the nature and purposes of human knowledge, nor of the advantages to be realised by the national mind from its extended cultivation. We readily admit, as a true and general maxim, that all knowledge is more or less improving; but it by no means follows that when we unduly confine the public mind within certain prescribed limits, and only call into exercise one set or class of its faculties or powers, we are doing our best to advance the cause of popular instruction, and to elevate the sentiments of the nation to their loftiest point of general improvement. On the contrary, we humbly conceive that we are, by sketching out and adopting such a narrow and contracted system, militating against one of the plainest and most imperative dictates or laws of our nature; and if we obstinately persist in pursuing such a course, we must fully expect to reap those bitter fruits which are the inevitable result of violating one of the established canons of nature's decrees. To effect the intellectual refinement of a people, there must be a judicious combination of all the different elements of knowledge and thought; and among the chief and most influential of these, is the science of human nature.

It must not, however, be inferred from these remarks, that, in order to comprehend other

branches of knowledge and science, it is absolutely requisite that we should be intimately acquainted with mental philosophy, and be able to trace its history with accuracy and minuteness. In the pursuit of information we are frequently obliged to take many principles for granted, without being able to prove their truth. All that we contend for is, that the science of mind is more or less a necessary ingredient in all human investigations, and that we cannot hope to take a conspicuous part in any department of general knowledge, without either tacitly or experimentally adopting many of the most essential axioms on which the fundamental movements of the intellect depend. The active principles of intelligence must be either theoretically or practically recognised and understood, before we can successfully apply them to any purpose whatever.

No system of education can be considered more meagre and imperfect, than that which entirely excludes the philosophy of mind from its range of inquiry. One of the chief benefits of instruction is entirely lost; that which enables us to cultivate both the active and reasoning powers of the mind, and to strengthen and mature them to that degree of excellence which is indispensably requisite to secure us against adopting the most erroneous opinions, and the most glaring and palpable absurdities.

One of the most powerful causes, perhaps, which have operated to check the general cultivation of speculative philosophy among a certain class of in-

telligent people, not only in England but in other countries, is the conception that its history presents nothing but a wild chaos of abstruse systems, of conflicting opinions, and unshapely chimeras; the natural tendency of which is to lead men into error, to fill their minds with shadows and delusions, and to excite false hopes and expectations. This is the popular accusation brought against the philosophy of mind, and on which rest the apathy and scepticism commonly felt and expressed as to its nature and benefits. But a moment's calm reflection will immediately dissipate this rash conclusion and vulgar prejudice. That there are various and conflicting opinions relative to some of the fundamental principles of the science, and to their influence upon, and applicability to, other branches of human investigation, is an indisputable truth; but this admission does not compromise the validity and importance of mind, considered as an independent and legitimate branch of philosophical inquiry. We find the same spirit of disputation and contention prevailing among those who cultivate every kind of knowledge. The abstract principles on which they all rest, are more or less matters of discussion, and are subjected to a variety of judgments and opinions. But this state of things proves nothing. It is the very nature, essence, and province of knowledge, to separate the true from the false, the hypothetical and conjectural from the certain and conclusive, the good from the bad, and the expedient from the inexpe-

dient. How great is the importance of morality both to individuals and to whole nations; it is the very life blood of their social and confederated existence. But where shall we find a theory of morality which is not open to a difference of opinion, or which is fully adequate to account for all the moral manifestations, rules, principles, obligations, and ideas of merit and demerit, which display themselves in the wide arena of the moral universe? Again, the science of politics is of the highest possible interest to man; but to what contentions, varieties of sentiment and opinion, and bitter conflicts, does it not give rise? Where is the writer who has ever penned a political system or theory which has been universally, or even generally, received? Why the very abstract maxims or principles on which all societies of men rest, are at the present moment, in spite of all the learning and scientific investigations of three thousand years, speculative objects of the most opposite and conflicting nature, among the able and intelligent legislative philosophers and politicians of all countries. If, again, we cast an eye to religion, we find the primary principles of both natural and revealed theology matters of every-day and eager discussion, and susceptible of being viewed through various mediums; and the same is applicable to legal science. Where shall we find a greater dissimilarity of judgment than that to which the laws and customs of various people give rise? Nay, we shall advance a step further, and maintain that even physical science, which prides itself on

its *positive* results, is not removed beyond the pale of differences of opinion, and conflicting judgments, relative to many of its theories, principles, and conclusions. Now, taking all these matters into consideration, would a man act wisely or consistently, were he to conclude, that, because in morals, politics, religion, law, and physical science, we find opposite theories and conflicting judgments supported by those who cultivate these respective departments of knowledge, he is warranted in affirming that they are all delusions, and that there is not the slightest substratum of truth or logical validity for them to rest upon? Certainly not. A man who should entertain an opinion of this sort, and endeavour to act upon it, would be deemed unfit to be reasoned with on any subject whatever.

What we claim therefore from ordinary candour and consistency is, that mental science be placed upon the same footing as other branches of knowledge. That there are differences of opinion about its fundamental truths, we readily admit; but they are neither greater in number, nor more discordant in their nature, than what appertain to almost every other topic of philosophical investigation. And it certainly appears the height of inconsistency for us to assume that there is no truth whatever in that particular science the principles of which are absolutely necessary to ascertain and to adjudge the amount and nature of truth to be found in every other subject. Of all perverse modes of reasoning, this must appear to be the

most self-contradictory and unsatisfactory to every well-regulated and candid mind.

As it is with mental science alone that we have immediately to do, we shall just briefly notice some of those general maxims or elementary principles, which seem to have been either logically demonstrated or tacitly assumed, in almost every system of speculation alluded to in this history of philosophy. A voluminous record of this kind, extending over more than two thousand years, offers, at first sight, a somewhat perplexing aspect to even scientific minds; but a little examination into the matter, and an ordinary degree of exercise of the power of generalization, will soon enable the intelligent and attentive reader to detect, amid the crowd of objects which present themselves, some distinctive land-marks which will serve to lead him out of the apparent labyrinth of endless speculation, and impart to his mind some steadiness of purpose. The diversity of systems and theories is, strictly speaking, more in appearance than in reality; for we often find, that though their external dress be very diversified, yet when we look narrowly at them, we soon recognise an affinity or sameness among the principles which form the nucleus of a great variety of speculative fabrics. The importance of these varied illustrations of the same fundamental positions, cannot, on many occasions, be too highly estimated; but still it is always valuable to observe the philosophic rule of looking at the elementary propositions on which different views of the human mind profess to rest.

It is this susceptibility of the principles of mental science to be viewed through various mediums, and to be illustrated by materials drawn even from opposite quarters, that imparts so much real interest to this branch of knowledge, and makes it such a necessary and useful instrument for the testing of truths in other departments of human inquiry.

And here it may be remarked, that the illustrations of principles connected with the human mind in all its grand aspects and divisions, stand so prominently distinct,—possess such an individuality of character, in their susceptibility of being varied, to an almost infinite extent, in every thing belonging to the mere physical investigations of the universe,—that we perceive at a glance the radical distinction between the truths of natural philosophy and those of human nature. A treatise on Astronomy, Hydrostatics, or Chemistry, is always the same, with the exception of recent discoveries, which are simply stated as matters of fact, and are linked to the general mass already accumulated. Writers in any of these departments of knowledge, follow each other in a beaten track, and have no latitude whatever for invention. There is no want of inclination to impart novelty and interest to physical science; but its cultivators have no room to effect any such thing. They travel in a path bounded by a lofty wall on each side, which shut out nine-tenths of nature from their view; and, consequently, they have liberty neither to turn to the right hand nor to the left. But

what different circumstances accompany the illustrations of truths springing out of the deep recesses of the human heart and understanding. How susceptible are they of infinite variation, and of becoming inexhaustible sources of interest. Conviction and mental pleasure rush at once into the soul from a thousand channels; and yet the perfect identity between the leading principles of human thought and action is never weakened or destroyed. The grand outlines of humanity are always visible. The truths of mind, of religion, of morals, of politics, of matters of intellectual taste, of the every-day movements of life, passion, and desire, are each of them the never-failing fountains from which the streams of human wisdom and genius perennially flow, to gladden and cheer the heart of man, and to impart to him that necessary mental sustenance, the ceaseless cravings for which constitute one of the striking characteristics of his being. The scientific classifications of the natural philosopher die almost the moment they are born; but not so the speculations of the mental philosopher, the moralist, the divine, the dramatic writer, or the poet; these enjoy a perpetual youth, and time itself stamps upon their respective effusions the seal of immortality.

We may now observe, in the first place, that one of the leading positions which seem to be established by the historical statements and details of philosophy in all countries and ages, is, that mind and matter are two separate and distinct things. The whole current of speculation scarcely fur-

nishes us with any thing approaching to a single complete theory, which in all its aspects, and in all its logical deductions, points to an opposite principle. The mind of man, in every state of existence of which we have any authentic record, has always been struggling to give utterance to this fundamental truth, or manifestation of its inward consciousness. It assumes, it is true, a variety of appearances, but it constantly retains the unity of its character intact. From the banks of the Thames to the banks of the Ganges; from the first mutterings of science in the East, to the finished philosophical productions of the present hour; this truth has never ceased its influence over the minds of countless millions of our race, who have passed through life under external circumstances and with speculative theories infinitely varied. Here there is a solemn unity of universal assent, which no hardihood of assertion can deny, nor captious sophistry gainsay.

In the second place, it may be observed, that we clearly perceive, from the whole range of ancient philosophy, that the religious spirit was more or less incorporated with it; that man was considered as of a heavenly origin, and as possessing a more refined and elevated nature than the mere animals around him. It was also clearly taught, from the same authority, that all investigations into the structure of his intellect, could only be successfully prosecuted by constantly keeping in view this double relationship or dependence. Whenever, therefore, we set out in our philosophical inquiries into the

nature of mental phenomena upon an opposite tack, and contemplate man with the sole view of referring them to the same laws, and subjecting them to the same logical ordeal, which govern and influence other creatures around us, we do, in fact, not only run counter to the universal experience and testimony of mankind, most indisputably and unequivocally expressed ; but we also find that all doctrines, founded on such a mode of investigation, are not only lamentably defective in point of logical merit, but, when reduced to practice, bear fruits inimical to the moral and intellectual improvement and well-being of man.

And do we not witness the verification of this truth in every stage of the history of speculative principles ? The whole course of human progress, since the first dawn of letters, bears testimony to the fact, that mankind have received incalculable benefits from the belief in the existence of the theological principle. Man is thus viewed as fitted for a higher destiny than other terrestrial and animated beings ; and we feel assured also, that in proportion as he keeps this opinion steadily before him in all his philosophical researches, the universe around him and the general course of events inspire him with a firm persuasion that he is endowed with faculties and powers expressly fitted for exercise, and to be eminently productive of benefit to mankind, and glory to the Creator of his existence. This conclusion does not rest upon a mere theoretical conjecture ; it is susceptible of incontrovertible demonstration, from the records of history, as well as

from the overpowering feelings and convictions of the human heart.

Every form which the great theological principle assumes in the history of philosophy, rests upon the position of *mind*, connected with a *creative and governing power*. The notions of mental operations, and those of a Deity, are purely elemental, and seem to be co-existent in the inward consciousness of man. Whether this primary truth can be fully demonstrated, either psychologically or ontologically, we need not stop here to determine; but certain it is, that the history of men's opinions strikingly proves that it lies at the root of every form of speculation, and seems to be one of those necessary and fundamental axioms, without which all reasoning is nugatory, all mental conviction impossible, and human life a dream.

And we further feel confident, that a candid and accurate consideration of theories of philosophy will lead the mind to perceive, that there is nothing in the general constitution of them hostile to the leading features and doctrines of the Christian system. In fact, there exists a surprising harmony between all speculative theories which have any degree of truth or solidity in them, and the elementary principles of revealed theology; and philosophic truth and theological truth will be found, in almost all cases, to act and re-act on each other, to the mutual elucidation and advantage of both. What may be termed the metaphysics of the Bible, if such an expression may be allowed, are in strict keeping with every thing which has been ob-

served and recorded, by the universal assent of mankind, relative to intellectual phenomena. There is no radical or constitutional discrepancy between them. The authoritative declarations of Scripture are intelligible only because they rest on the general perceptions and judgments of men; and the high purposes and hopes with which Revelation is conversant, are, in every case, powerfully and universally responded to by the most characteristic feelings and impulses of human nature.

The religious principle is, therefore, a necessary and wholesome ingredient in every system of speculative thought or inquiry. Nothing is intelligible without it. It speaks with a thousand tongues; and like the universal ether, to which it has often been made to claim affinity, pervades all nature, and is ever present to the mind of man. Its manifestations are sometimes faintly traceable in his mental physiology, and even oftentimes they become the sport of the wildest vagaries and most fantastical caprice; but we think not, we act not, without their co-operation, or beyond the pale of their influence.

In the third place, the existence and certainty of a number of *à priori* mental principles or conceptions, are decidedly recognised in every system of philosophy of which there are any full or regularly classified details. These original ideas become the life-spring of thought, and the steady guides of the understanding. They depend upon nothing capricious, variable, evanescent, or transitory; they form the primitive foundations of all human observation,

experience, and reasoning. From whence they are derived, and how regulated and guided, it is not our province here to inquire; it is sufficient to state that there will not be found, in all the historical sketches of systems of which we have any account, a single instance where their existence is not tacitly or expressly acknowledged.

In the fourth place, we shall find, from an accurate study of history, that philosophy is of a progressive character. Though its principles are abstract, and of an *à priori* description, yet their full and complete development rests with time. We find this depicted on the lineaments of philosophical speculation, from the remotest ages to the present hour. Unquestionably there have been very great vicissitudes in the progress of mental knowledge. Sometimes it would seem to have been almost stationary; then to have made a sudden bound in a forward direction; and again to have relapsed into a state of quietude and apathy. But still, on the whole, a decided and permanent progress was invariably secured. This onward course was not, however, characterised by the discovery and development of *new* truths or principles of human nature, but in illustrating the individual operations of those already known, and in more accurately tracing out their respective bearings on other important and collateral branches of human investigation. There is not, in fact, a principle of the human mind in our most approved modern treatises on its nature and faculties, which may not be found among the speculations of the Grecian philosophers: but still we have greatly the ad-

vantage over the ancients, in the copiousness of illustrations; the nicer processes of analytical and deductive reasoning; in displaying the power and influence of mental science over other subjects; and, above all, in those refined yet solid distinctions, which we can now make on almost every topic connected with man, as a thinking, moral, religious, and social being. It is this expansiveness or amplification of the primary elements of mind, which constitute the progressive character of philosophical speculations on its powers or faculties; inasmuch as it more completely opens out to our view the whole arcana of thought, in many of those sudden and rapid operations which were inadequately comprehended by antiquity, and appeared in the eyes of some of the ancient sages as partaking of the character of individual and instinctive impulses.

Besides this, there is a progressive character stamped upon every thing we behold. The whole economy of human nature proclaims it. We instinctively follow it from the cradle to the grave. There is no human being without a regularly formed system of speculative or theoretical knowledge, relative to his own nature and to that of the beings around him, however crude or limited it may be; and when we come to analyse this theory, we find it made up of varied materials, some illustrative of this principle, and some of that. Order, method, selection, revisal, are conspicuous everywhere; and the sum total of an ordinary man's views of himself, and of human life generally, is a perfect epitome of the more elaborate and sys-

tematic treatises of the philosopher. We recognise in both the progressive character of the mind; one truth is made predominant here, and another there; one subject is considered in this light, and another in that; weeding out the errors of yesterday by the fuller experience of to-day; and, in fact, invariably labouring towards a state of ideal harmony and perfection, and always making a decided step towards its attainment. This is the condition of humanity, and the whole body of human knowledge, and particularly mental philosophy, is marvellously confirmatory of the fact.

Indeed, to plead for the eclectic, or progressive, philosophy, is but a very trite and common-place affair; since it is nothing more nor less than to argue for that wholesome equilibrium among the leading branches of man's knowledge and springs of action, which all ages of the world, and all sects of philosophers, have more or less recognised as one of the indispensable conditions of human thought, power, and happiness. To be convinced of the utility of this, we have only to conceive for a moment, man, as now constituted, under the exclusive control of any one of the three grand divisions of human investigation, nature, mind, and God. Were he merely incessantly looking at the material changes and operations of things around him, he would be nothing more than a mere statue or vegetable excrescence; he might be said to exist, but not to live. Again, were men entirely engrossed by the feelings and movements of their minds, and to take no heed of external things,

they could not exist a single day. And, finally, were we continually making the nature, attributes, and mode of government of the Deity, exclusive objects of our perpetual contemplation, we should only be attempting to do what is impossible. So that every thing depends upon a due and proportional subordination of one thing to another; and this is the reason why the progressive character is imposed upon human knowledge, in order that it might be reared up into an immense and splendid temple, by the aggregate and universal thought of mankind.

Let us just cast a glance over the speculative opinions of mankind, and we shall instantly perceive the progressive character of mental philosophy. In Greece there was a system of great intellectual excellence, embracing within its range nearly all the primary principles of a comprehensive and matured body of thought. These were discussed by the Greeks in a manner and with a tact peculiarly their own; but towards the latter years of their political glory and independence, their speculations seemed to have been nearly worn out, and to have become decidedly tame and insipid. The Christian dispensation gave new life to human speculation. The Greek philosophy became amalgamated with it; and novel and highly interesting philosophical combinations were the result. New light was thrown on a thousand important questions connected with the nature of man, with which the Greek mind was unable to grapple alone. The philosophy of the Chris-

tian Fathers was followed by that of the Schoolmen; and, as far as the science of human nature was concerned, there was another step gained in a forward direction. For though we are apt to talk glibly, and with no small degree of self-complacency, of the *dark ages*; yet no one who is even tolerably acquainted with the nature and history of the philosophy of this period, can be ignorant that, independently of mere abstract investigations on mind, and of the principles of doctrinal theology, all the most important laws and institutions of European society were dug out of the mines of this ponderous and inexhaustible mass of human speculation. And we need scarcely add, that since the days of the Scholastic inquiries, we have made considerable progress, particularly in all our philosophical methods of investigation and reasoning, in shewing the mental dependencies, bearings, and relationships which subsist among all branches of knowledge; and in what way, and to what degree, they can be advantageously cultivated and applied.

It must be interesting to all cultivators of the science of intellect to have some general idea of the present state of speculation, both at home and abroad; and to observe those philosophical tendencies which the mental investigations of particular countries decidedly manifest. There never was, however, a period in the history of mankind, when it was more difficult to predict, with any thing approaching to certainty or probability, the turn which the speculative ideas of nations may

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take, than at the present moment.* We see men's minds in every direction moved and agitated in a remarkable manner. The first principles of all human knowledge are called in question, and subjected to the most rigid logical ordeal. What was mere theory, thrown with off-hand indifference upon the surface of intellectual society but a few years ago, is now brought upon the arena of practical life, and is attempted to be made the groundwork of sweeping legislative enactments and social innovations. The horizon of thought seems dark, overcharged, and threatening; and the prophetic power of the most comprehensive and penetrating sagacity is almost entirely paralyzed. At such a moment we instinctively fall back upon the eternal law of progressive improvement, and dwell upon the anticipations derived from a species of optimism, more or less vigorous in every human breast, that "all things are for the best." Hopeless despair is never a justifiable sentiment either in nations or individuals. On the contrary, we are called upon to look at the cheering side of things, from many weighty considerations. We therefore place unlimited confidence in the imperishable nature of mind. All its movements have for their grand aim, the ultimate increase of man's real knowledge, and the promotion of his happiness. There may be seasons of mental aberration; of reckless and discontented movements of the inner man; but these are but transitory, and last only for

* September, 1848.

a season. The intellectual apparatus of a nation soon rights itself. The influence of error is commonly prompt in its manifestations, and the progress of truth slow. Fifty or a hundred years are but as a hand's-breadth in the life of a whole people; and on this account we are called upon to check impatience and cherish hope. In the mental commotion of kingdoms, "the darkest hour is nearest to the dawn;" and after a few convulsive throes and struggles, a brighter era arises; and more refined, spiritual, and rational views occupy the mind of the nation.

As we have already noticed, the philosophy of mind has been assiduously cultivated in many continental countries, within the last century. In Germany this has been particularly the case. But Germany is just one of those places where it is extremely difficult to draw general conclusions from the intellectual movements of its philosophers. Though speculation has there a decidedly national character, yet its details are so multifarious and incongruous, that anything like accurate generalization becomes almost impossible; and anticipations of its future progress and prospects are difficult to realize. Philosophical inquirers have there taken unusual directions; have penetrated into every arcanum of the material and spiritual world; have by turns doubted all things and defended all things; have moulded and theorised every aspect or phase of human thought and life into a thousand forms; so that we have but a very feeble guarantee indeed for the fulfilment of any

prediction which may be hazarded on the movements of spirits so bold, ambitious, and versatile.

Looking, however, at the general features of German speculation within the last thirty years, we perceive a manifest change for the better. We see common sense and reason more generally recognised; and a growing desire among all the leading minds of the country to weed out of the national philosophy whatever is wild, incomprehensible, unsound, and irrational. The nation has become sick of speculation for the mere sake of speculating, and of doubt for the mere sake of doubting. Sober and thinking men sigh for something solid and satisfying; something more valuable than the fantastical absurdities of by-gone times. Every year we witness a decided movement towards a healthier state of things. The waters are subsiding to their natural level, leaving in every direction large portions of speculative *débris* behind them. Spiritualism is gradually becoming more material, and materialism more spiritual; so that the absurdities from the extremes of both sources of inquiry will soon be obliterated by doctrines of a more intermediate and reconcilable complexion. Idealism will be made subservient to lofty and interesting purposes, and will ultimately coerce empirical facts and principles into wholesome and fruitful channels of thought and action. On the other hand, the natural tendency of pure spiritualism to degenerate into rhapsodical and incomprehensible vagaries, will receive a wholesome check by the power of deduc-

tive reasoning and accurate observation. And thus do we hope, that ere many years pass away, sound and enlightened systems of mental philosophy will be everywhere prevalent in the high seats of intelligence throughout the whole of the Germanic empire.

Perhaps we may take upon us to add, before closing our observations on Germany, that the conflict in this country, at the present moment, lies between a rational spiritualism and an absolute and uncompromising materialism. The latter is the last enemy which the spirit of reform has to vanquish. The venerable and learned Baron Humboldt leads the way in the empirical philosophy of his country; and we cannot but feel deep regret in witnessing a long and arduous life spent in the promotion of physical science, having nothing better to cheer it, or to leave as a legacy to mankind, even at the grave's mouth, than a *material and primordial necessity*, and a deep "sense of insecurity" in every philosophical system which professes to maintain that there is any thing in the universe save mere objective existences.* Splendid and influential, however, as the Baron's acquirements and reputation unquestionably are, we have no apprehension of anything like a general adoption of his opinions. They may captivate or dazzle the unreflecting and superficial for a season, but they carry within themselves the seeds of a mortal dissolution. No man, be his spirit ever so "deeply mersed in matter," can

* See Humboldt's *Cosmos*, London, 1845.

impress upon the minds of men, for any length of time, the idea that the universe is a Godless universe. The bare attempt is a violent outrage on one of the most powerful and overwhelming convictions of the human soul.

Looking now at France, we clearly perceive that since the commencement of the present century, a great change for the better has been effected in the speculative philosophy of the country. For some years in the latter part of the last, and the beginning of the present century, we find ultra-materialism everywhere prevalent, and the philosophical intellect of the nation sunk to a low ebb. But in due course of time, the principles and spirit of the Scotch philosophy began to gain ground, and to shake and supplant the low and grovelling views of the mechanical philosophers. This was one important step gained in a right direction. By slow degrees the idealism of Germany came to the rescue, and greatly aided, under the peculiar circumstances in which France was placed, the good work of mental spirituality and regeneration. Nor ought we to pass over, without special notice, the great benefits derived from the Paris translations of the Greek metaphysicians, which have had a direct and powerful tendency to induce the young and rising thinkers of France to consult authorities on matters of abstract speculation admirably calculated to elevate and improve the general tone of academical studies, and guide them into more refined, rational, and wholesome channels.

In casting a retrospective eye on France for the last forty years, to the time when the speculations of Destutt-Tracy, Cabanis, and Volney constituted the staple elements of the national thought, what surprising strides she has made in mental inquiries. How varied and discursive, intelligent and able, have been the numerous publications which have issued from her press. The philosophical disquisitions of her able thinkers undoubtedly possess, like those of Germany, a distinctive and national character, and have frequently been directed into questionable channels; yet the Frenchman has never wandered so far from real life, nor thrown around his lucubrations such a halo of mysticism, as his German brethren. The Gaulic philosopher has always been the more rational and unpretending of the two. And there is scarcely a modern French publication, of any note whatever, on the human mind, and on its various faculties and powers, which does not display great ability, and a sincere and anxious desire to arrive at truth. The whole tenor of philosophical investigation and criticism has been changed for the better within these few years. Great truths on religion, morals, mind, politics, and human knowledge generally, have been discussed in a truly enlightened spirit; and many valuable additions made to the common stock of sober and rational discussion. Numerous verifications of this truth might be adduced from her literature, and from her social and religious institutions. And though she be now under a cloud, there is no ground for dejection or despair as to the future advancement of the nation in mental philosophy, or the

soundness of many of its leading principles. Every thing betokens that she will steadily and firmly retain the great truths she has so ably and enthusiastically laboured to illustrate and promulgate; and gradually leave behind that old leaven of materialism and folly, which the last century bequeathed, and which has been prolific of so many evils, both speculative and practical, to her character and institutions as a great nation.

In Italy there is a bright and cheering prospect that this first regenerator of speculative philosophy in Europe will speedily occupy a conspicuous and honorable position in mental science among other continental countries. Within the last quarter of a century the numerous publications which have appeared in different states of the kingdom, are characterised by an enlightened spirit, and by great good sense and philosophical acumen. The predominance of a state and influential theology has, doubtless, given a formal and limited range to her philosophy; but still there is so much real heart and pith in it, that it would betray a narrow spirit indeed to refuse our hearty commendations of its general merits. Speaking with some reservations, the ordinary bent of Italian metaphysics at the present moment is decidedly of an analytic and common-sense complexion. Of France psychology go hand in hand; and the abstract speculative truths of the mind are highly valued and universally recognised as necessary and important elements of all reasoning, yet they are not placed in opposition, to the actual exclusion of external and sensational sources of knowledge. The leading

Italian philosophers of the present day, among whom we place Gioberti, Mamiani, and Tomaseo, —now severally and actively engaged in achieving the social reformation and political independence of their country—are all influenced by lofty views of the nature of philosophic truth, and deeply convinced of its immense importance in regenerating the institutions and improving the intellectual faculties of a nation, and in preserving it from error and mischievous delusions. In no part of the European continent do we find mental speculations impressed with a more subdued, sober, candid, and discriminating tone, and more in accordance with the highest purposes and best interests of man, than in the writings of the modern cultivators of philosophy in this interesting and intelligent country.

The progress of mental philosophy in Belgium and Holland is at the present moment highly satisfactory and encouraging. The deep thinkers of these countries, especially the Belgian writers, have more or less looked up to France as a monitor and guide, without, however, making the least compromise of their own intellectual independence. There has always been less philosophy of a materialistic tendency in the Netherlands than in France; and the present treatises on the human mind are seldom tinged, in any deep degree, with unsound or irreligious opinions in this part of the continent. Although great liberty of discussion is allowed and enjoyed, yet everything from the philosophic press of the two kingdoms is characterised by a sober and rational spirit, becoming

reflective and intelligent communities. At no former period in the history of these European states, was mental philosophy more assiduously and profoundly cultivated than it is at the present time; and by philosophers too, such as Van Meenen, Van Heusde, Van De Weyer, Gruyer, Ubaghs, Reiffenberg, Tiberghien, Quetelet, and others, of vast literary attainments, and possessing a most accurate and comprehensive acquaintance with the whole speculative thinking of Europe. Everything from their pens bespeaks the innate power to grapple with questions of the greatest magnitude and complexity; and they have all besides manifested a strong desire to support and defend the cause of truth generally, by a course of discussion at once candid, enlightened, and forbearing.

In other northern nations, and in some of the southern, with whose respective literature we are in Great Britain but partially and imperfectly acquainted, we see much to encourage hope as to the future progress of the philosophy of mind. Every year affords some additional proof of its more general improvement and diffusion. In Sweden and Denmark, works are regularly issuing from the press which display an intimate knowledge of speculative systems, and great powers of abstract reasoning on topics connected with human nature. Even Russia is gradually extending encouragement and protection to subjects of speculation, which a very few years since were not admitted within the pale of her Universities. And the same may be remarked of Spain and Portugal;

in both of which we perceive one bulwark after another against enlightened philosophical discussion slowly giving way, and the avenues to scientific and reflective investigations becoming daily less obstructed by narrow prejudices, intolerance, and bigotry.

In the Western hemisphere, we find the active spirits of the United States cultivating a knowledge of mental science in every direction. Their continent has become a vast emporium for the speculations of all the European kingdoms; and there is scarcely a work of any note published in the Old World, on the science of human nature, which does not speedily find its way here, and which does not go through a regular critical ordeal in the chief periodicals of the country. Where there is such a regular influx of novel opinions, it becomes hazardous to venture on general conclusions as to the preponderance of particular metaphysical views and systems; but we may affirm, without speaking dogmatically on the subject, that within the last twenty years, there has been more or less a visible increase in the spiritual notions of mind throughout all the more enlightened and intellectual portions of the States. In the Reviews and Magazines of the country we see this change daily verified; and still more striking manifestations of it may be found in the general tone of the lectures delivered on mental studies, in the several chief places of academical instruction throughout the whole Union. The theological spirit of the nation is actively roused to a deep sense of the utility and importance of metaphysical studies;

and seems resolutely bent on clearing them from all the dross and mischievous elements which may be more or less incorporated with them when newly imported from every quarter of the world.

It has become almost a common remark, that in Great Britain mental philosophy has been entirely stationary for nearly the last half century. There is unquestionably much truth in this; but there have been latent signs of life in the study, of late years, which promise better things at no very distant day. Several publications have made their appearance which bespeak great ability and knowledge; and though they do not treat us with elaborated systems, yet their general tendency is on the side of improvement; and in many instances they are calculated to throw new and interesting light on several individual sections of the science of universal mind. The recent movements in theological literature and speculation have had no small degree of influence in imparting more spiritual views to some English treatises on metaphysical subjects.

It is therefore cheering to those who feel a lively interest in such studies, and are deeply impressed with their absolute utility and importance, to witness so many indications of their progress and extension, in every direction to which we can direct the intellectual eye. We know that great ideas are never lost; and we consequently feel an inward and firm conviction, that the advances which we are, in this age, effecting in the first of all branches of human knowledge, will never be effaced by any future retrograde movements what-

ever, in the minds of individuals or of nations. The whole progress of human society speaks loudly against any such catastrophe.

But whatever the unreflecting and superficial may think of mental philosophy, or of its future destination, we are firmly impressed with the belief that to those who are acquainted with its principles, and imbued with its spirit, it cannot fail to recommend itself, from the comprehensiveness of its range, the lofty aim of its disquisitions, and the firm and decided tone which it imparts to the intellect. It greatly quickens the reflective powers of man, and enables him to wield them with ease and energy. It gives an ever-living freshness to old truths, and reduces, by subtile and mysterious agencies, the most discordant thoughts and materials into a state of logical harmony, beauty, and order. It has the universe for its object—all matter and all mind; and its spirit is a universal presence. It is as sublime, boundless, and inexhaustible as the ocean. We can traverse by its means the whole region of human knowledge; and no soil and no age is exempt from its penetrating glance. The science of mind is, from its very nature and essence, universal and diffusive. Its ramifications and connections are infinite; and these reveal to us the hidden and interesting analogies subsisting among all topics of investigation, and shed a lustre over our path as we travel from one great truth of human nature to another. It exacts an intellectual tribute from every province of inquiry; and expends its treasures in

rearing a splendid temple, more colossal and durable than the material universe itself.

The philosophy of man is the sublimest of studies, and its spirit is the most elevating and transcendental of all the gifts of God. The overwhelming grandeur of its themes—themes which have “thoughts that wander through eternity” for their object—fills the mind with holy and improving contemplations, and removes it from all that is tame, earthly, formal, and material. Its speculations are the sacred vehicles of the most important and vital truths; and its reasonings relate to “things which speak not of earth.” It deals with mighty passions, affections, and thoughts which stretch into futurity; which have all mind and creative energy for their object; and which give expression and thrilling interest to those lofty and refined aspirations which seek after something more pure and consoling than the ordinary movements and concerns of life afford. These aspirations are the germs of the inward man, which are bound up in the soul just as the living and fructifying principle is incrustated in the seed. They constitute the vivifying energy which makes all things new; which moulds the combinations of matter and mind into an endless variety of forms; and develops them, by virtue of new affinities and the immutable laws of intellect, into those splendid and beautiful creations of philosophical thought, which the mere matter-of-fact man can neither grasp nor comprehend, and without which the universe itself would be a chaos, and human life an incomprehensible enigma.

FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD OF
MENTAL SPECULATION
TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

11

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

ETC. ETC.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

It is not intended to give in this chapter any thing like a lengthened account of the numerous Histories of Philosophy, but only to bring before the reader's attention a few of the principal of them, with a view of fixing in his mind some of the leading periods of history when certain works were published. It must also be premised, that what is generally meant by *Histories of Philosophy*, is not limited to histories of mental philosophy alone, but embraces morals, politics, religion, and even physical science. Metaphysics are, in all histories of philosophy which have yet appeared, mixed up and blended with other subjects. On this account, if a person wishes to trace out for himself the history of opinions relative to the human mind, he will have to select them from amongst a vast variety of other topics, with which they are historically classed.

Three of the most distinguished ancient historians of philosophy are Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Though not professed chroniclers of previous opinions, yet their treasures are uncommonly valuable, as frequent allusion is made, in unfolding their individual opinions, to the views and systems of other speculative men who had preceded them, but of whose labours we have little or no account direct from themselves. Plato, in his dialogues, brings contemporary writers on the stage, and paints their characters and systems in his own way. Aristotle, again, in laying down his own systems, furnishes us with the individual systems of other metaphysicians and philosophers. And Cicero, in his speculative traditions, has handed down many opinions exceedingly interesting to all speculative minds.*

Hippocrates was an eminent Greek physician. He alludes to the great advantage of an accurate knowledge of the human faculties, relative to the history of opinions. Xenophon is well known as a valuable historian of philosophic opinions; and Lucretius gives us an account of the metaphysical ideas of Democritus and Epicurus. We have the system of the Stoics expounded by Seneca, and the Sceptical Philosophy by Sextus Empiricus. If Plutarch be the author of the book entitled *De Placitis Philosophorum*, he has added to the useful documents of ancient philosophy; and to the book of Galen, *The Philosophical History*, we are equally indebted.

* Gedike has collected together all the passages of Cicero relative to Philosophy. Berlin, 1782.

Diogenes Laertius is an historian of great merit. In his work, "Lives of the Philosophers," we have many valuable extracts from the writings of the ancients, and many interesting facts respecting their lives and opinions. We find in several of the early Fathers of the Church, some valuable sketches of philosophical opinions and systems, particularly in Eusebius, St. Clement of Alexandria, and Epiphanius.

In the fourth century, we have the "Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists," by Eunapius, a general writer and a physician. He is zealously attached to the Eclectic philosophy, and displays great virulence against the Christians of his day. A little after him we find John Stobæus, who made large extracts from the philosophy of the ancients. Both these works are of great value to the historian.*

In the middle of the sixth century, Hesychius, a grammarian of Alexandria, composed an "*Abridgment of the Lives of Philosophers*," arranged in alphabetical order.† The work is chiefly taken from Diogenes Laertius. A long intellectual night, of several centuries' duration, here intervenes, in which nothing was accomplished in philosophical history worthy of any especial notice.

An Englishman, of the name of Burley, in the fifteenth century, published "*Lives of the Philosophers*," and the book is amongst the early specimens of printing in this country. In Italy, Ficinus, under the patronage of Cosmo de Medicis, and

* See an edition of Stobæus, by Heeren. Gottingen, 1792.

† Hesych. Milct. interprete Hadriano Juno. Anvers, 1672. 8vo.

Pomponius, otherwise styled Peter Calabria, revived a knowledge of the works of Plato and Aristotle with great éclat. After the partial revival of learning in Europe, we have John Louis Vives, a Spaniard by birth, but educated at Paris and Louvain, who wrote a work "*On the Origin of Sects, and the Merits of Philosophers.*" Daniel Chytrius published his treatise, "*A List of Philosophers, and their principal Sects, from Thales to Cicero:*" nearly at the same time we have William Morel's "*Table of the order of Succession, Doctrines, and date of the Ancient Philosophers;*" and also, the "*Chronological Library of Classical Philosophers,*" by J. J. Fries.

It would prove tedious, as well as unprofitable, to give an individual and detailed account, from this period, of all the writings which contain an account of philosophical opinions, down to our own day. It will sufficiently answer all the ends we have in view to furnish the reader with a bare enumeration of works, of such a character and extent, as will prove amply useful for all ordinary purposes of reference or consultation, both as to the history of philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular. This we shall do in a note at the end of this volume.*

* See Note A. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER II.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE IONIC SCHOOL.

THE philosophy of Greece is full of interest to every inquiring mind. It has peculiar claims upon our attention; for it exhibits the innate power of the mind of man to grapple with those interesting and abstruse questions which spring out of his existence, and which force themselves upon his notice by the powerful and irresistible law of his nature. Among the Grecian sages we perceive what has been accomplished by the speculative faculties, unaided and undirected by the genius of revelation; and how far, and in what degree, the errors and shortcomings of these philosophers may be profitable to our instruction in more intelligent and enlightened times. Mutilated and circumscribed as the Grecian philosophy has come down to us, still we perceive that, take it as a whole, it is a noble monument of thought; and that its powerful influence has been felt and acknowledged in every stage of literature and civilization. Amidst a vast deal that is crude and

fantastical, we can still recognise truths of great moment, and universal application; and the manner in which they are often developed and illustrated, affords the most indisputable evidence of the superior powers of the Grecian understanding.

Many speculations might be hazarded on what some modern writers have considered the origin of the Greek philosophic spirit. But these would inevitably lead us into too wide a field of discussion and controversy for our present purpose. Suffice it to remark, that there seem to have been three leading influences operating on the general mass of their speculative notions of mind, and which communicated to them that peculiar feature by which they are distinguished; namely, a religious feeling or sentiment, a love of poetry, and those habits and customs which arose out of their popular civil and political institutions.

The religious feeling or sentiment has an inseparable affinity to the true philosophic spirit. Whatever attempts are made to form conceptions of creative power, wisdom, and intelligence, directly lead to the formation and exercise of all those habits of mental culture and accurate analysis, on which true philosophy rests. In every department of Grecian speculation we find that mental inquiries were viewed through the medium of theological principles; and we also find that, in proportion as rational notions of natural religion were recognised, a corresponding degree of clearness and rationality pervaded the popular stream of philosophical discussion. This fact is illustrated in every

age of Grecian literature. Whenever low and grovelling ideas prevailed on the nature of deity and a presiding mind over the affairs of the world, in an exact proportion do we find the system of mental speculation, fantastical, irrational, and untenable. And this arises from the established laws of human thought. It is impossible to conceive an opposite state of things. The same powers which enable us to investigate the laws of human intelligence, and develop their mutual relations and dependencies, are precisely those which, when judiciously used, direct to all those primary truths on which the religious feelings and sentiments of mankind rest.

The same thing may be remarked of the imaginative or poetic feeling. This is closely allied to religion. There can be no true or sublime poetry apart from theological sentiment, though that sentiment may, occasionally, be grossly perverted. Poetry has also the human mind for its domain and object. It treats of the ideal; it lives in the realms of thought. Whatever, therefore, is favourable to its successful cultivation, must necessarily prove conducive to the exercise of all those refined powers of analysis and inward reflection, which have the mind for their common centre of operation. The creative energies of the poet directly lead to those abstract and sublime topics, which belong exclusively to the province of the metaphysician.

Social and political institutions have human nature for their basis, and they likewise greatly

influence mental disquisitions. Where freedom is the ground-work of a commonwealth, and the people have elevated conceptions of their rights and duties, a sound mental philosophy will invariably be found to flourish. The whole history of Greece is a striking confirmation of this position.

THALES. 640 B. C.

Thales was one of the most early sages of Greece who turned their attention to mental pursuits. None of his discourses or writings have been transmitted directly from himself, but only through the medium of Aristotle, Plutarch, and Strabo. Thales, even in his early day, soon seized upon a mental proposition which has subsequently, in divers shapes and forms, filled the world of philosophy with discussion; namely, the *spontaneity* of the mind of man. Aristotle tells us that Thales maintained that "the essence of the soul, or thinking principle of man, was motion; a spontaneous motion, a self-moving power." Plutarch says that Thales' definition of mind was "that it was a thing possessing self-contained or perpetual motion." Strabo mentions the same thing; "that mind, according to Thales, was that which contained self-will or motion."*

This early fragment of metaphysical philosophy is extremely valuable, inasmuch as it indicates, that this distinguished man had deeply studied the

* Arist. De Anima. l. Plut. De Pl. Ph. 4. 2.

nature of his own mind; and that the same difficulties presented themselves to him which have in all subsequent ages been so perplexing to speculators on the abstract nature of mind, and of its various powers and faculties.

Thales is considered one of what are called the *Seven Sages* of Greece; philosophers who wandered about from place to place, promulgating their doctrines and opinions. All accounts of him agree that he was passionately fond of speculating into the origin of all things, and that he founded the theory, that *water* was the primary principle of the world. Plutarch states the philosopher's reasons for this belief. First, because natural seed, the principle of all living things, is humid; whence it is highly probable that humidity or moisture is also the principle of all other things. Secondly, because all kinds of plants are nourished by moisture, without which they wither and decay. And, thirdly, because fire, even the sun itself and the stars, are nourished and supported by vapours proceeding from water, and consequently the whole world consists of the same.*

There has been considerable dispute among the learned, whether this principle of water was a purely *passive* principle or agent, or an *active* and creative one. It must ever be a doubtful point to determine what Thales' real opinion was; but it does seem probable that the philosopher only considered his machinery of watery vapours to be the

* Arist. Met. i. 1. Diog. Laert. i. 1. Plut. Pl. Ph. i. 1. c. 7.

instruments in the hand of a living and active power. From his definition of what he considers the nature or essence of the mind of man, already stated, this probability is considerably strengthened. The same reasons, and the same trains of thought, which brought him to the general conclusion, that mind, and creative or active power, were identical, would naturally force the conclusion on his understanding that the world and every thing he beheld in it were the result of an active and efficient agent. This process of reasoning seems natural and consistent.

ANAXIMANDER. 610 B. C.

This philosopher was a disciple and friend of Thales, and embraced and extended the general principles of his system. Anaximander cultivated physical inquiries to a considerable extent, as well as topics connected with human nature. It is said, that he was the first philosopher of antiquity who announced the famous axiom that "Out of nothing, nothing can be made." It is impossible, however, to ascertain in what sense he understood this general proposition; whether as a simple physical fact, or as a principle on which a comprehensive theory of philosophical speculation could be established. There can be no doubt but such an acute reasoner as Anaximander would readily perceive that this famous axiom of his cut, like a two-edged sword, both ways; that it had necessarily two distinct meanings attached to it; and that it might serve

both for rational and irrational speculations on the nature and constitution of all mental and physical phenomena.

Anaximander considered the *infinite* as the first principle of things. All things are produced by, and immerge into it. Of course there have been many different notions of what is here meant by infinite. Aristotle and Plutarch materialize the term, and make it stand for *matter* in general; and the learned Cudworth coincides with this interpretation. Others again think it highly probable that a guiding and intelligent principle was still recognised by Anaximander, and that by infinite was merely meant that seemingly endless and concatenated series of phenomena, which a contemplation of the world every way naturally suggests to most inquiring minds.*

The historian Ritter observes, that Anaximander "is represented as arguing, that the primary substance must have been infinite to be all-sufficient for the limitless variety of produced things with which we are encompassed. Now, although Aristotle expressly characterises this infinite as a mixture, we must not think of it as a mere multiplicity of primary material elements; for to the mind of Anaximander it was Unity immortal and imperishable; an ever-producing energy. This production of individual things he derived from an eternal *motion of the infinite*."†

* Plut. 1. 1. Arist. Phys 1 1. Cudworth, c. 3.

† Ritter, Hist. Phil. Oxford, 1839.

This interpretation is very fanciful, but it is natural in Ritter. Such a term as *infinite*, is too good a thing for a German to let pass, without attempting to make something grand and mysterious out of it. The word enables him to revel in luxurious profundity.*

ANAXIMENES. 556 B.C.

ANAXIMENES was a companion and disciple of Anaximander, and a promulgator of his system of philosophy. The former indulged in speculations as to the origin of the world, and maintained the doctrine, that *air* is the vivifying principle of the universe, of which all things are engendered, and into which all things are resolved. Our soul or spirit is air; for spirit and air are two names signifying the same thing.

Air he considers as the living Deity, because it is ever in motion. Some authors consider that *air* should not be taken in its common signification, but as a subtile ether, penetrating all material bodies, and communicating to them that motion and life necessary for their production and reproduction.†

HERMOTIMUS, OF CLAZOMENE. 520 B.C.

HERMOTIMUS of Clazomene was a distinguished early metaphysician. He entered deeply into all

* See Note B. at the end of this Volume.

† Simplicius ad Phy. lib. 1. Lactantius, lib. 1.

the mental speculations known in his day. He displayed great original powers of thinking; and if we are to believe Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Apollonius, and several others, he was the original propounder of the system of Anaxagoras. Hermotimus clearly perceived the important distinction between mental subjects and physical inquiries; and he seems to have kept this essential distinction perpetually before his eyes, in all his abstract speculations.

Pliny, in his Natural History, mentions, that Hermotimus entertained the idea that the soul often quits the body, and wanders to a great distance from it, in order to obtain that knowledge which is denied to it whilst residing in its earthly tenement. It was from this singular notion that his enemies assassinated him, that his own soul might wing its way to that situation destined for its reception in a future state of existence.

DIOGENES, OF APOLLONIA. 500 B.C.

DIOGENES was a follower and disciple of Anaximenes; but gave a more spiritual interpretation to his master's doctrines on the origin of the universe. The subtle ether which Anaximenes employed to create and sustain the world, became, in the hands of his pupil, endowed with a species of wisdom and intelligence. It was not blindness and fatality; it operated by a settled plan or method. The wisdom and order displayed in every part of nature, seem to have made a deep impression upon the

mind of Diogenes; for he affirms they give evident testimonies for the existence of a ruling principle of REASON.

ANAXAGORAS. 500 B. C.

ANAXAGORAS was one of the most renowned philosophers of his day, and succeeded in unfolding more just and comprehensive principles of theism, and of the general government of the world, than any preceding speculator. His opinions on mental subjects are but few, and limited in their range, and are handed down to us by Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus. Anaxagoras clearly pointed out how the judgment may occasionally be led astray from the truth, by the delusive appearances furnished by the external senses. The judgment, or reasoning power, is the governing principle in man, and is intended to correct the errors which first impressions may create in his mind. In pointing out the imperfections of our sensations as infallible guides to truth, he has been accused by some ancient philosophers with manifesting a decided leaning to scepticism; but this accusation is without any solid foundation. What he says may be conceded by every right-thinking man. He only shows that, on many occasions, such sensations or notions as relate to colours, the appearances of objects seen through various media by the eye, may undergo a multitude of changes; and yet the mind may deduce the truth respecting them from a variety of different considerations submitted to the reasoning

faculty. On this principle there cannot be two opinions.

Anaxagoras, like his predecessors, had his theory as to the origin of the world. He held that *the material principle of all things is one and many, of infinite parts, similar and contrary, continuous to the touch, sustaining themselves, not contained by any other*. Every individual thing in nature is constituted of particles peculiar to itself; and it is just this atomic construction which makes it what it really is. Bone, for example, is made from a certain specific form of its particles; gold and silver, and, in fact, everything else, from the same principle of individual adaptation. Lucretius describes this process in the following lines :

“ With Anaxagoras, great Nature’s law
Is similarity; and every compound form
Consists of parts minute, each like a whole;
And bone is made of bone, and flesh of flesh;
And blood, and fire, and earth, and massy gold,
Are, in their smallest portions, still the same.”*

Anaxagoras is more decidedly theistical than any of his predecessors. His distinction between mind and matter, between the Creator and the thing created, is clearly annunciated. Plato affirms that he taught the existence of a regulating mind over all things; and Aristotle declares that *mind* is the supreme and ruling element, and possesses within itself all creative power and thought. Plutarch gives his testimony to the same effect. He says,

* Plut. Pl. Ph. 1. Arist. Phys. 3, 4.

"the Ionic philosophers who flourished before the days of Anaxagoras, made a blind fatality or destiny the first elemental principle in nature; but Anaxagoras maintained that a pure mind, free from all material influences, governs the universe." Cicero says that the Grecian sage affirmed the existence of an "infinite mind, not inclosed in any body;" and Lactantius and Saint Augustine declare the same thing.*

There were several distinguished disciples of Anaxagoras; among the number may be mentioned, *Pericles*, son of Xantippus; *Archelaus*, son of Apollodorus; *Euripides*, his biographer; *Socrates*, son of Sophroniscus; and *Metrodorus*, of Lampsacum. Some few metaphysical opinions are ascribed to these persons, but they are not entitled to any particular enumeration.

. Vide Heuman. Act. Phil. i. 16; iii. 165, 173. Burnet, Arch. 1. 10. Cudworth, Int. Syst. c. 1. Cyril cont. Julian. 1. 1. Veleii Phil. Sac. c. 31. August. De Civit. Dei, 1. 8. Scaliger, Ep. 306. Themistii Orat. 26. Morhoff. Polyh. t. 2. Lipsii Phys. 1. 2. Thomasii Obeer. Hal. t. 2. Mullerus, De aqua principio rerum ex mente Thaletis. 1718. Budæus de Phil. Mor. Thalet. § 10. Brucker Hist. de Ideis, sect. 1. Grotius de Verit. 1. 1. Dickenson Phy. c. 4. Thomas. Hist. Ath. c. 4. Le Clerc, Bibl. Choisie, t. 2. Schmidius de Vit. Anaximenis, p. 1. Plouquet, Diss. De Thalet. et Anaxag. 1. 2. Bayle. Thalet. Ritter, Hist. Phil. Oxford, 1839. Tennemann. Hist. Phil. Renouvier, Mon. de la Phil. ancienne. Cousin, Cours de Phil. Degérando, Hist. Comparée des Systèmes. Enfield's Hist. Philosophy.

* Arist. De Anima. 1. 1. Plut. 1. 1. Cicero de Nat. Deor. 1. 1. August. de Civ. Dei, 1. 8. Lact. 1. 5.

CHAPTER III.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.



THE ITALIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

AMONG the leading philosophers on the science of the human mind in the Italian school, stands Pythagoras, a man of vast capacity, extensive information, indefatigable industry, and great original powers of thought. He was born in the Isle of Samos, and received his early education there.

Pythagoras was the founder of a school of speculative philosophy, and his principal followers and admirers were Ocellus, Timæus, Archytas, Philolaus, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy.

The Pythagoreans speculated deeply on the origin of the world, and on the principles of natural theism. On the human mind their inquiries seem not to have been directed with much judgment, nor signalised by much success. This sect of metaphysicians maintained that man had some affinity not only with the gods, but with the animal creation; and that the same principle of intelligence runs through the whole of living existence,

and unites the different parts into one uniform compound. We are distinguished from the brute creation by the possession of language. The human soul is divided, by these Pythagoreans, into two parts, or rather two leading faculties; the one embraces all the physical wants of the body, and all the blind and impetuous passions or impulses; and the other those controlling and modifying powers, which guide and propel mankind to virtuous and noble deeds, and which are commonly denominated wisdom, judgment, or reason.

The soul is in an imperfect state. It has three elemental divisions: *Reason*, *Intelligence*, and *Desire*. The inferior creation possess the two last attributes, but are denied the first; reason. The soul is a monad—one. It may have many aspects, but its essence or unity remains the same. In proportion as the rational, intelligent, or sensual principles predominate, so is the character of man proportionally affected. He may be a profound philosopher, a man of the world, or a low and beastly creature. "This soul, which can look before and after, can shrink and shrivel itself into an incapacity of contemplating aught but the present moment. Of what depths of degeneracy it is capable! What a beast it may become! And, if something lower than itself, why not something higher? And if something higher and lower, may there not be a law accurately determining its elevation and descent? Each soul has its peculiar evil tastes, bringing it to the likeness of different creatures beneath itself; may it not be under the necessity of

abiding in the condition of that thing to which it has adapted and reduced itself?"*

There has always existed considerable doubt as to what the real opinions of Pythagoras were. He was a public teacher of philosophy, but left no written records of his views. Conjecture has, therefore, to supply the place of positive information. His school was a school of mathematics also; and to his blending the two sciences together no small portion of his obscurity may be attributed. The essence of the universe was *Number*; but whether numbers were *real* things, or merely *symbolical* representations, has been the great source of contention among the commentators and critics on the Pythagorean system. Some maintain that the philosopher considered numbers as the real *principles of things*, or the cause of all *material existences*, or the *final nature of things*. Others again contend that these references to numbers were only a sort of mathematical formula, to be *symbolically* applied. It would be useless to enter into this controversy; for the reasons and authorities on each side seem to be nearly balanced. For myself, I confess I am inclined to join with Ritter, and to think that the numbers of Pythagoras were purely symbolical representations. The other hypothesis appears to me so utterly incomprehensible and absurd, that for the credit of the human intellect we should throw it aside.

The doctrine of the *Transmigration of Souls* is invariably connected with the philosophy of the

* Ency. Metrop. Art. Moral and Metaphy. Philos.

Pythagoreans. It was this notion which induced them to abstain from animal food, and to exclude animal sacrifices from all their religious ceremonies. Ovid represents Pythagoras as speaking in the following strain, rendered into our vernacular tongue by the immortal Dryden.

“What then is death, but ancient matter drest
In some new figure, and a varied vest ?
Thus all things are but altered, nothing dies ;
And here and there th’ unbodied spirit flies,
By time, or force, or sickness dispossest,
And lodges where it lights, in man or beast ;
Or hunts without, till ready limbs it find,
And actuates those according to their kind ;
From tenement to tenement is tost,
The soul is still the same, the figure only lost ;
And as the softened wax new seals receives,
Their face assumes, and that impression leaves ;
Now called by one, now by another name,
The form is only changed, the wax is still the same :
So death, thus call’d, can but the form deface,
Th’ immortal soul flies out in empty space,
To seek her fortune in some other place.”

. Vide Arist. Met. l. 1. 6. Sextus Empiricus, folio, Paris, 1621. Meiners, *Histoire des Sciences dans la Grèce*, t. 2. (French Translation). Justin. Hist. 20. 4. Dioge. Laert. 8. Leipsic. 1833. Ritter, *Hist. Anc. Phil. Oxford*. Tennemann, *Manuel de l’Hist. de la Philosophie*, by Cousin, Paris, 1830. Schwartz, *Manuel de l’Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne*. Liège. 1842. Renouvier, *Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne*. Paris, 1844. Tsaot. *Hist. Abrégée de la Philosophie*. Dijon. 1840. *Hist. Abrégée de la Philosophie*, par Bouvier, Evêque de Mans; Paris, 1844.

CHAPTER IV.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.



THE ELEATIC SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

THE Eleatic School of metaphysicians took its rise from the Italian and Ionian speculations. It differed, however, essentially from both. It had more boldness, more originality, and more system. The Eleatics affected a more complete severance between mental objects and the rules of reasoning applicable to them, and to the ordinary principles of natural theology and morality, with which they had previously been associated.

The philosophical predecessors of the Eleatics were not so ambitious as the latter. The former contented themselves with taking the constitution of things just as they found it, and modestly attempted only to ascertain the laws which regulated their action on one another, in all their mutual relationships. The Eleatics, however, took higher ground. They attempted to explain the origin of all things; and, by arguments *à priori*, to deduce the whole complicated and multifarious phenomena of matter and mind, from certain abstract principles.

XENOPHANES. 456 B.C.

Xenophanes was the most distinguished philosopher of this school. Considerable difference of opinion has existed, both in ancient and modern times, as to the precise notions he entertained on the mental laws of our constitution. By one class of historians he has been accused of complete scepticism; and by others, as a defender of the infallible certainty of human knowledge. The mass of evidence, and the general current of probability, are in favour of the latter hypothesis.

There is, unquestionably, a great deal of material necessity intermixed with all the mental speculations of Xenophanes. He affirms that nothing which exists can possibly change. Every thing is *one being*, and is not susceptible of diversities of form or essence. Thought, according to him, is the only real substance; permanent and immutable in its nature and properties.

The spirit of Xenophanes' mental philosophy bears a very close affinity to some modern systems, founded upon a particular application of the principle of necessary connexion. Those who will cast their eye over both, will instantly recognise the almost complete identity. The principle is the same in both the ancient and modern theories; only the proofs and illustrations are somewhat different. The reasoning of Xenophanes was of an *à priori* description; whereas the modern adopters of his peculiar views employ both *à priori* argu-

ments, and proof drawn from every-day experience.

The Fathers of the Church, St. Clement of Alexandria, and Eusebius, have preserved some verses of Xenophanes, in which he expresses himself with great freedom on the superstitious notions which the generality of mankind entertain as to the nature of the gods. He seems, however, to have had just and elevated conceptions of the First Great Cause, from other verses mentioned by Sextus Empiricus, where he says, "God sees all, hears all, knows all; and His wisdom governs all things without effort."

The Unity of the Divine nature is, then, decidedly affirmed by Xenophanes. Deity is self-existent, and consequently eternal; unmoveable, unmoved, and without change.

The peculiar expression that "God is a sphere," used by Xenophanes, is thus explained by M. Cousin. "The word *spherical* is simply a Greek locution to point out the absolute equality and unity of the Deity, and of which the conception of a sphere may be an image. The σφαῖρικός of the Greeks is the *rotundus* of the Latins. It is a metaphorical expression similar to that of *square*, meaning *perfect* and *complete*; a mode of speaking which though now considered in some measure obsolete, had at the early age of mathematical science, something dignified and noble in it, and is found in most elevated poetical compositions. Simonides speaks of a 'man *square* to his feet, his hands, and his mind,' meaning a complete,

perfect, or accomplished man; and the same metaphorical expression is used by Aristotle. We cannot, therefore, be surprised that Xenophanes, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, writing in verse, and not being successful in fixing upon the metaphysical term which fully expressed his ideas, should have borrowed from the language of imagination that word which would most fully denote his meaning."

Professor Fulleborn draws the following parallel between Xenophanes and Spinoza. "Though the system of Xenophanes does not display the same ability and profundity as that of Spinoza, yet we cannot fail to perceive that they both moved in the same direction, and adopted the same principles. The only difference which distinguishes them lies in the proofs they respectively employ. Xenophanes belonged to a period when philosophical studies were but as it were in their infancy, and the forms of language, as a medium of abstract reasoning, but imperfectly understood. After developing a general principle essential to his system, he clothed it with other attributes, and took a circuitous route. Spinoza, on the contrary, always went direct to his object. The former dealt exclusively in reasonings *à priori*, and rejected experience; whilst the latter used the *à priori* instrument in conjunction with that of observation and experiment."

"In Spinoza's day the ideas of *unity, substance*, and the like, were determined with some precision, particularly by the writings of Descartes; and the

Jewish philosopher had a more definite idea of *necessary connection*, than the ancients possessed. When they embraced a general principle or proposition, they pushed it to its utmost limits, without reservation or qualification; and hence a host of absurd and irrational deductions was the consequence. That mathematical form which Spinoza employed with so much effect in the exposition of his views, was not used by Xenophanes."*

The scepticism which has been attributed to Xenophanes, and which certain expressions ascribed to him apparently countenance, was certainly of a loose and indefinite character. It was not dogmatical. It evidently arose in the philosopher's mind from a deep conviction of the circumscribed and imperfect faculties of man to embrace the wide expanse of Creation. He was, as every man ever must be, no matter how sound and orthodox his theological opinions, overawed and confounded by the mere attempt to inquire into the great problem of existence. He essayed it again and again; but at every fresh effort a new host of insurmountable difficulties and perplexities presented themselves;

"Alps on Alps arose;"

which compelled him to fall back on his own puny littleness and insufficiency, and exclaim, when smarting under the bitter feelings of defeat, that "*error is spread over all things.*"†

* Fulleborn, Dissertat. De Xenopha. Halle, 1789.

† Vide Arist. De Xenopha. chap. I. Metaphy. Diogenes Laert. 9. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhon. l. 22. Cicero. Academ. Quæst. 2. 37.

PARMENIDES. 430 B.C.

Parmenides was a disciple and follower of Xenophanes, and considerably extended the range of his philosophical system. The former consolidated and arranged the thoughts of the latter, and, with great judgment, spirit, and boldness, gave them a more complete and systematic form. Some recent historians have affirmed that Parmenides was the first philosopher who attempted to found a regular theory of human knowledge.

This philosopher composed a Poem "*On Nature*," in the prologue to which he represents the goddess of wisdom directing the philosophical inquirer to truth and happiness. The goddess speaks nearly in these words: "I hail thee, O thou, whom the heralds of the goddess have conducted to my habitation. Rejoice, and count it not a misfortune that thou hast been conducted by a path unknown to mortals. Thou shalt discern the immutable and eternal things which truth teaches; and thou shall form just conclusions, both as to the phenomena of nature around thee, and the varied and conflicting elements of human opinions. Keep steadily in this path; and never allow thyself to become the slave of thy outward senses; of thine eye and thine ear. It is by shunning such guides, by the force of reason, that thou shalt be able to comprehend what I shall announce to thee. If we suffer ourselves to be directed by mere sentiment or feeling, we shall infallibly be misled from the true path."

In the book "*On Nature*," we find mental speculations treated under the head of "*The Intelligible*," or "*The Truth*," or the "*Unity of Existence*." The allegorical form is kept up, and the goddess "reveals what reason will discover in its researches. Reason teaches *that which exists*. The existence of a nonentity. *Speech, thought, and existence*, are all positive realities. Men, blinded by their senses, confound them by turns; and separate existence from creation. Follow then the path, which points out the *reality* of things. Many reasons prove that that which has never begun, cannot cease to exist. Existence is a whole; it is one; it is immutable; it is infinite. For does any one ask me from whence is this existence derived? From what source does its perpetual stream of creation flow? From whence doth it proceed? These are questions we cannot answer. For no person can conceive or tell why a thing exists, or what power is able to call it into being, or why it has appeared at a particular time, neither sooner nor later. It is necessary, then, that existence should always be, or never be; for this maxim is eternally true, *that a thing cannot by itself be created out of nothing*. Existence is founded upon itself; it universally reposes on itself, and is invested with immutability; the chains of necessary power envelop it. *Thought, and the object of thought, are one and the same*. We cannot have the thought, with the *object* which is cognizant to the mind."

This Poem ends with the following remark;

"The understanding is to man, what the bodily members are to his frame; for the thinking principle possesses the same unity of nature and design, as the organs of the outward man; all is filled by thought."

The general features of the speculative system of Parmenides, have no small resemblance to those which have been designated, by some modern thinkers, by the term *common sense*. He was less addicted to paradox than his predecessors; and seemed to seize those general principles of mind which display themselves in the every-day movements of the mass of mankind, and which form the ground-work of that universal sympathy and harmony which subsist throughout the whole region of thought.*

MELISSUS. 424 B.C.

MELISSUS of Samos expounded the doctrines of Parmenides. On the real existence of things, he remarks, "We cannot determine the quantity of any thing without taking for granted its existence. But that which is real cannot be finite; it must be infinite; not in *space*, but in *time*. It fills all time, and must always be the same in itself."

Aristotle calls the unity of Parmenides a *rational* unity, but that of Melissus a *material* one.†

* Arist. Met. l. 1. Sextus Empiricus l. 9. Diogenes Laert. l. 9. Plato in Parmen. l. 11. Plut. adv. Colot. l. 6. Eusebius l. 1.

† Tissot, Hist. Abrégée de la Phil. p. 106. Dijon, 1840.

The German historian Ritter makes the following remarks on Melissus. "As, however, the development given by Melissus to his theory of being strongly resembles the method in which it was carried out by Parmenides, we may here pass over much, and only bring forward what is peculiarly his own, and what is requisite to indicate its relation to other philosophical doctrines. This consists chiefly in the manner in which, as an Ionian and living among Ionians, he necessarily put most prominently forward those points which it was indispensable to establish against the Ionic philosophy. Melissus, in common with Parmenides, does not found his argument on the notion of the Deity, but on that of being. On the former point he recedes so far from Xenophanes, that he expressly declares, 'men must not speak of the gods, for of them we have absolutely no knowledge.'* Accordingly, the central point of the whole system—the notion of the perfect one—was even still more lost sight of by him than by Parmenides; and the whole argumentation bears the appearance of an empty sophism. On this account he was much less esteemed by the ancients than Parmenides; and Aristotle is of opinion that his principles present little or no difficulty."†

ZENO, OF ELEA. 450 B. C.

Zeno was the able, bold, and successful defender

* Diog. Laert. i. 1. 9. 24.

† Ritter, Hist. Phil. p. 481.

of the Eleatic philosophy. He possessed in a high degree all the mental requisites for an expert and formidable controversialist. He was remarkably acute, knew well how to handle general principles, so as to confound and annoy an adversary, and had, besides, a copious fund of information on all the current topics of the day. He may be considered as the founder of that general system of philosophical discussion, so prevalent for many subsequent ages, in all the countries of the East.

Among his controversial discussions we find the following, tending to invalidate the systems of those who founded all science on pure experience. "Every body constantly occupies a portion of space equal to itself; it is then constantly in repose. Now if it move itself, it should move in every instant; it would then be both in motion and at rest at the same time."

Zeno attempted to establish the doctrine of *perfect and absolute unity*. On the divisibility of matter, he observes, "When we arrive at the utmost boundaries of divisibility, we shall then only have a mathematical point; which is really nothing."

On the successful cultivation of the art of reasoning, and investigating truth, and communicating it to others, he laid down many excellent principles and rules. He divided this art into three distinct branches; the first, the art of drawing consequences or inferences from principles; secondly, the art of dialectics; and thirdly, the art of speaking.

Of the importance of the dialectics of Zeno, we have the testimony of M. Cousin, who says, "The polemical method entirely disconcerted the disciples of the Ionic philosophy, and excited a lively curiosity and interest for the stability of the doctrines of the Italian school; and thus was sown in the capital of Greek civilization and refinement, the prolific germ of a more lofty development of philosophy." Ritter also observes, "On account of the readiness and scientific skill with which Zeno indicated the contraries of all things, he has been called by Plato the Eleatic Palamedes. The dialogistic form of his composition was calculated to give rise to a sophistical tendency, as was shewn in latter times; but even in his reasonings there is often so close a trenching upon subtle and fallacious distinctions, that he has frequently been classed among the Sophists; nevertheless, when we consider the serious end which he pursued, we cannot but suppose that he merely employed those fallacious artifices as a by-play and relief to his dialogue, or in mocking defiance of the want of skill and the helplessness of his opponents."*

HERACLITUS. 460 B. C.

Heraclitus belonged to the school of the Eleatics, and signalled himself by his profound study of the general laws of the universe. On mental subjects he observes, "The human soul, such as is

* Arist. Met. 1. 1. Dioge. Laert. 1. 3. Sext. Emp. Math. 7. Plato, Parm p 127. Strabo. 6. 1.

endowed with reason, is an emanation from the universal mind; but it is united to an animal nature, in common with the inferior orders of creation. Man breathes the universal soul or mind, and readily unites with creative intelligence, in a state of watching; sleep being an immediate and temporary suspension of this communication."

This metaphysician established the maxim which exercised, in subsequent ages, a great influence over speculative minds, "that a thing can only be known by the same thing." "Conception is founded only upon the similitude between the agent and the object." This principle was considered, when viewed in all its bearings and ramifications, as destructive of the evidence of the senses; and places the discovery of truth solely in the faculty of reason. But in opposition to this conclusion from his premises, Heraclitus maintained that the senses were the apertures through which we inhaled the divine reason.

"Our sensations," says he, "do not appertain to external objects; they reside only in ourselves; for they vary amongst individuals, and even in the same individual, from the varied condition of the organs themselves. These senses cannot, then, communicate any certain knowledge of external things, since their operation is so unsteady and fluctuating. The understanding alone possesses the power of teaching us the absolute nature of objects; it alone can impart truth to us."

He argues however in another place for the testimony of the senses; for he remarks, "The

judgments which mankind in general form, possess the certain testimony of truth; this common light which diffuses itself over all at once, is nothing else but the Divine Reason, shed over all our understandings by a direct and immediate effusion."

On the nature of memory he observes, "the mind represents to itself the universe such as it has been preserved by the memory; we arrive then at truth when we borrow from memory that true and veritable sketch which has been deposited and confided with it. Wisdom is then accessible to all men."

His notions on the origin of the world did not materially differ from those which had been promulgated by many of his predecessors. Fire, or an ethereal exhalation, is the principle of existence and life. This agent consists of two indivisible portions or atoms, which are simple in their natures, and eternal, and indestructible. The particles of which this ethereal exhalation consists, are in perpetual motion. From the various modes in which these two constituent elements are combined, we have the result of all the numerous and diversified forms of material existences. There is a rational or thinking principle incorporated with this primary fire, and this principle animates the whole, and preserves and changes the face of nature at its will.* This principle, in fact, is God, the maker of all things.

There is a story told about the writings of Heraclitus, that they were deposited in the temple of

* Clem Alex. Prot. p 42. Tertull. Contr Marcion.

Diana, at Ephesus, and remained there unknown for a considerable period. At length they were discovered and published; and the poet Euripides made known their contents to a public audience in the same celebrated temple. This circumstance excited a lively feeling amongst the philosophers of the day, some of whom immediately declared themselves Heraclitus's disciples. Among the number was Hippocrates, the famous physician.

We shall close this notice of Heraclitus with a few observations of Ritter's upon the system of the Grecian philosopher. "The notion of life implies that of alteration, which by the ancients was generally conceived as motion. The Universal Life is therefore an eternal motion, and consequently tends, as every motion must, towards some end; even though this end, in the course of the evolution of life, presents itself to us a mere transition to some ulterior end. Heraclitus on this ground supposed a certain longing to be inherent in fire, to gratify which it constantly transformed itself into some determinate form of being, without, however, any wish to maintain it, but in the mere desire of transmuting itself from one form into another. Therefore to make worlds is Jove's pastime."

CHAPTER V.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SECOND ELEATIC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

THIS second school of Eleatics was distinguished by many important and subtile speculations on mental subjects; but its general scope and tenor had a decided leaning to the most objectionable forms of materialism. They were devoted and zealous students of philosophy, but they adopted general principles without sufficient discrimination, and supported them by fictions and fallacies discreditable to discerning minds.

EMPEDOCLES. 444 B. C.

This philosopher was born at Agrigentum, in Sicily, about the year 400. From his youth he devoted himself to medical pursuits with great zeal and success. He travelled also a great deal, and became, by his skill in medicine, and the boldness and singularity of his character, a well known personage, even beyond the limits of his own country.

He prosecuted the science of mind with some

success. His theory of sensation is worthy of notice, principally from its singularity. He followed the general maxim of his predecessors, *that the same thing could only be perceived by the same thing*. He attached to each of the senses a particular element; thus, the fire could only be perceived by the fire, that is, sight; the air by the air, which is the ear. To the whole of the senses he joined other two—namely, discord, which is perceived by discord, and love, which is perceived by love. He explained the general phenomena of sensation by affirming that there was a complete identity between the object perceived and the sensation itself. The colours of objects, for example, were certain forms, proceeding from things external, and transmitted to us through the medium of the organ of sight.*

Empedocles makes a distinction between divine and human knowledge, and yet he rather inconsistently attempts to resolve all kinds of knowledge into the Divine Mind. However, it would appear that, according to his idea, man has some portion of this divine intelligence given him to balance his sensual knowledge. How it operates, what are its limits, what influences it exerts, or in what degree it counteracts material agents, we can form no conception, neither from the philosopher's own language, nor from any of his commentators.

The system of the universe, as promulgated by Empedocles, is dimly shadowed forth. World-

* Arist. De Sensu, cap. 2. Plut. de Placit. Phil. 4.

making with him is a very crude and bungling affair. He collects all the elemental principles together, separates them, descants upon them individually, and then mixes them in such confusion, that it becomes in the end impossible to obtain even a glimpse of his system.

LEUCIPPUS. 428 B. C.

Leucippus belonged to this school, and struck out a new system of philosophy. He was a subtile observer of the laws of the human mind. His whole theory of human knowledge and the constitution of nature, is founded upon an obvious train of thought, when contemplating the world around us. We incessantly see an endless variety of forms, and a perpetual change of motion amongst all bodies, whether animate or inanimate. We see one thing slowly but steadily amalgamating with another thing, and the forms and properties of both changed. These multifarious changes of nature almost naturally excite the mind to suggestions of thought founded upon the gratuitous assumption, that a system of motion amongst the inanimate particles of matter, whether organized or unorganized, must be the efficient cause of all the varied forms of creation. There seems to be no other feasible solution of the phenomena we behold, save a theory of this description; the mind rests for the moment upon it, and seems to feel a temporary pleasure and satisfaction that it affords a probable solution of philosophical difficulties of such magnitude. Hence it is that this theory of

Leucippus, and modifications of it, have prevailed since the first dawn of letters amongst men, and will, in all human probability, keep its ground till the end of time.

Leucippus supposes that every atom of matter is invested with a peculiar principle of motion ; and that a number of these atoms produce a kind of vortex. *Huet* and *Bayle* have both remarked, that this theory is very similar to that broached by Descartes in modern times.

Leucippus says, "There are then two principles in all things, one primitive, and the other positive : space, and a vacuum." "Thus," he adds, "the whole train of events we see are subjected to a principle of necessity."

These few words embody the whole system of this Eleatic philosopher, as it has been handed down to us through the writings of the ancients. He thought it fully accounted for all the diversified appearances of the universe, both physical, mental, and moral.

The metaphysical views of Leucippus are, of course, founded upon the same material basis. Life, thought, motion, are all one thing ; respiration is the condition, and heat the sign of them. The soul, in which these three properties of life, thought, and motion reside, is itself only an aggregation of atoms ; a compound of fiery particles which circulate in all bodies.

We must, notwithstanding this system of materialism, award the high honour to Leucippus of being the first philosopher who clearly detected,

and fully explained, that important principle in metaphysics, so highly valued in recent times ; namely, the distinction between the *primary* and *secondary* qualities of matter.

The whole system of Leucippus is also worthy of remark as being the first regular theory founded upon materialism in its most absolute sense.

DEMOCRITUS. 460 B. C.

Democritus followed in the same path of speculation as Leucippus ; and more fully developed his system. The views of the latter, relative to the distinction between the *primary* and *secondary* qualities of matter, were, however, not entertained by Democritus, who stoutly contended that the *secondary* qualities were nothing but mere modifications of the thinking principle. "Honey," says he, "is in itself neither sweet nor sour, but it produces upon the organ of taste an impression to which we give the name of *sweet* ; and from hence is derived the varied class of sensations which different individuals experience. It is precisely the same with colours, sounds, and odours." He thought that the sense of *touch* was the only one which really taught us the knowledge of external objects.

He maintained, likewise, that all human intelligence was of a passive character. "All our perceptions come to us from without, and the objects which produce them emit certain emanations resembling them, and like images are imprinted on the soul." Again, for example, water, which composes the principle of life or vitality, furnishes as

it were by reflection, a copy of its properties to the mind; the air transmits them through the ear, by an internal movement of particles, precisely similar; and thus it is with all the other organs of sense.

Democritus affirmed that there were two kinds of knowledge, the genuine and the abstract. The first has its foundation in the mind; and the latter from the operation of the external senses. The abstract or obscure species of knowledge is acquired by the influence of external agents on the thinking faculty (*νοῦς*), and thus conceptions are generated.* Bodies operate, however, only by contact. There must be an impression on the soul from without.† This is indispensable. An external object is made known to us by a sense, through the medium of certain effluxes filled with sensation and impression, which the philosopher calls images (*εἰδωλα*); these drop as it were from the object, and after assimilating themselves with the surrounding air, enter into the organ of sensation through certain channels or pores. This process communicates certain figures corresponding to the external objects from whence they come. But it is only the external covering or surface of these objects which we perceive; and this is the chief reason of the mass of obscurity which hangs over their real nature or properties. There is always, therefore, a cloudiness and haziness hanging over everything around us; and it is in vain to think of ever removing it from the sensuous organization of man.

* *Arist de Anima*. l. 2.

† *Arist de Sensu*, 2.

We have only, in fact, a one-sided glimpse of natural objects.*

We must not, however, suppose that all knowledge was confined to this imperfect sensuous operation. There was a higher principle of intelligence; something which guided and directed us to truth, independent of the impressions from external objects. There were certain internal perceptions or elements of thought which seemed to form part of the construction of the mind itself. This has been considered by some writers as the faculty of *reflection* (διάνοια), which forms such an important element in modern metaphysical science. Whatever opinion may be formed on this point, certain it is, that Democritus seems to have been constrained to admit, though in rather ambiguous language, the existence of certain primary elements of thought, apart from the mere mechanism of sensation.

Condorcet, in his *Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind*, has the following remarks relative to the philosophy of Democritus.

“Democritus regarded all the phenomena of the universe as the result of the combinations and movements of simple bodies, possessing a determined and fixed shape, and having received a primary impulsion, from whence was imparted a quantity of motion, which modified itself in every distinct atom, but which, in the entire mass, always preserved an aggregate harmony.”

* Theophr. de Sensu, 63.

CHAPTER VI.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE GREEK SOPHISTS.

. We come now to notice that class of speculative persons whom historians have distinguished by the term *Sophists*. They occupied a prominent station among the learned Greeks, although they did not form any distinct school or party, properly so called. The spirit of their system encouraged an independent tone of thinking, and but little in accordance with the constraint or authority of any federal head whatever.

There were two species of Sophists: the one generally exercised the profession of Rhetorician, and the other confined themselves to the instruction of their pupils in all the branches of mental philosophy.

The philosophy of the Sophists comes down to us under great disadvantages, both for their reputation and our own conviction. They left no writings of any moment behind them; and what records there were, have all perished. We have their opinions, systems, and characters, only through

somewhat suspicious and prejudiced channels. It is therefore by way of inference alone that we can approximate to the truth.

The philosophical system which the Sophists adopted, if it can be called a system, was the natural result of the peculiar state of speculative science in this age. Men of active habits and inquiring minds, had seen one sect of reasoners after another usurping public attention, by attempting to solve the problem of the origin of the world, and the constitution of all things, both physical and mental. Their opinions were marked by great subtility, inconsistency, and extravagance. They seemed to agree only to differ from one another. Nothing had been satisfactorily proved; no one general principle established; nor was there a single philosophical resting-place for the sole of the foot. This state of things naturally created a reaction. Men of bold and stirring habits shook off the cobwebs of speculative subtility, seized hold of the reality of things around them, and made a straightforward appeal to the feelings, opinions, and common sense of mankind. It is easy to see that an enterprise of this kind, under such circumstances, was sure to prove successful. Mankind listened, and they even fancied they obtained instruction. All the recluse and subtile philosophers were deeply shocked by this Gothic irruption into their territory. The withering jeers of the multitude were keenly felt by the speculative recluse. He had no means

of repelling the attack. His weapons were too refined for such rude and vulgar warfare; for, under such circumstances, his retaliation would in reality have been "to chop blocks with a razor."

We can readily therefore imagine, that no good feeling would exist between the disciples of the old schools of Greece, and the Sophists. There was no communion of fellowship and sympathy between them. It may readily be conceded—indeed the matter seems quite obvious—that the majority of the Sophists would be shallow and declamatory personages, dealing in generalities, and avoiding every thing like abstruse reasoning and deduction. But still they could not propagate their views without spreading useful truths far and wide. They would doubtless make a liberal use of ridicule and banter in their popular orations; and would, on many occasions, push their principles to an extravagant length. And there can be no doubt but that many of the expressions and propositions, which Plato and Aristotle have handed down to us, as falling from the lips of the Sophists, were uttered in the heat of extemporary oratory, or when smarting under some unmerited persecution. Making, however, every allowance, there is reasonable ground for supposing that their services in the cause of true knowledge were considerable, and that they by no means merit that contempt and derision which many ancient and modern philosophers have heaped upon them.

PROTAGORAS. 475 B.C.

Protagoras was one of the most eminent and early of the Sophists. His metaphysical notions may be gathered from what Sextus Empiricus has told us of them. They are in substance the following. Man is the standard of the truth of all things. He is the proper *criterion* of the reality of every thing which exists. This is the fundamental principle of all human knowledge. Matter is in a perpetual flux and reflux; it is constantly changing its forms. Our bodily senses, which are affected by and perceive these changes, undergo also a modification from old age, disease, and other circumstances. The foundation of every thing which the senses can perceive, or be affected by, resides in matter. But men at different times, and under different circumstances, derive various impressions from external objects. Those whose organs are in a healthy and vigorous state, perceive objects just in the same manner as other persons do who are in a similar situation, and whose sensuous faculties are in a similarly organised condition. On the other hand, those whose organs are impaired or diseased, recognise external objects in precisely the same way as those who labour under corresponding imperfections and infirmities. Man, then, is the sole *criterion* of the truth of things. We are perpetually in the habit of making references to our own individual feelings and per-

ceptions as the infallible test of truth and falsehood.*

Plato, in one of his works, gives the most unequivocal evidence that the above is the sum and substance of the system of Protagoras. In the passages quoted by Plato, he makes the Sophist take his stand upon the common and every-day feelings of human nature; and supposes one man to test the truth of his sensations and feelings, by a direct appeal to the consciousness of his neighbour. This is the first great effort which was made to bring the ordinary emotions and opinions of mankind to bear upon the extreme subtilty and abstract refinement of the various schools of philosophy which had, up to this period, prevailed throughout Greece. Protagoras spoke a language responded to by all mankind. A fine field was open to his rhetorical talents; and there is little doubt but that the *common sense* tone of his philosophical discussions must have produced a powerful influence on the inquisitive spirit of his day.†

On the merits of Protagoras and his system, philosophical historians are widely at difference. Degérando observes, "Les autres Sophistes adoptaient indifféremment toutes les opinions; Protagoras essayait de prouver que chacune a des fondemens légitimes. La plupart des autres Sophistes n'eurent que des auditeurs; Protagoras exerça une influence importante sur la marche de l'esprit

* Arist. Met. 3. 5. Diog. Laert. 9. 50. Cicero, Acad. Quest. 4.
Plato. Theat. 2.

humain. La plupart des autres Sophistes furent bientôt oubliées et méritaient de l'être ; Protagoras a posé des problèmes qui subsistent encore, et qui peut-être ne sont pas entièrement résolus. Enfin, il soumit à des règles l'art que professaient les Sophistes ; il découvrit plusieurs formes de raisonnement, et on convient que sa méthode se rapprochait à quelques égards de celle de Socrate."*

Ritter observes : " In all these propositions and reasonings of Protagoras we recognize at once the endeavour to resolve conception into sensation, and to deny the universality of pure intellectual thought. It was in this sense that the ancients understood the position, that all is in a continual state of incipency ; for since every sensation is nothing more than the result of the concurrent activities of the percipient and the perceptible, and thought merely sensation, the former must consequently be a production of the constant variation of these changeable activities. All, therefore, according to Protagoras, lives merely in the sensible changeableness, and is in fact this mutability itself. The sensible is indeed true, so far as it is sensibly perceived. But nothing in itself is cold or hot, nor generally has any sensible quality ; but is of such or such qualities, according as it is perceived as such."†

GORGIAS. 452 B. C.

Gorgias was another Sophist of distinction. In addition to the general current of opinions held by

* *Histoire Comparée*, vol. 2. p. 83. † *Hist. Philosophy*, vol 2. p. 576.

his predecessors, he advanced many original propositions of his own, and pushed them to a great length. In a book entitled "*On what is not, or on Nature*," he attempts to establish three distinct principles or axioms, all, however, directed against the stability of human knowledge. They are the following. First,—That nothing exists. Second,—That if anything really exists, it cannot be known to man. Third,—That if he could know it he has not the power of communicating that knowledge to others.

The first proposition, *that nothing exists*, Gorgias attempts to establish by the following arguments. At first nothing existed. Then reality had no existence. Now everything must have either been eternal, or must have been made; or must have possessed the characters of being both eternal and created. If matter be eternal it could not have been created, and must be infinite; but that which is infinite has no parts; it must also be different from that which contains it; and must also be comprised in space. This space must then be a different and a greater thing than it; which is a notion not in unison with infinity. If matter has been produced, it must have either been created from that which previously existed, or from nothing. On the first supposition it has not been created, it has only been changed in its form; and on the other hand it is contradictory to say that a thing has been created which never existed.

On the second proposition, *that if anything should even have a real existence, we could not know it*;

he, in substance, argues as follows: We cannot know what things are in themselves; for it would be necessary, for this purpose, that there should be a perfect relationship established between our conceptions and those external realities; that what they offer to our senses should be the very qualities themselves, under the self-same form that they are perceived; but all this is absurd. If we could conceive, for example, that a man could walk upon the winds, or a chariot drive along the surface of the sea, we should then be entitled to conclude that a man might fly, and that a chariot might ride upon the surface of the waters. That, therefore, which really exists escapes our knowledge. Each sense only perceives that which belongs to its own province; a thing is called visible because it is the object of sight; but it does not cease to exist because it cannot be seen. What then can be conceived may exist, though it may not affect our senses, because it is beyond the limit of their range.

The third proposition, that *if anything really existed, we could not communicate its existence to others*, he defined in this manner. The means we have of communicating with others, is through the medium of language. But language is not identical with external things, or real objects. We only transmit to others our own words. Now that which is visible is not felt by the ear, nor does the ear see external objects; the province of these two senses is quite separate and different. We say, indeed, that language is formed from the impres-

sions we receive from external objects, through the medium of the senses; as colour, for example, is derived from the act of vision. It does not, however, follow from this that our words really and fully express the qualities or properties of things without us; but simply the effect they produce upon our organs of sensation. Even admitting that the objects of sense really exist, we are not from hence entitled to say that they are the objects of language. Our sensations and words are two different things.*

There were several other Sophists distinguished in their day as bold and reckless declaimers. Prodicus, Hippias, Euthydemus, Thrasyarchus, and Callicles, are the chief names mentioned by Xenophon and Plato. Some of these Sophists were charged with blasphemy by the civil authorities, denounced as corrupters of youth, and condemned to public execution.

* Arist. de Gorg. Plato, Meno. p. 76. Sext. Empiricus l. i. 85.

CHAPTER VII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

SOCRATES. 400 B. C.

THE name of Socrates forms a landmark in mental philosophy. Though not strictly a metaphysician, yet his influence as a public teacher produced a marked effect upon all the subsequent speculations on mind. His powers were not of a system-making or speculative cast, but were of the highest order of common sense. In fact, he was a sober-minded, rational sophist, who had as thorough a contempt for pure quibbling, as for shallow and empty declamation. His scholastic acquirements, and his knowledge of the world, were so happily balanced, that he exercised all the influence and power of a monarch over opposite and conflicting systems and parties.

Besides the mode of reasoning adopted by Socrates, metaphysical science received great indirect assistance from the soundness and consistency of his ideas upon matters connected with natural theology. These were in strict keeping with his lofty ideas of the reasoning faculty, and the various

important offices to which it must be applied. His notion of the soul of man, according to Xenophon, was, that it was allied by its nature to the divine mind, not by essence, but by virtue of its nature. Man was elevated beyond all the ranks of animated beings, and this by the power of his reason.*

The influence of Socrates upon metaphysical science arises from his peculiar method of instruction. This was based upon the general workings and principles of his own mind. "Know thyself," was the key-stone to his philosophy. The first step in the pursuit of useful knowledge was a rigid examination into man's nature. This he ever steadfastly kept in view. He took his stand upon the perfect and absolute certainty of human knowledge, and never for a moment allowed his thoughts to wander into the regions of doubt and perplexity. He took the world of thought just as he found it; and all its daily and varied manifestations constituted the materials of his method. Every pupil of Socrates was early initiated into the invaluable habit of looking into his own mind; of practically operating upon his own consciousness; and of deducing rules and principles for the government and direction of his reasoning powers. This dialectic discipline enabled the student to place every idea and thought in a variety of aspects, and to fortify his logical conclusions by numerous and apposite illustrations.

From what we learn of Socrates, it is quite ob-

* Xenoph. Memor. l. 1.

vious that he was well acquainted with several metaphysical theories, though it does not appear that he ever formally reduced his own thoughts upon the subject to regular order or method. When developing his mode of instruction he always proceeds upon propositions generally received as true or self-evident. Aristotle says, that Socrates, in studying the moral virtues, was the first who, in giving a definition of them, sought to conform them to reason, and establish them upon the realities of things. Socrates rendered two essential services to true knowledge,—the introduction of the inductive method of reasoning, and an accurate mode of using general terms. But Socrates did not separate universal ideas from particular facts; his successors did this, and gave them the name of ideas.*

Ritter, in his *History of Philosophy*, has the following observations on Socrates, which I think sound and correct. "It is clear that the ultimate object of the Socratic method was to apprehend in the thought the essence of a thing, and that strongly impressed with the character which predominates in the Platonic and Aristotelian, it made the explication of terms the centre of its system, and sought to exhibit, in the definition, the real nature of the object. Consequently, although we must hesitate before we assert, with a later writer,† that Socrates was the first to establish the doctrine of ideas, still we cannot deny

* Arist. *Metaphysic.* l. 6, chap. 4.

† Aristocles, ap. Euseb. 10. 3.

that the connection which he discovered between the idea and its object, must naturally have awakened investigations calculated to call the ideal theory into existence."*

* See also the following works: Olearius, *De Genio Socratis. Vie de Socrate*, Amsterdam 1699. Gilbert Cooper's *Life of Socrates*, London, 1749. Wasser, *De Vita, Factis, et Philosophia Socratis*. Menzius, *Dissert. de Socratis methodo docendi*, &c. Leipsic, 1740. Lossius, *De arte Obstetricia Socratis*, Erfurt, 1785. Simon, *Dissert. de Socratis meritis in Philosophiam*, &c., Wittembergh, 1797. Heller, *Socrates*. Franckfort, 1789. M. Stapfer, *De Philosophia Socratis*, Berne, 1786. Dr. Wigger's *Life of Socrates*.

CHAPTER VIII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.



THE CYRENIC AND CYNICAL SCHOOLS.

THE Cyrenic and Cynical Schools of Philosophy formed a rather singular feature in the history of mental inquiries. The members of them professed to reject all formal rules of abstract reasoning, to study nature with all possible simplicity of design, not to avail themselves of any aid from mathematical forms or principles, but to be solely guided by the common and every-day rules and maxims of life.

Their views relative to the nature of the human mind, and all its powers and faculties, approached very nearly to those systems in modern times, denominated by the general term "idealism." We cannot in substance, say they, perceive and know anything save our own impressions,—not the external causes of them. When we are affected by the image of *white*, or the taste of *sweetness*, we can very truly affirm the effect these produce upon ourselves, but not that the object of whiteness or sweetness has any real existence. The words we

use to designate these sensations do not designate the objects, but simply our feelings at the moment. The intervening links, the motion, the transformations, involved in this act of sensation, form a complete barrier to our knowledge of what external things are in their own nature. Hence it follows that there is really nothing in common amongst men relative to their sensations, except the mere language they use to point them out; for there is no invariable or unalterable law of sensation for the whole species. We employ the terms *while* and *sweetness*, but they stand for different feelings in different persons. Every man judges for himself, and not for his neighbour; he can only know that which affects himself personally. Though our decisions are expressed in the same language, there is still no infallible criterion to judge of other men's feelings, sensations, or emotions.

The three principal philosophers of these two schools were Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Diogenes; but the metaphysical gleanings from them are very scanty. Their principal disquisitions related to morals. What we have already mentioned embodies nearly every notion attributed to them on mental inquiries.*

* Arist. Metaph. l. 8. chap. 29. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. Diog. Laert. 6. Lactantius. Divin. Inst. l. 5. Clemens Alex. Admon. Sect. 46.

CHAPTER IX.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SCHOOLS OF MEGARA, ELIS, AND ERETRIA.

THESE schools were branches or offshoots from the Eleatic Philosophy, and always retained the fundamental lineaments of the parent establishment.

EUCLID. 400 B.C.

Euclid was the most distinguished philosopher of the school of Megara. He was imbued with a subtile spirit, and enjoyed knotty and puzzling questions. In dialectics he took the opposite principle to Socrates; for he did not attack the premises, but the conclusion. He is charged with having renounced all analogical reasoning; but this is absurd, he could not do so, were he ever so confirmed a sceptic. Analogy constitutes the foundation of nine-tenths of all human knowledge. The rule which Euclid laid down as to reasoning was a solid and substantial one; that in any inferences drawn from two cases, or sets of circumstances, it is necessary that every thing in these

cases and circumstances should be identical. Any little variation may make the greatest difference in the deductive reasoning. To every man, therefore, who wishes to cultivate truth, this maxim of Euclid is invaluable. It is for want of its knowledge and observance, that such erroneous reasonings, on every thing connected with human nature, are presented to our notice in the ordinary concerns of life.

The other distinguished disciples of the Megarean school were Eubulides, Diodorus, and Alexinus. Their metaphysical opinions are unimportant. Ritter observes, "The majority of the later members of the Megaric school are famous either for the refutation of opposite doctrines, or for the invention and application of certain fallacies; on which account they were occasionally called Eristici and Dialectici. Still it may be presumed that they did not employ these fallacies for the purpose of delusion, but of instructing rash and hasty thinkers, and exemplifying the superficial vanity of common opinion. At all events it is certain that they were mainly occupied with the forms of thought, more perhaps with a view to the discovery of particular rules, than to the foundation of a scientific system or method."

Phædo of Elis, a scholar of Socrates, was the founder of the Elian school. That of Eretria sprung out of it. The leading doctrine of both was, that what was *good*, and what was *true*, were based upon reason and intelligence.*

* Cicero. Qu. Acad. 2. 42. Diog. Laert. 1. 2. Plut. adv. Colot. 23.

CHAPTER X.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

PLATO. 430 B.C.

WE come to notice, at as full a length as is consistent with the limited plan of this work, one of the most eminent metaphysicians and general philosophers of whom antiquity can boast. Under his auspices the nature and powers of the human mind were fully investigated, and clothed with a clearness and facility of expression, which have served as shining lights to illumine the paths of mental philosophy for more than two thousand years.

The powers of Plato's mind were of the highest order. He possessed a more than ordinary share of that mental energy, so requisite an ingredient for all great enterprises of philosophy. In all the learning of his age he was profoundly skilled, as well as in the lighter departments of polite literature. He was a great writer, orator, and politician; and possessed, besides, the power of enduring mental labour to a surprising extent.

This distinguished philosopher improved all these

talents and acquirements by varied and extended travelling. In Italy he devoted much of his time to the sages of the Pythagorean School; at Cyrene he studied geometry; and in Egypt he contracted an acquaintance with the priests, studied astronomy with them, and attempted to penetrate into the sacred mysteries of which they were the sole depositaries. He overran the whole of Greece, resided thrice in Sicily, and made himself acquainted, in all the countries he visited, with their forms of government, laws, manners, and social institutions.

The speculations of Plato constitute an important epoch in the history of mental science; and chiefly for the following reason. He was the first heathen philosopher who possessed enlarged and refined conceptions of a first *universal cause*, and of a *divine providence*. The loftiness and purity of his principles of natural theology, gave a tone and elevation to all his mental investigations, and preserved him also, in a great measure, from all those extravagant conceits and paradoxes which so materially mar the speculations of his predecessors. He cultivated the science of mind in conjunction with the dignified investigations of a comparatively pure theism, and made, in some degree, the former co-operate towards the elucidation of the latter.

Plato was the first metaphysician who clearly and forcibly laid down the general principle that a knowledge of the laws of mind was an indispensable qualification for prosecuting, with success, physical inquiries. He says, "Philosophers have

laboured for the establishment of science, but have neglected to ask themselves, beforehand, what that science is; they have speculated upon things, and have omitted to examine the nature and offices of that principle of intelligence which alone can exercise itself upon surrounding objects. What has been the consequence? Why, they have transferred their own sensations to objects; have been entangled in all manner of contradictions; and have bewildered themselves in clouds of difficulties and embarrassments."

There are, in a certain sense, two souls in man; we give the name of *soul* to that physical life and spontaneous activity, to that organic power we possess in common with the animal and vegetable creation. But in a rigorous sense we apply the word *soul* only to designate the principle of sensibility and thought; this principle is one and simple; for the subject which judges is identical with that which conceives and thinks; therefore, all knowledge, judgment, and science, appear to be involved in this notion of mental identity or union. This soul which thinks, feels, reasons, and judges, exists only in man; it emanates from the supreme intelligence; it is immaterial; it falls upon the organs of sense, and is not subject to change. Body and soul, though different in their nature and essence, are nevertheless linked together by a powerful bond of union, and exercise on each other a reciprocal influence; and the health and happiness of man consists, in a great measure, in preserving this constant harmony.

We can only thoroughly understand the faculties of the mind by carefully studying the effects they produce. We ought then to distinguish as many faculties of the mind as there are different and distinct mental operations. I distinguish at first two principal faculties, that of *feeling* and *thinking*. To *feel* is to be affected by an external impression; to *think* is to operate upon our ideas. The faculty of thinking divides itself again into two others, the *understanding* and *reason*. The understanding is that power which combines sensible images; reason is that supreme faculty which regulates all others, directs to an end or object, marks the relations of things, and forms conclusions from the whole. The understanding and reason exercise themselves both under an *active* and *passive* form; under the latter form they receive and preserve notions; and under the former they are united, separated, combined, and placed in logical and methodical order. These two powers are equally exercised on external objects and intellectual notions. What is eminently characteristic of the power of thought, is that ability of uniting, judging, and concluding relative to sensations and ideas. Thought is a species of inward self-instructor; it interrogates itself and furnishes the answers. This self-instructor, through the means of language, forms the *judgment*, which consists in the uniting of ideas together, in the same manner as discourses are formed through the instrumentality of nouns and verbs.

The understanding is closely linked to sensa-

tion; for every sensation is but a confused judgment, which the understanding has afterwards to develop. The latter power unites in one image the detached and apparently unconnected impressions to which sensation gives birth; the senses furnish the materials, and the understanding elaborates them. Though sensibility and reason be two separate powers, opposite in their nature, yet they possess mutual relationships; they appertain to the same thinking being, which unites, by an act of mental consciousness, the objects of thought furnished from both sources.

Let us consider more in detail the particular functions attached to each of these faculties, and the fruits of their joint and separate exercise. There are in our minds *images*, *notions*, and *ideas*; the first belong to sensation, the second to the understanding, and the third to reason. Let us commence then with sensible images, for they develop themselves in man a considerable time before the faculty of thinking. The infant experiences sensations at its birth, but the indications of thought manifest themselves much later, and in some individuals are hardly ever recognized at all. Besides, the soul and reason cannot be conceived without life and thought, nor these again without the influence of external things upon the organs of sense. There are three things involved in every individual external perception;—the object perceived, the subject which perceives it, and the perception itself which bears a mutual relation to both. Colours, smells, &c., reside not in the objects,—they

have their seat only in ourselves. Sensations are then only a certain kind of *affections* or modifications of the power of sensibility; the soul is passive in receiving them. An external object acts upon the organs of sense; certain fibres receive and transmit this impression to the soul. Sensibility is the faculty of being affected, modified, and changed in its condition by this process of sensation. External impressions are remarked and noticed from their diversity and the changes they undergo. In fine, external objects which affect the soul, leave certain traces behind them, the memory preserves them, and imagination revives them.

Sensible perceptions are then the effect of the combined action of external objects upon our organs of sense; and it is necessary also that these perceptions should be united in a centre or common focus, and the result of this concentration is the power of consciousness. Each sense transmits to us only a particular species of impressions; the sight, colours; the ear, sounds; and so on. Now we have the power of comparing these divers classes of impressions, and judging of their analogy and distinctness. What is the faculty which makes this comparison? It can be neither one sense nor another; it must have its source in the soul itself. It is the understanding which performs this office. At the moment when our senses are apprised of the existence of an external object, we appreciate not at first all its divers qualities of greatness, smallness, &c. This operation belongs to the judgment,

which is seated, as it were, in the centre of the soul, to take cognizance of these impressions. It is in this that the power of abstraction consists. The understanding forms *notions* then; that is to say, perceptions of relations and generic qualities, whether as distinguished from or combined with objects possessing a common resemblance or difference; it isolates them from the particular incidents belonging to them, and thus produces all those abstract notions, without which there could be no clear perception whatever. These abstract notions are partly the fruits of external sensations, and partly of the internal power of thinking; and, under this second relation, are grounded upon our own mental nature. Sensation furnishes us with what is particular and individual; the understanding with what is common and general. The senses furnish us with confused perceptions in the *concrete* form, and the understanding clear perceptions in the abstract form.

Such is the general outline of the metaphysical system of Plato. It has many very valuable principles involved in it; and it must be considered by all intelligent and candid judges, as the most important step in the path of speculative inquiry which had, up to his own time, been taken by any philosopher, on the nature and powers of the human mind.

The great dispute about Plato's metaphysical system, has arisen from doubts as to what he means by the word *idea*. Controversies innumerable fill the annals of philosophy on this point; and to this

hour the question remains as unlikely to be solved as when first propounded. To wade through these controversies can be neither pleasant nor profitable. Were I to hazard an opinion I would say, that, from all I have read upon the subject, I am fully convinced that Plato meant by the word *idea*, just the same thing—neither more nor less, than what we do in common conversation or discourse at the present hour. It is conceded on all hands, that he employed the word to designate almost all things, both particular and general; and this can only be accounted for upon rational grounds, that he understood it to mean, according to Locke's definition, *whatever it is that is the object of a man when he thinks*. If Plato had been asked to give a definition of this word, this must, from the mere nature of the thing, have been what he would have said. *Idea* is the simple sign of thought. It may be general, it may be particular, it may be true, it may be false; but it is, in all its phases, just that, and no more, which occupies the mind, or is in the mind, at the time being. How could Plato, or any man else, give a different definition? The thing is impossible. To define *idea* is to define what is the essence of thought.*

The scientific method of Plato is essentially the same as that of Socrates, with some additions and improvements. In fact, Plato's method is the best which he could form out of all preceding systems, and that of his great master in particular. His

* See Note B. in the Appendix to this Volume.

object, like that of Socrates, was, Which was the best mode of seeking after, as well as of communicating, knowledge? On this point, the following observations from Mr. John Mill are very judicious. Contrasting Plato with Socrates, he says, "No doubt the disciple pushed his mere *inquiries* and *speculations* over a more extended surface, and to a greater depth below the surface, than there is any reason to believe the master did. But though he continually starts more original and valuable ideas, it is seldom that these, when they relate to the *results* of inquiry, are stated with any air of conviction, as if they amounted to fixed opinions. But when the topic under consideration is the proper *mode* of philosophising—either the moral spirit in which truth should be sought, or the intellectual processes and methods by which it is to be attained; or when the subject matter is not any particular scientific principle, but knowledge in the abstract,—the differences between knowledge and ignorance, and between knowledge and mere opinion,—*then* the views inculcated are definite and consistent, are always the same, and are put forth with the appearance of earnest and matured belief. Even in treating of other subjects, and even when the opinions advanced have the least semblance of being seriously entertained, the discourse itself has generally a very strong tendency to illustrate the conception which *does* seem to be really entertained of the nature of some part or other of the process of philosophising. The inference we would draw is, that, on the science of the investi-

gation of science, the theory of the pursuit of truth, Plato had not only satisfied himself that his predecessors were in error, and *how*, but had also adopted definite views of his own; while, on all or most other subjects, he contented himself with confuting the absurdities of others, pointing out the proper course for inquiry, and the spirit in which it should be conducted, and throwing out a variety of ideas of his own, of the value of which he was not quite certain, and which he left to the appreciation of any subsequent inquirer competent to sit in judgment upon them."

Plato has always been a great favourite with the philosophic poets of all countries. Every thing he said, and every thing about him, strengthened this prepossession. The Platonic orb, though burning in a sepulchre, has been as a shining light to their path. Milton, Young, Thomson, Akenside, as well as Shakspeare and Pope, are conspicuous instances in our own country. The four first poets were unusually proficient in Platonic knowledge. They drank its spirit at its source, the genuine living fountain. Shakspeare's all-searching genius derived its intelligence and direction from such scattered glimpses as shone, to his acute perceptions, in the pages of the olden and less learned philosophers of the middle ages. The philosophic light was subdued, but it had much resemblance to those roscate hues that linger on the mountain tops long after sun-set; and men of upward tendencies of soul, like Shakspeare, are the cliffs which catch them.

Pope knew little of Platonism himself, and what he did know was solely from the Discourses of Bolingbroke, who studied it in the Latin version of the monk Ficinus, with all the facility, but levity, of his natural temperament ; and who seems to have retailed it, so far as he had mastered it, to his admiring pupil as wisdom of his own. How little Warburton really knew of the Grecian sage may be guessed at from this, that though the editor of Pope, he did not know that his most brilliant work, "The Essay on Man," was but depraved and corrupted Platonism.

Goethe has the following remarks on Plato, of whom, like all minds of an imaginative kind, he was passionately fond. "Plato was a happy and beneficent spirit, sent into this world to sojourn in it for a season. He did not seek so much to make himself profoundly acquainted with it, as to communicate with gracefulness those treasures of wisdom of which mankind stood so much in need. He penetrated into the abyss of speculation, more from the lofty grandeur of his nature than from any vain desire for abstraction. He took his flight to celestial regions, his soul glowing with desire to participate again in its divine nature. Every thing he said had a relation with the good, the beautiful, and the immutably true ; and he ardently desired to inspire all those who heard him with the same lofty and noble sentiments."

The same principle which has so powerfully acted on the philosophical spirit of poetry, from Plato's speculations, has also exercised a great influence on

the current of theological thought, from the first introduction of Christianity to the present hour. Plato has always been a much greater favourite with divines of all denominations than his pupil Aristotle. There is doubtless spirituality in the system of the Stagirite; but it is not the spirituality of Plato. The deity of Aristotle is indeed an *active* creation, but no more. It exercises no providential care or interest over human affairs. In the eyes of Aristotle the soul is distinct from the body, but without a body it cannot exist. The understanding is connected with the soul, as the soul is with the body, and they must all three perish together. We can readily see, therefore, that Christian philosophy could never have any very close alliance with opinions of this description. In Plato, however, we see the creation of the world, and its government, referred directly to the Deity himself; and the immortality of the soul is unqualifiedly maintained. These theological principles constitute the great bond between him and all Christian philosophers; and that bond will remain unsevered till the end of time.

. It is impossible to enumerate a fiftieth part of the authors who have written on the works of Plato. Patricius counts, among the ancients alone, sixty-five commentators on the Platonic Philosophy, before the time of Ammonius Saccas in the year 220. We shall give the following list of publications on the subject, which will, it is hoped, be found ample enough for any rational purpose of consultation or reference. Apuleius, *De Dogmat. Platonis*; Alcinous, *De Doctrina Platonis*; Diog. Laertius, *Olympiodorus*, *Hesychius*. Guarini di Verona, *Vita Platonis*; Marsilius Ficinus, *Vita Platonis*; Melancthon, *Oratio de Vita Platonis*; L'Abbé Fleury, *Discours sur Platon*; Dacier, *Vie de Platon*; Sam. Parker, *A Free and Impartial Censure of Platonic Philosophy*, London, 1666;

Bernardi, in the second book of his *Seminarium Totius Philos.* Venice, 1599; Coclenius, *Idea Phil. Platonice*, Marbourg, 1612; Patricius, *Plato Mysticus et Exotericus*, Venice, 1591; Keuke, *Dissert. De Philos. Platonis*, Helmstadt, 1776; Weigenmeier, *Dissert. De Philos. Platonis*, Tübingen, 1623; The Articles of the Abbé's Fraguier, Garnier, Sallier, and Arnaud, in the *Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions*, Paris; Tennemann, *System of Platonic Philosophy*, in German, Leipsic, 1792, 4 vols.; *Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato*, London, 1760. The following works are on the Platonic Theory of Ideas: Scipione Agnelli, Venice, 1615, fol.; Thomasius, 13th Letter; Sibeth, Rostock, 1720; Schulz, Wittenberg, 1755; Fache, Leipsic, 1795; Schantz, London, 1796; Bartsch, Erlangen, 1761. M. Cousin has given a translation of Plato's Works, in French, in 13 vols.; and the reader will find an English translation by Floyer, Sydenham, and Thomas Taylor, in 5 vols., London, 1804.

CHAPTER XI.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

ARISTOTLE. 384 B. C.

THE successor of Plato was Aristotle, his pupil; a genius of transcendent powers and boundless reputation. He stands alone, without a single competitor, in the history of the philosophy of the human mind; and his speculations have been the fruitful source of more extensive and varied discussion, explanation, and comment, than the writings of any other human being that ever figured on the stage of life.

The extensive range of his inquiry precludes the possibility of giving here anything approaching even to an outline of his labours. The extent of his acquired knowledge, the systematic turn of his mind, his indefatigable application to study, his unrivalled power of analysis, his sagacity in detecting general principles from a chaos of particular facts, his ardent love of truth, and his clear and forcible language, have been, ever since his own day, the theme of admiration of all the lovers of learning in every civilized country.

In the following observations under the head of Aristotle, we shall confine ourselves to four points, namely, his theory of Sensation, his Categories, the Syllogistic theory, and a few cursory remarks as to the nature and principles of Logic in general. These four divisions will embrace the leading topics which the writings of Aristotle, considered exclusively in the light of a metaphysician, usually suggest to the minds of philosophical readers.

SENSATION.

Aristotle's theory of sensation may be developed in the following observations.—

Sensation is the feeling or emotion we experience from external objects acting upon our organs of sense. This sensation or feeling is, in the first instance, passive and transitory, and is always to be distinguished from those universal feelings which, when once brought under the influence of the will, have a permanent residence in the mind. Of the five senses, Aristotle considered that of *touch* to be the most important, inasmuch as it is diffused over the whole body, and cannot be destroyed but with life itself. The sense of taste he considers a species of touch, for an especial object,—the nutrition and support of the body.* The three other senses reside in particular organs, which may be impaired, and even destroyed, without the risk of life itself.

The eye and the ear are appropriated to colours

* De Anima. l. 2. c. 3.

and sounds; and motion and form are conveyed to the mind through more senses than one. A third class of perceptions are communicated to the mind through the united action of all the senses.

The real qualities and properties of external bodies are made known to us through the senses; but those qualities and properties, such as they appear to us, have no actual existence until they are perceived. Previous to sensation, they exist only in what Aristotle calls their *causes*; that is, in their fitnesses or susceptibilities to produce certain effects upon our organs of sense. Were man differently constituted, the world would probably assume a very different aspect; for then sensation might not only inform us of the nature of external things, considered in themselves, but also considered in relation to the peculiar organization of the individual senses.

The powers of imagination and memory depend upon the senses, and are, in a certain degree, common to man with many other animals. As sensation is created by certain motions excited in the organs; so imagination and memory, which are copies of sensation, exert their power and energy through the medium of fainter motions, which are representatives of the former.*

Aristotle considers that the perceptions of imagination and memory are amenable to a certain law of order and progression, and differ in this respect from mere sensations. The movements and

* Rhetor. I. 1. c. 11.

influences of the latter seem more capricious and wayward. Reminiscences are in some degree under the influence of the human will; and the principles which seem to govern them are four in number,—proximity in time, continuity in place, resemblance or similarity, and contrariety or contrast. And to shew, he says, how much the will has to do with the act of remembrance, we are conscious of *hunting about, as it were, among our thoughts*, until we meet with connecting circumstances, which bring the past perceptions sought after present before the mind.*

This faculty of reminiscence, and the power the will seems to have over the train of our ideas, is, in Aristotle's conception, a boundary line between man and the other sentient members of creation. The divine principle of reason is recognized in man by the power which he possesses of moulding the more common sensations and emotions into more elevated and harmonious compounds. Every specific act of remembrance implies comparison; and every act of comparison, expressed in the simplest manner, indicates a substance different and separable from mere matter. This substance we may not be able fully to detect or describe; but still we are convinced of its existence, by the mere power of those attributes which we conceive to belong to it, and which manifest their influence by the irresistible feelings of consciousness.

Between the nature and properties of mind and

* De Memor. p. 682.

those of matter, there is a wide and palpable distinction. It is not sense or fancy which has the power to recognize its own being or existence; it is the intellectual nature alone. It is this which ennobles man, and confers on him a resemblance to his Creator. It is this which, when separated from the body, is invested with an immortal and divine nature, and which does not decay with the bodily tenement it inhabits.*

THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE.

The different Categories, according to Aristotle, comprehend all of which we can have the least knowledge. They are ten in number, namely, QUANTITY, QUALITY, RELATION, ACTION, PASSION, THE WHERE, THE WHEN, POSITION IN SPACE, POSSESSION, and SUBSTANCE.

QUANTITY.—Quantity is divided into *discrete* and *continued*. Discrete is that whose parts can really be separated, as number, &c. Continued is that whose parts cannot be separated. These are again divided into successive and permanent. Successive quantity is that which comes by succession, as *time* and *motion*. The parts of these cannot be divided as those of number, but run onwards in a continued series. Permanent quantity is that which remains always the same, as *space*, which never changes as

* De Anima, l. 3. c. 6. Various interpretations have been put upon Aristotle's expressions in this part of his work. We refer the critic to Dr. Gillies' translation of the "Ethics and Politics," vol. 1. p. 57, and Note; and also to Lord Monboddo's "Ancient Metaphysics," vol. 2. p. 165.

time and motion do, but has always a lasting and permanent existence. Its category is *long, broad, and deep*. And here we may observe, that quantity when considered barely as extended, without breadth or depth, is called a *line*; when it has both length and breadth, a *surface*; and when it has length, breadth, and depth, it is denominated a *solid*.

QUALITY.—This is divided into four kinds. First, *habits*, which are such endowments as are either created or very materially strengthened, by repeated acts of the mind. When a man is virtuous, we say he possesses the habit of virtue. In a similar qualified sense we apply the word habit to *wisdom, temperance, learning, &c.* Those endowments which are acquired by different acts of the mind are also considered as qualities, but they are usually called habits. Secondly, *natural powers*, which relate more particularly to our bodies, such as the power of walking, riding, &c. These powers are possessed more or less by all mankind, and can be exercised as occasion requires. Thirdly, *sensible qualities*, which are those we acquire by our senses from the operation of external objects, such as colours, tastes, smells, sounds, &c. Fourthly, *figure and form* are also ranked under this category; all external objects must be possessed of these.

RELATION.—This indicates the relative connexion of one thing with another, as parent and child, master and servant. It also denotes resemblance, equality, greatness, smallness, &c.

ACTION.—This is either *internal* or *external*. Internal action is when I think of a particular

thing confined within myself, and effect nothing without me. External action regards something without, as when I cut a piece of wood or hew a stone.

PASSION.—After action, passion naturally follows; and is always expressed by a verb.

THE WHERE.—This answers to the question, Where was such thing done? If one ask where such a battle was fought, I tell him it was in such a country, and near such a city.

THE WHEN.—This category gives answers to questions relative to *time*. As, How long is it since he died? One hundred years ago.

POSITION IN SPACE.—This relates to standing, sitting, before, behind, right, left, &c.

POSSESSION.—This involves the whole rights of property.

SUBSTANCE.—This is divided into two kinds, *spiritual* and *temporal*. Spiritual is divided into living creatures, as men, beasts, birds, &c.; and temporal into inanimate things, as metals, minerals, earth, air, stone, &c. Both orders may be subdivided again into almost endless classes and varieties.

These are the famous categories of Aristotle, and every one must see how defective they really are, as a philosophical classification of things. This list was considered for many centuries as the most perfect and complete arrangement of the phenomena of nature that ever was made. On this point Dr. Gillies observes, "The reduction of things to genera or classes, by applying to them common names, is the foundation of division and

definition, which have been called by a just metaphor the firm handles of science. Each of the categories, or classes, above mentioned, that of substance for example, may be variously divided according to the intent of the division, which may be undertaken for explaining the works of art or of nature; for delineating the institutions of civil policy, or describing the structure of plants and animals; in a word, for examining any object, whether material or intellectual, about which human thought is conversant. But for whatever purpose the division is intended, it can be perspicuous and satisfactory only when it descends from the more general classes or terms to those which are less general, until it arrives at the lowest species of all, which rejects all further partition but into individuals only. The intermediate terms between the highest genus and the lowest species, stand each of them in two distinct relations, and therefore receive two different names, that of genus with respect to the less general terms which they contain, and that of species with respect to the more general terms under which they are contained. Such is Aristotle's own doctrine concerning classification and division; a doctrine continually exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well as physical; and admirably illustrated by some modern writers, especially on the subjects of natural history.

SYLLOGISM.

Our observations in this division shall be con-

finer to three distinct heads; namely, first, to show what the syllogism is, according to the usual explanations given of it by logicians and metaphysicians; secondly, to inquire into its nature and object; and thirdly, to state, as briefly as possible, what are the general opinions of the learned on its real merits, as an instrument for the discovery and communication of truth.

The process of reasoning involved in the syllogism, has, by some logicians, been looked upon as simply a process of comparison. When we compare two things of dissimilar qualities together, we cannot affirm or do anything respecting them, without endeavouring to find some intermediate ideas, to reconcile as it were to the mind these dissimilar or contrary qualities. But, it may be asked, by what process is this effected? And how do these intermediate ideas come to discover the relations of things of an incongruous and opposite nature? No rational answer can be given to these questions, except this, that such is the constitution of our nature, that when two ideas are presented to our attention, from which no reasoning conclusion can be adduced, it so happens that when one or more intermediate ideas are presented to our minds, and contemplated by them in conjunction with the other two ideas, we instantaneously, as it were, draw a logical inference from the whole.

It is from this cause that those writers who have argued in favour of the use of syllogisms have founded their doctrine on the principle, that every act of reasoning assumes the form of a syllogism.

They consider reasoning to be merely an operation of the mind, which deducts some unknown propositions from other propositions which have been rendered familiar by a previous exercise of reasoning, or are intuitively certain. In every simple process of reasoning, two members or parts are employed; and these members or parts must of themselves be obvious to the understanding, and we assent to their truth immediately upon their enunciation. In a syllogism, the premises are assumed to be self-evident truths; and if this were not the case, we could never draw any logical inference from them. In the major of a syllogism, the connexion between the subject and the predicate could not be observed by the mind, by a mere attention to the ideas themselves which compose the major; for this proposition requires as much proof as the conclusion drawn from it. In this case the mind must find out fresh matter to trace the connexion wanted, and furnish another syllogism to establish the first point in the general one. And should it so happen, that this second syllogism is not found sufficient to establish the truth of the first, we must have recourse to a third, and a fourth, and so on, till it be discovered. We go on in this manner, till we arrive at perfect intuitive truths, and here we are compelled to rest satisfied.

From these remarks, it is maintained, therefore, that every single process of reasoning is founded upon intuitive propositions; and if this be not the case, syllogisms must be employed to lay the

foundation. By this view of the matter, every train of reasoning consists of a greater or lesser number of syllogisms. These may not, in many cases, be put into a formal shape; but it is entirely from the natural connexion which subsists among the propositions, that the force and conclusiveness of general reasoning proceed.

To show the nature of the syllogism more clearly, we shall here give an example. Let us take the proposition, and form it into the shape of a syllogism—that *man ought to practise justice*. Now, we want to discover the relation which ought to subsist between *man* and *justice*; for the mind does not perceive this relation, as the proposition at present stands. By considering the matter a little, we soon learn, that for *man* to be under an obligation to do a thing, he must have the sagacity to perceive, and the power to execute it. A creature must have the faculty of distinguishing good from evil, as well as the liberty of choosing either, otherwise he lies under no obligation to perform the one or refrain from the other. Now, these are the *middle terms or ideas*, which must be compared by the mind with the first term in the proposition, namely *man*; and when we have made this comparison, we find that it may be affirmed of him, that he is a being who can distinguish good from evil, and that he has the liberty of choice in his actions. We have here, then, two distinct judgments that *man can distinguish good from evil*, and *that he has the power of himself to do either*; and a third judgment immediately suggests itself,

that *man ought to practise justice*. The argument may now be put into the shape of a syllogism, thus—

“Every creature possessed of reason and liberty
ought to practise justice;

Man is a creature possessed of reason and
liberty,

Therefore man ought to practise justice.”

In this syllogism three distinct parts or propositions are involved; and they are so arranged as to agree with the mode which our minds naturally follow in the arrangement of our ideas in reasoning. The first two propositions are denominated the *premises*, because they go before, or lay the foundation for, the other proposition, which is called the *conclusion*, in consequence of its naturally growing out of the *premises*. But there is a matter here which the reader will do well to consider thoroughly, and make himself master of. The two terms *man* and *justice*, which express the two ideas whose connexion or relation we wish to find out, are called the *extremes*; and the intermediate idea, by which this connexion or relation is discovered, namely, *a being possessed of reason and liberty*, takes the name of the *middle term*. Now we are to understand that before the *premises* of a syllogism can be established, the terms called the *extremes*, and the *middle term*, must be compared together; for out of this comparison proceeds the very essence of the syllogism. The *conclusion* is the proposition which arises from the *extremes* being considered either in connexion

with, or separated from, that which appears the result of this comparison.

Reasoning in common life has been affirmed to be nothing more than merely ascribing the general qualities of things to their objects in matters with which we are concerned. We refer a particular object to some general head or class, which general head or class possesses some fixed attribute or quality. We then ascribe that attribute or quality to the particular object we have placed under the general assortment of things. Thus, if I scrutinize the character of my friend John, and find it to be virtuous, I then begin to reflect that a virtuous character is worthy of esteem and reward; and I draw the conclusion, that the conduct of John is worthy of esteem and reward. This is the common process which the mind follows in forming judgments of this description. If we wish to arrange the process of reasoning in the form of a syllogism, it will stand thus:—

“Every virtuous man is worthy of esteem and reward;

John is a virtuous man,

Therefore John is worthy of esteem and reward.”

These few remarks apply to syllogisms in general. But we come now to speak of the different kinds or sorts of syllogisms. There are four general assortments, which take their rise from the particular situation which the *middle term* holds in the syllogism. 1st, That in which the middle term is the subject of the major proposition, and

the predicate of the minor. 2nd, That in which the middle term becomes the predicate of both *premises*. 3rd, That in which the middle term becomes the subject of both premises. And, 4th, That in which the middle term is the predicate of the major proposition, and the subject of the minor. These four different classes or assortments become divided again according to what logicians call their *modes*, which are determined by the *quantity* and *quality* of the propositions framed into syllogisms. By *quantity* is meant the consideration of propositions as they relate to *universals* or *particulars*; and by *quality*, whether these propositions be of an *affirmative* or *negative* description. All the possible modes of syllogisms may be found by ascertaining how many combinations may be made out of these four general kinds. The number will be sixty-four, which, multiplied by four, will give two hundred and fifty-six.

Each of these figures has rules peculiar to itself; but there are some rules which are common to all syllogisms; and Aristotle enumerates the following. 1st, Every syllogism must have only *three terms* or *propositions*. 2nd, The *middle term* must be taken *universally* in *one* of the premises. 3rd, If one of the *extremes* be particular in one of the premises, it must also be *particular* in the *conclusion*. 4th, The *conclusion* must be *particular*, if either of the premises be *particular*; and *negative*, if either of the *premises* be *negative*. 5th, No term can be taken *universally* in the *conclusion*, if it be not taken universally in the *premises*.

Without drawing out these general remarks on the nature of syllogisms to a greater length, we shall now advert to a few only of the different kinds of syllogisms. These will be sufficient for common purposes, as well as to illustrate the leading principles of the syllogistic theory.

There is a kind of syllogism in which the number of propositions is more than three. This syllogism is technically called a *sorites*; which means a number of propositions piled up one upon another, in which the predicate of the first proposition is made the subject of the second, and so on, till in the conclusion the predicate is attributed to the first subject: thus,

“ Man is an animal,
Every animal is a body,
Every body is a substance,
Therefore, every man is a substance.”

Now this particular combination of propositions, it must appear obvious to the reader, may be continued to almost any length we desire, without weakening the premises or grounds on which the conclusion rests. The reason of this is, that this kind of compound syllogisms may be divided into as many simple ones as there are middle terms in the *sorites*. When such a division takes place, and the simple syllogisms follow one another, the last in the series becomes the conclusion of the compound syllogism or *sorites*. This method, therefore, of constructing syllogisms is nothing more nor less than joining together

several simple syllogisms; and consequently the sorites must stand upon the same ground, in respect to logical stability, as do the individual parts of which it is composed.

There is another kind of syllogisms, called by logicians *enthymeme*; where one of the parts is omitted, and is left for the mind to supply upon the spur of the moment. This happens when one or more of the premises is a self-evident truth, and familiar to the mind of every one. Such, for instance, is the following:

“Every man must breathe,
Therefore the king must breathe.”

This syllogism has the appearance of being imperfect, as having only two propositions; but this is not the case. It is really complete; for the minor proposition, *every king is a man*, is omitted, and the reader is supposed to supply the ellipsis in his own mind.

False syllogisms are called paralogisms; and a false syllogism, the error or fallacy of which is not very readily perceived by the mind, is called a sophism. The following kinds of sophisms are generally treated of by writers on logic.

Ignoratio elenchi, or a mistake of the question, is a term applied to a proposition which has no necessary connexion with the subject in dispute. If, for example, a man should wish to establish the position, that God is infinitely good and merciful, and begin by demonstrating His omniscience, this would be a deviation from the

question under consideration; for God's omniscience may be granted, and yet His goodness and mercy may still remain subjects of discussion. In like manner, a man may argue that all religion is a delusion; for he has seen some persons who have made loud professions of piety and devotion in public, who were, nevertheless, very profligate and wicked in their general conduct. This also is an *ignoratio elenchi*, or a mistake of the question; for a hypocritical professor of a system is here made the test or standard by which the nature and truth of that system are to be estimated.

Petitio principii, or begging the question, is a term employed to denote the taking for granted the proposition you wish to prove. If a man were to maintain that a certain act of his was not in the least immoral, because it was not contrary to the acknowledged rules of morality, nor to commands of Scripture; he would here be begging the question, and assuming in the outset the very thing he was desirous to prove—the harmless nature of the act. This mode of reasoning is also sometimes called arguing *idem per idem*.

Arguing in a circle is when the premises are demonstrated by the conclusion, and the conclusion by the premises. If, for instance, it be affirmed that the authority of any particular church proves the truth of the sacred Scriptures, and the Scriptures the authority of that church; this would be arguing in a circle.

Non causa pro causa, the assigning of a false cause for any effect. Thus when a person ascribes

certain events to good or ill luck, to the influence of the planets, or the like.

Fullacia accidentis, arguing from what is local and incidental to what is general and essential. If, for example, a person were to maintain that a bank-note of any country is of a value as universal and absolute as a piece of gold, this would be a *fallacia accidentis*; for paper money has only a local, but gold a general value. And further, if a man were to say that any particular amusement is dangerous or immoral because it is liable to be abused, this is arguing from what is particular and accidental, to what is general and essential.

Sophisms of equivocation, are those which are formed by the employment of ambiguous terms, or terms which are of doubtful meaning. The following is an old example.—

“He that says you are an animal says true;
He that says you are a goose, says you are an animal;
Therefore, he that says you are a goose says true.”

We shall add to these remarks on the nature of the syllogistic theory, a few observations from Dr. Reid, who wrote an *Analysis of Aristotle's Logic*. The following extract forms a compendium of the precise mode of reasoning exemplified in three forms of the syllogism.

“In the first figure, the conclusion affirms or denies something of a certain species or individual; and the argument to prove this conclusion is, that the same thing may be affirmed or denied of the

whole genus to which that species or individual belongs.

"In the second figure, the conclusion is, that some species or individual does not belong to such a genus; and the argument is, that some attribute common to the whole genus does not belong to that species or individual.

"In the third figure, the conclusion is, that such an attribute belongs to part of a genus; and the argument is, that the attribute in question belongs to a species or individual which is part of that genus.

"I apprehend that, in this short view, every conclusion that falls within the compass of the three figures, as well as the mean of proof, is comprehended. The rules of all the figures might be easily deduced from it; and it appears that there is only one principle of reasoning in all the three; so that it is not strange, that a syllogism of one figure should be reduced to one of another figure.

"The general principle in which the whole terminates, and of which every categorical syllogism is only a particular application, is this, that what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus may be affirmed or denied of every species and individual belonging to it. This is a principle of undoubted certainty indeed, but of no great depth. Aristotle and all the logicians assume it as an axiom, or first principle, from which the syllogistic system, as it were, takes its departure; and after a tedious voyage, and great expense of demonstration, it

lands at last in this principle, as its ultimate conclusion. *O curas hominum! O quantum est in rebus inane!*"

That one of the principles on which the syllogism rests is, that the same word is invariably used in the same sense, is quite obvious. Indeed the truth of this position has been attested by a number of enlightened philosophers. Lord Bacon says, "A syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the signs of notions; therefore, if our notions, the basis of all, are confined, and over hastily taken from things, nothing that is built on them can be firm."* Professor Stewart remarks, that "the whole theory of the syllogism proceeds on the supposition, that the same word is always to be employed in the same sense; and that, consequently, it takes for granted, in every rule which it furnishes for the guidance of our reasoning powers, that the nicest, and by far the most difficult part of the logical process, has been previously brought to a successful termination."† We find M. Turgot making the same remark:—"Tout l'artifice de ce calcul ingénieux, dont Aristote nous a donné les règles, tout l'art du Syllogisme, est fondé sur l'usage des mots dans le même sens; l'emploi d'un même mot dans deux sens différens fait de tout raisonnement un sophisme; et ce genre de sophisme, peut-être le plus commun de tout, est une des sources les plus ordinaires de nos erreurs."‡

* Nov. Org., part 1.

† Elements of M. Phil. vol. 1, p. 356.

‡ Œuv. de M. Turgot, tom. 3, p. 66.

The nature as well as the utility of the syllogistic theory has been long and keenly contested. For many ages it was considered almost sinful to call in question either its truth or usefulness. There was no language too eulogistic to sound its praise. The syllogism was considered the noblest and most useful invention ever produced by man ; the universal organ of science ; the eye of the intellect ; and, like the sun, the light of the world. It was called the "*ars artium, scientia scientiarum, organum organorum, instrumentum instrumentorum, ancilla, clavis, testa, murus philosophiæ, docendi discendique magistra, veri falsique disceptatrix et judex.*" Aristotle himself was extolled in the same extravagant terms. Father Pardies, a French writer, says, "Que si, dans sa physique, il a parlé en homme, dans sa morale il a parlé en Dieu ; qu'il y a sujet de douter si, dans ses morales, il tient plus du jurisconsulte que du prêtre ; plus du prêtre, que du prophète ; plus du prophète que de Dieu." Averroes, an Arabian philosopher, declares that "Nature was not altogether complete till Aristotle was born ;" and that in him "she received the finishing stroke, and could advance no further !"

The language of modern times is, however, more subdued and modified. We are not all in the same way of thinking on Aristotle's merits as a logician. There is a diversity of opinion as to the nature and importance of the syllogistic theory. But the dispute, though still undecided, is now carried on with more calmness and liberality than in bygone times. And perhaps the day is not far distant

when an unanimous and settled opinion will be formed by all speculative thinkers, as to the true nature of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of that portion of praise to which they are justly entitled.

On the general value of the syllogistic art, I cannot refrain from giving the opinion of the late Professor Stewart. He says :—"The remarks which were long ago made by Lord Bacon on the inutility of the syllogism as an organ of scientific discovery, together with the acute strictures in Locke's Essay on this form of reasoning, are so decisive in point of argument, and, at the same time, so familiarly known to all who turn their attention to philosophical inquiries, as to render it perfectly unnecessary for me, on the present occasion, to add any thing in support of them. I shall, therefore, in the sequel, confine myself to a few general and miscellaneous reflections on one or two points overlooked by these eminent writers ; but to which it is of essential importance to attend, in order to estimate justly the value of the Aristotelian logic, considered as a branch of education.

"It is an observation which has been often repeated since Bacon's time, and which, it is astonishing, was so long in forcing itself on the notice of philosophers, that in all our reasonings about the established order of the universe, experience is our sole guide, and knowledge is to be acquired only by ascending from particulars to generals ; whereas the syllogism leads us invariably from universals to particulars, the truth of which, instead of being

a consequence of the universal proposition, is implied and presupposed in the very terms of its enunciation. *The syllogistic art, therefore, it has been justly concluded, can be of no use in extending our knowledge of nature.*

"It is, not, however, merely as a useless or inefficient organ for the discovery of truth, that this act is exceptionable. The importance of the very object at which it professedly aims, is not a little doubtful. To exercise with correctness the powers of deduction and of argumentation; or, in other words, to make a legitimate inference from the premises before us, would seem to be an intellectual process which requires but little assistance from rule. The strongest evidence of this is, the facility with which men of the most moderate capacity learn, in the course of a few months, to comprehend the longest mathematical demonstrations; a facility which, when contrasted with the difficulty of enlightening their minds on questions of morals or politics, affords a sufficient proof that it is not from any inability to conduct a mere logical process that our speculative errors arise. The fact is, that, in most sciences, our reasonings consist of a very few steps; and yet, how liable are the most cautious and the most sagacious to form erroneous conclusions!

"The fundamental idea on which Aristotle evidently proceeded, and in which he has been so implicitly followed by many even of those who have rejected his syllogistic theory, takes for granted, that the discovery of truth chiefly depends on this

reasoning faculty which constitutes the intellectual superiority of one man above another. The similarity between the words reason and reasoning, of which I formerly took notice, and the confusion which it has occasioned in their appropriate meanings, has contributed powerfully to encourage and to perpetuate this unfortunate mistake.”*

LOGIC.

The principle laid down by Aristotle, is, that all reasoning whatever rests on one simple principle : that “what is predicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated in like manner of anything contained under that term.” This, I conceive, must ever be considered a very inadequate definition of what a process of reasoning is, *metaphysically considered*. All reasoning is called a *process* ; now we want to know what this process is. But we shall look in vain for any thing in the logical works of Aristotle, or of his commentators, ancient or modern, which throws light on this curious process. To affirm, or deny, or predicate anything of one or of many things, is not a *process* ; it seems, from an appeal to consciousness, to be a simple act of the mind ; consequent, however, upon other previous acts or perceptions of the thinking principle. It may be safely affirmed, that the whole theory of reasoning, considered as involving mental phenomena, is very imperfectly understood, even from

* Elements of the Phil. of the Mind, p. 427. . Edit. 1836.

the writings of our ablest and most perspicuous writers. This subject will, however, come under the reader's attention in a subsequent part of this work.

Aristotle dissented from Plato's notion relative to the nature of ideas, and in many parts seems to condemn it rather severely. But it is still a matter of great difficulty to determine the precise character and import of Aristotle's objections to his master's theory. The former agrees with the latter, that the essences of things are expressed in our notions of them, but that this essence is not found in the general ideas which we form. This controversy has given rise to considerable discussion in Germany; and to those who may feel any interest in it, we refer them to the end of the volume.*

To these remarks I would add the following observations from Mr. Stewart, whose opinion on the subject in question, is entitled to great respect. "On most of these points, *the philosophy of Aristotle seems to have coincided very nearly with that of Plato*. The language, however, which these philosophers employed on this subject was different, and gave to their doctrines the appearance of a wider diversity than probably existed between their opinions. While Plato was led, by his passion for the marvellous and the mysterious, to insist on the incomprehensible union of the same idea or essence with a number of individuals, without multiplication or division; Aristotle, more cautious, and

* See Note C. at the end of this Volume.

aiming at greater perspicuity, contented himself with saying, that all individuals are composed of matter and form; and that it is in consequence of possessing a common form, that different individuals belong to the same genus. But they both agreed, that as the matter or individual natures of objects were perceived by sense, so the general idea, or essence, or form, was perceived by the intellect; and that as the attention of the vulgar was chiefly engrossed with the former, so the latter furnished to the philosopher the materials of his speculations.

"The chief difference between the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on the subject of ideas, relates to the mode of their existence. That the matter of which things are made, existed from eternity, was a principle which both admitted; but Plato further taught, that of every species of things, there is an idea of form which also existed from eternity; and that this idea is the exemplar or model according to which the individuals of the species were made; whereas Aristotle held, that, although matter may exist without form, yet that form could not exist without matter."*

On the subtle, though important, doctrine of Cause and Effect, Aristotle's opinion is worthy of a passing notice. He divides all causes into four kinds; the *material*, the *formal*, the *efficient*, and the *final*. Material causes relate to the substance or matter out of which things were originally

* Philos. of Mind. Vol. 1. p. 88. See also Brucker, Dr. Reid, Harris's Hermes, and the work, "Origin and Progress of Language."

made; the formal designate that inward structure or form, on which rest the outward figure and diversified appearances of things; the efficient cause is the instrument of motion or change; and the final cause is the end or purpose which certain things were made to accomplish.

"A student, passing from the works of Plato," it has been well said, "to those of Aristotle, is struck first of all with the entire absence of that dramatic form and that dramatic feeling with which he has been familiar. The living human beings with whom he has conversed have passed away. Protagoras, and Prodicus, and Hippias are no longer lounging upon their couches in the midst of groups of admiring pupils; we have no walks along the walls of the city; no readings beside the Ilissus; no lively symposia, giving occasion to high discourses about love; no Critias recalling the stories he had heard in the days of his youth, before he became a tyrant of ancient and glorious republics; above all no Socrates forming a centre to these various groups, while yet he stands out clear and distinct in his individual character, showing that the most subtle of dialecticians may be the most thoroughly humorous and humane of men. Some little sorrow for the loss of those clear and beautiful pictures will perhaps be felt by every one; but by far the greater portion of readers will believe that they have an ample compensation, in the precision and philosophical dignity of the treatise, for the richness and variety of the dialogue. To hear solemn disquisi-

tions solemnly treated; to hear opinions calmly discussed without interruptions or personalities; above all, to have a profound and considerate judge, able and not unwilling to pronounce a positive decision upon the evidence before him; this they think a great advantage, and this, and far more than this, they expect, not wrongfully, to find in Aristotle."*

. The Commentators on Aristotle are still more numerous than on Plato. The following may be consulted with advantage: The ancient Commentators, Simplicius, Alexander Aphrodisicus, Ammonius son of Hermias, Porphyry, and Themistius. Among the moderns: Bernardi, *Seminarium Philos. Peripat.*, Lyons, 1599; Crassot, *Institutiones in Universam Aristotelis Philosophiam*, Paris, 1619; La Ramée, *Animadversiones Aristot.* Paris, 1518; Gassendi, *Exercitationes Paradoxicæ*, Grenoble, 1624; Delaunay, *De vari. Philosoph. Arist.* Paris, 1653; Charpentier, *Descriptio universæ artis Disserendi ex Aristotelis Logico Organo*, Paris 1564; Mazzoni, Italian translation, Venice, 1547; Backmann, German translation, Nordhausen, 1629; French translation by Charpentier, 1574. The English reader will find Gillies' translation of several of Aristotle's works useful; and the translation of all his works by Taylor, in 9 Volumes, may also be beneficially consulted.

* Ency. Metropoli. Art. Moral and Met. Phil.

CHAPTER XII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

ON ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, AND ANALOGY, CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

IN almost all the speculations of the ancient philosophers, we find more or less attention given to the powers of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy. The degrees of importance assigned to these respective powers were various; some referring nearly the whole phenomena of thought to them; while others again confer upon them but a passing notice. To enter into all the discussions on the nature and limitations of the faculties we find in the writings of the sages of antiquity, is out of our power; but we shall hazard a few general observations on these constituent principles of thought, which exercise so marked an influence over the mental movements of all mankind.

By analysis we must understand the dividing and separating a general truth or proposition into its elementary or component parts. This is a

mental process carried on to a great extent by all men, without their being, in ordinary cases, in the least degree conscious of its operation. When a beautiful and extensive landscape bursts suddenly upon our view, the mind is occupied with the consideration of the whole taken together; but after a certain time has elapsed, we begin to examine the different parts of which this landscape is composed; to reflect upon and examine them, and to apportion out to each individual part, according to our knowledge and taste, its due proportion of influence in the general effect produced. We examine the landscape by piece-meal; beginning, in ordinary cases, with the most important parts, and descending in the scale of promineney, till our observations have assumed a sufficient degree of minuteness to gratify the spirit of inquiry, or to grasp the mental object of which we are in search.

Those who can attend to the operations of their own minds, will readily perceive the vast use of this power of analysis, and how necessary its cultivation and exercise are to our making any progress in many important branches of human knowledge. Referring again, by way of illustration, to an interesting landscape, we know that the artist who can furnish a representation of it, must be greatly indebted to this power of analysis. He must carefully attend to the effects of the scene as a whole; and yet he must, at every step of his performance, be carrying on a most accurate and minute process of analytical division. He must

give to every part of the landscape a proper degree of attention. The general aspect is grasped as a whole by his mind; and then it is parcelled out among the rocks, and prominences, and waterfalls, and woods, and buildings, &c., in suitable proportions, according to the principles of art. Indeed, it is to this habit of analyzing his ideas of the sublime and beautiful in external nature, that he owes his skill; for if he had no art to separate his general conceptions into their component parts, and apportion out to each its suitable situation, as to dimensions, light, shade, distance, colour, &c., his canvass would be one uniform representation of shapeless nonentities.

And the case is precisely the same with one who, instead of representing a landscape on canvass, presents you with a verbal description of it. No general language can possibly convey to you the most distant conception of the landscape, till the describer descends into particulars, and divides the object which occupies his thoughts into its several parts. He must talk to you of the conical-topped mountain; the rugged and prominent cliff, overhanging the banks of the river; the weeping willows shading the waters from your view; and the tremendous roar of the mountain torrent, as it dashes from rock to rock. There must be individuality embodied in every part of his description, that it may be understood and relished by those to whom it is addressed; and when the whole has been analyzed into sufficiently minute portions, these are all summed up, as it were, by the mind,

and united into one general and uniform representation.

The same power of the mind we are here describing, is called into active exercise in the efforts made in the current literature of all civilized nations to delineate human character, in its various forms and aspects. But here, as in painting and descriptive writing, general ideas must be resolved into their individual parts, before our descriptions of character can be rendered intelligible, or in unison with nature. In drawing a mental or moral portrait, we must begin with the leading and more conspicuous traits of character, and gradually descend to the more hidden and minute principles of action and passion; filling up the sketch, as we proceed, with the little angular prominences and whimsical eccentricities, which diversify the wide and extended range of human nature. In those writings descriptive of men's habits of thinking, powers of mind, moral principles, passions and sentiments, we immediately recognise the hand of a master, if the description display a minute and skilful exercise of the power of analyzing. We are never deceived in this matter, but promptly pronounce the portrait to be admirably drawn, when all the parts which constitute the picture pass in review before our minds, and become invested with an evident unity of design and appearance.

In subjects of an abstract and profound nature, the mind follows the same plan to arrive at truth. The process employed in abstruse sciences has frequently been illustrated by a piece of machinery.

Let us take the steam-engine for an example. We wish to make ourselves well acquainted with its nature and mode of operation. If we wish to obtain this information by the analytic method, we take the engine to pieces, and examine its parts separately. When we have seen the action and use of all the parts of which it is composed, compared them together, and seen their mutual dependence and relationship, we then discern the nature and use of a steam-engine. We have unravelled the mystery, and can now discover the cause of those phenomena which so often puzzled us.

Before proceeding farther, however, we would call the attention of the reader to a few remarks in reference to the power of analysis. The analytic method is never used alone, but generally conjoined with the synthetic method. They are often alternately employed by the mind; and these alternations are, in the majority of instances, so quick and rapid, that we cannot perceive them, even by the strongest efforts of consciousness. The manner in which we exert these faculties is this. We first take the general proposition as a whole, divide it into its elementary parts; we then sum up all these parts again, to form afresh the original proposition. Thus we employ both analysis and synthesis. These two operations are strictly distinguishable from each other, from the point at which they set out in the reasoning process. If we begin at the top, and descend, it is analysis; if at the bottom, and ascend, it is synthesis.

Analysis by itself would never, however, lead us to truth. And here we must notice a peculiarly important principle, arising out of the mechanism of the understanding, in relation to this analyzing process. Were we to go on to analyze every object presented to our minds, we would never get any nearer the truth. There is a limit beyond which our division of objects must cease; but this limit cannot be specifically pointed out by any precise rules or precepts of logic. This discriminating power is under the control of the superior faculties of the mind; and commonly goes by the name of *judgment, taste, &c.* To be entirely destitute of this power, is to be entirely destitute of intellectual acumen; and on the contrary, to possess this power, and to know how to regulate it properly, constitute the distinguishing properties of a rational being.

Let us suppose that a painter, when he endeavours to represent a landscape, should direct his attention so minutely to everything which composed the rural scene before him, as to dwell upon every leaf of a tree, every blade of grass, and every minute object which came within the sphere of his vision, he could never by this means complete a picture at all. The analysis would be too minute, and carried beyond its legitimate boundaries. Again, should a man, when he wishes to make himself acquainted with a piece of machinery, such, for instance, as the steam-engine already referred to, dwell with fastidious and scrutinizing minuteness on the nature, configuration, and properties

of all the fibres of wood which compose the framework of the machine, or the grains of metal, or the shape and number of the nails which have been employed in the construction of the boiler; if, in fact, he were to attempt to analyze *every thing* relating to the object of his inquiries, he might so employ himself for a thousand years, and be no nearer a correct understanding of the nature and power of the engine, than the first day he commenced his investigations. Thus it appears that an unlimited analysis can lead to nothing. But this power is wisely placed under the control of the judgment; and, while she occupies her supremacy, the power of analysis is carried just to that point which is necessary to make us perceive the truth of the general propositions of which the mind is in search.

These two powers of analysis and synthesis enter into every process of reasoning, however limited or unimportant. We are almost every moment of our lives employing them. These operations, however, are frequently so subtle and rapid, that it can only be from long attention to the inward workings of our own minds, that a habit can be permanently formed of readily recognising their existence and influence upon our intellectual movements. From the writings of logicians and metaphysicians, the reader might be led to imagine that the analytic and synthetic methods of reasoning are purely matters of *art*, and only of very recent invention. But this is a great mistake. The division of our general conceptions or ideas into their component

parts, and the power of again uniting them into their former state of aggregation, are faculties intimately blended with the very earliest movements of the mind of man, however rude or unenlightened it may be. We recognise the application of these intellectual instruments in the savage, as well as in the philosopher, as far as their respective degrees of knowledge require that application.

These remarks will be sufficient to illustrate the analytic method of reasoning; we come now to the synthetic method, or that of induction. We here reverse the order followed in analysis. In seeking knowledge for ourselves, or in communicating it to others, by the synthetic plan, we begin with the simple and elementary parts of which general truths or propositions are composed. In abstract science, we commence with intuitive or self-evident truths or axioms, and advance by regular steps upwards, carrying evidence and conviction along with us; so that, at every interval of our reasoning, we have a clear view of the ground which we have immediately gone over, and the reasons which, at every point, have commanded our assent.

In natural philosophy the synthetic method is generally adopted. In making experiments and observations upon various objects, we notice the result; and by comparing and judging, we come to the knowledge of those quantities or properties of bodies which are common to many apparently different substances. As we follow up this process we come to generalize still more, until we arrive at

what we call the ultimate principles of bodies, or general laws of nature.

What generally passes under the denomination of *method*, is simply the exercise of these two powers of analysis and induction. Our all-wise Creator has assigned them a conspicuous place among our intellectual principles. There is in man a love of order and arrangement, which manifests itself at a very early period of life. At the first dawn of reason, ere the mental powers have acquired almost any strength, we find the young child begin to make selections of material objects, and to arrange and classify them according to a particular standard fixed in his mind, as to colour, size, &c. Some faint traces of this power are discernible in the inferior creation; but it is vastly pre-eminent in man. It gradually develops itself as he advances to manhood; enables him to divide and methodize his thoughts and sentiments; and becomes of vital importance in the proper discharge of those numerous duties which fall to his lot to perform.

Analysis and induction, however, viewed singly, cannot be regarded as instruments either for the discovery or promulgation of truth. Another power is absolutely necessary,—that of analogy; and to it, therefore, we shall call the attention of the reader.

We have, in the preceding remarks, pointed out at some length the importance of the two operations of the mind, called analysis and synthesis. But we must here observe, that these faculties

would be of very little use if we did not possess the power of reasoning from analogy. If we required to analyze every object which came before us, and to resolve it into its general principles, before we could pronounce with certainty any thing respecting it, our actual knowledge would be exceedingly circumscribed indeed. Here, however, another operation of the mind is brought into play, which relieves us from an inconceivable degree of trouble, enlarges our knowledge, and expands our reasoning powers to an almost indefinite extent. This process is analogy. If we analyze a portion of matter into its elementary parts, we firmly believe that another, possessing the same external appearances as the former, is composed of like materials. If we see a man following a certain line of conduct, and bringing upon himself and others poverty and disease, we immediately draw the conclusion that the like will happen to others if they tread in the same steps. In these respective instances we do not institute an inquiry into every individual object upon which we reason and decide ; but we draw our conclusions from what we have actually experienced, and apply them to objects of a similar nature, which we may, nevertheless, never have submitted to personal examination.

The term analogy is generally used, both in common language and in systems of logic and philosophy, to denote a certain degree of relation, agreement, or resemblance in some points, between two or more objects, which in other respects have

little in common, or possess altogether different properties or qualities. It must be obvious, from the immense variety of the works of creation, that the objects which bear a relation or resemblance to one another must be numerous beyond the possibility of calculation, and we shall find that analogy or resemblance is of every degree, from nearly complete identity to direct opposition or contrariety.

A great portion of the reasoning of mankind is founded upon analogy. It is in constant and universal use, and is employed alike by the rustic and the philosopher. It is one of those instruments which the Almighty has placed in our hands to secure our comfort and welfare, and to develop for our information the laws of nature; but, like all other gifts from the same munificent source, it requires to be judiciously applied to the proper and legitimate purposes for which it was given.

In almost every department of human knowledge analogical reasonings are employed to a great extent, and are found to be of vast utility. In the science of comparative anatomy, for example, it is of singular importance to trace out the resemblances between the structures of different animals, their organs of sensation, digestion, and motion; and from this analogical inquiry we may draw useful conclusions for the government of our own conduct and constitution, and the promotion of our interests. For example, we make experiments with certain kinds of food on the digestive organs of dogs, and from these we *infer* or *draw con-*

clusions that such and such effects will result to ourselves from taking these same kinds of food; and these experiments have often led to the formation of rules of diet and regimen of considerable importance to our bodily health. Many highly beneficial discoveries in medicine may be traced to experiments and observations made upon the inferior animals, founded upon the resemblance between their functions of life and our own.

In chemical science we may perceive the wonderful effects produced by the operation of the principle of analogy. Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science were the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that Dr. Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric air; and it is related that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when on a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely upon analogical conjectures, that the latter philosopher was induced to commence experiments, with the view of proving the compound nature of water, and of reducing it to its constituent elements. Indeed the whole history of this important and useful department of human knowledge exhibits very striking and incontestable proofs, how much of the science owed its existence to mere hints and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon slight resemblances or analogies.

In the science of astronomy we find that analogy has been the principal instrument in conducting us to important discoveries and improvements. The law of gravitation, as unfolded by Sir Isaac

Newton, was discovered by a train of analogical reasoning founded on one of the most trifling circumstances which daily present themselves to our notice. While Sir Isaac sat ruminating under a tree in his garden, an apple happened to drop from it, and hit him on the head. He conceived that the same law which determined the fall of the apple might possibly be that which moved the heavenly bodies in their orbits. This led to inquiry, and inquiry ended in a full and settled conviction, that the law which regulates the motion of terrestrial bodies is the same which regulates the movements of the sun, moon, and whole planetary system. And it is by observing the motions of the planets which belong to our solar system, and by comparing their annual and diurnal motions with the corresponding motions of the earth, that we come to the well-grounded conclusion that these planets are the habitations of various orders of living beings; for we are confident that the sun imparts both light and heat to the planets as well as to our globe; and as his influence gives birth to the various animated beings with which we are conversant, "analogy," says La Place, "induces us to believe that his influence produces similar effects on the planets; for it is not natural to suppose that matter, of which we see the fecundity develop itself in such various ways, should be sterile upon a planet so large as Jupiter, which like the earth has its days, its nights, and its years, and on which observation discovers changes that indicate very active forces. Man, formed for the

temperature which he enjoys upon earth, could not, according to all appearance, live upon the other planets; but may there not be a diversity of organization suited to the various temperatures of the globes of this universe? If the difference of elements and climates causes such variety in the productions of the earth, how infinitely diversified must be the productions of the planets and their satellites. The most active imagination cannot form any just idea of them, but still their existence is extremely probable."

It would be impossible in this chapter to advert to all the advantages which analogical reasoning has conferred, and is daily conferring, upon science. But these advantages are not exclusively confined to matters of abstract speculation; they influence us also, to a wonderful extent, even in our common and every-day occupations, opinions, and language. Nearly the whole of our knowledge of human nature is founded upon analogy; though it is commonly, but very erroneously, attributed to *experience*. We conclude, that any given line of conduct will be pleasant or disagreeable to our fellow-men, merely because we conceive them to be of a similar construction with ourselves in body, mind, and moral feelings. When we confer benefits upon our neighbour, we conceive that he will feel grateful, because we presume that his nature is similar to our own; and for the same reason, when we inflict an injury upon him, we conceive that he will feel and express indignation. The

food which is palatable and nourishing to us, or that which is unpleasant and pernicious, we judge will produce like effects upon other people, solely because we ground our conclusions upon the analogical hypothesis that there is a close similarity among all men in the organs of digestion and general powers of life.

The whole structure of metaphorical language is grounded on the resemblance or analogy which the imagination conceives to exist among different objects. We say that virtue is fair and beautiful, that the mind is strong and robust, active and lively, precisely because we conceive there is something in the moral and mental qualifications analogous to the material objects which we clothe with these attributes. Metaphorical expressions will always be found most numerous in the writings of those authors who are led, from the habits of their minds, into extensive comparisons and a minute examination of the works of nature. The poet is a well known instance of this. It is from metaphors and similes that a great deal of the pleasure which poetry affords us is derived. We clothe the objects of nature, both animate and inanimate, with various properties and attributes ; but all these must in true poetry be founded upon some real or *apparent* analogy or resemblance, otherwise we derive no pleasure from poetical metaphors ; on the contrary, nothing so readily disgusts and puts us out of humour with our author, as when his similes and metaphors do

not suggest to our minds some natural or fancied resemblance to the objects which they are designed to represent.

But though analogy is one of the most powerful and general operations to which the mind resorts, and the exercise of it seems indispensable to our comfort, nay, to our very existence, yet it is not placed beyond the reach of misapplication. Analogy frequently leads us into gross errors, both in speculation and practice; and we ought at all times, in using it, to exercise a vigilant circumspection over all conclusions which seem to rest exclusively on analogical reasonings; and more especially if these conclusions involve subjects of deep interest to our present or future well-being. Were we able, in the majority of cases, to trace the remote or hidden springs of those actions which hurry the unthinking and profligate part of mankind to a course of life destructive of their virtue, their comfort, and existence, we should find that a great part of their misfortunes might be fairly attributed to erroneous or fanciful analogies, or miscalculations as to the effects of any given line of conduct.

In our abstract and speculative opinions, we are also greatly affected by erroneous or doubtful resemblances; and no one can take up a book on controversial topics of any description, without noticing that the differences of opinion may, in nine cases out of ten, be attributable to some false analogies incidentally introduced, as it were, into the

discussion, and made the ground-work of the whole matter of dispute. To give an example of this kind of influence on our speculative conclusions, arising from erroneous analogies, will perhaps prove more strikingly illustrative of the truth of these remarks, than any general observations which could be made upon the subject. The quotation I am about to give relates to the long and keenly contested question on liberty and necessity; and the extract is the more valuable as having come from the pen of a very able and accomplished American writer, the Reverend Jonathan Edwards. Of course it would be altogether out of place here to express any opinion on the questions under dispute; it is simply our duty to notice how false analogies may impose upon the strongest minds, and vitiate a long chain of close and argumentative reasoning. "There is a vast difference," says he, "between the sun's being the *cause* of the lightness and warmth of the atmosphere and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence, and its being the *occasion* of darkness and frost in the night by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon." "If the sun were the proper *cause* of cold and darkness, it would be the *fountain* of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat; and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are black and frosty. But, from its being the cause, no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing

can be inferred, but the contrary ; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment ; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and under certain circumstances necessarily follows on the want of his influence ; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil, but, on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether good and holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing indeed, that because men never commit sin but only when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin when he does so, their sin, therefore, is not from themselves, but from God. and so God must be a sinful being ; as strange as it would be to argue, that because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, all darkness, therefore, is from the sun, and his disk and beams must needs be black."

Now the whole of this argument from analogy is founded upon the assumed principle, that there is a *resemblance* of the sun, a created and dependent object, to the Almighty Creator of that same object, and of every thing else. But a moment's consideration will convince us, that there can really be no resemblance between the principle on which

the movements and energies of a dependent creature rest, and the principle on which depends the active power of the Being who made that creature. The two objects have nothing in common; that is, the sun wants the essential attributes of *self-motion*, *will*, and *intelligence*, which must be considered as inherent qualities in the divine nature.

We cannot fail to view with wonder and admiration that subtile power of mind, which, in general cases, balances so nicely, and promptly too, the different degrees of evidence which result from different degrees of analogy existing among various objects. Where the analogy or resemblance between two or more objects is almost perfect, the mind readily, and upon the spur of the moment, reasons upon both, and draws similar conclusions from them; and when this analogy or resemblance becomes fainter and more imperceptible, then we advance in our reasoning with more hesitation, and our conclusions are encompassed with a greater portion of doubt and uncertainty. How surprising is this power of the mind, and how subtile and dexterous are its movements!

Now, looking at the great importance of analogy, both as it influences our abstract and speculative principles and reasonings, and as it bears upon our practical conduct, we ought to be perpetually upon our guard to employ this mighty engine in a proper manner. In this consists the greater part of that which generally goes under the denomination of judgment. Let us be cautious in drawing analogical inferences and conclusions from certain sets

of facts or circumstances, which are not in all particulars alike. It is from the neglect of this precaution that we are so frequently involved in difficulties and perplexities in our reasonings, and thus led into error on many important subjects. In all our speculations we shall do well to keep this precaution steadily in our mind's eye, and we shall thereby be prevented from falling into many mistakes of moment, both as it regards our abstract principles and our actual comfort and happiness.

Looking over the Grecian metaphysical systems as a whole, we may plainly perceive, that they are varied in character, almost solely from the proportion in which Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy, are mingled together. Where the synthetic principle predominates, we see a more determined love of system, and often a reckless habit of generalizing. In the early philosophers of Greece, this is very observable. On the other hand, when analysis unduly prevails, we see the genius of philosophy bolstering up its influence by minute, unimportant, and frivolous particularities. Again, when we see the speculative habit resting principally on Analogy, we find theories and systems full of crudities and inconsistencies. It is when all these three great principles of our mind are rightly adjusted and proportioned, that the happiest results may be anticipated. And what is true of individuals, is true in respect of the philosophical spirit of a whole people.

It may be remarked, that all readers of Grecian

Philosophy will readily recognise the great knowledge which the sages of that country generally display, in their appreciation of the nature and use of these principles of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy. They mix and blend them, so to speak, with consummate skill. In all the most valuable portions of their writings we see the right application of these general powers of thought. It is only when very abstruse theories are developed, and fanciful systems advocated, that we perceive any derangement in the management of the reasoning faculties. The works of Plato and Aristotle furnish us with innumerable examples of the beautiful application of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy; especially in those sections of their respective treatises, which depend upon a correct observation of nature's operations, and the every-day appearances she presents to our view. In all the various dialectical systems of Greece, we see no errors from the application of these rudiments of reasoning; it is only when ultimate principles of being and of thought are brought into play, that we find room for dissent or censure.*

* See the Author's "Essay on Logic," Second Edit. 1848, published by Saunders, 6 Charing Cross.

CHAPTER XIII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SCEPTICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

PYRRHO. 340 B. C.

PYRRHO stands at the head of the ancient Sceptics. We are not, however, to understand by the term *sceptic*, as here used in reference to the personal opinions of Pyrrho himself, that he embraced the notions commonly indicated by the generic term Pyrrhonism in modern times. He did not deny the absolute existence of truth; but only showed that in seeking after it we often feel a difficulty in seizing hold of it, from the mass of error which commonly surrounds it.

Pyrrho formed part of the court of Alexander the Great, in his grand expedition to Asia. The personal friend of the philosopher was Anaxarchus, from whom he derived a knowledge of the speculative opinions of the Eleatics. Pyrrho also learned the Indian doctrine of the Gymnosophists. He attended the philosophical school of Megara, and studied with great care and zeal the writings of -

Democritus. He was greatly esteemed by all his contemporaries for the purity and simplicity of his life and conversation.

The *Ten Tropes*, so often alluded to in the philosophical writings of the ancients, and which contain the general tenets of what goes under the name of Pyrrhonism, are attributed to Pyrrho as their author. The principles of doubt involved in these rules go simply to recommend a *suspension of assent*, rather than a positive denial of matters submitted to the judgment. His scepticism was more of a *passive* than an *active* type. A French historian of philosophy, and a Catholic bishop, makes the following observations on Pyrrho. "Que Pyrrhon ait été amené, par son doute universel, à ne pouvoir agir, à ne croire à rien dans la pratique, à ne pas se détourner pour éviter un précipice, comme le raconte Diogène Laërce, ces assertions sont sans fondement et tout-à-fait invraisemblables. Ce philosophe reconnaissait, au contraire, l'autorité du bon sens, des lois, des usages; il admettait des règles de morale, et prétendait que ces règles avaient leur fondement dans le cœur. Il voulait qu'on suivît les apparences, sans se mettre en peine de la réalité; qu'on agit comme le commun des hommes, qu'on évitât soigneusement les discussions épineuses qui ne pouvaient enfanter que le doute, et qu'on demeurât dans ce repos d'esprit qui seul peut faire le bonheur de l'homme."*

* Bouvier, *Hist. Abrégée de la Philosophie*. Vol. 1. p 184. Paris. 1844.

The strong hold of the Sceptics was the variable nature of our ideas of pure sensation. These always afforded them weapons against the attacks of their adversaries. The sceptics carried their analogical reasonings from this source into every department of human knowledge, but particularly into our notions of what constituted good and evil. Here too, they received fresh succour, from the apparently discordant opinions and judgments of mankind upon the rules and obligations of morality. People in different countries have different notions of what is proper and beneficial; and this diversity is strictly analogous to the variable sensations of external things, produced by the operation of the senses. It would be idle to deny, that such analogical reasonings would have a powerful effect upon popular opinion; but still the nature of all similar logical declamations exercises a pernicious influence over the progress of sound and rational knowledge.*

The more abstract scepticism among the Greek and Roman philosophy has a great uniformity of character, because it was grounded upon views and arguments which lay very open to common remark and observation. The following may be stated as the principal springs, out of which the various

* On the Sceptics, see Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh.* l. *Diog. Laert.* 9. 74. Cicero, *De Fini.* 2. 13. Epictet. *Fragm.* ed. Schweigh. Bayle, *Diction.* Huet, *Traité de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain*; Ploucquet, *Dissert. de Epoche Pyrrhonis*, 1758; Beausobre, *Le Pyrrhonisme raisonnable*, Berlin, 1753; Langheinrich, *Dissert. De Timon. &c.*, Leipsie, 1720.

currents of sceptical opinions flowed, in almost every period of the ancient philosophy.

1st. The great diversity in animal nature, as to its origin, organization, &c.; the differences in which external objects are viewed by the inferior creation; all of which go to show what a vast variation there must necessarily be in the conceptions formed of the qualities and properties of external bodies, through organs of sense so much varied. The question then is, as animals are deprived of reason, what grounds have we to prefer our perceptions to theirs when we are in the search of truth?

2nd. The diversity of character is very great in human nature; and the differences among men, both in mental and bodily qualifications, are varied beyond all conception. This contrariety, joined to the interminable disputes among philosophers themselves, and the differences in tastes and affections particularly noticed by physicians, render all attempts to arrive at the truth of things hopeless.

3rd. There is a great difference in the organs of sense, and every organ has its appropriate objects. Do the qualities of these objects belong to the particular conformation of our senses, or only to the objects themselves? Have they only as many and such qualities and properties as we perceive, and have they none which we do not perceive? What are the constituent elements of objects, have they just such and such qualities and no other?

4th. The various ways in which our physical

organs are affected, by disease, sleep, old age, sadness, fear, cold, heat, and a thousand other circumstances, must necessarily create a great diversity of judgment relative to things around us.

5th. The differences from variation in the quantities of things, produce often opposite judgments and conclusions. A little more heat, a more rapid motion, or a little more wine or spirit, creates divers changes in our opinions. The general aggregation or division of homogeneous bodies greatly modifies sensation.

6th. The various kinds of education among men, and the different laws and conventional rules of society, beget opposite opinions and conclusions on the most important subjects.

7th. From the interminable mixtures and combinations of things, it is next to impossible to form a correct opinion of the mass of objects around us. Colours, density, and forms, are for ever changing; and the eye can only judge of that which is, at the moment, an object of vision.

8th. The relations of things one with another are continually changing. We seldom see an object precisely in the same point of view twice in succession.

9th. All relations, and objects, opinions, notions, and principles, are connected together, and have mutual dependencies one upon another; so that the mind of man can never be certain that the conclusions it forms are the really true ones. All things are not perceived, therefore our judgments are onesided.

CHAPTER XIV.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

EPICURUS. 341 B. C.

EPICURUS was the founder of that school of philosophy which has gone under his name for many centuries. He was a philosopher of great parts, and cultivated inquiries into the nature of the human mind, in conjunction with speculations on the principal questions of morals.

The following is the substance of the metaphysical theory of Epicurus. The soul is corporeal; it is composed of the most refined and subtile matter; it is inherent in the whole of bodies, and forms a constituent element of their nature or essence. We can distinguish *three* separate or distinct elements in the soul. The *senses*; the *appetites*, diffused over the whole organization of man; and *intelligence* or *reason*, placed in a sort of intermediate position between the senses and the appetites, sharpening the former, and guiding and regulating the latter. The senses are a kind of soul within a soul. They form the organs or instruments by which the soul seizes hold, as it

were, of external objects. It is thus that objects vastly varied act upon us, and that we are enabled to distinguish the differences amongst them. Forms, colours, sounds, smells, and tastes, which affect severally the five senses, are composed of corpuscles, disposed in different orders, endowed with different motions, and these corpuscles are received into the various organs of sensation, by pores or canals proportionably suited to their nature. These elementary corpuscles penetrate even into the *sensorium* itself, strike and affect it, and give birth, in our sentient being, to images similar to these external things. These images may be compared to the impression of the seal left on wax.

The principle of intelligence or reason exercises supreme authority over the senses. Its province is, whilst the senses are affected by external objects, to think, to perceive, to conceive, to reflect, to meditate, to discuss, and to deliberate. Reason is not passive. But how is this thought excited? By a phenomenon analogous to that which produces sensation; by *airy* or *spiritual essences*, which present themselves to reason. These spiritual essences are disengaged from bodies, or are formed in the air, and seize hold of the mind, and fix themselves in it. But in the multitude of intelligences, these essences choose those whose attention is excited, and such as direct themselves to particular forms of thought; to others they remain perfect strangers. Attention is then reason's principal instrument; by it, judgments and conclusions are formed.

The appetites and passions relate primarily to

pleasure and pain; and from these follow hope and fear. The soul naturally expands itself when under the influence of pleasurable feelings, and, on the contrary, shrinks from what is painful and unpleasant. This pleasure and pain result also from the subtile and minute corpuscles of bodies, which introduce themselves into our organs of sensation. When there is a natural harmony between these subtile corpuscles and our internal thinking principle, pleasure is produced; but, in a contrary state of things, when this harmony does not exist, the delicate organs of sense are wounded, and pain and suffering are the consequence.

Again, it is by an action entirely mechanical that the soul puts the divers members of the body in motion. The whole system of mental phenomena may be compared to a machine of wheels and springs, the two ends of which rest upon external objects. But there is, nevertheless, this essential characteristic relative to voluntary motion, that the soul judges beforehand, and wishes the effect which it produces.

Of the absolute certainty of our knowledge from the senses, Epicurus was a strenuous advocate. Sensations are the *criterion* of truth; the only test of certainty; they never deceive us. Whenever there is error, it may be traced to the judgment; it arises, from our hasty or premature decisions upon objects which act externally on the senses.

The circumstance of the perfect freedom of the human mind to act or not act, just as the will pleases, is a curious, and apparently an incon-

sistent item in the metaphysical system of Epicurus. All other phenomena seem pretty tightly chained down to the principle of necessity or fate; but the mind, or intelligent principle, he sets at complete liberty.

The notions of Epicurus as to the formation of the world, are nearly the same as those of Democritus, with whose system he was intimately conversant. His primary elements are the atoms of Democritus. The atoms of Epicurus harmonize and repel each other, and generate a rebounding and oscillating motion. They combine and form various systems, which constitute what we denominate visible bodies or worlds. These primary atoms are infinite in number, and, therefore, an infinite number of worlds may be framed out of them. It is needless to say that such notions are vague and childish.

. Diog. Laert. 10. Cicero De Nat. Deo. 1. 25. Sextus Empi. Math. 7. See also the works of Gassendi, the modern commentator on the Philosophy of Epicurus: and the following works:—Sorbière, *Lettres sur la Vie, &c.*, Paris 1660; Jacques Rondel, *La Vie d'Epic.* Paris 1670; Pierre de Villemandy, *Manuductio ad Philosophiæ Aristotelicæ, Epicuræ et Cartesianæ Parallelismum*, Amsterdam 1681; L'Abbé Batteux, *Morale d'Epicure*, La Haye, 1686; Temple's *Essay on the Gardens of Epicurus*, London 1696. Tragilli Arankiel, *De Philoso. et Schola Epicuri*. 1671; Faust. Diss. de Deo Epicuri, Strasburg, 1655.

CHAPTER XV.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE STOICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

As we proceed down the stream of time, we find the discussions and speculations on the nature of the human mind becoming more diversified, profound, and important. The Stoical School of Philosophy, especially in reference to the principles and practice of morals, has long maintained a considerable portion of respect and attention among the learned in all countries; and the discussions of this school on the laws of mind are also well entitled to a careful and attentive notice.

ZENO. 362 B. C.

Zeno was one of the most able and distinguished masters of this school. He followed the profession of a merchant for some time, but relinquished it, and attended all the most celebrated seminaries of learning and philosophy.

The idea of this philosopher, as to the abstract nature of the evidence which our senses furnish

us, was, that knowledge was certain and immutable. In this respect he vigorously opposed the general doctrines of the Sceptics, in all their shapes and forms. The train of thought which appears to have been in his mind on this occasion, is exceedingly curious and interesting; as it seems, as far as we are able to judge of the matter, to have led him to precisely the same conclusions which several metaphysicians of modern times have propounded with all the pomp and display of new discoveries. I allude here to the doctrine of *ultimate truths*, or, as some term it, the doctrine of *common sense*. Zeno maintained that *evidence*, and evidence alone, was the foundation of his theory of human knowledge,—the very key-stone of his system; and he points out a guide to the use of this instrument. He calls it *right judgment*, or healthy reason. This *right judgment*, or healthy reason, is partly founded on an accurate knowledge of things, and partly upon the condition and state of the soul, as to its exemption from corruption. Nature has furnished us with a kind of model or expression of herself, by which the mind gathers together the divers notions of things. These notions furnish the elementary principles of all science. By their assistance an extensive field is opened for the prosecution and investigation of truth. As nature is the same in all mankind, those primary notions form a sort of *common sense*, which appertains to the entire mass of humanity.

Zeno distinguished *eight* faculties of the soul; the five senses, generation, language, and thought.

It will be perceived by the reader, that he here classifies generation, a physical power, with the other faculties which essentially constitute our thinking principle. The reason of this is not stated. These eight powers or faculties are, according to Zeno, a kind of *governess* to our soul, to lead and guide us in all matters of knowledge and life. We can say, under this point of view, that there is in the soul only one faculty, from which all others are derived. This faculty is passive when it receives external impressions, and active when it unites, separates, and combines them, for the purpose of forming general notions and judgments from them. Thus the nature and operations of the soul form one perfect whole, like a smaller universe.

The Stoics introduced in their school the famous maxim, "*that there is nothing in the understanding which has not been previously in the senses.*" They did not admit of innate ideas. They distinguished natural ideas from artificial notions. The former were obtained without any effort of the mind itself, and were denominated *anticipations*; the latter were the work of the remote spontaneity of the mind, and were called *notions*.

Artificial notions were derived from several sources, namely, from analogy, composition, proportion, opposition, transposition, repetition, and privation.

Zeno differed from Plato as to the latter's theory of ideas. The Stoic coincided with Aristotle, but did not implicitly adopt all his opinions on mental speculations.

His notions as to the origin of things were, that there were two principles. The one is primordial matter, which is the passive material of which all things are formed. The second is the active element which moulds and forms every thing; this is Reason, Destiny, God. The laws of matter are imprinted on it by this intelligent and active principle.

CHRYSIPPUS. 250 B. C.

Chrysippus was another distinguished philosopher of the Stoical school. On many points he entertained correct views as to several important principles of mental philosophy.

He agreed with Zeno as to the difference between sensible perceptions of external objects, and *notions* of the mind created by its reflecting on its own powers, or consciousness. These notions are not propagated immediately from the senses; they exclusively appertain to thought. They institute, as it were, a comparison between objects of sense; they seize the common and general features or characteristics which belong to them; the one operation is founded upon natural causes, and the other upon the reflective faculty of the understanding alone.

Chrysippus attempted to make a catalogue of undemonstrable or elementary truths. His idea was, that all other truths should be arranged under some one of these. These general truths may be reduced to two kinds; those which include propositions necessarily involved in propositions

previously admitted as true; and consequences which result from disjunctive propositions. The minor details of this system of reasoning are comprehended under the heads of simple and complex maxims; possible and impossible; necessary and contingent; probable, paradoxical, rational, and empirical.

On the doctrine of Causation, Chrysippus divided causes into two descriptions; those which he considered purely *mechanical*, which belonged to the aggregate masses of matter; and those which were *organic*, and constituted the principles of vegetable and animal life.

Most of the opinions of Zeno and the Stoics of this period generally, on the nature of the Deity, are extremely rational. They clothe the Divine nature with noble and sublime attributes. They regard Him as infinitely perfect, and every way worthy of adoration and homage. It must, however, be stated, that there is a great drawback to this species of theism. Though they invest the Deity with these attributes, they nevertheless believe Him to be essentially connected with matter. They say that the Deity constitutes both the visible and the invisible world; that God is the soul of the world; that He penetrates all parts of it; that He is the living and vivifying principle of it; in fact, that the world was composed of God, who was the soul of it, and matter, which was its body.

Zeno and his school were strict and absolute necessitarians. Every thing was linked together by an inexorable fatality. They made some little

display of allowing the First Cause a degree of liberty or choice; but it was evidently a mere piece of philosophical delusion. Cicero accuses them of this fruitless attempt to reconcile liberty with necessity.* Both Zeno and Chrysippus saw the difficulty, that if they did not invest man with personal freedom, it was impossible to conceive how actions could be considered either praiseworthy or blameable, or entitled to rewards or punishments. They were, therefore, obliged to cede a form of liberty, to harmonize, in some measure, this moral responsibility with the other parts of their system.†

The Stoical doctrines, as a whole, present much that is praiseworthy and valuable. The philosophers of this school set themselves against the whole mass of vain and conceited quibbling which too often usurped the name and authority of philosophy and true wisdom. They took human life and human nature as they found them. The whole of their doctrines were grounded on the more obvious and striking principles of men's thoughts and actions. They say, in substance, If your system be against common sense, it must be erroneous; we may not perhaps be able to rebut all your refined and subtile arguments, but be you assured, that nature has not left the first principles of speculation and action to be trifled with by the weak and puny sophistry of man. Upon these grounds the whole of their public teaching was based.

* Cicero, *Noctes Atticæ*, 4. 2. 15.

† Cicero, *De Fato*, 10. 12. *Nemesius, De natura Hominis*. c. 2.

CHAPTER XVI.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

ON THE NOTIONS COMMONLY ADOPTED BY THE
ANCIENTS, UP TO THE PERIOD OF THE STOICS,
ON THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, AND THE
NATURE OF TRUTH.

WE shall attempt, in this chapter, to give a general but concise view of some important and elementary principles discussed by the ancient sages; simply with a view of fixing the ordinary reader's attention more firmly on the real amount of progress which the philosophy of the mind had made, up to this point of history.

The first question with the philosophers of Greece was, From whence is our knowledge derived? Does it proceed from ourselves? Does it emanate from any physical channel or source we can recognize? Does it own a divine or heavenly origin? Their inquiries soon, however, brought them to something which seemed to point out what appeared to indicate, in some measure, a probable solution of the great problem. This

something was SENSATION. They saw that an affection of the senses was prior to thought. This conclusion was established not only from every man's hourly experience, but from a consideration of the infant years of mankind, when the development of sensation was more strikingly and pointedly marked, as an anterior operation to the knowledge of the existence and qualities of external objects. No man could be ignorant, much less a philosopher, that a mountain, or lake, or river, must be *seen by the eye* before a person can possibly have an *idea* of it; that sounds must be heard by the ear, before we can have an idea of them, or be able to feel the exquisite pleasures which are derived from their mechanical combination in the art of music. And the like may be remarked in reference to the other three organs of sensation. This being the precise state of the case, inquiring men took their stand on Sensation. They perceived that it was, in some way or other, indissolubly and invariably conjoined with knowledge; this they were in no position to deny, either as philosophers or men. Nature decided with peremptory authority. She pointed her finger to the final cause of this great source of knowledge, that this peculiar organization of our senses shall be the medium of that information of the qualities and properties of external bodies and agencies which is absolutely requisite for the support and enjoyment of animal existence.

We find, therefore, no difference worth mentioning among the various schools of philosophy as to

common and every-day operations of sensation, considered as mere phenomena of existence. Its necessary connection with knowledge could not be denied. But a little inquiry below the surface of things suggested another important question, Are there any thoughts, or ideas, or notions, or principles in our minds, which do not seem to have their origin in this peculiar affection of our senses, either from their separate or collective operations? We have the colours and conformation of bodies by the eye, sounds by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the mouth, and feeling by the touch; but does any one, or do all of these produce those ideas, for example, which I have of *myself*, of being or existence in general, of space, of time, of number, of infinity, of right, of obligation, of cause and effect, and of a thousand others which are in every man's mind, and which form as it were the pabulum of his mental existence? This is the point of departure of mental philosophy. To solve this problem has been the great object of all metaphysicians from the earliest records of speculation; and the question is still asked from a thousand different quarters, even at the present hour.

The first step which philosophers took to throw some light on this intricate question was, to divide our sensations into two classes; the one related to the simple or secondary qualities of material bodies, and the other to their primary ones. Our simple ideas or notions of the secondary qualities or properties of things, are only conditionally or

relatively uniform. Let us, for example, take the sensation of warmth. Take a bason of water heated to a certain degree, and put a cold hand into it, and a warm one. The water will feel quite warm to the cold hand, but cold or chilly to the warm one. Does then this sensation belong, as an inherent quality, to water? Does it form a constituent portion of its nature? If this were granted, it would make the water both hot and cold at the same time, which is absurd. Such sensations are called *simple* or *secondary* ones, because they depend upon and are apparently regulated by the physical state or condition of the organs of sense. But whether water be hot or cold, warm or chilly, it always occupies space, it has a certain volume or bulk, and a certain density or weight. These qualities appertain to it, independently of our sensations, or the state of our organs of feeling, taste, smell, or sight. These, therefore, are termed the *primary* qualities of matter, and seem to form the groundwork of a mighty structure of intellectual mechanism and contrivance.

We come now to the third step in the progress of inquiry. Was there any inward principle in man which could elaborate or concoct any ideas or notions out of the ordinary sensations which our senses produced; or did these ordinary sensations merely operate as *exciting causes* to the mind, forming out of its own resources notions or ideas which did not seem to have any immediate or necessary connexion with the process of sensation? This was a puzzling question to the inquir-

ing philosopher. It was clear to him that there were certain notions in our minds, and very familiar ones too, which did not seem to owe their existence to the operation of external objects on the senses; but how to account for them, constituted the difficulty. There were two modes of attempting to remove the perplexity; the one supposed that the mind, as by some chemical laboratory, distilled, as it were, these more rarefied notions from the mass of common ones which flowed through the senses; and the other, that these refined ideas were drawn from the internal resources of the mind itself, independent of sensation. These two theories both came under the notice of the ancients, whose systems we have previously glanced at. The evidence preponderates in favour of the solution that those general abstract notions which we possess, and which seem to be so necessary for the acquirement and cultivation of knowledge, owe their existence to the mind itself; and that the operation which evolves them is called *reflection*. We find that the most acute and comprehensive reasoners on mental subjects, from Thales down to the time of the Stoics, were obliged to admit this inward power of reflection, to be enabled to make any progress in the study of mind themselves, or to convey their information and knowledge to others.

The abstract nature or character of *truth*, was another stumbling block to all the ancient sages of Greece. Are our sensations to be taken as the evidence of truth? They are variable and uncertain. Do our more abstract and refined notions or

ideas afford more evidence? We cannot rely upon them either. Is there any criterion by which we can determine a thing to be true or false? Some lay down one test, and some another. The Academics maintained there was no criterion of truth whatever. The Dogmatists all agree upon a criterion of truth, but differ about that in which it consists. Plato would allow no criterion from the testimony of the senses; for, says he, "from them we have nothing but opinion." He affirmed, however, that we had a criterion from pure intellect, which afforded a test for certain knowledge. Aristotle differs in some degree from his master. The former allows that the pure mind confers upon us certain conviction, although the evidence from the senses was sometimes very variable and uncertain. Among all the sects of philosophers none contended so zealously and boldly for a criterion of truth as the Epicureans. They established their test on three principles; sensation, anticipation, and passion. Subsequently, the most indefatigable hunters after a criterion of certainty were the Stoics. They suggested several modes by which this great desideratum might be found. Some amongst them, in order to conquer what they conceived as prejudices, went so far as to distrust the intimations from their own senses, and to contend that the ordinary principles of action among men ought not to be implicitly relied on. They conjectured that some wicked demon might insinuate falsehood through this channel, and make men the objects of their

wicked and malicious sport. After laying aside, however, all the usual maxims received among men, they seem to have been driven into a corner at last, and compelled to admit, that truth might rest upon the evidence of their own minds.

CHAPTER XVII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SECOND ACADEMY.

THE philosophers of the Second Academy differed in several points from Zeno and his followers. The former especially directed their discussions towards those parts of the mental philosophy of the Stoics which related to the foundations of human knowledge, and the nature of truth in general. This conflict of opinions is exceedingly interesting. The truth of important principles was at stake; and the various combatants brought to the task great natural acuteness, and a perfect knowledge of all preceding systems.

ARCESILAUS. 315 B. C.

According to Sextus Empiricus, Arcesilaus directed his logical attacks against Zeno's theory of perception. The historian tells us that "The Stoics maintained three things; science, opinion, and comprehension; the last of which occupied an intermediate place between the other two. Upon

this point they were attacked by Arcesilaus. As comprehension has to be sustained by science and opinion, it cannot be the arbiter of their nature or essence. Now this comprehension resides either in wisdom or folly. If it resides in wisdom, it is science itself; if in folly, it is no opinion, but mere empty jargon. This comprehension, by which we pretend to derive the power of giving assent to visible things, exists nowhere. We do not give assent to what we merely see, but to reason alone. Men only affirm formal or implied propositions. Besides, are there not thousands of delusions from visual objects, as well as true representations? If then wisdom gives its assent upon the strength of this *criterion* of the Stoics, it only gives an assent to a very illusory opinion."

This philosopher seems, however, to have limited his observations to the phenomena of external things, and not to have carried his doubts to the existence of the mind itself. But on this point there is a diversity of opinion.

CARNEADES. 215 B. C.

This philosopher, according to Sextus Empiricus, not only opposed the Stoics in their general tenets, but seems to have founded upon their own *criterion* a system that went to establish contrary propositions. Lactantius also mentions that Carneades had an intuitive quickness in perceiving the weak sides of his adversaries' doctrines, and designed their overthrow by the inward consciousness that he would prove successful.

On the nature of perception Carneades has the following observations. "The *criterion* which pronounces upon truth can consist only in an adhesion to the mind which creates the evidence of the object. The senses begin to indicate the existence of objects only when they are affected by them, whilst the former undergo divers alterations in coming in contact with the latter. It is in these affections, and in these divers modifications of feeling produced by external bodies, that we must seek for the foundations of truth. Vision, for example, shows us two things at once; a modification of feeling we experience, and the object which exercises itself upon us. It is thus that light shows itself, and manifests the object which strikes our eyes. But the sense of vision does not invariably teach us the real nature of objects, but sometimes deceives us. All visual things cannot, then, be taken as an infallible standard of truth, but those things are only true which are proved to be so in themselves."

Carneades established the proposition, that a chain of probable evidences is connected with the exercise of all our organs of sensation; but this is more strikingly indicated from the exercise of the organ of sight. He says, "Perception represents two things at once; the external object perceived, and the subject which perceives it. Vision must then be considered under two distinct relations. First, relatively to the object perceived. This may be either true or false; true, if in conformity with it; and false if otherwise. Secondly, relatively to

the subject perceiving. That which is true appears to differ from that which is false. That which bears the appearance of truth is probable. Sometimes this indication of truth is faint and weak; it may be from the smallness of the object, or from the weakness and confused operation of the senses themselves. Sometimes this appearance is very striking and evident; in such cases this distinctness is a sure *criterion* of truth; it is sufficiently manifested by itself."

On the doctrine of necessary connection Carneades seems to have been inclined to the liberty of human thoughts and actions. He says, "From the proposition, that there is no effect without a cause, it does not follow that every thing which happens arises from external causes. Now our wills are subjected to no antecedent cause. Such is the nature of all voluntary actions, that the cause of them arises from the will itself."

Ritter observes, that "Carneades laboured to prove that all previous attempts of philosophy to establish a criterion of truth had miscarried, and moreover that it was impossible to find such a criterion. For, he argued, it must be placed either in sensation, or in conception, or in reason. Now as to the last, he maintained that it could not be found in reason independently of both sensation and conception, for that which is the object of any judgment of the reason must first appear to the mind in a conception, which is impossible unless it has been first of all presented to it by some irrational sensation; so that every operation of the

reason is originally dependent upon sensation, which is irrational, and consequently the truth of rational cognition depends upon that of sensation.*

PHILO. 100 B. C.

Philo's metaphysical disquisitions related chiefly to the abstract nature of truth and evidence. Sextus Empiricus informs us, that this philosopher maintained that the reality of objects could be known from that comprehensive perception on which the Stoics founded their *criterion*.

Philo remarked that a logical consequence might be true, though it was united to a false supposition. He distinguishes three species of truths; first, that which is deduced from a self-evident proposition; secondly, that which is deduced from a false proposition, though conditionally true; and, thirdly, from a proposition from which the conclusion presents not only a hypothetical, but a real truth, in spite of any absurdity contained in the proposition itself; *as the earth moves, therefore it exists.*

ANTIOCHUS. 86 B. C.

This philosopher of the Second Academy seemed to be actuated, in all his mental inquiries, with a sincere and ardent love of truth. He set himself to correct the general principles of the school, and

* Hist. Phil. Vol. 3. p. 614. Oxford 1839.

to banish that species of loose and undefined scepticism which had, ever since the foundation of the academy, hung around it, and engaged it in perpetual quibbling discussions and irrational speculations.

"Philosophy," says Antiochus "has two principal objects in view; truth and happiness. He can have no pretensions to true wisdom, who does not keep this double end in view; who is ignorant from where he sets out, and whither he is going. A real philosopher ought to establish himself upon sound principles."

Cicero, who enjoyed the personal friendship of this philosopher, tells us, that, on the long contested point, the real foundation of human knowledge, Antiochus makes the following remarks. "The testimony of the senses is worthy of all confidence, if they are themselves free to act, are in a healthy state, and no obstacle intervenes to obstruct the faithful perceptions they furnish. If this were not the case, of what use would be our deductions from them? What would be the foundation of memory? What distinction would there be between knowledge and ignorance, between the lettered and the unlettered man? What would there be attached to reason? Of what use would it prove to exercise its powers and faculties? Scepticism is at direct variance with the whole nature of man, his desires, powers, and destination. Desires influence the will, and suppose certain judgments in the mind. If men wish to act, they must hold by the truth presented to them. But above all,

virtue is the best testimony to the certainty of human knowledge. How could men resolve to suffer inconceivable torments rather than desert their duty? or why should they bring upon themselves the vengeance of rigorous laws, unless they were under the control of clear, fixed, and determined principles?"

The predecessors of Antiochus in the new academy had made a fine and subtle distinction, in their metaphysical system, between a *clear perception*, and a *real perception*. This distinction was combated by Antiochus. He argued, How could we affirm that an object, for example, was *white*, if we happened to take it for *black*? Or how would we know when a perception was a clear perception imprinted on our minds, if we were not certain whether it was a real one or not? Such a mode of reasoning would go to establish that there is neither colour, nor body, nor truth, nor reasoning, nor sensation, nor any thing truly seen by the mind. We are so constituted that our minds give their assent to testimony, just as the scale of the balance is influenced by greater or lesser weights.

Antiochus exercised great influence in his day; and was certainly a metaphysician of no mean order. He was not, however, successful in framing any peculiar system; but his aim seemed to be to arrive at a species of eclecticism in reference to all previous speculations on the nature and faculties of the human mind.*

* Sextus Empi. Pyrrho. l. 235. Nemesius ap. Euseb. 14.9. Stobæus Eclec. 2. p. 38. et seq.

CLITOMACHUS. 125 B. C.

This metaphysician was a disciple of Carneades, and wrote four books on the reasons which ought to induce us to suspend our assent to the general truth of things. Cicero tells us that he distinguished vision into two kinds; the one embraces all things which we perceive, and those which we perceive but indistinctly; the second, those which are probable, and those which are not probable.

POSIDONIUS.

This philosopher established a philosophical school at Rhodes, where, it is said, he had Pompey and Cicero for his hearers. He was partial to the system of Aristotle, whose general arrangement of mental speculation seemed to coincide with his views. He opposed Chrysippus on the division of the soul. His great anxiety appeared to be to reconcile if possible all the conflicting theories of human nature, and to reduce them to some common-sense level. It was probably with this view that he revived the Platonic division of the mental powers or faculties.

The direct influence which the bodily organization exercises over the mind, engaged the attention of Posidonius. He thought this influence was very considerable, and that previous philosophers had not made due allowances for it in their systems of the mind.*

* Galen, l. 4. pp. 143. 153. Plutarch, *Frugm.* l. 6.

Human nature, in the opinion of Posidonius, was a compound material, in which the desires of the creature corresponded to vegetable life; the violent passions, as anger, &c., to the brutish or animal life; but *reason* was the exclusive attribute of man.* The doctrine of physical temperaments is here clearly shadowed forth; and there can be no doubt that both the Sceptics and Stoics generally, in their public teachings and dissertations, must have dwelt very often on the striking connection which subsists between the bodily organization and the mental habits and acquirements. This was one of those prominent topics which the everyday intercourse of human life must have forced upon their attention.

PANÆTIUS.

Panætius was a popular teacher of mental and general philosophy, and endeavoured to communicate his opinions with all possible simplicity and clearness. This spread his fame in every direction; and many of the most celebrated Roman lawyers attended his lectures, and became his philosophical disciples and advocates.†

His metaphysical opinions are but little known. His talents and acquirements did not lie in abstract questions and theories. The system of logic he taught had an especial reference to grammar, and did not rest upon a full development of those prin-

* Galen, *ibid.* p. 170.

† Van. Lynden, *De Panætio Rhodio*, Lugd. 1802. p. 50.

ciples of reasoning so commonly incorporated with many other ancient systems of Logic.

Panæti^{us} was passionately fond of Plato, and considered him the greatest philosopher that ever lived.

The notions of Panæti^{us} on the soul differed from those entertained by some of the earlier masters of the Stoical school. He only admitted it to have six parts; and referred the faculty of speech to voluntary motion, and maintained that generation belongs not to the soul but to vegetable nature.

None of the speculative works of Panæti^{us} have come down to us. Only two physical treatises have survived.*

* Cicero, *De Fini.* 4. 28. *Idem De Divina.* 1. 3. Nemesius, *De Natur. Hom.* 15. p. 96. Clem. Alexand. *Strom.* 2. p. 416. Stobæus *Ecler.* 2. p. 114. Diog. Laert. 7. 92.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

The formation of the Alexandrian School of philosophy forms an important era in the history of mental speculations. A vast number of the most subtle reasoners, and the most renowned men of whom the history of letters can boast, attended, in some part of their lives, at the Alexandrian Seminary. This school of learning claims also peculiar attention from its connexion with the early introduction of the Christian faith, and with the reciprocal influence which philosophy and religion exercised upon each other, at this eventful period of the history of the human race.

The doctrines of the Grecian philosophy were gradually introduced into Alexandria by the intercourse maintained with the most eminent men in Athens. Antiochus corresponded with Heraclitus of Tyre, who taught at that time in Alexandria; Strabo, the geographer, had amalgamated the doctrines of Zeno with those of Aristotle; and Ammonius attempted to reconcile the doctrines

of Plato with those of his distinguished pupil. These learned men soon established a taste for abstract speculation and useful knowledge; and metaphysics formed a very conspicuous portion of their general system of public instruction.

It is impossible to think of the School of Alexandria without emotion. To the divine, the philosopher, and the lover of general science, she is, and ever must be, an object of supreme interest and regard. Every movement of her mind, from her earliest establishment, has been fruitful of important results, and has, in every civilized country, left indelible memorials of her influence. She was destined to play an interesting part in the history of speculative opinions. She succoured the exiled sages of Greece, and furnished them with new weapons to combat their enemies, and even to overthrow their own systems. She changed the whole current of men's thoughts. Old theories were renounced, and new ones adopted, which created and fostered whole families of illustrious men. Her name is inseparably connected with the greatest event this world ever witnessed; the rise and progress of that Christian system, which is destined for ever to hold the flambeau to that philosophy which she, in her early years, considered as fixed on a rock of adamant. She is still glorious even in her ruins.

* The philosopher Potamon was one of the most distinguished among the early founders of the Alexandrian School, for his cultivation of mental

science. He had studied with great care and success the most important writings of Grecian literature, and was highly esteemed among his contemporaries for his skill and judgment on all knotty and difficult questions. According to Diogenes Laertius, he was the founder of the Eclectic sect of philosophers. The historian observes: "But a short time since a new sect called Eclectic had been introduced by Potamon of Alexandria, who selected from each school of philosophy that which he considered the most worthy and important. He thought there were two criteria of truth. One resided in the same faculty which judges; that is reason, which presides over the whole system of intellectual laws or movements. The second consisted in those perceptions which serve as the measure or instruments by which knowledge is communicated; or, in other words, in the certainty and evidence of the received impressions from external objects."

The Stoical philosophy was zealously studied and cultivated at Alexandria. Aristotle had many disciples and commentators; and the doctrines of Plato were both openly and secretly cherished by many philosophers, of a more enthusiastic and imaginative temperament. Here every thing belonging to philosophy was to be found; and the wide interchange of opinions was greatly promoted by the trading and commercial importance of the city. Here were men of all nations collected together for the purposes of traffic; and the proxi-

mity to the seat of eastern speculation soon led to the gradual introduction of principles and theories with which the Grecian sages had previously been unacquainted. This famous seminary of philosophy and learning soon gave evident proofs of new doctrines and new systems. The spirit of inquiry received a powerful impetus; and those seeds were profusely sown, which were afterwards to yield such a rank and luxurious harvest.

We shall have to enumerate, in subsequent parts of our history, some of the most eminent philosophers who flourished at this notable seat of learning.

We may allude generally to one or two doctrines which took their rise at this famous seat of learning, and which are commonly connected with its history. The one is what is called the *Alexandrian Trinity*, and the other the doctrine of *Emanations*.

It must be observed, in reference to the first doctrine, the Alexandrian Trinity, that many writers have supposed that it arose directly from the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, and was not an original theory or speculation either from Alexandria or from any other place. This, on the other hand, has been stoutly denied. It would be contrary to the spirit and object of this work, to enter into any controversy on the question; therefore we shall refer the reader to ecclesiastical historians for a full statement of arguments on the point in dispute.

The metaphysical doctrine of the Alexandrian

Trinity is this. God is of a threefold nature, and at the same time but ONE. His essence contains three distinct *elements, substances, or persons*, and these three make, or constitute, *One Being*. These three distinct persons or substances have also distinct and individual attributes. The first is *Unity*; the second is *Intelligence*; and the third, the *Universal soul*, or the vivifying cause of life and motion.

This theory of the Divine Nature produced many heresies in religion, and led to a great mass of idle speculation on the nature of the human mind. We shall have frequent opportunities of alluding to this doctrine, in the course of our subsequent inquiries into philosophical systems of a later date.

The theory of Emanation arose naturally enough out of the Alexandrian Trinity. Something was wanted to manifest the connexion between divine and earthly natures; and hence the doctrine of Emanation, which was invented to explain the phenomenon. The human soul is identified with the *Infinite*; and the world, and every thing in it, is an *Emanation* from this Great First Cause. This opinion was a prolific source of contention for several centuries, in all the schools of philosophy and theology.

CHAPTER XIX.

ON THE NOTIONS ENTERTAINED BY THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY ON THE NATURE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSITIONS, UP TO THE TIME OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL.

It must appear to the attentive reader, that a considerable portion of that controversial matter which formed so essential a part of the philosophical disquisitions of the ancient sages of Greece and Rome, consisted in the nature, extent, and application of general principles and propositions. To examine these in all their abstract nakedness; to estimate their influence and power over individual minds, and masses of men; to see the mode of their operation in detecting truth and falsehood; to point out their relationship to the various individual powers of the mind; and, in fine, to view all their manifold offices in the general phenomena of thought, was the perpetual aim of nearly all the profound speculators on human nature, of whom, in ancient times, we have any record.

On a subject so recondite, and far removed from ordinary observation, and the common trains of thought, we might fairly expect to find a considerable diversity of opinion. This anticipation we find realized by unquestionable facts. Some schools of philosophy treated of general principles and propositions in a plain and common sense manner, making them comparatively easy of comprehension; and, at the same time, calculated to promote the cause of sound and rational knowledge. Others, again, sublimated and refined to a great extent, and placed those elementary rules of reasoning and truth at a considerable distance from the grasp of ordinary minds. While no small number of inquisitive thinkers were led to form theories and systems, which had the evident tendency to call in question all truth and knowledge, and submerge the human mind in the slough of irredeemable and universal scepticism.

But though these views were opposite in their nature and tendency, yet necessity, and the force of nature, kept the generality of philosophers within certain bounds, and gave to all their discussions a portion of uniformity and system. They could not labour, nor convey their views to others, without making use of certain formal and recognized instruments of thought. This laid them under obligations to arrange and systematize their weapons of reasoning and argumentation. It will, therefore, prove of advantage to the general reader to present him with a bird's-eye view of this in-

tellectual armoury, so far as the common opinions, statements, and systems of the ancient sages will afford us materials.

It may be remarked here, in passing, that general principles and propositions, for the purpose of mental instruction, are not confined to mere metaphysical knowledge. They embrace a wider range. They claim a connexion with the whole circle of the sciences; and are applicable to the discussion of every topic relating to human nature.

It was a generally received opinion amongst the ancients, that all knowledge was founded upon certain ultimate or first principles, which were supposed, by several men of distinguished renown, to have been imprinted on the mind at its formation, by the hand of the Supreme Being himself. These elementary principles went, at various periods of history, under divers names; but on the whole they were considered, by a decided majority of speculators on the mind, to be of a really *innate* character. These principles may be divided into three classes or sorts; namely, *Speculative*, *Practical*, and *Theological*.

Speculative principles were, in the systems of the ancients, those which related to the nature and constitution of things, and concerning which the mind, or the more elevated part of the intellect, had to exercise its contemplative or thinking powers; as, for example, when we say that a whole is greater than a part, or that two and three make five. These purely speculative principles are ex-

ceedingly numerous, and must always, from the nature of the mind itself, be the ground-work of a great portion of philosophical discussion. Accordingly we find that they formed, so to speak, the stock in trade of a considerable number of the ancient schools of philosophy; and though these principles are in appearance distantly removed from the ordinary views and affairs of men, yet this circumstance did not prevent them in bygone times, and will not prevent them now, from exciting the most lively and ardent feelings, founded on intellectual rivalry, superiority, and distinction.

Practical principles were, in the eyes of the ancients, those which required something to be done; which led to some immediate action, and which were determined in their nature and influence by the suggestions of nature, or the necessities men found themselves under to reduce them to application. Such, for example, as that parents should be honoured and obeyed; honesty and integrity observed; and contracts fulfilled. These practical principles were of every-day use, and formed the basis of human society, confederation, and brotherhood. They constituted the materials of that which had, more or less, been incorporated into all systems of philosophy, and must always be invested with paramount interest; namely, the common-sense feelings and opinions of mankind.

Theological principles were such, in the ancient systems of speculation, as related to divine or celestial things; as the existence, nature, and mode of action of the Great First Cause; and these

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principles also embraced all those rules of conduct and trains of thought, which were grounded upon that sense of duty which prompted mankind to feel a desire to worship and obey the Creator and Sustainer of the universe.

There are three attributes, in the opinion of the ancients, belonging to all innate or ultimate principles or propositions; namely, that they are self-evident, universal, and the source of many conclusions.

1st. Self-evident principles are such as the mind readily gives its assent to, as soon as the terms, or any form of words in which they are embodied, are expressed and understood. All negative propositions are self-evident; as a square is not a circle, nor a man a horse. But then these propositions, and all others of a similar nature, wanted one important qualification requisite to all *innate* principles; that *they are not the source of a number of conclusions*. Neither from the proposition that a square is not a circle, nor a man a horse, is there any conclusion necessarily deducible.

2nd. Universal propositions are such as are agreed to by persons of all nations and creeds.

3rd. Principles are said to be the source of a number of conclusions, from which we can deduce a great many truths.

Innate ideas may also be further subdivided, in accordance with the ancient philosophy, into four descriptions, *immediate, common, external, and immutable*.

1st. Immediate principles are those, the truth of

which we can perceive without the help of any intermediate ideas, such as those which constitute the evidence on which mathematical conclusions are grounded.

2nd. Common principles are such as are agreed upon by all mankind.

3rd. External principles are those which ever have been, and always must be, true. Though, for example, a triangle had never been formed or described, yet it needs must have been eternally true that its three angles are equal to two right ones.

4th. Immutable principles are those which remain always the same. We cannot conceive how even Omnipotence Himself could reverse their nature. The terms in which such propositions are couched may be reversed; but their mental nature or essence seems to be unchanged and unchangeable. A square may be called a circle, and a circle a square; but still to the mind's eye, or to the eye of the understanding, the nature of these two mathematical conceptions remains the same. We conceive it is not in the power of the Almighty Himself to make two contradictory propositions, both true and false at the same time, nor cause the same individual to be at two different places at the same moment. This does not argue any imperfection in the Supreme Being; on the contrary, to make Him the author of an absurdity, ought to be considered as a manifest and great imperfection.

Aristotle, and the Peripatetics generally, maintained the idea that there were two principles, of a seemingly discordant and contradictory nature, on

which a great part, if not the whole, of our knowledge was built. The first of these principles was, "Whatever is, is;" and the second, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." The first proposition was called a *direct* one, because it was thought to form the basis of all direct or certain information. The second was termed *indirect*, and was conceived to be the ground of all indirect demonstrations, or such as led to absurd and ridiculous consequences or conclusions. Some of the ancient Sages, who were smitten with a love of system to a great extent, went so far as to declare that the first proposition, that "Whatever is, is," embodied the sum and substance of all human knowledge.

The discussion, in the different schools of philosophy, relative to the general doctrine of ultimate or first principles, gave rise to a variety of opinions and systems. One class of reasoners, deeply impressed with the importance of truth, were anxious to divest themselves of prejudices and partialities of every kind, in order to guard against error more effectually. They attempted the study of nature with minds like a *tabula rasa*. This led them formally to renounce all established principles. They supported this course of proceeding by urging that, from personal experience, their various organs of sensation deceived them, and conveyed to their minds false impressions of external objects; and, in fact, that these faculties of perception were so capricious in their operations, that no positive or legitimate conclusions could be

drawn from them. These reasoners also maintained, that they had been induced to place faith in a variety of things from the prejudices of education; and that they were daily called upon to renounce some favourite principle or other, which a more extended acquaintance with the maxims of philosophy showed to be perfectly absurd or ridiculous. Even with respect to self-evident maxims and propositions, they felt themselves not fully justified in placing implicit confidence in them. This brought all such reasoners to the verge of complete scepticism. The existence of a material universe seemed almost to vanish from their belief.

The reader will readily recognise from the preceding remarks, that the speculative principles greatly predominated in the seats of learning at particular periods. They also gave way at intervals to investigations of a practical or common-sense character; and very often both were blended in the elucidation of theological principles, relative to the existence of nature, and the modes of operation of the Divine or Supreme Mind.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ROMAN SCHOOL OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE Roman School of metaphysics, considered in itself, is but of little moment. In viewing it, however, in conjunction with various Grecian systems, it becomes more interesting, and has a higher claim to our regard.

The Roman people were altogether different from the Grecians. The warlike character, the rude and abrupt manners, and the enterprising restlessness of the former, present a striking contrast to the mild, refined, and effeminate civilization of the Greek republics. The Roman was, therefore, a man whom both nature and education had in a great measure unfitted for very abstract speculation. His forte lay in activity and martial ardour. Pure speculation hung always loosely about him, because it proved but a drag or incumbrance to his movements. The theatre of his action was confined to the bustle and turmoil of public life; and his only hope of fame and distinction rested on

the active and efficient discharge of duties which society imposed upon him. Not so the Greek. His soul was fashioned in a softer mould. Luxurious ease, and contemplative equanimity, were the grand objects of his life. He lay upon his couch, or sauntered in his garden, with his soul buried in sublime speculation; and to solve a problem or develop a theory, afforded him more intense gratification, than the possession of a crown or the subjugation of an empire.

Some philosophical historians have expressed their surprise that the Romans added so little to the science of mind. Why should they be surprised at this result? Do men "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" It is no easy matter to change the frame-work of a nation's mind. Many ages of discipline and favourable external circumstances, are requisite to effect such a result. We may readily imagine with what wonder the inhabitants of Rome would first listen to the development of Grecian metaphysics, conveyed through the medium of a different and unknown tongue; couched in a dialectic form to which they were entire strangers; and aiming at nothing short of accounting for the origin of the universe, and every thing in it. The seeds of such knowledge must have fallen upon many hard and stony places. Several ages must have been required to cultivate and enrich the soil for their reception and fruition. Our surprise therefore ought to be that the Romans really made so much progress in the knowledge of the philosophy of

Greece, as they actually did, considering the manifold obstacles from political institutions, social habits, difference of language, and constitutional temperament.

The Romans first became acquainted with the mental speculations of the Greeks, through the channels of political relationship. The consular and ambassadorial dignities carried the seeds of the new philosophy to Rome. Scipio long patronized the Stoic Panætius, who seems to have been extremely zealous and successful in disseminating his views in the metropolis of the world. It is said that he fully developed both the Platonic and Stoical systems; and made many converts of rank and influence. A knowledge of other schools and sects followed. The doctrines of the Epicureans, and of the New Academy, were promulgated; and Sylla brought to Rome the works of Aristotle, which became generally accessible, through the means of a translation, effected by Tyrannion and Andronicus of Rhodes.

LUCRETIVS.

The first fruit of Grecian speculation among the Romans, was that of Lucretius. He was a disciple and admirer of Epicurus. His poem, *De Rerum Natura*, contains all the leading views and principles of the Epicurean philosophy. We have the religious veneration and fear of the gods ridiculed; the necessity of emancipating the mind from all notions of a Divine Nature; but, at the same time,

to endow it with that resolute and inflexible determination and self-government, that will enable it to triumph even over destiny itself. *Nature* is the only Deity which the poet can recognise; but even here, we find that striking circumstance occur, which demonstrates that poets cannot go on long without some active or creative power; and hence it is that we find him giving life, vitality, and intelligence, to this very principle or abstraction which he calls *nature*. In fact, he makes a Deity of it, both in its essence and offices. It is only through the instrumentality of this vivifying or active principle, that he has been able to make any thing like a readable poem out of the Epicurean system. He personifies Nature. He represents her as a ruling unity, who makes her power and influence felt in every direction. Even when this power and influence are delegated to inferior agents, as the sun or stars, the same vital principle goes with them, and discharges the active duties of their office. This is not ascribable to any poetic license, but arises from the very nature of things themselves. There is no other course open to the poet, no matter what his notions of fatality may be.

Lucretius' notions on the human soul are very perplexed and irrational. His theory of the nature of the primordial atoms of which all things consist, is the only key we have as to what his opinions really were. He talks of atoms having a principle of self motion*; and these are the elements out of

* "Prima moventur enim per se primordia rerum." b. 2. 132.

which the voluntary powers are fabricated. The different forms of the atoms, and the direction they take, either straight or oblique, determine the individual character of the soul. These forms are finite, but the seeds of each configuration are innumerable; and hence, by inference, the immense variety in animated creatures.

CICERO. 106 B. C.

Cicero is the most distinguished civilian in Roman history. As an historian, a politician, a statesman, and an orator, he is unrivalled; as a philosopher he holds a respectable station. We estimate him in this last character, not so much for what he has left us of his own speculations, as for what he has given us of the opinions and systems of others. He was not a profound and subtle genius, who could frame a system, and work it out with the most refined and elaborate illustrations; but he had a powerful and brilliant judgment, and keen intellectual perception, which could penetrate into matters of the most recondite nature. Still, however, he was no theorist. He knew a great deal of many systems; felt some partialities for particular ones; but he never assumed the character of a philosophical partisan, in the strict sense of the word. He dived a little into this system, and a little into that, but never appeared as a thorough-paced proselyte, determined to defend certain dogmas, whether they were true or not. The structure of his mind, and the habits of his

life, were quite in opposition to a character of this description. He was in every sense of the expression, a man of the world. Knowledge was to him an instrument for use, not an object of mere curiosity or display. It was to promote his views and fame as a lawyer, an orator, a statesman, and a politician, that he cultivated an acquaintance with philosophy; and in every movement of his active mind, of which we have any literary memorial left, we may fairly discern how adroitly he turned this acquaintanceship to a profitable and honourable use.

We shall consider him chiefly as a metaphysician. His genius embraced every section of Greek philosophy. He had studied with considerable care and success both Aristotle and Plato, as well as the Epicurean and the Stoical systems. For a critical knowledge, he sufficiently mastered the most important theories connected with the nature and faculties of the human understanding.*

On the nature of the human soul, this celebrated man observes: "The soul is derived immediately from the Divinity. It retains ties of relationship with celestial beings; and hence it comes to pass that amidst all animated nature, man is the only creature which possesses the knowledge of a Supreme Being. The possession of this knowledge is then sufficient to entitle man to point to his upward origin. Nature has placed in us certain *necessary and elementary notions*, which form the basis of all true wisdom and science."†

On the nature of the organs of sensation Cicero

* See Note D. at the end of this Volume.

† De Legibus l. 8. 9.

remarks, "Our senses have been conferred upon us, in our present state of being, to act the part of so many satellites or messengers, each of which is invested with its own proper function, and the perfection of each sense consists in perceiving, with promptness and certainty, those things which nature submits to them."

It is not possible, however, to determine whether Cicero considered our sensations as affording us a standard of truth, or whether they were fallacious, and not to be depended upon. He is wishful to steer a kind of middle course between conflicting systems. He could not go the whole length of saying, that the impressions by the senses were stamped with infallible certainty; neither, on the other hand, would his movements among men of the world, and an active participation in all its duties, allow him to consider these impressions, *in the vast majority of cases*, as uncertain and illusory. To solve the difficulty in some measure, he instituted a species of *probability*, which was to serve the common and ordinary purpose of guiding men to safe and rational conclusions, on all matters appertaining to the mere phenomena of sensation. There is, however, great vagueness and uncertainty on every thing the philosopher has advanced on this question. In some places he considers the senses as the mere channels through which objects are conveyed to the mind; and that it is the peculiar province of this intelligent principle, to procure information, to combine, and compare, and to judge.* This position

* Tusc. 1. 20.

is, however, laid down with so many qualifications and reservations, that it becomes quite obvious that he had no decided or systematic opinions on the subject of sensation generally.*

On the difficulties which present themselves in all investigations after truth, Cicero thus expresses himself: "All knowledge is encircled with difficulties. Such is the natural obscurity of things, and the constitutional weakness of the principle of intelligence, that the most sagacious minds of antiquity have doubted whether we ever can arrive at truth at all. The most part of mankind embrace opinions without having the power of choosing them. They judge of what they do not know; and attach themselves to some favourite system, as mariners do to a rock in a tempestuous sea. But a philosopher will only give his assent after he has patiently heard both sides, and after a careful review of all the opinions which have previously been advanced on the subject."

Cicero seems to have established his metaphysical creed upon the general principles of Plato's system. Though well grounded in various other doctrines relative to the mind, he decidedly gives the preference to those of this eminent Grecian sage. Cicero almost always had a fondness for Plato. They had many things in common. There were the same elevation of thought, and warmth of feeling, displayed in both; and the same deference paid to the common-sense feelings and sentiments of mankind. This must have proved a powerful

* De Finibus. 2. 12.

bond of union. And there can be no rational doubt but that the predilection which the great orator and statesman manifested for Plato's views of the human understanding, arose from an inward and powerful conviction that they were more in unison with the duties and destinies of man, than those of any other of the Grecian philosophers.*

The immediate followers of Cicero in philosophical disquisitions, were not signalized by any advancements in the study of mind. Indeed it was in a great measure neglected by all the latter disciples of the Stoical School at Rome. The speculations of the learned men who still adhered to the forms of philosophy, were directed to the principles which regulate the ordinary current of human life, and into the nature of public and private good and evil. The Stoical school, for a long period after the death of Cicero, clearly indicates how disinclined the Romans were to abstract studies, and what a faint relish they displayed for all the most sublime speculations which formed the intellectual glory of Athens. With the exception of the doctrine of the freedom of the human will, we can scarcely recognize a single speculation of a metaphysical character, brought prominently

* Vide, The Memoirs of Gauthier de Sibert, on the Philosophy of Cicero, in the 27th book of the Academy of Inscriptions, Paris; Faccipati, *Vita Ciceronis Litteraria*, Paris, 1760; Middleton's *Life of Cicero*, London; Hulsemann, *De Indole Philosophica M. Tullii Ciceronis*, Luxemburg, 1799; Meniers, *Oratio de Phil. Ciceronis*, Leipsic; Adam Buraius, *Dialectica Ciceronis*, Zamosck, 1604; Janson de Nares, *Brevia et distincta Quest. in Ciceronis Philosophiâ*, Pavia, 1697; Waldin, *Oratio de Phil. Ciceronis Platonici*, Jena, 1753.

forward on the stage of public discussion, for a long series of years. To this doctrine, however, the Stoics were enthusiastically attached. Indeed it forms the grand key-stone to their whole system of morals. A few scattered thoughts on the philosophy of mind may be found connected with the names of Q. Sextus, Demetrius, Demonax of Cyprus, Ctenomachus of Gadara, Athenodorus of Tarsus, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius Antoninus.

ALCINOUS.

Amongst the most eminent metaphysicians who adorned the school of the new Platonists at Rome, Alcinous took a distinguished rank. His "*Introduction to the Philosophy of Plato*," is the very best summary of Plato's system which has ever been given.

Alcinous maintains that that which has for its object intelligent things, is science, or scientific reason; that which embraces sensible things, or sensations, is *doxastical* reason, or opinion.

It follows then from this, that all which flows from the exercise of this scientific reason, is solid and immutable, because it is itself founded upon a basis which embodies these two qualities. On the other hand, factitious reason or opinion offers only general probabilities, and resemblances, because it is founded only upon uncertain data.

The understanding is the foundation of science, which has for its objects intelligent things; and

sensation is the link which connects the understanding with our senses.

Sensation is an impression which the soul receives from external objects, and which impression indicates its passive nature.

When, then, the soul receives, through the instrumentality of the senses, a sensible impression,—that is to say, a sensation,—instead of its being destroyed, or erased by time, it remains and is treasured up there; and the continuation of its future existence, is that effect of sensation which produces what we term memory.

When we recognize a sensible object, whilst the presence of that object produces in us a sensation, and this sensation is imprinted on the memory; when we perceive again this identical object, we compare the preceding sensation, which has been preserved by the memory, with the new sensation; and we thus say to ourselves, for example, *Socrates, horse, fire*; and so of other things.

When, then, we compare a previous sensation with another just experienced, the effect of this act of comparison is termed *opinion*. When the two objects compared are in unison, the result of the comparison is truth; on the contrary, when there is want of agreement, the opinion is false and erroneous.*

MAXIMUS OF TYRE.

This writer on the mind follows nearly the same

* Introduction to the Philosophy of Plato.

path as Alcinous. The distinction between reason and the mere sentient principle, he points out in the following manner.

“Let us inquire what that is in man to which we apply the terms *to know, to learn, to apprehend*, and other phrases of a similar nature which indicate that the soul is in a contemplative state of existence. Do we call by the name of science that which the senses assemble as in a contemplative picture-frame, and which we commonly designate by the name of *experience*; that, in fact, which is submitted to the eyes of the mind, and which reason, after due examination, stamps with its own seal? Such a science as this, it must be owned, is common to brutes; for they receive sensations, acquire experience, and possess a species of wisdom. The superiority of man is derived from his *reason*, and his relation to science is nothing but this reason bringing under its power, for a sufficient length of time, the multitudinous objects submitted to its notice; and in its active powers detecting resemblances and contrarieties; separating, uniting, distinguishing, and producing an harmonious whole, out of a mass of incongruous and diversified materials. The soul of man is a compound of mortal and immortal elements. The latter qualities unite him with the gods. Instinct is the gift of the former; intelligence that of the latter. Prudence or sagacity holds a situation between them both; and establishes the supremacy of our immortal nature upon that which we possess in common with the animal creation. Experience has created the

arts ; prudence or sagacity governs the passions and emotions of the soul ; and intelligence represents the laws of this external habitation of ours—laws which have been created by God himself. I call true science the harmonious combination of these *three* faculties or powers."

We find Maximus entertaining the most lofty ideas of the nature of the soul. He had evidently drunk deep in the Platonic philosophy. It is only the internal and intelligent parts of the man which command his admiration and respect ; it is these alone which raise him to the dignity of claiming an affinity with Deity itself. There is a genuine spirituality and life in his mental speculations, which are not displayed in the lucubrations of his predecessors.*

Maximus did not fail to notice the various sources of error mankind had to contend against in their pursuit of truth. Not only the passions of the soul blind and misdirect the reason, but even philosophy herself, infallible as she is commonly considered, is but a frail and uncertain guide. The rivalry of different and opposing sects, the influence of ambitious singularity, and the strong prepossessions in favour of particular studies and sciences, distract the judgment of the most sedate and able men, and convert them into instruments of delusion. The philosophy of Thales was viewed through the medium
 • of astronomy ; of Pythagoras, through music ; of Heraclitus, through solitude ; of Socrates, through

* Maximus Tyr. Diss. 12. 14. 17.

the moral affections; and of Epicurus, through voluptuousness. Thus mankind are bewildered and tossed from one set of doctrines to another.*

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS.

This metaphysician was a distinguished commentator on Aristotle, to whose ideas he added some notions of his own. He attacks the Platonists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, and seems to have been a stout and resolute defender of the perfect stability of human knowledge.

Alexander was a strenuous advocate for free-will. He maintains that this power was given to man, and is one of the marks which distinguish him from mere animal nature. He points out, with great force, the moral and social evils which follow the doctrines of necessary connexion, when they are once brought into active operation in the conduct of individuals or whole bodies of men.

GALEN.

This distinguished physician did not confine his inquiries to those topics more immediately connected with the physical constitution of man; but with indefatigable labour investigated those hidden springs of mental action, which always exercise a greater or lesser influence over the bodily powers of human nature. He seems to have freed himself

* Diss. 25.

from the trammels of systems, and to have prosecuted his inquiries under the influence of a sincere and ardent love of truth.

On the abstract nature of evidence he makes some profound and just remarks. He saw the great error which pervaded many of the systems promulgated by the ancients, which principally consisted in an absurd and ridiculous application of general terms, without making those perpetual references to facts, which are indispensable for the foundation of comprehensive branches of science and knowledge. In his definition of synthesis and analysis, he points out the nature of both these instruments, the limits of each, and the most approved rules for the advantageous combination of both.

He distinguished four kinds of demonstration. The first produced all science; it seized the reality of things, and investigated their nature completely; the second, that logical process on which dialectics were founded; the third, that which embraced foreign testimony, grounded upon the probability of the statements advanced; and the fourth rested on commonly received notions or opinions.

Galen remarks, that evidence is the source of all intellectual light; if there were no evidence, there could be no exercise of the human understanding. This power is to the soul what the eye is to the body. To perceive, is to comprehend, to know, to be assured of the existence of things. It is necessary, then, to commence all our inquiries with essential and fundamental things, and to take our departure

from those things that are easy of comprehension, and are immediately around us.

This philosopher considered that the common source of error amongst men, arose from a too hasty generalisation. The successful search after truth essentially consists in an extensive and careful investigation, and an exact comparison as to the differences and resemblances of things.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE LATER SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICAL SCEPTICISM.

AT stated periods in the history of mental philosophy we find that certain men invariably attempted to gain distinction and notoriety, by calling in question the fundamental maxims of knowledge, truth, and reasoning. We find all shades and degrees of scepticism; from the humble and simple doubter, to the absolute and dogmatical disbeliever in even his own personal existence. The nature of mental inquiry is favourable to this intellectual disease; chiefly from the abstract nature of its principles, the uncertainty and imperfections of language, the difficulty attending a close and consecutive examination of the phenomena of thought, and the variable motives which may influence the judgments of the metaphysician throughout the whole course of his investigations.

ÆNESIDEMUS.

Ænesidemus was a reviver of the doctrines of the

Pyrrhonians. He was a contemporary of Cicero, was a native of Crete, and taught philosophy at Alexandria. He wrote a work to point out the distinction between the doctrines of the Academicians, and those of the followers of Pyrrho. In the second book of this work Ænesidemus treats of truth, causation, action, chance, motion, production, destruction, with a view of showing the imperfections of our knowledge on all these matters. In the third book he treats of our sensations, and endeavours to show that there is a great want of uniformity amongst them. The fourth book is occupied with the imperfections of signs; and the fifth points out the uncertainty accompanying all those deductions which we make from sensible things, to matters removed from the senses. The sixth attacks the ordinary maxims respecting cause and effect; and the other three books are confined to questions as to good and evil, and the end and destiny of man.

On the subject of causation, this philosopher makes the following remarks: "Bodies cannot be the cause of other bodies; for if they act, they must either act by themselves, or by others, as intermediate agents. If by themselves, they can only produce that which already forms a part of their own nature or essence; if they act through the instrumentality of others, then these become necessarily one and the same substance. That which is incorporeal cannot, moreover, be the cause of another incorporeal substance; and for this reason, beings cannot produce that which forms no part of their own nature. Besides, that

which is incorporeal cannot be in contact with, or act upon, or be acted upon by, that which is material. Bodies cannot be the cause of incorporeal natures, nor can the latter be the cause of the former, for they contain opposite properties or principles. A body at rest cannot be the cause of another body also at rest, nor can a body in motion be the cause of another that moves itself.”*

What Ænesidemus meant by being or essence, is difficult to conjecture. His views on the primary causes of things seem at variance with the general scope of his speculations. The essence (*ousia*) was the primeval body; but whether it included a secondary body, is uncertain.† He also considered air as the principle of all things. There seems, however, to have been great confusion in his mind on every topic of speculation.

AGRIPPA.

This ancient writer was the successor of Ænesidemus, and cultivated his system with great zeal and success. He made additional maxims to the theory of Pyrrho. These maxims are five in number. The first relates to the differences amongst the various schools of philosophy, on the truth of their respective elementary principles. The second arises from the notion of infinity involved in every chain of proofs, that one depends upon another *ad infinitum*. The third maxim, of

* Photius, Bibl. pp. 642. 648.

† Sextus Empiri., Pyrrh. 3. 138.

doubt, refers to the uncertainty we must always labour under as to the real nature of objects ; inasmuch as we can only speak or judge of things by our own individual sensations or perceptions. Fourthly, we are led into doubt and error from the hasty adoption of purely gratuitous principles. And the fifth maxim is the common practice of reasoning in a circle. There seems, however, nothing novel in all these maxims. They have been repeated over and over again by many preceding philosophers.*

PHAVORINUS.

This philosopher wrote a treatise on Vision, as well as upon the Academical propositions, and the views of Pyrrho. Philostratus informs us that these works were of high merit. It was against this philosopher that Galen directed his metaphysical writings. The latter remarks, "That some recent writers, and amongst the number is Phavorinus, carry their doubts to such a pitch, as to call in question the existence of the sun."†

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.

Sextus was not only a most profound metaphysician himself, but he was, on the whole, a most able and candid historian of mental theories and systems generally. He had paid great attention

* Diog. Laert. 9. 84. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. 1. pp. 164 –178.

† Diog. Laert. 9. 87.

to this department of knowledge; and it is chiefly to him that we owe any information at all of the views and writings of several eminent philosophers of ancient times.

His own personal opinions seem to have classed him amongst the Sceptics; but it has long been a question, since his day, what was his degree of doubt, and how far he carried out his scepticism on the fundamentals of human science and knowledge. On this point it will be difficult to form a correct opinion. We have only a few scattered observations of his own, and very slender probabilities to guide us. It would seem, however, that he did not carry his system of doubt to such a length as to invalidate the testimony of our senses, or the elementary principles of reason. On this subject he remarks, "We never examine how sensible things fall under our senses, nor how intelligent perceptions arise in the understanding and are there perceived by it; we receive both in a simple and absolute manner, as a matter unaccountable and undefinable."

Sextus remarks also, that the philosophers who preceded him had maintained three standards of truth, or rather we should say, three instruments for the discovery of truth and falsehood. The first is that which belongs to man, and which forms his power of judgment; the second, the means he employs for judging, that is, his senses and understanding; and the third, that action or power by which he applies these objects or instruments. The first principle he rejects, on account

of the compound nature of man, possessing a body, as well as a soul, which must, in his opinion, give rise to many operations we never can know anything about. The second *criterion* he also refuses his assent to, principally on the ground of the conflicting and variable nature of our organs of sense, and the sources of delusion to which the understanding is liable from this and other causes. The third standard is rejected likewise, from the doubt thrown over our organs of vision.

The notions entertained by Sextus on the human soul, are of a material complexion. He thought we knew little or nothing about it.* All the higher kinds of thought were but the relations to the sensible particles of matter. Our sensations seemed to be the only ground he had for anything approaching to truth and certainty. But Sextus was not apparently consistent even in this position: for he maintained that man did not know anything whatever of himself. We have no sure means of arriving at the truth of our own natures, either bodily or mental.† Every thing is tainted with doubt. If the mind can know any thing of man, it must know him only through three channels, the body, the senses, or itself. If the body compels the mind to think, then the body moves without any reason, and consequently our minds must be moved or impelled irrationally. The same objection lies against the position that the senses can be known by the mind, for they are

* Pyrrh. Hyp. 3. 51.

† Pyrrh. 2. 29.

themselves irrational in their movements and operations. If we learned what the senses were through the medium of the understanding, this would reduce all to the same uniform nature or essence. As to the mind taking notice of its own thoughts, feelings, opinions, and emotions, this is evidently impossible, for we should have neither a subject to know, or an object to be known. For the mind to know itself, it must know what its real substance is, all its laws of action, where its proper location is; and, in fact, in what mode it operates on matter, and matter operates on it.

These doubts and objections are reiterated over and over again by this learned Sceptic, but there is little method or ingenuity displayed in the arrangement of his views.

The ideas of Sextus on cause and effect, are clothed in the same mystification as his other notions on the foundations of truth in general. Causation from the contact of material bodies is considered very doubtful. No two bodies can touch each other; it may be conjectured that they may touch each other at their *surfaces*, but the bodies themselves can never come in contact.* The same thing may be affirmed of all mixtures of material elements, and the various changes they seem to undergo in consequence. There is no real contact of the particles in such cases.

On cause and effect generally, the objections urged by Sextus are very subtle, and fairly stated.

* Pyrrhon. Hyp. 3. 42.

In modern times we have seen them often brought upon the stage of philosophical discussion. If one thing, says Sextus, can be the *cause* of another thing, one of the following circumstances must take place; either the quiescent must be the cause of the quiescent, or the moved of the thing in motion; or a moving cause produce a quiescent effect, or a quiescent cause a moved effect. Now this cannot be, because it is maintained, as a general maxim, *that like things can only produce like things*. Again, it is affirmed that cause and effect must have a co-existent nature. That a cause cannot be posterior to an effect is quite true; neither can an effect be subsequent to a cause, for this reason, that if the cause be anterior to the effect, there must be a certain time when it was deprived of, or separated from, the effect, therefore making it no cause at all. If again the effect be posterior to the cause, then it must exist when its cause ceases to exist, which would make it, in fact, an effect without a cause, which is a thing impossible to be conceived.

Besides these objections, it is urged by the Sceptics, that our ordinary theory of causation involves the position that all causes are *active principles*, and all effects are *passive ones*. Now this cannot be proved. Indeed this theory of cause and effect contains many contradictory conclusions; and it is from the consideration of these, that Sextus sees it is impossible to extricate himself from this labyrinth of doubt and perplexity.

On the nature of Deity, the whole of the doubts.

and speculations of Sextus are of a material nature and tendency. There is nothing of novelty in them.*

* See the three works of Sextus Empiricus; the Pyrrhoniastic Hypotyposes, that against Encyclic Sciences, and that against the Philosophical Sects. The two last are joined in one called *Adversus Mathematicos*.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS,
UP TO THIS PERIOD OF HISTORY, ON A DEITY,
AND THE HUMAN SOUL.

As we have now arrived at what may be strictly called the termination of heathen speculations on the mental nature of man, it will prove of advantage to take a retrospective view of the general notions entertained by the sages of antiquity on the nature of a First Great Cause, and of the human soul. These are two branches of knowledge so nearly allied to metaphysics, so closely interwoven with all the inquisitive powers of men's minds, so vitally important to the right application of all speculations on human nature, and so deeply momentous to the present and future interests of mankind, that no apology can be necessary here for giving these topics the fullest consideration possible. Indeed, unless these important doctrines were founded in truth, and taken with us as guides throughout life, it is difficult to conceive what could really be the object in instituting any

investigations into the laws of either matter or mind. The doctrines of a Deity, and the spirituality of the human soul, are the true vivifying principles of intellectual existence; and without them all speculation would only present a melancholy and dreary wilderness, without a single object of substantial interest for the eye of man to dwell upon.

Among the various modern writers on the principles of natural theology, and the evidences of Christianity, there are evidently two classes, characterized by strong marks of difference. One portion have always shown a marked jealousy against allowing the heathen philosophers the smallest credit for any knowledge of a Supreme Being; and the other have been apt to misconceive and overrate the importance of that heathen knowledge. The former writers have, in substance, maintained that Christianity should have the sole undivided honour of revealing to man the existence and attributes of a Deity; that human reason had no just claim to such a magnificent discovery; and that had it not been for the direct and positive declarations of Holy Writ, no knowledge would have been found at this day among the human race, on this interesting and all-absorbing topic. Now I conceive there can be no good grounds for depreciating ancient knowledge on the nature of a Deity. There is nothing here to detract from the merit of Christianity; but on the contrary, to strengthen its evidences, and to make them take a firmer hold of the human understanding. It is quite obvious, as

a matter of fact, that many of the sages of antiquity had very clear and elevated notions of a Supreme Being; and these notions had been worked out by the pure force of their natural mental faculties, and their accurate modes of interrogating nature. And this is perfectly in accordance with the declarations and spirit of Revelation itself; for it declares that God did not leave himself without a witness; inasmuch as he had given to every man a light to guide him to a knowledge of Himself.

We find, on the other hand, that some theological writers have descanted on the nature of the knowledge which the heathen possessed of a Supreme Being, as if that knowledge was every thing that could be desired; and that the subsequent revelations from heaven on this grand subject, were nothing more than a simple recapitulation of the opinions of Aristotle or Plato. This is erring on the opposite side. We should, therefore, hold the balance fairly between both parties. The opinions of the ancient philosophers are well worthy our special regard; but we must amalgamate them with the more full and comprehensive developments of the Divine nature and attributes, which the Christian system unfolds.

There is one very obvious difference between the Deity of the heathen philosophers and the Deity of the Christians. The former is invariably represented as a Being very far removed from all human sympathy and regard. He rules and governs the world by general laws, but takes no interest in the petty affairs of man. Now the Christian sys-

tem brings the Deity, so to speak, nearer to mankind; institutes a close and mutual sympathy between them; and represents both under the familiar and interesting relationship of Father and children. When this difference of character is duly estimated by the practical consequences which must follow from it in our modes of worship, the result must display the great defects in the speculative systems of the ancient world, in reference to the existence and attributes of the Author of the universe.

We find that those ancient philosophers who discussed the nature of the Great First Cause, pursued the same line of argumentation which has commonly been employed by all theological writers in modern times. There is a very interesting and striking resemblance on this point. The proofs of a Deity furnished by the ancients, may be classified under three distinct heads; namely, *human testimony; the order and constitution of the world; and the pernicious consequences of Atheism.* Under the first head they showed the almost universal opinion entertained by all mankind on the subject of a First Cause, and that men of the greatest wisdom and penetration had given their cordial assent to it. In the second place, they considered the order and wisdom displayed in the constitution of every department of nature. Where intelligence is so strikingly imprinted on every thing around us, it is but reasonable to suppose that an intelligent cause must be the creating and sustaining principle of action. Again, nothing is so perni-

cious as the doctrine of Atheism. Every noble principle, and every disinterested feeling, become paralyzed under its withering and hateful influence. It destroys all religion, all morality, all wisdom and justice among men.

One of the most early notions respecting the Deity entertained by the ancient philosophers, was that the all-creating Cause was not different in nature or essence from the universe itself. They imagined the Divinity to pervade all space, to be every way present, and that no change or movement could be produced but by His direct will or influence. We find traces of this opinion throughout the whole range of heathen philosophy. It does not appear, however, that they deduced any atheistical inferences from it. The reasonable supposition is that very elevated and transcendental notions of supreme power led inquirers to this train of thought, and by not wishing to mix the actions of the Deity with every petty mundane affair, they talked of this Spirit pervading and forming part of the whole frame of universal creation.

Some philosophers—and the Stoics were of this number—considered that the Deity consisted of more than one person. Cicero, in his Treatise on the Nature of the Gods, says that all the theology of the Stoics may be divided into *four* parts; namely, first, that there are gods; secondly, that their nature may be defined; thirdly, that the gods govern the world; and fourthly, that they especially interest themselves with the affairs of men.

Akin to this last opinion, was the one generally.

prevalent amongst the Eastern nations, which embraced, in divers shapes and forms, the two principles of good and evil. This idea was the groundwork of many systems of theology.

There was a notion almost universally entertained amongst all classes of the ancient philosophers, that the Deity acted under the influence of an irrevocable fate or destiny. The affairs of the world, and the constitution of things in general, could not be otherwise managed than we find them. They were always more or less scrupulous in admitting the application of this doctrine, in all its fulness, to the superior or intellectual part of man, but seem to have tacitly acquiesced in it, in reference to the Deity. There were, however, many qualifications and modifications of the doctrine of necessity, when thus applied to the influence of the universal Cause.

Another opinion, somewhat curious, was adopted, that the Deity and the Creator of the world were two Separate Beings; the latter, however, only the agent or instrument in the hands of the former. This notion, it may be observed, was confined to a very small section of the philosophical world of antiquity.

The Deity of the ancients was almost invariably associated with a high degree of intelligence. He was the centre of all thought, truth, and wisdom. The intelligent principle is always the leading and prominent attribute of his nature; and goodness and benevolence were made to occupy a subordinate station in the character of the Divinity.

This notion gave a great variety of colourings to their theological systems.

There were, as we have already noticed, three leading arguments used by the ancients for the existence of a Deity, namely, testimony, the constitution of the world, and the evils of atheism; yet, in addition to these, there were other powerful influences which seemed to have a great effect upon all their reasonings on this interesting question. Among these, the origin of motion occupied a conspicuous place. We find that, whenever a reasoner was placed in any real or apparent dilemma on the nature and existence of Deity, he invariably took shelter in the origin of motion. He demanded, how could a body move itself? There *must* be a first cause, or you cannot advance a single step in accounting for anything. Your philosophy is puerility and nonsense without it. Every reader of the works of the Grecian sages can readily bring to his recollection innumerable instances of the adoption of this line of argumentation.*

The opinions of the ancient philosophers on the nature of the human soul were exceedingly diversified, often contradictory, and sometimes unintelligible. We can do little more here, therefore, with any hope of profit, than just present the reader with a few general remarks, on some of the leading systems which obtained currency amongst the speculators of antiquity.

There were a few of the ancient philosophers

* See Note E. at the end of this Volume.

who maintained that the soul was propagated by parents to their children by the ordinary laws of generation. Against this opinion it was contended, that if the soul were created in this manner, it must either be from the body or from the soul of the parents. If it proceeded from the body, the soul would then be a material substance; and the *effect*, in this case, would be vastly more noble and exalted than the *cause*. If, on the other hand, our thinking principle proceeded from the soul of our parents, then the difficulty presented itself, that by thus making the soul a simple uncompound substance, it could not possibly be dissolvable or communicative. Again, it was asked, If the soul be propagated from parents, by the ordinary laws of generation, is it from the soul of one of them, or from both? There is no reason why it should be from the one parent more than the other; and if we say it is from both, then we are immediately betrayed into the absurdity, that the soul is made up of parts. Its unity is hereby destroyed, which is one of the leading attributes attached to the soul or mind of man. The opponents of this theory always insisted, that it was impossible to conceive how the souls of two parents should be so united, as necessarily to produce a new soul. On the other hand the advocates of the theory attempted to illustrate their principles in the following manner. The soul exerts a thought; that thought becomes the *germ* or *seed* of another soul. There was no greater difficulty involved in this simple assumption than there is when speak-

ing of the *germ* or *seed* of material things. But here it was objected, that if by a thought one spirit could produce another, then one superior intellectual nature could produce its own kind in like manner; which would end in chaotic confusion. Besides, this theory involved the notion, that the soul was capable of an act of creation, which is the especial prerogative of the Divinity itself; for whatever can produce a substance out of nothing, possesses undoubtedly a power of creation. If the soul of man had the power of creating another soul from a simple thought, and if that thought be maintained at the same time to have nothing in itself of a substantial form, then the soul would possess that same creative power which we consider as the sole attribute of the Deity. To avoid this conclusion, it was contended that though the soul had not the *absolute* power of creation, yet it possessed a power to multiply itself, and so produce other souls, in precisely the same manner as a candle is lighted from another, without diminishing its substance.

There was a very commonly prevailing opinion amongst the ancients, that the souls of men were originally made by the divinity himself at the creation of all things; and existed in a prior state, where they were completely happy, and might have continued so for ever, had they not committed some heinous offence against their Creator, and thereby lost their primitive integrity and purity. In consequence of this, they were placed in bodies as punishments for their former crimes. This doctrine was objected to on the general ground;

that if this were the real state of the case, how comes it to pass that men had no remembrance whatever of any former state of existence? To this it was answered, that eternal oblivion constituted one of the chief elements of the punishment inflicted upon them for their disobedience.

The doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, or *transmigration of souls*, claimed a kindred alliance with the above doctrine. It maintained that the souls of men passed after death into the bodies of other living animals, whose habits, modes of life, and dispositions, bore a suitable resemblance to those moral pursuits and intellectual qualities, which defined the characters of individuals on earth. If a man led a debased and sensual life, he was doomed, after death, to be imprisoned in some wretched beast, there to perform a species of penance for several ages. If, on the contrary, he lived a sober, temperate, and virtuous life, he was more fortunate in being sent to some happy and peaceful animal. Some of the ancient philosophers pretended to have had visions on this subject. One describes the soul of Orpheus, who was musical, melancholy, and a hater of the fair sex, as entering into a swan; the soul of Ajax, represented full of anger and ferocity, into a lion; the soul of Agamemnon, who was soaring and ambitious, into an eagle; and the soul of the scoffer Thersites, into a monkey. This doctrine of transmigration has often been alluded to by modern writers of great note. How fine is Dryden's translation of Pythagoras' speech, in the fifteenth book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, touching the im-

propriety of eating animal food. And most literary readers must know the famous prologue which Congreve fixed to one of his very best comedies, in which the following lines occur, with respect to the supposed consequences of this grand doctrine of transmigration :—

“ Thus Aristotle’s soul of old that was,
May now be damn’d to animate an ass ;
Or, in this very house, for ought we know,
Is doing painful penance in some beau.”

There were a considerable number of the ancient sages who strenuously maintained that the power or faculty of thinking was an inherent and essential property of the soul, and if this thought were taken away from it, its nature would be entirely destroyed. They affirmed, that the soul was a substance altogether distinct and different from matter, the constitutional properties of which were solidity and extension. If the soul be neither solid nor extended, then, said they, we cannot conceive how it can exist, when it does not think. It may be true indeed, that a body when put in motion may continue to move in a straight line, until it comes in contact with some other body which may give it another direction ; but this case does not apply to the general argument, for a body when moving is entirely passive, whereas the soul of man is perpetually active in all its creations ; and, therefore, it must be concluded, that constant thinking is an essential attribute of the mental nature of man.

This opinion was qualified, in some degree, by asserting that the essential principle of the soul

was not perpetual cogitation, but only a communicated power to think. Thought was considered relatively to the soul, what motion is to the body; as it is not always necessary that the body should be in motion, neither is it necessary for the soul always to think. To account for the soul's existence when it does not think, we have only to suppose that though the soul is not solid, so as to offer resistance to bodies, yet it is extended; and it is as easy to conceive how the Divinity might communicate a power of thinking to extended matter, as to accommodate an immaterial substance, so as to harmonise with a material one.

We must here notice those persons who adopted the atomic or corpuscular theory of matter, for their notions of the nature of the soul were in a great measure peculiar to themselves. They accounted for the soul's influence over the body upon similar principles with those which in modern times have been ascribed to the doctrine of attraction and gravitation. It was a fundamental proposition with these reasoners that the seat of the soul was in the head, and that the thinking principle is not generally diffused throughout the various parts of the body. The soul is limited to this locality, and it is also maintained that the soul does not act upon the body *immediately*. There are certain nerves, canals, or channels, distributed through almost every part of the body, even the most remote. All these conduits are much of the same nature as the strings of a musical instrument; so that when one end of any of them is moved, the others partake of

the motion. All these canals or channels of sensation have a connexion with the head, and consequently with the soul itself. When the soul wishes to move any particular part of the body, there is a motion immediately communicated through these nerves or canals, which in their turn move the soul, and then the sensation of pain or pleasure is produced. This was the ordinary process by which these mental speculators endeavoured to account for the manner in which the soul moved the body, and the way in which external things excite sensations in the mind. They would not allow pure spirit to move bodies *immediately*, nor bodies to act on spirit *immediately*; but the action and re-action must be solely through the intervention of a third medium.

There was a small section of philosophers amongst the various schools of learning, who seemed to have adopted that hypothesis respecting the nature of the soul, which is now pretty generally maintained as the most orthodox one. This view is grounded on the notion, that at the organization of the body, when the receptacle is properly furnished, the soul is immediately created by God himself, and infused into the body; like a person taking possession of his new habitation, when all things are in readiness for his reception.

Several metaphysicians of antiquity, of great note, were exceedingly puzzled, by their inability to conceive how the soul could act upon the body, or the body upon the soul; or in other words, how a spiritual substance could have any influence over

a material one, so as to move and act upon it. This difficulty led these reasoners to adopt the notion—a notion which has formed the foundation of several metaphysical systems in modern times—that all our actions were brought about by the direct interference of God himself. This was conceived to be effected in two ways. First, whenever there was an impression upon any of our organs of sense from external objects, there was a sensation suitable to this impression excited in the soul by the Deity himself. Second, whenever the soul wishes to move any particular member of the body, immediately upon the existence of this volition, God excites a corresponding motion in that particular member. According to this doctrine, the will of the soul is not the *immediate* cause of the motion of the body, but only the *exciting* cause of the Divinity's creating that motion; and the impression made by a body upon any organ of sense, is not the cause of the sensation, but only an inducement for Divine interference to effect that purpose. When, for example, I wish to move my finger, or any other member of the body, it is not my soul which moves my finger, or the member; but the Deity, upon my volition, takes the occasion to move either the one or the other.

A portion of the ancients considered the soul and body to be but of one substance. They maintained that the particles of which the soul consists, are not different in nature, but are only of a finer and more subtile kind than those of the body.

There was a very influential theory amongst a

number of the ancients, respecting the nature and operations of the human soul, grounded upon a very subtile and refined principle of concord or harmony between the soul and the body. The soul being a thinking or spiritual substance, could not act upon the body, nor could the body act upon it, but only through the medium of a certain constituted agreement between the volitions of the soul and the motions of the body. This theory may be illustrated in this way. The Divinity has decreed that every soul should have a certain train of thought and desires, and no other; and that all mental operations should go on according to a regular and circular order or plan. A thought may produce a desire, and a desire a will, and an effort of the will a motion of the body, and so on, in a regular progression. In every body there are certain springs for producing every species of action, and every body must perform certain actions agreeably to its nature, and no other. This is a binding and unerring law; and, consequently, it is impossible for any given body to perform any other kinds of motion than those it was destined to perform from the beginning. Now among so many souls, possessing an immense variety of different thoughts and volitions, and so many bodies with such different springs or principles of action, the Deity chooses one soul whose thoughts and volitions might correspond to the motions of some suitable body. Here is a mutual sympathy created; which may be compared to two pendulums which do not act upon each other, but when one is down the other

is down also, and *vice versâ*. For example, when the soul had a desire to eat, the human body was so modelled from the beginning of time, as to take victuals at a certain period, and in a certain given way or manner; and when the soul willed to go in any particular direction, the feet were determined to move in this same direction.

Another prevailing notion was, that the soul of man was a real part of the divine nature; not different in nature or essence, but only in degree. This system had varied and extensive ramifications, and formed the nucleus of many doctrines on natural theology.

CHAPTER XXIII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA.

THE positive knowledge we shall be able to derive from the Indian philosophy, will not be great in amount, nor very satisfactory in its nature. The obscurity which hangs over it is so murky and dense, that even those who have devoted nearly a whole lifetime to its consideration, have not been able to reduce it to anything like system, or to recognise what are its first or elementary principles.

The few observations we shall make on the subject, are suggested from a perusal of the "Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society." The members of this Society have displayed the most commendable zeal in all their inquiries on this subject; and the only regret one feels is, that their labours should have proved so comparatively barren and fruitless.

THE SANKHYA AND YOGA.

This is considered the best known of all the systems of Indian speculation on philosophy. There are three kinds of knowledge which are here recognised, namely, *perception*, *mediate knowledge*, arising from the various forms of the Syllogism, and *traditional knowledge*. The first, perception, appertains to sensible objects; but this faculty is not of itself sufficient to account for all the various kinds of thought; therefore, recourse must be had to the second species of knowledge, reasoning or demonstration, which assumes two forms, either going from cause to effect, or from the effect to the cause. The Sankhya acknowledges no *intuitive* knowledge whatever; this is reserved for beings of a higher grade than man.

All objects of scientific knowledge are either creative and not created, or both creative and created, or created and not creative, or neither creative nor created.* Creation is the first principle of things, without it nothing could exist. This creative energy is supposed to be a subtile fluid or essence, which operates in and through the senses. This fluid or essence possesses, however, perfect unity of nature; it is one and not many. The evidence for this creative unity arises chiefly from the uniform appearances of nature, from the singleness of design imprinted upon every

* Colebrooke, *Isvara-Crishnas*, l. p. 31.

thing, and from the impossibility of conceiving a creative power acting harmoniously, without being invested with unity of conception and purpose. This creative energy or power is not, however, possessed of intelligence; it is a blind corporeal body, but of a very subtile nature, so as to elude all human perception.

That object which is neither created nor creates, is the soul of man. The evidence for the existence of this soul arises from many considerations. We find a blind corporeal body in existence, whose physical capabilities may be likened to a musical instrument, such as an organ for example. Now this piece of workmanship owes its existence to some designing agent, and is made for some purpose. This purpose is to afford a suitable place of residence for the soul. The evidence of the existence of a soul is also evinced from the consideration of its various feelings and emotions, and its numerous sources of pleasure and pain. We see, too, that the blind incorporeal matter cannot move or direct itself, and, therefore, this argues the necessity for a soul. All the higher feelings of which the soul is susceptible afford likewise convincing proofs of its separate nature and superior excellence.

It is almost needless to observe, that there are palpable contradictions involved in all these opinions and statements. Matter or body is considered a blind and immoveable thing, and the soul as a vivifying energy, and possessed of intelligence. Now this creative or living power, which is the

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first principle of things,—the source of all being,—is denied intelligence, which is conferred upon a more humble and subordinate agent, the soul of man. This is obviously very contradictory and inconsistent.

The principle of all corporeal things is simple unity; but the principle of all thinking creations is multiple. All bodies may assume different forms, still they are but *one*; a multiplicity of souls have all distinct natures, which is evinced by the different parts they are made to act in the drama of existence.

The first emanation which arises from the creative principle of things, is *mind*. All rational and thinking beings are minor emanations from this *great Mind*. It overrules all. A Deity means this first-created Being, or mental energy. It has divers modes of manifestation. There are five elementary energies which are productive or creative of things above sensible objects, and which energies are not perceptible to man. Those which produce sensible objects are of a subordinate or grosser character. These create the five senses; and to correspond to these, five other organs of activity are framed, which are, as it were, the material instruments by which these senses act. These active organs are, the tongue, the organ of speech; the hands, the feet, the alimentary and secretive organs, and the organs of generation. These active instruments are made parallel to other elements of an ethereal and active nature.

THE BHAGAVAD-GHITA.

This record of Indian speculation is more of a theological nature than the preceding one we have mentioned. There seems one simple and absorbing principle, which is that God, or the Supreme Mind or Soul, is the Creator of all things. Creation is just a manifestation of the existence and nature of this first great principle. All souls emanate from it; and maintain a perpetual sympathy with it, in all states of their existence. "The great Deity is my womb, in it I lay my fruit, and the origin of all things emanates therefrom. The Deity is the great womb; and I the seed-giving father." Such are the terms employed to express this connection between heavenly and earthly natures.

THE NYAYA AND THE VAISECHIKA.

This branch of speculation is considered by oriental scholars as one of the most intellectual systems of Indian philosophy. It attempts to develop more fully the principles and rules of reasoning, than the systems we have just glanced at; but it must be confessed, that after one or two elementary maxims are laid down, we are lost in the wild and irregular superstructure which is built upon these maxims of the Nyaya. European thought has not yet been able to penetrate into the mysterious arcana of their logic. A species of syllogism is used, consisting of *five*, instead of our three parts. The following is given by

Colebrooke as an example. 1. The hill is fiery. 2. Because it smokes. 3. Whatever smokes is fiery, e. g. a kitchen hearth. 4. The hill also smokes. 5. Therefore it is fiery.*

According to this branch of Indian speculation, the soul is possessed of altogether different properties from the body. *Thought* is the grand distinctive attribute of the former. This is displayed in knowledge, desire, aversion, and the pleasures and pains of our internal mental structure. Body has none of these qualities or affections. There is, however, a bond of union between it and the soul, and this bond is manifested by the connections which exist between our external senses and our physical organs. These senses are five in number, and are not mere modifications of consciousness or internal feeling, but they possess a corporeal nature. To correspond with these five senses, there are five elements provided, which sympathise or keep up a constant intercourse with these senses through the instrumentality of some subtile powers or other, which are not clearly defined.

The act of perception is considered a compound act, but of homogeneous parts alone. Heterogeneous or dissimilar agencies cannot act together, or be combined into one whole.

The atomic theory of the Indians bears a strong resemblance to that of Greece. It is affirmed by the philosophical schools of the former, that an extreme point or limit must be arrived at, otherwise

* Colebrooke, l. p. 116; and also Windischmann, p. 32. 38.

investigations would be endless and inconclusive. If all bodies consist of an infinite number of parts, all must be alike infinite, and then we must concede the conclusion that a part is equal to a whole. To avoid so absurd a conclusion, it must be assumed that all compound bodies are the result of a union among corresponding parts; and when these parts are separated, we must come to some atom whose division ceases.* Certain dimensions are nevertheless given to this ultimate atom, for its magnitude is defined to be the sixth part of a particle floating in the sunbeam.

On matters of theology, the Nyaya is very obscure. It maintains that the soul is the highest of created things, but that it is fettered by the body, which is essentially the source and active instrument of all evil. It is on this ground that the Metempsychosis is advocated. The soul which has committed any sin or fault, is, after death, again united to a body. In this philosophy, the existence of a First Cause is obscurely stated. What notions are entertained seem to be of a material character. The portion of Divine intelligence and wisdom is small, and undefined in its operations.

THE VEDANTA.

The Vedanta claims to be the orthodox expounder of the religion of the Brahmins. A peculiarity in this system of speculation on human knowledge is,

* Windischmann, p. 1924. Colebrooke, b. 1. p. 105.

that it is maintained that there are other sources of information besides what is derived from perception; and these sources are revelation and tradition. The knowledge conveyed in this revelation is eternal; and the language in which it is conveyed, is also immortal, and not of human invention. All matter by its nature is inert, and cannot move itself, nor effect spontaneously any change in its structure. There must, therefore, be a spirit of some kind; and this spirit must be endowed with self-existence and a creative energy. It exists in itself, and can perceive, reflect upon, and be conscious of its own powers. The properties of the body are all deficient in these attributes. They cannot feel, or be sentient of their own natures; they are only the instruments through which the soul feels, and thinks, and understands.

On the nature of matter and mind, which this school of philosophy held, Sir William Jones makes the following remarks:—"The difficulties attending the vulgar notion of material substances, induced many of the wisest among the ancients, as well as the Hindoo philosophers, to believe that the whole creation was rather an energy than a work, by which the Infinite Mind, who is present at all times and in all places, exhibits to his creatures a set of perceptions like a wonderful picture, or piece of music, always varied, yet always uniform."*

"The Vedantis," the same author observes, "unable to form a distinct idea of brute matter,

* Introduction to a Translation of some Hindoo verses.

independent of mind, or to conceive that the work of supreme goodness was left a moment to itself, imagine that the Deity is ever present to his work, and constantly supports a series of perceptions, which in one sense they call illusory, though they cannot but admit the reality of all created forms, as far as the happiness of creatures can be affected by them."

"The word *MAYA*, or *delusion*, has a subtle and recondite sense in the Vedanta philosophy, where it signifies the system of *perceptions*, whether of secondary or primary qualities, which the Deity was believed, by Epicharmus, Plato, and many truly pious men, to raise, by his omnipresent spirit, in the minds of his creatures; but which had not, in their opinion, any existence independent of mind."*

On the nature and existence of a First Cause, the Vedanta is very confused; and Oriental scholars are at variance on the precise doctrines of this branch of the Indian system. It is generally laid down, that where there are decisive marks of design and contrivance in the construction and arrangement of external objects, there must be a designing and intelligent cause. But at the same time this principle is clogged with so many qualifications and restrictions, that at length it becomes difficult to say what is really meant by Indian *savants*. Mr. Kennedy controverts the opinion of Colebrooke, that, according to the Vedanta, God is not only the efficient but *material* cause of the

* Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India.

universe. The former gentleman insists that the Indian philosophy does not acknowledge the idea of matter at all, nay, absolutely denies its very existence.* It is observed by Ritter, that "It will at once occur to the reader, that the strongest argument on which the Vedanta could have rested, must have been the view which pervades the whole philosophy of India, that the multiplicity of phenomena does not destroy the unity of the essence. Thus it was held, that as the essence of the soul may remain intact, notwithstanding that the most diversified phenomena are mirrored upon it; so the Supreme Mind or Spirit is not altered in its essence by the change of the mundane objects which arise out of itself. In this view the identity of the essence is so firmly maintained, as to exclude every possible change that can happen to or in it. Accordingly it is said of God, that although he can transmute himself into all, and create all things out of himself, he is nevertheless without shape or form; not affected by the states of the universe; without passion or change; and similar to the clear crystal, which apparently receives into itself different colours, but in reality is equally transparent at all times; or to the light of the sun or moon, which, although it is invariable in itself, nevertheless appears different according as it shines upon different objects. The Mind or Spirit may be compared to pure space, wherein all exists and goes through change after change, but which is not it-

* Royal Asiatic Soc. 3. p. 412.

self changed thereby. In these there is no difference between the recipient, the perceived, and the perception; it is without multiplicity, and he who believes it must be multiple, dies death upon death."*

We have given a short sketch of the mental speculations of an imperfectly civilized portion of our race; and every candid reader must allow, that in one point of view this Indian philosophy does not lag far behind that of more polished and intellectual nations; that is, in reference to the notions entertained as to a first or creative principle. To the Indian understanding, *mind* is indispensable to enable even the savage to conceive any active or creative power in nature at all; and on this account he is placed on precisely the same footing as the most favoured people among whom the arts and sciences flourish in the highest degree of vigour and perfection. The savage and the civilized man are nearly, if not identically, on a level as to the first step in philosophy; but the great discrepancy between their respective views arises from the different ways in which each analyzes and illustrates the principle. Both admit simply that *a mind* is indispensable to the solution of the phenomena of existence; but when each attempts to describe in what way and manner this mind operates and displays itself, then we recognise the great disparity between ignorance and intelligence. The man of civilization and science gives some plausible and

* Hist. Phil., vol. 4. p. 388.

rational theory for his views and opinions ; but the savage, or half civilized, run riot in the wildest excesses of ignorant conjecture and superstitious fears. Both set out from the same starting point ; but they take opposite directions, and, of course, the longer and farther they travel, the greater is the interval of space which separates them from each other.*

* See Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 1. pp. 19. 43. 92. 118. 439. 466. 579. ; and Vol. 2. pp. 1. 39.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES WITH THOSE
OF GREECE AND ROME.

WE come now to a marked and important epoch in the history of mental speculation, namely, the amalgamation of the Greek doctrines with that great and varied mass of refined and attenuated philosophy which prevailed in many of the more intelligent and civilized parts of the Asiatic continent. This alliance caused an obvious change in the mode of conducting investigations into the laws of the human mind; and made, moreover, these investigations more subservient to other branches of knowledge, than they had hitherto been in the divers schools of philosophy at Athens, Rome, and Alexandria. Discussions on the nature of mind took now a more lofty *à priori* station; were sublimated into endless refinements; were more completely shrouded in mysterious allegories, and enveloped in the gorgeous pomp of Eastern metaphor and imagery. All this proved a source of interminable and unprofitable inquiries and discussions;

clouded the whole horizon of the philosophy of mind; and ushered in a long and dreary night of wrangling, doubt, and obscurity.

What were the precise causes of this union, do not very clearly appear from any historical records we possess. Certain it is, that a mixture took place between some of the leading systems of Greece, and the peculiar views of Oriental nations; and that Alexandria was the principal seat of learning where this union manifested itself. The doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras seem to have been great favourites, but there are also evident traces of some of the opinions which exclusively belong to the Stoical school of philosophy.

The chief difference between what is termed Oriental philosophy and Grecian, arises from this; the Oriental chiefly relates to notions or principles immediately connected with Divinity, and endeavours to develop those laws connected with the creation and regulation of mundane affairs. The Greek speculation follows a different route. It starts with man, his mind, his feelings, his moral emotions, and social and physical existence. It is obvious that a different result would be effected by these varied modes of inquiry; and as general principles in both cases became more minutely analyzed, the divergency from the respective points of departure, would necessarily become wider and more palpable. Now this is precisely what we find. Both the Oriental and Grecian streams of knowledge took their rise from nearly identical localities, from a united desire to know the origin of all

things; but they flowed through diversified regions of thought, and at their point of junction we see them tinged with the respective intellectual strata over which they had passed. The Oriental was thick and turbid, and the Greek comparatively pellucid and clear.

ARISTOBULUS.

After the Jews returned from their captivity at Babylon, they brought with them many of the peculiar philosophical notions prevalent among the Babylonians, and other neighbouring nations. This importation of speculative novelties, changed and corrupted the simple philosophy of the Hebrew people; and their learned men made various attempts to unite the foreign with their own peculiar abstract views of human nature.

Aristobulus was one of the first among the learned Rabbins who made this attempt at amalgamation. His views on metaphysical subjects were precisely those of Plato, with a little admixture of Asiatic hyperbole, and metaphor. He endeavoured to explain the doctrines of the Jewish faith through the means of the abstract principles of the Greek philosophy. There are none of his writings extant; therefore we cannot furnish the reader with any details as to his peculiar views on the nature of the faculties of the human mind.

PHILO.

Philo was a distinguished Jewish writer. He

had studied with great care and success all the principal Greek systems on the human mind; and he was, also, partially versed in the mystic philosophy of the East.

He maintained that there were two distinct souls in human nature; the one a reasonable, and the other an irrational or animal soul. To the reasonable soul he attributed three separate faculties, understanding, sensation, and speech; and to the irrational soul, the sensual passions and affections. Philo affirms that the understanding is not only a divine spirit, but an inseparable portion of the divine essence itself. It is also *the word*, analogous to the Deity; it bears his image, and virtually contains in it all forms. The soul pre-exists in bodies, and is possessed of complete liberty of action. God has given to man prudence to govern his reason, courage to restrain his passions, and temperance to repress his sensual desires. Sometimes the soul, invested with the senses, only sees sensible objects; sometimes, by taking a spontaneous flight, it disengages itself from material influences, and elevates itself to the perception of intelligent things. It is this deliverance from the bondage of the body, that the truly wise always aspire after; this conflict between the senses and the free exercise of the understanding, constitutes wisdom in its loftiest acceptation. It is from this contemplation of the divine essence that man obtains all his true knowledge, and arrives at virtuous excellence.

Philo dwells upon some of the sceptical arguments of the Academic School of Greece, by repre-

sending the great difficulty there is in man's ability to detect the truth in matters of abstract speculation. The impressions from the senses are not always to be relied on; and even those more refined thoughts which seem to have their source out of the mind itself, may lead us into error and delusion. Man cannot penetrate into the arcana of nature; and the only kind of knowledge which is calculated to improve and delight, is that which arises from a contemplation of the powers and faculties of the soul.* But even here our desire for knowledge receives a severe check; for it is as unreasonable for the soul to know itself, as it is for the human eye to direct its powers to its own movements. We know not the nature of the soul; it may be blood, or air, or fire, or it may have no material quality whatever. How little then can we really know of the matter! All true science will teach man humility, and will force him to acknowledge that he indeed knows nothing. God alone is the source of all knowledge.

Considerable difference of opinion exists among philosophical historians as to the proportion of heathen notions incorporated with Philo's own Jewish system. This is a controversy not easily decided. The majority of the German critics refer a great portion of his philosophy to an eastern origin; but there is really no solid ground for this. The theological principles involved in the Jewish Scriptures were sufficient of themselves to give that

* De Ebriet. 40. p. 382.

peculiar cast to a speculative system, which we recognise in the writings of this distinguished Rabbi. In every thing he advances there is a great portion of common sense; few thoughts of fanatic absurdity or oriental mysticism are perceptible. His views are just such as an inquisitive mind might be supposed to entertain, who had the revealed system of Moses, and the Grecian philosophy to guide him; without availing himself of any speculations from the Magi, or the Gymnosophists.*

APOLLONIUS OF TYANA.

There is very little known of this philosopher. He was a sort of marvel-monger, and dealt in miracles, soothsayings, and omens. On metaphysical questions he seems to have made Pythagoras his model and guide. Apollonius recommends that we should adopt a pure worship of the Supreme God, a sort of personal and inward movement of the soul towards Him, apart from all parade or external ceremony. He also maintains that the animal creation bore an affinity to man, and that the doctrine of the Metempsychosis was well founded. He undertook long journeys into India and Upper Egypt to consult the Magi; and he affirms, ~~that~~ the result of his personal inquiries and invest ~~its~~ lofty ~~ideas~~, that Pythagoras derived his philosophy of ~~them~~ from Indian sages.

* See Dahne's *Theol. Studien u. Kritiken*, Jahrg. 1833. p 984. The same author treats very fully of Philo in his *Geschichtliche Darstellung d. Jüdisch-Alexandrinischen Religiösen Philosophie*, Halle, 1834.

PLUTARCH.

This philosopher is better known for his biographical labours and moral disquisitions, than for his metaphysics. He was not, however, altogether unacquainted with the science of mind, and its kindred doctrines as to the origin of the world and the nature of the human soul. The systems of Plato and Aristotle were great favourites with him, but especially that of Plato, whose views of life, and speculative ideas on the Deity and the human soul, were more in unison with his own. He adopts Plato's division of the soul into five members; the nutritive, the sensitive, the sensual, the irascible, and the rational.

LUCIUS APULEIUS.

This philosopher was a public teacher of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, in the time of Antoninus, at the city of Madaura, in Numidia. He endeavoured to reconcile the opinions of Plato and the Stagirite, and steered a sort of middle path between them on controversial points. His notions of the Deity are rather singular. He maintains that it would be highly derogatory to the Almighty to guide and regulate the affairs of this world; and for this reason Apuleius thinks that mundane concerns are all committed to the superintendence of a host of angelic ministers. These ministers have their abode in the air, and fill up that great void between heaven and earth.

All the divers forms of religion among men, even the most ignoble and degrading rites and ceremonies, have their respective representatives among these aerial ministers or agents. They know everything, down to the intents and purposes of the human heart. He likewise affirms that the Divine Mind is constituted of a kind of *trinity* of faculties, and is immutable and eternal. All ideas reside in this divine Reason.

NUMENIUS.

The metaphysical opinions of this learned man are but very imperfectly known. He was born at Apamea in Syria, and is supposed, on this account, to have entertained a marked predilection for Oriental ideas. He was a great favourite with the New Platonists, who considered his system, (if his peculiar views are entitled to that designation), as singularly profound and valuable. He held the character of Moses in high veneration, and was no doubt well acquainted with his writings. The philosophical opinions of the Egyptians, the Magi, and the Brahmins, he studied carefully, and is even said to have made free with the personal history of Egypt's Saviour.*

His opinion on the general constitution of things seems to have been, that there could be no corporeal substance, unless there was some incorporeal agent previously existing. This is nothing

* Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 9. pp. 7. 8.

more nor less than saying, that mind must have existed prior to matter. Everything, according to Numenius, which is corporeal, is subject to decomposition and decay ; an immaterial soul or principle is, therefore, requisite to secure immortality.

On the nature of the Divine essence, we have a good deal of refined and mysterious speculation. This is a point on which both Numenius and most of his commentators have been sadly puzzled. The philosopher attempted to explain the connection which subsists between a spiritual and creative mind, and the material universe. This was an arduous task, and we cannot wonder that he should fail. Indeed all his conjectures and fancies on this subject are not worth the trouble of exposition or comment.*

* Eusebius, *Pr. Ev.* 15. 17.

CHAPTER XXV

THE GNOSTIC METAPHYSICIANS.

THE mental disquisitions of the Gnostic sect of philosophers are but very imperfectly understood. They were generally incorporated with their peculiar doctrines on the nature of the Supreme Being, the creation of the world, the nature and origin of good and evil, and the future destiny of the human race. These Gnostic speculators were divided into many different sects or parties; but they all seemed to maintain that man was a being compounded of two distinct souls; the one intelligent, and the other sensitive. The ordinary division of the mind into various faculties or powers, appears to have obtained their general assent. The practical application of their metaphysical principles was, that man should cultivate his intelligent at the expense of his sensitive faculties. "Man," say they, "is only a passive instrument in the hands of the Divinity. Science comes solely from this source; and reason should detach itself not only from the influence of the senses, but even from itself. The ascetic, or he who elevates himself to God, alone possesses true knowledge. All is then pure ecstasy.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW
PLATONISTS.

The philosophical school of the New Platonists was formed from the mixture of the doctrines of Plato, with the traditions and mysteries of the East. This school is sometimes termed by historians, the Alexandrian School of Philosophy. The opinions which were promulgated by these learned men, exercised a very marked and powerful influence over the whole philosophy of the mind for many subsequent centuries, and even over the moral and religious principles of a large portion of the civilized world.

AMMONIUS SACCAS. A. D. 200.

Ammonius Saccas was the founder of this school of philosophy at Alexandria. It is said that he was the son of Christian parents, and had received a Christian education; but that when he became of riper age, he gave himself up to the study of the Greek phi-

losophy, and afterwards to the observance of the rites and ceremonies of Paganism.*

The principal aim in his philosophical studies was to reconcile the discrepancies between the Platonic and the Aristotelian systems. How far he was able to accomplish this task, does not very clearly appear, from any historical accounts which we have of him.

There are two philosophical fragments of Ammonius Saccas, preserved by Nemesisius, Bishop of Emessa, in which some of his opinions on interesting and important questions may be found.

On the immortality of the soul, Ammonius seems to have a fixed and decided opinion. He advocates its spirituality and indestructibility. A corporeal body, according to his notion, must have some principle or essence, by which its individual parts can be held together and sustained; for it is quite obvious, that this principle or essence must be of a different nature from that which has no life in itself, and which cannot communicate life, activity, and motion. There may be a mode of the two natures, corporeal and spiritual, acting on each other, but their real essences must necessarily be diametrically opposite.†

On the nature of the Deity, Ammonius held that he was eternal and immutable, the cause of all

* See on this point, *Essai Historique sur la vie, &c. d'Ammonius Saccas*, par M. Dehaut, Bruxelles, 1836.

† See the learned and critical *Essai* of Dehaut, already mentioned, p. 135.

things, the substance of all substances, the being of all beings, the essence of all essences, and the archetype of all intellectual perception and power. The Deity does not possess relative, but absolute *unity*; and He is not pure intelligence, for He is above all intelligence, and had a prior existence to it.

LONGINUS.

Longinus, the author of the treatise "On the Sublime," cultivated philosophy among the New Platonists. He did not, however, adopt their most extravagant and mystical doctrines. He rejected the theories of Epicurus and Chrysippus, because they had a direct tendency to materialize the human mind. Longinus affirms it is foolish to think that the phenomena of thought and intelligence can be the result of simple mechanical action, or of a mere combination of material atoms.

PLOTINUS. 206 A.D.

Plotinus was one of the ablest and most renowned of the New Platonician Metaphysicians. He was a writer of vast acquired information, and of a vigorous and powerful mind. His mental speculations are contained in a treatise, called the "*Encade*." This is truly considered one of the most interesting books on abstract science of which antiquity can boast. It contains nine parts. The first treats of morals; the second of physics; the third, general considerations on the laws of the universe; the

fourth, on the human soul; the fifth, on intelligence; and the sixth is a summary of the whole. Some of the chapters or parts are double ones.

This speculative work of Plotinus is confessedly one of the most abstruse which antiquity has handed down to us. It is extremely difficult to obtain a right conception of its leading principles, or the end which the author had in view to establish. The theory seems grounded on a peculiar notion of *unity*; but the exact meaning to be applied to this word is not easily divined. Plotinus calls it *absolute, perfect, and primordial* unity. He tells us again that this unity is *necessary, immutable, and infinite*; it is *not* numerical unity; not the indivisible point of the arithmetician and geometrician. It is *universal* unity, perfect in its own simplicity. It is the highest degree of perfection; it is the *beau ideal*, the only true beauty; it is the supreme good, the highest excellence.

After this subtle and laboured attempt to explain a very remote abstraction of the mind, Plotinus endeavours to point out how this principle of unity operated in the production of the universe. "At first, from its own bosom proceeds the *supreme intelligence*; a secondary, subordinate, but perfect principle. It proceeds from its source without external action or internal volition; without the first principle of unity being either modified or affected; in fact, it emanates like light from the sun. This intelligence is the image, the reflection of unity; the luminous crown or glory of it. This intelligence embraces the object conceived, the subject which

conceives it, and the action of conception itself; the whole of these three things are embodied in itself. This principle of supreme intelligence constantly contemplates itself; this contemplation is its essence."

"The universal soul is the third principle, subordinate to the other two. This soul is *thought*, *speech*, an image of intelligence, the exercise of its spontaneity; for intelligence acts only by thought. But this thought is determined only because it is infinite. All this train of events or circumstances acts not in time, but in eternity; and the three principles, primordial unity, supreme intelligence, and the universal soul, though forming a hierarchy of separate and independent dignities or orders, are nevertheless co-eternal with each other."

On the nature of existence generally Plotinus maintained, that natural beings were not the true beings. The real universe admitted neither of alteration nor transformation; it is identical with the Deity; it is the Divinity itself, such as he manifests himself, and is eternal and immutable like him.

On the nature of the human mind in particular, this subtile philosopher observes, "The human mind has two ordinary modes of acting, and knowing; the one by a participation in intelligence and the other by forms. It enjoys the former when filled and illuminated with intelligence, which enables it to see and feel immediately. It enjoys the second, by means of certain characters, or certain laws which have been engraven on our natures. For

the Supreme Being has imprinted on the human mind the rational form of things. True knowledge is that, when the object conceived or known is identical with the subject which conceives or knows it."

"The faculties of the soul are of two kinds. The one, derived from above, constitutes reason; the other, descending to the inferior regions, forms sensibility and vegetation."

"Reason is placed in an intermediate position between the understanding and the senses. It acts not by the agency of the bodily organs, but solely by the force of intelligence."

Plotinus entertained some curious notions as to the nature of memory. He affirmed this faculty did not consist in preserving impressions received from the senses, but solely in an innate development of self-power or energy. And the power of memory was in strict proportion with the internal strength of this power. According to this opinion it is not necessary to place confidence in memory, to recal the impressions which externals may have made upon it; for the mind possesses in itself for the retaining of knowledge, a sufficient power by its intercourse with superior intelligences.

On the nature of sensation, he remarks, "The perceptions we obtain from external objects are always obscure; while, on the contrary, those we receive from reflection are always clear and luminous."

The general outline of the doctrine of Plotinus bears a striking resemblance to some modern specu-

lations on the human mind, which we shall have to notice in a subsequent part of this work.

Plotinus seems to have followed in the wake of Ammonius Saccas, and to have moulded his philosophical system upon the principles of that learned person. Plotinus was of an ardent and imaginative mind; and this led him, in conjunction with the general tone and character of the philosophy of the times, into mystical and fanatical speculations. These shed a cloudy haziness over the more rational and solid portions of his system; for it was not so devoid of valuable disquisitions as some historians have imagined. There is a strong undercurrent of common sense in his writings; and his ideas of the philosophy of the mind in particular, show that he had culled from the systems of Plato and Aristotle some of the best and soundest maxims on this branch of knowledge, and that he fully appreciated their intrinsic worth and importance.

PORPHYRY.

Porphyry was the pupil and personal friend of Plotinus, and embraced essentially the same principles, as to the nature of the human mind and its modes of operation.

With the view of reconciling the doctrines of Aristotle with those of Plato, which was one of the grand aims of the new Platonists, Porphyry wrote a work on the *Predicables* of Aristotle, and endeavoured to enter into a minute analysis of the

notions we commonly attach to particular generic terms of reasoning; such as *genus*, *species*, *contrariety*, *identity*, &c. This is considered a very excellent work of its kind, and it shows the profound attention with which he had studied the metaphysical works of the Stagirite.

The ideas Porphyry entertained on the nature of general terms, may be inferred from the following remarks on this eagerly contested point. "Genus is the principal, which contains the species and the individuals placed under it; and involves an idea of multitude, or number." "If *genus* and *species* possessed each a separate and independent existence, or were two distinct and separate notions of the mind, then, on the first supposition, they would have a corporeal existence; and on the second, they would be of an incorporeal nature, for they would be separated from sensible or external things."

Porphyry compared the human mind, in reference to sensation, to the harmony elicited from the cords or strings of a musical instrument. The senses are the agitated cords, and the soul is the musician who moves them. The human soul has reasons contained within itself for all things; and it is on this account, and by this special reason, that it can always operate on the senses, whether there be an external exciting cause, or merely the internal suggestions of its own nature or will. If there be an external exciting cause, then this leads the mind to the cognizance of external objects; if only an internal suggestion, then we are led to the

contemplation of more intelligent ideas. Sensation never takes place without a modification being experienced by the organs of sense; and the understanding in its turn never receives assistance from its own imaginative workings, without these intellectual objects receiving an intellectual impression. The human understanding is essentially uniform, of perfect unity of parts, one and individual in every thing which constitutes it.

JAMBlicus.

This philosopher composed a work, addressed to Porphyry, "*Upon the Egyptian Mysteries*," in which there are a great number of curious and important remarks on divers topics connected with the mind of man. The fundamental system of the new Platonicians is strenuously upheld. Jamblicus maintains the existence of an intellectual and a sensible world; but considers the former as containing in itself the whole of the latter; or perhaps, to speak more plainly, that the sensible or external world is only the shadow of the intellectual one. "The Gods," says he, "which compose this superior region, contemplate their own divine ideas; the stars, or visible Gods, are only the images created by divine and intellectual realities. A bond of union associates these two orders of existences into one indissoluble whole; the visible Gods being contained within the intellectual ones. The farther we ascend in this chain of existence, the more we develop first causes by their genus and essence,—the

more we shall be directed to the consideration of parts of the stupendous whole, and the better able to detect that sublime and perfect unity of design and purpose, so visibly imprinted upon every thing we behold."

"This knowledge of the Gods is intimately blended with our own individual being. It is anterior to every mental act of examining, judging, and reasoning. It has been co-existent, from the beginning of time, with a certain predisposition in our souls towards that which is good. It is the same with all those superior intelligences which fill up the intervening space between the Gods and the human soul; which form the intermediate link between both, in that immense chain which binds the most elevated things with the most common, and sustains the harmony and order of the whole creation."

PROCLUS. 412. A.D.

Proclus was one of the great shining lights amongst the metaphysical philosophers of the new Platonic School. He was a man of great and varied accomplishments, and gathered around him a lively and intense interest during his scholastic reign. He was born at Constantinople, in 412 of the Christian era, and at an early age was sent to Alexandria to study philosophy, oratory, and belles-lettres.

Proclus adopted the system of Plato in all its fulness and in all its bearings. The latter says,

that "unity and variety are the essential characters of human thought;" and this principle serves Proclus to work out a very extended, subtle, and elevated commentary, in reference to the whole constitution of nature.

According to this philosopher the human mind may be considered under three points of view, the essence of every thing, identity, and diversity. These elementary forms give rise to three other principles of a prolific nature. "The world," he says, "is composed of harmony. Now harmony is unity in variety. Unity and variety exist then primarily in the conceptions of the Grand Architect; or rather the Grand Architect is only the highest unity, which embraces in its bosom all other divine unities. Similitude is the limit which determines diversity from infinity. Similitude assembles, diversity disperses. These three things, essence, identity, and diversity, produce by their action all the forms or unities which reside in individual things."

Proclus distinguished five orders of faculties in the human soul. The first is confined to the exercise of the external senses. The second is that which displays the soul's connexion with the body, and yet preserves her own individuality. The third consists in rectifying and testing our opinions and conclusions, by the aid of superior intelligences and wisdom. The fourth detaches the soul from all inferior and grovelling impressions, renders it peaceable and tranquil, looks into its own powers, feelings, and emotions, and observes the harmonious action of the whole inward man. And the fifth

power is that which excites and sustains our sympathies with all our kindred of mankind, and with all those angelic forms, in which superior degrees of intelligences reside.

In accordance with these five powers, there are five branches of knowledge. The first relates to matters of a very humble character; to material objects and such as influence us by the force of physical destiny. The second order of intelligent things has for its object all general notions, which form the basis of reasoning. The third embraces absolute unity, or the power of analysing and discussing general principles, a knowledge of causes, and conclusions and inferences drawn from them. This branch of knowledge also embraces all mathematical forms, and numbers. The fourth division includes all theories, resolutions, compositions of reasoning, definitions and demonstrations, and all systems of speculative truth. The fifth class of things relates to matters of a high and lofty character; to a divine exaltation, gradually assimilating the human mind to the nature of the divine Being and his attributes.

Proclus sought above all things to give order and logical method to his speculations. Consequential reasoning was, in his opinion, indispensable to all useful human learning. It was one of the great labours of his life to give his master Plato's philosophy in a logical form, and he has left us a striking memorial of his zeal and industry in this direction. But his great work of method is his "*Elements of Theology*," which he has treated of at

great length, and which embodies the chief elements of the Platonic system, as defined and illustrated by Proclus and his immediate successors. It is impossible to look over the methodical propositions of this Treatise, without recognizing it as the prolific parent of many subsequent theories, both in theology and philosophy. It is an exceedingly interesting exposition of an ancient system, and treated in a manner the most profound and logical. The whole of the propositions will be found at the end of this volume.*

MARINUS.

This philosopher was a disciple and biographer of Proclus. The former filled the chair of Instruction at the death of the latter.

Little is recorded of the mental speculations of this writer. He examined with considerable profundity the nature of our abstract conceptions, and the laws of thought which seem to accompany their development.

ISIDORE OF GAZA.

This member of the new Platonic theory succeeded the preceding philosopher in the chair of Philosophy. He appears to have given to his metaphysical speculations a decidedly religious turn. He remarks, "that human knowledge and reasoning are

* See Note F. at the end of this Volume.

but feeble succours for that sublime wisdom which is alone agreeable to the Divinity. To enlighten the reason is the privilege of God himself; man cannot confer it; but he must receive it as a gift.*

With the name of Proclus the ancient Grecian system of philosophy may be said to terminate. It had run a long and noble course; was characterised by profound thought, patient investigation, comprehensive views, noble aspirations, and indefatigable zeal; and was destined to leave the imprint of its existence upon the minds of all succeeding ages of civilized men. But it was henceforth to shine only with a borrowed light. Its own effulgence was to be obscured by brighter rays of truth; and it was to be used only as an instrument for the illustration or defence of more sublime doctrines, and more lofty views of the future destiny of man. Another power had been established, which was hourly on the increase, and which should solicit the suffrages of mankind, and place

* See l'Histoire de l'Eclecticisme, by Beausobre, Avignon, 1766; Olearius, Dissert. de Eclecticism; Cudworth's Intellectual System; Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History; The Histories of Philosophy by Brucker, Tiedemann, Buhle, and Tennemann; Victor Cousin's Translation of the works of Proclus; Taylor's Translation of Proclus; Feussling, De tribus Hypostasibus Plotini, Wittenberg, 1690; Hebenstreit, Dissert. de Jamblichi Philos. Leipsic, 1764; Fichte, Dissert. De Philos. Novæ Platonice origine, Berolini, 1818; Fabricius, Biblioth. Grec. Articles, Proclus, Marinus; Stobæus b. 1. Articles, De Gradibus, De Anim. Viribus, De eo quod est in nostra potestate; De Gérando, Hist. Comparée, vol. 3; Ritter's Hist. of Philosophy, vol. 4.

speculative philosophy upon another and a firmer basis. The great problems which Grecian ingenuity raised, were to be solved in a manner, and with a clearness and conclusiveness, of which the disciples of Plato and Aristotle had no conception. The lofty hopes which many of the Grecian sages entertained were to be realized to their more fortunate successors; and those bright rays of light, which gleamed in the distance, and which they but distantly recognised, were to shine, to all future philosophers, "more and more unto the perfect day."

But though the independence of the Grecian speculation was to be destroyed for ever, it was still to be a useful and often wielded instrument in the hands of future cultivators of philosophy. This honour was, however, to be confined to the two great pillars of Grecian thought, Plato and Aristotle. The smaller sects were to be comparatively forgotten in the new order of things. The Stoics, the Epicureans, the Pythagoreans, the Sophists, the Sceptics, were to pass away, but Plato and Aristotle were to remain; and for many centuries were to divide the opinions and applause of the learned and contemplative. We shall have frequent occasion, in our historical progress, to record the influence of their respective systems, and the favourable or unfavourable judgments of rival partizans. But that undivided and despotic power they for many hundred years exercised over the minds of men, was now to crumble gradually to the dust, without any hope of future resuscitation.

CHAPTER XXVII.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL DISQUISITIONS OF THE
ANCIENT FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

It is necessary we should fall back a little upon the regular course of time, and notice at some length the labours of the first promulgators of Christianity in the field of mental philosophy. These labours constitute an important epoch in the history of the human mind.

The establishment of the Christian dispensation must always be considered the most important and interesting event in the history of the philosophy of human nature in all its departments. Science no longer stood alone, upon its own abstract principles and merits, as an intellectual exercise; but all its doctrines were, in the future ages of the world, to be discussed in reference to the great truths revealed to mankind in the Holy Scriptures. Religion and Philosophy, it is true, had to wage many bitter and protracted conflicts; they had both to undergo a most rigid scrutiny before the tribunal of human reason; they were frequently placed, by the over-heated zeal and mistaken views

of their respective advocates, in direct opposition to one another; but still we find, that as time rolled on, their points of difference became gradually less, and both seemed calculated to throw additional light upon, and to give natural support to, each other.

And this was nothing but a natural consequence from the constituted order of things. Revealed religion did not profess to make man an entirely new creature; to give him a new body and a new mind, endowed with various faculties which were never before recognized in the human species. No! it only assumed to direct his ordinary bodily and mental functions, to objects and pursuits more sublime and important, and which were but dimly, and in many cases not at all, shadowed forth by the mere light of nature. The relative position, therefore, in which religion and philosophy stood towards each other, was a natural position. Philosophy professed to investigate all those powers of body and mind which distinguish our species from the inferior creation; and to unfold the laws which govern their mutual dependencies and relationships. The heathen philosophers had to labour in the same vineyard as the professors of Christianity. That both parties should form different opinions as to the value of their own exertions and the merits of their respective modes of culture, is quite natural. Revealed religion was not a mere simple fact, or mental conception, or intimation from heaven; but it appealed to human reason, based itself upon principles, laid down abstract propositions, and openly

challenged the human race to their discussion. It did not set itself in opposition to human learning, but only declared that that was insufficient of itself to produce certain results, and guide to certain ends.

These general remarks will be fully borne out, by a brief summary of the philosophy of the ancient Fathers of the Church, relative to man's moral and mental natures, and to those opinions and principles connected with the important doctrines of natural and revealed religion. It cannot fail to prove extremely interesting to all reflective minds, to have laid before them an intellectual chart of the opinions of these distinguished men on points of faith and speculation, which must always, as long as the world lasts, exercise a very powerful influence over the minds of the general mass of mankind.

Here we may briefly notice, in passing, that many distinguished writers have entertained a very low estimate of the opinions of the Fathers, and have upbraided them with numerous and palpable contradictions. It must be admitted there is some truth for these accusations. But to form a just estimate of the Fathers, we ought always to keep before us their exact position relative to religious doctrines and other opinions connected with subjects closely allied to them. We know that many of the Fathers had been either educated in Pagan systems, or were more or less brought into close fellowship with them, in their daily communications with those around them. This circumstance must have exerted a powerful influence over the every-

day current of their thoughts and opinions. They would daily meet with men who had to be converted through a formal refutation of these false systems ; and this could only be done by means of an accurate acquaintance with them, and an effort on the part of religious teachers to accommodate their own doctrines to the minds of their pupils. There would always be going on a sort of compromise of principles and opinions, with a view of obtaining a hold of the minds of men, and subjecting them to a peaceable course of instruction and conviction. Teachers would occasionally diverge a little to gain a victory over the stubborn and deep-rooted prejudices of a convert. This would be done with the best intentions, and frequently with the most happy effect. Many of the Fathers went from country to country, from district to district, and from town to town to, making converts, and imparting instruction as they well could. And it is quite obvious that their public addresses must have varied considerably from each other, on account of the diversity of heathen notions, rites, and ceremonies, entertained and practised by their hearers. If therefore these addresses were afterwards published, it is quite a thing to be expected that considerable discrepancies would be apparent upon the face of them ; not springing from any defection of doctrinal purity, or from the lack of sound knowledge, but from casual and incidental circumstances. This would naturally, in after times, give rise to observation and comment, and a difference of opinion would

thus be formed. A Father would appear under the disadvantage of self-contradiction, and inconsistency of statement, and thus his authority and influence would become weakened from no justifiable cause whatever.

JUSTIN MARTYR. 99 A. D.

Justin Martyr was one of the early Fathers of the Church who successfully cultivated philosophy with a view of extending and illustrating the Christian system. He had been educated in foreign schools of learning, and, for a considerable period of his life, had followed the heathen modes of worship. He especially studied the doctrines of Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras, and was minutely acquainted with all the various divisions and modifications of these different schools of philosophy. After his conversion to Christianity, he still continued to cultivate profane learning; and his remarks upon the use of speculative doctrines are admirable. He says, "Philosophy is a very noble thing, and very agreeable to God, since it leads us to Him; and truly happy are those who avail themselves of such an aid. Though the doctrines of Plato, and the Stoics, as well as the writings of historians and poets, are not in strict conformity with the Gospel, yet they do, nevertheless, bear a certain relationship to it; and what good and just things have been here said, are calculated to advance Christianity. The writings which existed

previous to the Gospel gave us a glimpse of those great truths which it has revealed ; and have vastly aided the Divine reason which is implanted in us from our birth. This reason is the germ or seed which Christianity is to fructify."

Again, he says, "Socrates exhorted men to raise themselves above mythological fables, and to search again for the unknown God, whose existence it was reserved for the Gospel alone fully to demonstrate." "The true philosopher is neither a Platonist, Peripatetic, nor a Stoic, nor a Pythagorean. If he belongs to any of these sects, he has substituted human authority for reason."

It is mentioned by Eusebius that St. Justin had written a work upon the nature of the human soul, in which he had unfolded the various opinions which the Pagans held of this subject ; and that he intended to write another Treatise, to expose the fallacy of these opinions, and also to show what were his own notions on this important doctrine. None of these works, however, have descended down to our times.*

TATIAN. 170 A. D.

Tatian, who was St. Justin's disciple, paid great attention to mental philosophy in all its branches. He had travelled a great deal, and visited many eminent seats of learning, and possessed a very accurate knowledge of all the subtile and distinguished

* Apologia. Sect. 13. 15. 46. Benedictine Edition.

controversies of his day. He maintains that there are in man two distinct mental principles. "The one is the soul, the other is superior to the soul; it is the understanding, the image of God. The soul in itself is full of darkness; alone it is subjected to matter, and is confounded with it; and it is not simple but compound; the mind or understanding uniting itself with it, gives light, power, and life to it. It elevates and purifies it. This mind is the divine reason, or *Logos*. It is not communicated to all, but only to those who live in accordance with the dictates of justice and wisdom. The soul, being an emanation from the Deity, is light; it only becomes obscured by its connection with matter."

The peculiar philosophical opinions of Tatian are expounded in his *Oratio ad Græcos*, the only genuine treatise we have of this writer. In this apologetical work we find that the author was deeply skilled in Oriental systems; for the general tone of all his speculations on mind and matter bears a great resemblance to those opinions promulgated in the early days of the Alexandrian Academy.

Tatian considered that matter was the source of all imperfection and evil. In this respect he follows Plato. This opinion had probably led him to the Gnostic idea that our Saviour had no real body.*

* See the Oxford Edition of the "*Oratio*." 1700.

ST. ATHENAGORAS. 172 A. D.

The attachment of St. Athenagoras to speculative learning is well known. Even after he had been converted from Paganism to Christianity, he still wore the costume used in the East in his own day by the studious and philosophic. In his *Apology*, addressed to the Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, in the year 170, he enters very fully into several speculative theories, and compares them with the general principles of the Christian faith. In the writings of the poets and historians he found the doctrine of the unity of the Deity recognised, and several other important truths, which were more fully and clearly revealed in the Gospel. His grand aim was to reconcile the Christian creed with the doctrines of the founder of the Academy. "Plato," says he, "contemplated, with a lofty stretch of thought, that eternal intelligence and Divinity which reason alone can conceive; that Being who is the only true one, who is unchangeable, full of goodness and truth. He saw in Him infinite power, that glorious Source of all perfection, that celestial Ruler, the universal Cause which is every way present. The *Idea* is the first creation of the celestial Ruler; it is the type of all creation. This type was necessary to shapeless matter, to that nature which invoked and offered itself to it, and which was again plunged into confusion and chaos to receive that consolidation of parts, and form and beauty, which we now behold.

Though this faculty of reason be the same in all men, yet it takes different directions, elevating some to sublime conceptions, to heavenly things, and to the great Author of all; while on the other hand the same reason produces worldly and grovelling pursuits, vain imaginations, and the suggestions of evil spirits. While the soul is soft and flexible, and has not embraced sound principles, nor contemplated the truth, nor carried its thought up to the great Creator of the universe, it is susceptible of false opinions, and of the influence of malicious spirits, thirsting for the blood of their victims, and filling their imaginations with delusions, from which spring all kinds of idolatry and superstitions."*

ST. THEOPHILUS. 172 A. D.

St. Theophilus was one of the Alexandrian Fathers, and manifested a passionate attachment to the philosophy of Plato. He became bishop of Antioch in 170, and governed his diocese for thirteen years with great zeal and prudence. He was a zealous disputer with heretics, and it is in these controversial writings that we find the philosophical opinions which he seems to have entertained. He had evidently studied deeply both Aristotle and Plato; for the latter of whom, as just stated, he shows a decided preference. St. Theophilus points out to his opponents the great defects in all hea-

* *Legatio pro Christianis. Sect. 5. 6. 8. 15.*

then speculations, and how much superior the philosophy of Christianity was, to anything which mortal man had been able to discover.

St. Theophilus has furnished us with an historical chronology from the creation of the world to his own time; and he endeavours to prove that the history of Moses is the most ancient and authentic account we have of the early days of the human race.*

ST. PANTÆNUS. 180 A. D.

The first school opened at Alexandria for the instruction of Christians in philosophy, was by St. Pantænus. He belonged to the sect of the Stoics, and on account of his great knowledge and talent, was appointed to carry the Gospel into India, and to convert the Brahmins from their idolatry. He was well acquainted with the works of Aristotle and Plato; but manifested a decided preference for the philosophy of the Stoics. He thought the system of the latter, considered in relation to practical life, more in accordance with the important practical precepts of the Christian faith.*

ORIGEN. 185 A. D.

The famous Origen, a disciple of St. Clement's, was a prodigy of learning and science. From the

* See Gesner's Edition of the works of St. Theophilus. Zurich, 1546; also Du Pin, Lardner, Mosheim, and Cave.

† See Cave, Lardner, Milner, Du Pin, and Mosheim.

accounts of Eusebius, he had studied almost every system of speculation, and made himself completely master of the whole circle of knowledge in his own times. There was nothing too varied or profound for the versatility and grasp of his mind. His wonderful activity and zeal showed he possessed an intellect susceptible of great mental labour and application. He was intimately skilled in the doctrines of the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Platonists, and the Pythagoreans ; and also with the traditionary knowledge of the Hebrews as well as all the heathen systems of speculation celebrated in his own day. He divided all human science into *three kinds* ; namely, first, *profane wisdom*, which comprehended natural philosophy, mathematics, and what came under the denomination at that time of the fine arts, as poetry, rhetoric, grammar, music, and medicine ; secondly, the *wisdom of the princes of this world*, which embraced all the mysteries and speculative theories of the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, and the Brahmins ; and thirdly, that wisdom which was especially revealed to man in the Holy Scriptures.

Origen seems to have entertained the opinion of the absolute reality of all moral distinctions. He remarks that, "if the reality of the Gospel is in accordance with that of the Greeks, it is because the notions of moral rectitude are destined to regulate human life, and are engraved on the soul of man by the finger of the Deity himself, in the same manner as He has recorded them upon the minds of the prophets and of our Lord and Saviour."

This distinguished Father of the Church believed in the fact, that all the Grecian philosophy had been originally derived from the Hebrew nation. His notion of the immortality of the soul, was grounded on the supposition of its pre-existence in a former more elevated sphere; and that when it took up its abode in a material body, it still had the faculty of recognising a Divine Being, of obeying his laws, and of preparing itself for a life of full enjoyment with him for ever. This notion was common both to the Gnostics and to the new Platonists.*

ST. CLEMENT. 218. A. D.

We come now to St. Clement of Alexandria, who was the shining light and glory of his age. His acquisitions and labours were prodigious. He knew all the learning of the Greeks, the Syrians, the Egyptians, and the Hebrews; and had visited every seminary of knowledge which was of any note in his own day. He viewed the philosophy of human nature through a candid and enlightened medium; and he embraced every opportunity of showing how nearly, on many points, the principles enforced by the ancient philosophers were allied to those laid down in the Sacred Scriptures. He contended it was a most mistaken, as well as a mischievous, opinion, that Christianity opposed itself to the cultivation of human knowledge. On the contrary, he zealously and eloquently contended

* See the Works of Origen by the Benedictines. Paris, 1783.

that it was only by the cultivation of science and useful information, that revealed truth could either be promulgated or understood.

St. Clement openly declared himself favourable to the Greek philosophy, even in spite of the opinions of some of his brethren, who were hostile to the speculative system of this country. He says, "The Grecian philosophy forms the man to virtue, and teaches him, also, that it proceeds from God himself. Those, then, who would judge harshly of the philosophy of Greece, ought to be prepared to prove their statements; and in order to enable them to do this, they must study and examine it. If it does not rest on a perfectly solid foundation; if it does not always conduct to satisfactory conclusions; it is ornamental at least, and exercises the student in detecting truth from falsehood. As the labourer first waters the bosom of the earth, before he commits the seed to it; in like manner when we extract out of the writings of the Greeks what we can advantageously borrow from them, we are watering the earth, that the sun may exercise his influence in giving vitality to the intellectual seed. I do not give the name of philosophy to the particular doctrines of the Portico nor of Epicurus, nor of Plato, nor of Aristotle, but to what appertains to justice and sound religion in all these different schools. I give the name of philosophy to that which is really excellent in all their doctrines; and above all to that of Socrates, such as Plato describes him to have been. The opinions of Plato upon *ideas*, is the true Christian and orthodox philosophy. Those intellectual lights

amongst the Greeks have been communicated by God himself. But they have not been charmed by their power, but have mingled them with human errors and delusions.”*

St. Clement frequently remarks that true wisdom or philosophy is the right understanding of human and divine things; and severely rebukes those who fall into habits of snarling disputation or captious scepticism. He however strenuously recommended fixed rules of reasoning, and particularly the Greek system of dialectics. On this subject he remarks, that “Dialectics form a sort of rampart for the protection of truth against the assaults of sophistry. The cause of all error and false judgment is, that we cannot detect the reasons on which the accordance or differences of things amongst themselves are founded; and thus we erroneously classify things together which ought to be separated. It becomes necessary, then, to apply the art of dialectics, as a useful instrument to conduct us to truth, to enable us to demonstrate it to others, and to protect and defend it from captious argumentations. But we must guard against the abuse of this art.”†

HERMAS—TERTULLIAN—ARNOBIUS—IRENÆUS—
LACTANTIUS, &c.

We must here make an allusion to several of the

* Stromat. lib. 1. Ed. Paris, 1641.

† See the Oxford Edition of the Works of St. Clement, 1716; also Du Pin, Blount's Censura, Fabricius, Mosheim, Lardner, &c.

learned Fathers, who entertained strong prejudices against all kinds of profane philosophy whatever. They were led to form notions of its dangerous tendency to revealed religion, from the many examples of eminent and learned individuals forming seminaries of learning under the auspices of revealed religion, and imparting to numerous classes of persons, who afterwards took an active part in ecclesiastical affairs, those peculiar doctrines which emanated from these different schools of instruction. These philosophical establishments became on many occasions, and from the sheer force of particular circumstances, formidable instruments in the hands of zealous sects and parties; and hence arose certain feelings of jealousy against both them and their principal professors. Irenæus, Tertullian, Arnobius, Irenæus, and Lactantius, were the leading Fathers of the Church, who, with various modifications, adopted these opinions as to the general tendency of human learning in matters of religion.

Irenæus wrote a treatise to refute the Pagan philosophers, which contains a considerable portion of the Grecian metaphysics. Irenæus waged war most zealously against all the religious heresies of his own times; and attributed them to the pestilential influence of the Gnostic system. Tertullian entertained a determined hostility to the doctrines of Plato, which he regarded as the prolific source of all the heresies which harassed the Christian Church. "Heresies," says he, "are the individual opinions of men and demons. They have their source in that insatiable curiosity for human science

which our Lord himself severely reprobated, while he promulgated those views which appeared foolishness in the eyes of the world. This modern philosophy presumptuously attempts to interpret the Divine nature, to mislead unwary spirits." Of the Academicians, Tertullian says, "Who art thou, impudent Academician? You overturn every condition of life; you derange the whole order of nature; you remove a divine superintending Providence. It must have given, according to your doctrine, the senses to men as the most fallacious organs for comprehending and admiring His stupendous and marvellous works. Is not every thing under the control of the senses? Is it not through their ministration, that all men receive that subordinate instruction which embraces the sciences, the common affairs of society, the relations of things, the joys, the sorrows, the hopes, the fears, the wants, and every thing which ornaments human life; since it is only by these same identical senses, that man can be distinguished as a rational creature, capable of knowledge, even to commence Academician himself."*

Arnobius, an African by birth, and, during a part of his life, a zealous advocate for Paganism, expressed, after his conversion to the Christian faith, his decided hostility to all kinds of philosophy. The science of Logic fell especially under his displeasure. He maintained that with all its display of methodical arrangement and demonstrative conclusions,

* Tertullian, *De Præscript.* cap. 7.

who is deprived of this celestial light, must always remain full of error."

On the nature and offices of Logic, Lanctantius has the following remarks. "That portion of philosophy which we call Logic, is that which contains dialectics, and the rules of reasoning. The Divine reason has no need of any such assistance, it resides not in forms of words but in the heart, and it is of little moment what language we employ; for it is things we seek, and not words."*

ANATOLIUS. 226 A. D.

This Christian writer was a public teacher at Alexandria, and obtained great celebrity from his extensive knowledge in philosophical systems. He studied Aristotle profoundly, and endeavoured to amalgamate his opinions with those of other Grecian and heathen speculations. It is however unknown whether he succeeded in this enterprise, as none of his commentaries upon Aristotle have survived to our times. He was a profound mathematician, and made an attempt to explain subjects of mental philosophy upon mathematical principles.†

ST. AUGUSTINE. 354 A. D.

St. Augustine comes next in order, as a disciple

* De Ira Dei, cap. 1.; Divin. Inst. lib. 2. cap. 3.; lib. 3. cap. 16.

† See the fragments of Anatolius' Philosophy in Fabricius, Bibli. Grec. Vol. 2. pp. 274—277.

it was but a very inefficient instrument for guiding us to truth.* Lactantius followed in his wake with the same class of opinions. This venerable Father entered very fully into all the heathen systems, with a design to collect together, and place in one point of view, the numerous contradictions and discrepancies to be found in these various speculative theories. By this plan he made a considerable display in favour of his own peculiar opinions. On the nature and use of human knowledge generally, the following quotations will furnish us with his views; and they embody, in point of principle, the real essence of his writings on this subject. "Science," says he, "cannot be derived from human intelligence, nor could it be unfolded by the mere effort of thought. It is the prerogative of the Deity himself, and not that of man to possess science properly so called. Man can only receive that knowledge which comes from without. This is the reason why the Divine Mind has given him organs of sensation, through which knowledge is conveyed to the soul." "The human soul is shut out in the obscure abode in the body, from the means of acquiring knowledge. Thus ignorance is the lot of humanity, as wisdom is the inherent attribute of the Deity. We need, then, a light to dissipate the dark clouds which envelope human thought. The Deity is this light of the human soul; and he who receives it in his heart, will immediately discover the mysteries of truth; but on the other hand, he

* Tertullian, De Præscript. lib. 2. cap. 9.

of Plato. He had at first been attached to the Aristotelian theory, but it did not correspond with his wishes, and he exchanged it for the doctrines of Plato; these were more in accordance with the nature of his mind, being a man of a lively and active imagination, and warm feelings.

We shall only make a few brief remarks on, and quotations from, St. Augustine's work "*Against the Academicians*," which is the most important connected with the history of philosophy. He commences the work by urging the most powerful inducements to study philosophy, and to excite in the student's bosom an ardent love of truth. Then follow copious outlines of the heathen notions on speculative topics, showing their various changes and modifications during many centuries. These he examines and discusses with great care, and minuteness. The opinion entertained by the Academicians, that happiness consisted in seeking after truth, he attempts to refute; and endeavours to establish the opposite theory, that happiness arises from the possession of truth itself. In the third book, he attempts to define the indefinable notion which the Academicians entertained about probability and resemblance; and he finishes by refusing his assent to the philosophy of the Academy, which maintained that the human mind had not the power of seizing hold of real truth.

This work of Augustine's is written in the form of dialogue, and is exceedingly interesting. The leading idea throughout the whole treatise is, that the Academicians have been obliged, in spite of them-

selves, to admit the existence of such a thing as truth; which showed, at once, that their whole reasoning rested upon a sceptical foundation.

In St. Augustine's work "*On Order*," he has developed that argument for a superintending Providence, which has in recent times been so admirably handled by many learned and able men. He says, "Order is wisdom and perfection; disorder is evil. Order is that law by which the Almighty executes all which he had ordained. The wisdom embodied in this order is united to the Deity, because that he conceives himself every thing of which He is the source."

This venerable Father, in his soliloquies, attempts to furnish us with the distinctive characters of *truth* and *falsehood*. "Truth," says he, "is superior to right; it is eternal and immutable. There is truth in God, and in the human mind. Truth is the source of all intelligence or wisdom."

In St. Augustine's book "*On the Quantity of the Soul*," that is, on its power or nature, he has given us a full discussion of every thing which the light of nature and revelation establishes respecting our spiritual frame. He treats of the origin of the soul, of its nature, what are its faculties or powers, why it was placed in the body, what is its condition while it is placed here, and what will be its condition in a future life. The soul is a substance endowed with reason, and placed in the body for the purpose of guiding and directing it. "The soul derives its origin from God; it is simple and immaterial; and what proves this is, that it can con-

ceive ideas of abstract quantities and dimensions which are not corporeal; though it is susceptible of feeling through the agency of the body, it is not extended over the body."

St. Augustine distinguishes the visual perceptions of objects, from the judgments which accompany them. On the subject of sensation generally he has the following remarks—"Sensation is produced from external objects, which act upon the soul. Sensation is not science; and science itself differs from reason. By reason we seek and develop science, and reasoning is the instrument which conducts us to it." Again he remarks, "The exercise of the faculties of the soul may be divided into seven distinct stages. In the first, these powers are manifested in that life or being which belongs to vegetable existence. In the second, these powers give birth to sensation; they move and direct bodies, and form the foundation of animal life. In the third, they rise above the brute creation; they compare material objects with one another; act upon them; change their nature and appearances: apply them to human wants; and create all that multiplicity of objects and pursuits, which we denominate the arts of life. The fourth stage of these powers of the soul, displays itself in giving birth to a moral world; enabling us to detach and contemplate our minds apart from external and sensible things; and in recognizing the principles of justice and virtue. The fifth period is marked by the soul's reflecting upon its own powers, enjoying itself fully in its own innate liberty and ease. The sixth, or

last stage, is characterised by a kind of sudden bound, by which the soul at once aspires to really superior things; purified by this long course of probation, it steadily directs its eye, with a calm and confident assurance, towards the region of pure and exalted intellect. In fine, intuition, the contemplation of truth itself, is the last act, the summit of the ladder, the sublime end of all its efforts, and is thus carried to the Great First Cause, to the Supreme Author of all things.

St. Augustine has been accused, in modern times, of a decided leaning to Pantheism; but this accusation rests upon a very slender foundation. The fact is, that the same charge might, with equal justice, be brought against many hundreds of able and orthodox divines, of almost every Christian church, and in every period of ecclesiastical history. Everything depends upon the meaning which is attached to the word Pantheism. It is almost impossible to tie men down to anything like a fixed definition of words of this description; particularly when employed under the heat and excitement of sectarian controversies.*

There are none of the Fathers of the Church whose lives are so full of interest, relative to spo-

* The following is the passage from St. Augustine, on which this accusation rests. "*Substantialiter Deus ubique diffusus est. Sed sic est Deus per cuncta diffusus, ut non sit qualitas mundi, sed substantia creatrix mundi, sine labore regens et sine onere continens mundum. Non tamen per spatia locorum, quasi mole diffusa, ita ut in dimidio mundi corpore sit dimidius, atque ita per totum totus; sed in solo cœlo totus, et in solâ terrâ totus, et in cœlo et in terrâ totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in se ipso ubique totus.*"

culative opinions, as that of St. Augustine. His mind underwent many changes; and these changes exercised a powerful influence over his active energies and pursuits.*

NEMESIUS. 350 A. D.

The writings of Nemesis are well worthy of especial notice at this period of the Christian Church. He was Bishop of Emessa, a city of Phenicia, and wrote a book in the Greek language, in forty-four Chapters, called, "*On the Nature of Man.*" This is unquestionably one of the very best productions of Christian philosophy of which the early Christian Church can boast. The author combated, with great power and zeal, the doctrine of fatality involved in the system of the Stoics; and he also showed himself greatly averse to the speculative opinions of the Manicheans. He adopted however the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, which had been revived by Origen, and which was afterwards, in the year 551, condemned at the Council of Constantinople. Nemesis also studied anatomy and physiology; and we find it stated in the Oxford edition of his works, in 1671, that he made important discoveries on the nature and uses of the bile; and that he was well ac-

* See Confessions, lib. 1. 2. 3. 4. 7. 8. 9. The best edition of St. Augustine's works is that published by the Benedictines at Antwerp, 1703, in 12 vols. folio.

quainted with that important fact, the circulation of the blood.

On the nature of the human soul, Nemesisius entered very fully, and discussed the various opinions which preceding philosophers had expressed on this interesting but abstruse subject. He maintains that the soul is immaterial, and that it is not the result of a peculiar organization of body. "The soul," says he, "is united to the body." Again, "A portion of the faculties of the soul are destined to serve, and another to command. The organs of sense, their movements, and the appetites which belong to them, compose the first class, and reason the second."

Nemesisius advances a theory of sensation in which both intellectual and physiological facts are stated with great clearness and effect. He had evidently been a very attentive and discriminating observer of nature. He distinguishes sensations from conclusions of the understanding which accompany them; and affirms that all our errors are solely confined to the latter and not to the former. The judgment and the memory are, in his opinion, the two principal faculties which conduct the mind to important abstract truths. He rejected the theory of Porphyry, who maintained that the soul saw every thing through sensation, as through a mirror. "The memory," says Nemesisius "preserves the perceptions obtained by the senses; and the understanding combines and arranges these materials furnished by the senses and the memory." Again he remarks, "We are conscious of the ex-

istence of things which we have been accustomed to think and judge of; as, for example, reason intimates to us the existence of the sea, and the sand on the sea shore; though we cannot fix or define the limits of the sea, nor number the individual grains of sand. We can conceive the general ideas of the sea and of the sand, but not the individual parts of which they are composed."

To the doctrines of voluntary and involuntary actions, Nemcsius had paid considerable attention. He has made many judicious remarks on this abstruse branch of the philosophy of mind.

ST. GREGORY. 372 A. D.

St. Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, wrote a work on the immortality of the soul, which has been often highly praised by learned divines since his day. He argued strenuously against the Platonic notion that the soul was composed of many different parts, a sort of little municipality or commonwealth. He allows, however, three distinct parts or principles of the soul, namely, the vegetable life, the sensitive life, and the intellectual life. He also refuted several heretical opinions on this subject, which had gained a considerable portion of popularity in the East.

SYNESIUS. 410 A. D.

The learned Synesius was the ornament and philosophical light of the age. He was an African, born at Cyrene of illustrious parents. He

studied the sciences with great success; and having embraced the doctrines of Aristotle, he gave to that system of philosophy additional charms and interest, by his ingenious illustrations and the fervour of his fancy. His mind was engrossed with the most lively feelings of philosophical and religious adoration of the works of nature; and his reflections on the attributes of the Supreme Mind and of the human soul, are at once just and sublime.

Synesius, after having been for several years an Aristotelian, began to study with great minuteness the philosophy of Plato; and more especially those views of it which were rife in the Alexandrian school. He became, in consequence, more ideal and mystified in his opinions on the nature of a Deity, the human soul, and the intellectual principle. His orthodoxy in matters of religion was generally questioned. It is certain he entertained doubts on the doctrine of the Resurrection.

CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS. 450 A. D.

This Christian writer was a learned Presbyter at Vienna. He was deeply versed in the dialectic system of Aristotle, and displayed great eloquence in his philosophical discourses. His work "*On the State of the Soul*," is a curious work. It is grounded on the principles of two divisions, the senses and the powers of reflection.*

* Fabricius, Bibli. lat. t. 2, p. 642.

BOETHIUS. A. D. 470.

Boethius was famous for his virtues, talents, civil distinctions, and misfortunes. He was born at Rome in the year 470; and studied philosophy and general learning at Athens. In the year 525 he suffered an ignominious death, without the forms of law, for an alleged treasonable correspondence.

Boethius studied the doctrines of Aristotle, and made himself completely master of them in all their ramifications. He translated the *Categories* at Rome, and several other tracts of the Stagirite, and also the Commentaries of Porphyry. But though nominally belonging to the school of Aristotle, yet in spirit he was a real Platonist. The sublime doctrines of the latter class of philosophers, seemed to have entirely engrossed his mind, and to have led him, in all his speculations, to give that form and expression to his thoughts, which were widely removed from the dryness and technicality of the Aristotelian theory. He loved to roam amongst the lofty doctrines of the Grecian sages. The stupendous operations of nature; the mysterious union of the soul and body; the nature and attributes of the Divine Mind; the immortality of the soul; and a future state of rewards and punishments; filled his comprehensive intellect with the most exalted conceptions, calculated to elevate and dignify the human mind, and console and cheer the heart of man. Never was there a genius better fitted, both from its worldly afflictions, and from its own rich

and inexhaustible resources to unfold "*The Consolations of Philosophy* ; a work which must always remain an imperishable monument to his name, as well as a tender memorial to his virtuous and unmerited suffering.*

MARTIN CAPELLA. 474 A. D.

Martin Capella, who was an African by birth, wrote a book, entitled "*Satyricon, or the Re-union of Philosophy with Mercury*." Part relates to mythology and part to the fine arts. He also wrote on grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. He adopted all the rules and maxims of philosophy taught by Aristotle and the Stoics. His writings are a sort of *common gathering* of all the opinions and systems which history had handed down, as prevalent at different periods amongst the Greeks and Romans.

CASSIODORUS. 480 A. D.

Cassiodorus, who was a contemporary of Boethius, wrote several works on metaphysics and on other kindred branches of knowledge. He was an ardent admirer of Aristotle, and conceived his philosophy to embrace the whole of what mankind could ever know of the laws and principles of the human mind. The works of Cassiodorus formed the text books in the schools in the East, for a considerable period after his death.

* See Fabricius, *Bib. Lat.*; and *Vies des Saints*, Vol. 7. par Baillet.

From the beginning of the fifth to the end of the sixth century, the discussions amongst the learned Fathers were not so detached and independent of each other, as they previously had been. There was more of unity and party, and fewer individual theories struggling for distinction and public favour. Nearly the whole of the writings of the priesthood on philosophy in general, were divided, or rather amalgamated, into two leading divisions; those which were in favour of the theory of Plato, and those who contended for the supremacy of Aristotle. Under these two banners, the general mass of disputants and writers were arrayed, and many were the varied aspects of party success, during this long and conflicting struggle.

There were several distinguished expounders of the leading principles of the Platonic doctrine at this period. In their writings against the Manichean heresy, as well as in many other tracts, they showed the harmony which existed between this Grecian system, and the leading principles of nature and revealed religion. Their opinions were at once truly enlightened and liberal; and manifested how carefully they had studied both the philosophical tenets of heathenism, and the theological doctrines contained in the Holy Scriptures.

In the 7th and 8th centuries the two most eminent men, in reference to the cultivation of the philosophy of human nature, were John the Grammarian and St. John Damascenus. The first composed extensive and erudite commentaries upon the works of Aristotle; and the second attempted to simplify the Greek philosopher's doctrines, so as to render

them more commonly understood. His general remarks as to the nature of philosophy, are very admirable. "Philosophy," says he, "is the science of things which are just what we find them to be. It is divided into two parts, *speculative* and *practical*. Speculative philosophy comprehends theology, physiology, and mathematics; practical philosophy comprehends ethics, economics, and politics. Theology has for its object that which is immaterial, such as the Deity, angels, and the souls of men. Physiology embraces a knowledge of material things, as of animals, plants, minerals, &c. Mathematics consist in things which, though not strictly corporeal themselves, have a relation to external bodies, as number, proportions, figures, and the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Dialectics, or the art of reasoning, is more an instrument of philosophy, than one of its leading divisions. It is, from its very nature, a preliminary acquisition. The Sceptics were guilty of self-contradiction when they affirmed that philosophy had no claim to a knowledge of things. There is nothing more excellent than knowledge; it is the light of an intelligent soul. Seek it, explore for it, by unremitting investigations; and at the same time consult the works of the ancient heathens, where you will find many important truths, which you must disentangle from the errors with which they are associated."

He has the following observations on method.
 "There are four dialectic or logical methods. The

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first is the division which separates genus and species; the second is the definition which defines the subject by the genus; the third is analysis, which decomposes every part; and the fourth is demonstration, which establishes the truth by means of the last term." St. John Damascenus also distinguishes analysis into three distinct kinds; natural, logical, and mathematical. The first resolves compound ideas into their simple elements; the second resolves the syllogism into its different parts; and the third consists in admitting the correctness of a certain principle, in order to arrive at a knowledge of an important truth.

On the doctrine of Sensation, St. John Damascenus maintains that the faculty of sight informs us of the magnitude, position, and distance of objects.

"Imagination," says he, "is a faculty belonging to the irrational division of the soul, which operates through the organs of sense. When the soul perceives external objects by the organs of sense, it forms to itself an opinion or judgment; when it knows, by thought, things which appertain to the understanding, it conceives a notion. Such notions cannot proceed from the senses; they can be obtained only by instruction. Memory is the image which has been left by objects offered to the senses, and seized by the action of the soul, or preserved from that which has been perceived through the senses, or the inward process of thought."

A long darkness in the Lower Empire now succeeded to the comparative light which we have just described. Leo, the philosopher, obtained considerable reputation in the Byzantine Empire for his various writings. Photius flourished at Constantinople, in general philosophy, oratory, and poetry. Leo VI., son of the Emperor Basil, distinguished himself in general literature.

There were a great number of commentators on Aristotle in the latter centuries of the Lower Empire. David was an eminent critic and expounder of the philosophy of the Stagirite; Eustratius composed treatises on dialectics and morals. Nicephorus, a learned monk, cultivated general philosophy with divinity. George Pachymera composed an *Epitome of the Philosophy of Aristotle*, and a *Compendium of his Logic*. Theodorus Metachita stood at the head of the school at Constantinople, for his eloquence and profundity. Magentinus illustrated the doctrines of many of the Pythagorean philosophers. George Cyprius, surnamed Gregory, obtained well merited honours from the patrons of learning in his own day. Michael Psellus cultivated philosophy, medicine, and mathematics, and obtained the title of the "Prince of Philosophers." He composed and published an "*Exposition of the Chaldean Oracles*," and a "*Treatise on the Faculties of the Soul*."

. The following, among many others, are interesting works on the philosophical principles and opinions of the Fathers of the Church. Thomasius, *Orig. Hist. Ecclesi. et Phil.* Mosheim, *De Turbata per Platonicos Recentiores Ecclesia*. (This work has occasioned considerable discussion among learned ecclesiastics of modern times; particularly Baltus and the Benedictines of Saint Maur.) Huet, *Origines. Clerc*,

Biblioth. Select. Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. Carus, L'Etude de l'homme et la Psychologie en particulier. Jean-Baptiste Crispus, De Ethnicis Philosophis caute Legendis. Souverain, Le Platonisme Dévoilé. Baltus, Défense des Saints Pères; Jugemens des Saints Pères sur la Morale de la Philosophie Païenne, (Strasbourg). Barbeyrac, Traité de la Morale des Pères de l'Eglise. Standlin, Progr. de Patrum Ecclesie Doctrina Morali. Eberhard, Spirit of Primitive Christianity, (in German). Rocasler, De Originibus Philosophiæ Ecclesiasticæ. The fourth Volume of the Bibliothèque des Pères de l'Eglise. Tennemann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, the seventh Volume. Cave's Lives of the Fathers, and Ecclesiastical Antiquities. Whiston's Primitive Christianity. Fabricius, Biblioth. Grec. Lardner's Account of the Christian Fathers. Journal des Savans, 1734. Tillemont, Mem. Ecclesi. Gaudentius, Diss. de Compar. Dogm. Orig. cum Dogm. Platonis.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS, FROM ASCETIC WRITERS, ON MATTERS CONNECTED WITH REASONING AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE.

As we are just upon the eve of entering into a long night of comparative stillness and unprofitable discussion, we shall lay before the reader a few scattered fragments, culled from ascetic sources, on matters bearing a certain relationship to mental studies. These fragments, though very scanty and limited in their range of inquiry, will be found not altogether devoid of interest, considering the period and the circumstances under which they were written.

ST. PETER THE ANCHORITE. 410 A. D.

On Human Wisdom and Learning.

“It has often appeared to me that there are among the learned of this world, and even among some of our ablest divines, many odd and curious notions about the nature of human wisdom and

learning. I have long come to the conclusion that there is no learning nor wit of men that is not grounded in religion—little that is not decidedly of a religious character; and my reasons for this opinion I shall state to you as briefly as I can.

“Men pride themselves on their wisdom in observing the *causes* of things, and their *effects*. A physician, for example, is called a learned man in proportion to his knowledge of the cause of human ailments, and the effects that particular drugs have upon them. And, again, a man is called a wise legislator who is acquainted with the *causes* of social happiness and prosperity, and with the *effects* which particular measures have upon the welfare of the community. Here causes and effects are the materials of wisdom. Now I conceive that no man can be intimately conversant about these, make them daily objects of his attention and notice, and pride himself on his mode of arranging them in his mind, without his thinking often of the *First Great Cause*, which made and sustains all things. I know well there are thousands of learned men who never directly refer their wisdom to the Deity; but still the thought is in their minds, whether they give formal utterance to it or no. And this is the thing to look at. If there were not indirectly a reference made to this knowledge of Deity, it is difficult for me to see how there could be anything like wisdom in the world, or why men should pride themselves upon possessing it, and demand praise from others for it.

“ You have heard me often mention in conversation, that I very much doubted if there were ever such a being as an Atheist; and it is upon the strength of this doubt that I am now offering my opinions. All the philosophers I have read of who have been charged with denying the existence of a God, always had a notion of supreme power about them. This notion may have assumed various forms, but it is always in the mind of man, and influences him without his knowing it. It is never destroyed, and I question much whether it be ever very much weakened. The natural man, it is true, does not know God as we Christians know Him; but he does know Him notwithstanding. We are not in a precise situation to estimate the influence which this primary notion of the Deity may have over the other faculties of the mind, nor over the judgments we form of things. We cannot do this either with other people or ourselves. But I hold it evident that the whole frame-work of our nature rests upon it; and there would be nothing in the universe we could call wisdom or learning, unless it were based upon this fundamental principle of theology.

“ Learning and wisdom would not be placed against each other in the world’s estimation, if men would only base their knowledge upon religion. They ought to commence with it, and descend to other branches of information; and not begin with the latter, with a view of obtaining a knowledge of the former. This is inverting the natural order of things. Most of the heathens, and even

some good Fathers of the Church, have maintained that Socrates was the wisest man of ancient times; and the proof that is adduced for this is, that he connected his knowledge with some definite notions of a God. This has often struck me as a very curious circumstance; but it is very confirmatory of what I am now contending for. If we could make ourselves acquainted with every thing in this world, and yet had no notion of what lay beyond it, what men call wisdom would be but a poor and miserable thing indeed. And in all the Pagan writers we find that continual references were made to the wisdom, favour, and applause of the gods, when they were intent on doing great things. The Deity must be the fountain of all knowledge and wisdom, and in proportion as men direct their minds to him, they will make real progress in knowledge; but if they neglect him, all they can know is but dross and emptiness.”*

ST. ALONZO DE VEGA. 530 A. D.

Nature of Unbelief.

“In moving much in the world, in the early part of my life, it has often been my lot to meet with men who refused to give credence to the Gospel; and the variety of reasons they adduced often attracted my notice. But I have almost uniformly found that, at bottom, such men did not approve

* *Dies y siete Coloquios y Discursos Varios*, Salamanca, 1593, Vol. 1. pp. 310—314. *Flos Sanctorum*, Madrid, 1710.

of religion in their lives, and this, I conceive, made them averse to its truths. Some exceptions to this rule I have met with; and when the parties were men of intelligence and learning, I have felt no small degree of interest in discussing points of doctrine with them.

“In all my encounters of this kind, I have noticed that their objections were much of the same cast as those which the old philosophers used to employ in their discussions and wranglings with one another, on the general doctrines of a Deity and a superintending Providence. The latter, as well as modern doubters, always wanted to know the *reasons* for things being constituted as they are. Now this is a silly notion, because it is just as pertinent *against* as *for* those who use it. It is a two-edged sword. Therefore, whenever I have met with persons who followed this line of argumentation, I have endeavoured to turn their own weapons upon themselves, and this has often made them plead for mercy. I adopted this mode of warfare, from an accident which befel me in one of my travels, and which I shall here relate.

“Going once over one of the most wild and mountainous parts of Spain, I was accompanied by a physician, with whom I had become acquainted in the last town in which I had rested. He was a very intelligent man; knew Hippocrates and Galen by heart; was fond of disputation; but would not listen to my doctrines of religion. We were benighted in the midst of one of the mountain passes;

but, after a good deal of suffering and fatigue, were seen by a shepherd, who took us to his humble dwelling, and succoured us for the night. The badness of the weather prevented us from leaving our quarters the next day. To beguile the hours, my friend, the physician, began to converse with the shepherd, with a view of sounding the depth of his knowledge of sundry matters. The physician found him a keen and witty man by nature. This gave some zest to the conversation. My companion attempted to explain several things distinctly connected with his own profession, but the shepherd would not believe his statements, and always met his declarations and reasonings with the inquiry, why such and such a thing was made in this or that particular manner, rather than in some other? When the physician attempted a solution of any question, the shepherd laughed and shook his head in derision. When the physician affirmed that such and such things were true in philosophy, the shepherd denied the truth of the statement, and asked, with no small portion of ironical wit, why should the thing be in that way, when another way, apparently much simpler, would have answered the purpose? I saw my friend was exceedingly annoyed; but I enjoyed the dispute myself; for it so happened that when I attempted to unfold any theological principle or doctrine, he dexterously employed the same line of argument against me which the simple and untutored shepherd now used against himself. The physician was in

the habit of asking me why the Almighty had not made us so as not to have needed the costly sacrifice of His own Son? why we could not see the truth of another life in a much clearer light than we do? why there should be any evil at all in the world? These and many more questions of a similar nature he urged to baffle and confute me. Now, I fancied he had thought of this in his conflict with the shepherd, and had felt inward mortification in consequence. For my part, I felt a secret pleasure at his discomfiture, and I endeavoured to draw a useful lesson from it. I have found such arguments as these used by the shepherd, to question the truth of plain principles of knowledge, almost universally employed among doubters of the Gospel. When the real nature of these arguments is examined, they will be found a very weak subterfuge for error and delusion.”*

On the Immortality of the Soul.

“All my reading and reflection have convinced me that man lives after his earthly career; and my reasons for this opinion are drawn more from human testimony, and the nature of things, than directly from the Scriptures themselves. The opinion of another life is universal; no people are devoid of it. Idolatry of all kinds is a striking manifestation of it. It was the creed of the Egyptians, and Chaldeans, and Persians, and Greeks,

* Los Padres del Desierto. Madrid 1564. Vol. 1. pp. 200. 202.

and Romans, and Jews, and is interwoven with all Pagan rites and ceremonies."

"Socrates says, 'I hope there will be something after death, and that the future life will be better for virtuous men than for the wicked.' Plato, in his letters, remarks, 'That we ought to assent to the ancient and sacred opinion, that the soul of man is immortal; and that after this life it will be judged and punished severely.' Aristotle spoke of the happiness of a future state as an opinion of very great antiquity, even in his day. Cicero says 'that the immortality of the soul has been adopted and defended by the most distinguished men.' And a like opinion may be found in Homer, Thales, Pythagoras, and Zeno."*

PELAGIUS. 768 A. D.

Pelagius was born in some part of Syria, but the exact place is not known. The events of his life are but briefly related by his Spanish biographers.

It would appear that this recluse was born of rich and influential parents, who gave him a very learned education. He was employed, in the early part of his life, in the service of Prince Abdalrahman, who, in 750, at the revolution of the Caliphate at Damascus, having fled from the massacre of his family, came into Spain, and fixed his residence at

* *Los Padres del Desierto*, Vol. 1. p. 250.

Cordova. Here he found an independent kingdom, where the arts and sciences were introduced and cultivated with assiduity, during a period when most other kingdoms of Europe were involved in heathen darkness, barbarity, and ignorance.

Pelagius, for several years after the establishment of Prince Abdalrahman in Spain, laboured with uncommon zeal and effect in promoting a knowledge of all kinds of science, and a love of general literature. In this laudable undertaking he met with every degree of encouragement from his munificent and intelligent patron, who kept him about his own person, and consulted him in every undertaking for the welfare of his kingdom.

At the age of fifty-three he was tired of all public life, and determined to withdraw into solitude to devote himself exclusively to the perusal of the Holy Scriptures, to which he thought he had not paid so much attention as he ought. This resolve gave Prince Abdalrahman great pain. He used every art of persuasion to induce Pelagius to change his mind, but all to no purpose.

He sought out one of the most barren and desolate places in the country, where to fix his dwelling place, which was a cave hewn out of a solid rock. Here he lived upon the wild fruits of the earth, and drank nothing stronger than water. In the heat of summer he had a kind of cradle erected upon a lofty tree which over-hung his cell, wherein he slept during the night. His mental occupations were the reading of the Scriptures, and the study of

some of the most distinguished of the Grecian and Roman philosophers, of whose writings he was passionately fond.

It is related that once in every year he paid a visit to the Prince, his kind patron, who was always delighted to see and converse with him. It is not known in what year he died, but his age is stated to be eighty-two. He was buried with great pomp, and many thousands of persons, from all parts of the country, came to pay their respects to the ashes of this singular and talented man.

His literary remains are under the head of "Fragments," from which the following extracts are made. His knowledge of philosophy is singularly great for the time in which he lived.

*On matters relating to Knowledge in general,
and Reasoning.*

The human mind is divided into two faculties, viz. the judgment, and the memory. Philosophy is of use to inform and rectify the mind; but it will be necessary to give a definition of the word philosophy, and to show whence it had its origin. The ancients who employed their time in the search of knowledge were called *Sophoi*, before Pythagoras existed, who, out of an air of modesty, refused the name, as being proper to immortal gods only; instead of which, he assumed the name of philosopher, and which, since his time, has been attributed to the former characters, and hence arose this designation.

Vulgar knowledge is that by which we know only the bare existence of things, without being able to give reasons why they are so and so. Solid knowledge is that of which we know the causes and effects; as that the sun melts snow, and the frost congeals water.

Aristotle divided his works into two kinds, *exoterica* and *acroamatica*; the former he wrote for the vulgar, without giving any reason for what he affirmed—as, God was to be worshipped, or the soul was immortal, which men were to believe upon his word. The latter he taught his disciples, to whom he proved every thing he said with the strongest arguments he could advance.

From hence may be drawn the following four corollaries:—

First—*Vulgar knowledge* is that which we wholly acquire by the senses, and is the foundation of all solid knowledge; for we must know a thing is so, before we can offer a reason for it. Vulgar knowledge is the least degree of knowledge we can conceive.

Second—*Solid knowledge* does not depend so exclusively upon our senses, but upon right reason; that is, by deducing some truths from others by a necessary conclusion. But there are some parts of learning which cannot be called philosophy; such as *mathematical arts*; and even *theology*, because acquired by revelation. As to mathematical arts, though they be deduced from some principles of philosophy, yet it commonly happens that the arts

are themselves illustrated by an inquiry into the nature of things, and by practice and experience. It may be said, since right reason is the faculty of deducing some truths from others, how comes it to pass that we embrace false opinions? We answer, by an unavoidable mistake, or erroneous judgment, from whence many errors proceed. But a philosopher ought not to receive any doctrine but what can be deduced from self-evident truths, principles, and axioms. On the other hand, there are some doctrines which cannot be demonstrated by axioms and definitions; in that respect they have recourse to probability and analogy.

Philosophy is divided by some writers on metaphysics into subjective and objective.

First—Objective is a system or collection of so many dogmas or opinions.

Second—Subjective is a faculty, or a certain habit of deducing some truths from others. If we understand philosophy in the second sense, viz. subjectively, sceptics may be recorded among philosophers, as being always searching after truth, but never coming to a resolution on the certainty of any thing. But if we place philosophy in the former, (where we may with more propriety,) they have no claim to be classed with philosophers.

Philosophy by some is divided into true and false.

True philosophy is that which is founded upon right reason. Philosophy does not deserve the name of false, because there is no such thing. Phi-

losophy is by others called *eclectic*; this name was given to those who, out of doctrines and opinions which they had heard or read, chose what they thought best, and most agreeable to truth and reason.

The objects of philosophy are truth and goodness; and the end of it, the true happiness of mankind.

Philosophy is again divided into *instrumental*, *theoretical*, and *practical*. The first part of philosophy is logic, which is instrumental, or, as Aristotle called it, *organon*, a machine, because it is to the mind what an instrument is to the body. I cannot cleave a piece of wood with my hand, but easily with an axe; so logic affords proper help and assistance to the mind for investigating truth, and distinguishing it from falsehood.

But it is necessary to give the derivation of the word logic. It comes from the word *logos*, i. e. *sermo*, or *ratio*; and it is very probable it comes from *logos* in the last sense, because it is the art of reasoning. Though some who occupy themselves in trifling speculations, call it *sermo*, because, say they, thoughts are the internal speeches of mind. The object of logic is truth in general; and the end of it, the investigating of truth, and communicating it to others.

Logic may be defined the science for discovering and propagating truth. A science is any part of learning which depends upon self-evident truths or undoubted principles. Hence logic may justly be termed a science, because it is founded upon axioms or self-evident principles. Truth is, as it were, hid-

den in a pit, and logic is the ladder by which we may descend to search for it. Truth is blended with falsehood, and therefore logic is rendered more necessary, which teaches the method of investigating truth.

Logic is conversant about three things :—

First—The nature of the human understanding.

Second—The nature of truth.

Third—The method of investigating truth and communicating it to others.

The nature of the human understanding, which is divided into two principal faculties, the understanding and the will. The understanding is chiefly conversant about truth ; the will, about goodness.

In the understanding mind there are certain ideas which experience tells us are infinite in their number. Plato, and the philosophers of his time, were of opinion, that these ideas were stamped or imprinted upon the mind of man from its first formation, by the Author of nature ; and these were called *innate* truths or ideas.

The idea we have of immaterial things comes from the inward man ; that is, by reflecting on what passes in the human mind. Hence some are to be found fault with in saying we have our ideas of immaterial things from material things, as the passions of hope and fear, joy, anger, &c. These could never be acquired by material objects. Thus, suppose a man void of any of the passions, as for example, anger ; he could never form an idea of it from merely seeing a man in a rage, with his countenance changed, and speaking loudly ; but

that which gives him an idea of it, is by reflecting on what passed in his own mind when he was affected with this passion; for, until he feel it himself, he can never have a just idea of it. When the mind is furnished with a considerable number of ideas, the first thing which occupies it is, the comparing two of them together, to see whether they be equal or unequal, whether they agree or disagree; as when we see a child that knows the difference between a book and a leaf of paper, by lifting and comparing them together. But when the objects cannot be removed and applied to one another, as two buildings, we must have recourse to some intermediate measure, as a rope, yard, &c., and measure the one, and then the other, and see whether they agree or disagree.

There are three acts of the mind, which are called perception, judgment, and reasoning. First, Perception is that which we barely perceive, without passing any judgment upon it, as the fire, a house, the sun, moon, or stars, &c. This is called perception, and sometimes apprehension. Second, Judgment is the comparing of two ideas together, as, I have an idea of God, and another of justice, and can judge that God is just, for I see that these ideas agree. Third, Reasoning is the third act of the mind: it takes place when two things cannot be affirmed to agree or disagree without the help of some intermediate idea, as for example, I want to compare my soul with matter. I cannot do it immediately, but I find out an intermediate idea, a middle term, which is *thinking*. I first compare

thinking with matter, and I find it does not agree with it, then I conclude that my soul is not matter. If we were only endued with these three faculties, all our knowledge would be very confined, and would depend upon things present ; for example, if I were shut up in a room talking with a man, then all my knowledge would be confined within these walls ; but the Author of Nature hath endowed us with an act of the mind called the *imagination*, whereby we can excite the ideas that were formerly in our mind from the world around us : the imagination is the knowledge of things absent as if they were present. I can form an idea of a horse or an ape, though they do not immediately affect my senses : thus the imagination brings into our mind the ideas we formerly had. By the help of the imagination we can excite the ideas of objects, corporeal things, and exert certain faculties about them. I think there are four such faculties, viz. *Compounding*, *Discerning*, *Recalling*, and *Retaining*.

First—*Compounding* is the combining or gathering our ideas into one collection, as the idea of a unit ; and by joining as many ideas to it as make a dozen, or a score, I have as distinct an idea of these numbers as I have of a unit. What would be our condition if we wanted this faculty ? We should then have no idea, for example, of the college, because it consisted of many houses ; but only of our room ; and so of other things which consist of parts.

Second—*Discerning*, or distinguishing, is the separating our ideas from one another. I have an idea of two men being intimate friends ; I cannot

distinguish the one from the other, in their friendship.

Third—*Recalling* is the bringing back into our minds the ideas we formerly had. By this act we remember our former acts. It is commonly called the memory, which is, as it were, the repository of all our ideas.

Fourth—*Retaining* is the keeping in our mind the idea of an absent corporeal object excited in our mind by the imagination. I have the idea of a triangle, and can retain it in my mind until I have compared all its parts. But it is almost impossible for one to keep his thoughts for a month or two fixed upon one object, on account of the vast number of ideas that crowd in upon us: no sooner does one disappear than another appears. Hence, this faculty of retaining is so imperfect in some men, that it renders them very unfit for acquiring knowledge, because they cannot keep in their minds any thing so long as to examine and consider its properties and qualities.

Thus, then, that faculty which keeps and retains an idea for some time is exceedingly useful to man; and without which all our ideas would be jumbled together as a chaos.

There are three other faculties: *Comparing*, *Naming*, and *Ranging* of our ideas into different classes.

First—*Comparing* our ideas together; namely, two triangles together to find the difference.

Second—*Naming* is an act of the mind, by which we express our ideas by articulate sounds, called

words, in order to distinguish one thing from another. Words are nothing else but the marks of our thoughts, by which we keep converse, and communicate our knowledge one with another.

Third—*Ranging*, or reducing our ideas into proper classes. To illustrate these, we observe that many things produced by nature have a certain resemblance one with another; as, when we observe a certain rank of beings of an erect form, with their heads set, so as to make them look towards heaven; these we commonly comprehend under one general class called men: so also as to horses, birds, and fishes. If we had not this faculty we should be obliged to give a name to every individual, which, in the first place, would be impossible, because no man could be endowed with such a memory as to find a name to every grain of sand, or single hair; and even if we were, it would be idle and superfluous, because by naming the hairs of our head we could not convey any different idea to ourselves or others. However, there are some classes that occur in common conversation, of which we are obliged to call every individual thing by a particular name, for distinction sake, in order to excite the same idea which is in the minds of others. Hence, every man is called by a particular name; and it is even the same with horses sometimes. In like manner sportsmen distinguish dogs; and we call countries and kingdoms by particular names, for no other reason than because they frequently occur in common conversation; and we thus communicate a dis-

inct idea of them into the minds of others. The shepherd calls his dog by name; but he need not use this formality to his sheep. But we may proceed further. All those who have life, and are endued with spontaneous motion, we call by the name animal. Yet some who are more speculative have found out a more general name, under which we may comprehend all things which have life, whether rational, sensitive, vegetative, called by the name *vivens*. Some have gone further, and have comprehended all things material under one name, called *substance*. But there is another power of the mind whereby we make one singular idea universal. Every idea as it enters the mind is single, and we make it complex by making that simple idea represent a whole class of things; as when I have the idea of a book, by abstraction I can make it represent all books, of different sizes. If we had not this act of the imagination, we could not have a general idea, but only be conversant about individuals; as we could not have the idea of a triangle in general, but only of some certain one. Thus it is by the act of compounding we combine our ideas, excited in the mind by the imagination, into one collection; then by an act we can imagine a pole which reached from our eyes to the stars; and first having a notion of gold, and then of a mount, we can form the idea of a golden mountain, a sea of milk, &c., which are called *creatures in the mind*, but not in the nature of things.

Again, ideas which contradict and destroy one another, which neither exist in the mind nor in the

nature of things, are called *nonentia*, as a square circle, since the imagination may compound ideas which cannot exist in nature. To prevent being led into errors and mistakes, there is need of the judgment to distinguish these ideas from real ones; hence it is that he whose judgment predominates is fit for philosophy, the civil laws, &c.; and he who excels in the acts of the imagination is best qualified for poetry and oratory; and he that excels in memory is fit for acquiring the languages. Since the mind of man is endued with such acts or faculties, how comes it to pass that we often embrace falsehood and fall into errors? It has been a question much agitated among philosophers, what is the source and spring of all errors and mistakes? One of the ancient philosophers imputes it to the depravity of the will; but others say that it is the limited nature of the human mind, and the understanding being so narrowly confined is the source of all errors and mistakes. The prejudices of *authority* and *precipitancy* are the chief leading causes of error.

First, the prejudice of authority is defined to be the embracing of or rejecting an opinion without thoroughly examining into it, upon the qualifications or endowments of the persons who maintain it, as children are obliged to obey their superiors, parents, and nurses, and to believe for truth whatever they say, since they cannot search into the arguments upon which the doctrine is supposed to rest. So when they come to the years of maturity, and are able to converse with their acquaintances,

and the doctrines are never contradicted which were told them by their nurses, parents, or others, in their tender years, they make such impression upon their minds, that they think them sacred, and a thing unpardonable to part with them as long as they live. Another instance is this; many follow the opinion of Zeno, who said there was no vacuum. In this country, we believe the contrary. Besides, there is a prejudice in religion, as we see from experience; for almost whatever doctrines prevail in the country where we are brought up, we adhere to without examining them, chiefly because the minister or people around us maintain them.

There are more prejudices, as those of antiquity, honour, fame, and probability; and there is a prejudice which is still more ridiculous, as we see most common people believe what their rich superiors say, because they are rich, and for no other reason. Thus far concerning the prejudice of authority.

Second. The next grand prejudice is that of *precipitancy* or rashness. It is defined to be a rejecting or embracing an opinion without accurately considering it, as we see most people are averse to reasoning or entering into a long series of arguments whereby they may prove the principle they embrace, and are content with a superficial knowledge of them; and their minds are often changed with the books they read, or by the arguments they hear advanced about any subject. For example, when they hear the argument raised to prove the immortality of the soul, they easily as-

sent to it; and when they hear the argument asserted to prove the contrary, they as easily embrace it, and alter their opinions as often as they hear different arguments offered.

Under this class may be comprehended that prejudice which is called a *spirit of contradiction*. We see a great many show their wit and learning in contradicting whatever arguments they hear advanced either on the right or wrong side of the question; and also a great many debates arise about the meaning of words in matters of religion.*

On the Thinking Principle of Animals.

It has been often a keenly agitated question whether the lower orders of creation perceive ideas as we do. Some of the ancient philosophers, who abounded in nice distinctions, particularly those who resided at Alexandria, divided souls into three kinds—*rational*, *sensitice*, and *vegetative*. The first was given to man, the second to animals, and the third to plants.

There were two philosophers who made no small noise in Arabia, about fifty years ago, that maintained that animals were susceptible of sensations from external objects, and, consequently, that they had a *sensitice soul*, but were deprived of a *perceptive* one, whereby they are prevented from reflecting upon their own inward sensations, and from comparing two or more ideas together.

* See Los Padres del Desierto. Madrid 1564. 2 Vol. Art. St. Pelagius.

I have often perused with amusement the treatise on this subject, composed by the good Nemeseius, Bishop of Emessa, who was a decided advocate for giving certain animals credit for a great share of artifice and prudent calculation. He cited a variety of instances which had come under his own personal observations, wherein great wisdom and forethought were clearly manifested in the animal nature. But it must be allowed on all hands, that there is something pre-eminent about man, over all classes of the living creation.*

* See *Los Padres del Desierto*. Madrid 1564. 2 Vol. Art. St. Pelagius.

CHAPTER XXIX.

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY, IN MATTERS
OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, MAINTAINED
BY THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

IN cultivating an acquaintance with philosophy, it was natural for the Fathers of the Church to view all its principles through the medium of the doctrines contained in revelation. A rigid examination of every abstract proposition grounded on human nature, would be instituted with a view of ascertaining all its bearings upon vital questions of faith and duty. This practice, so natural to men placed in their situation, would almost insensibly suggest rules and maxims of religious authority. Human nature, in its widest range, was the common arena of disputation, both for philosophers and theologians. It was the source from which both drew all their materials, though they received them through different channels. Philosophers speculated in the closet; theologians in society; the one illustrated their principles by mental abstractions, the other by the every day scenes of life and character. The theologian would, in consequence,

be powerfully inclined to appeal to human authority, in support of his general views and abstract principles of human nature. The ordinary modes of thinking and feeling among mankind would be constantly referred to, and become invested, in his eyes, with an authority in matters of speculation, from which there could be no philosophical appeal.

The every-day discharge of the arduous and important duties of the Clergy, would invariably strengthen this principle of authority. A Divine Revelation is of itself an act of authority of the most comprehensive and decided nature. It is opposed to the doctrine of the infallibility of human reason ; it defines limits to speculative inquiries ; it directs them into particular channels ; and renders them subordinate to certain ulterior purposes and ends. This revelation, therefore, involved the doctrine of authority, in all its fulness and purity, and could not but prove powerfully influential on the minds of those, whose herculean labours were directed towards its extensive promulgation among mankind.

It must have proved, also, not a little influential on the minds of the Fathers, that many of the ancient heathen philosophers, whose writings were familiar to them, acknowledge the necessity of some divine authority and communication, to direct men to sound and wholesome conclusions on philosophical doctrines and systems. The Fathers were acquainted with the declarations, on this point, of

Pythagoras,* Socrates,† Plato,‡ Aristotle,§ Hippocrates,|| Cicero,¶ Catullus,** and Seneca.††

Indeed this question of religious authority has always, since the introduction of Christianity, been more or less a subject of discussion; and has exercised over speculative philosophy a much more extensive influence, both directly and indirectly, than is commonly imagined. In our own day, especially in continental countries, it is quite a popular controversy; and it may be considered as a singular thing, in the history of modern speculation, to find some of the most distinguished of the German metaphysicians maintaining the necessity of a divine revelation to guide mankind in their philosophical inquiries. To hear this from Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herder, whose speculative systems lead, by a short route, to absolute pantheism, must be considered as something both curious and instructive.

St. Justin, after having alluded to the disputes among philosophers, and the uncertainty of almost every fundamental principle which they have attempted to establish, attributes this unsatisfactory state of affairs, to the opinions they entertained as to the infallibility of human reason, and the vain attempt to dispense with instruction. "*Quod a peritis discere noluerint, sed esse existimaverint*

* Demoph. Lact. Pythagoras.

† Phædo. p. 83.

|| Book. 3.

** Liber 64. Ver. 385 et seq.

† Memorab. Socrat. 1. 4.

§ De Mundo. Cap. 4.

¶ De Legg. 1. 7. 2. 14.

†† Epis. 90.

mentis humanæ solertiâ claram cœlestium rerum cognitionem assequi posse, cùm ne terrestrium quidem potuerint." And he concludes with referring to the doctrines of the ancients, who had faithfully transmitted the truth to us, which they had originally received from God himself. "Quocirca, cùm veri nihil de Religione a doctoribus vestris (Græcis) præcipi posse constet, et idoneum satis documentum vobis ignorationis ipsi suæ per dissidentes inter se factiones exhibuerint, reliquum esse opinor, ut ad majores nostros revertamur, qui et magistros vestros longe tempore anteverterunt, et nihil de suis ipsorum cogitationibus et placitis docuerunt; minime ipsi mutuis dissensionibus invicem conflictantes, aut alii aliorum dicta evertere in animum inducentes; quippe qui omni contentionis studio et factionum dissidio liberi, sicuti à Deo acceperunt, ita nobis doctrinam tradiderunt."

Hermas descants upon the errors and contradictory systems of philosophers; and contrasts their pretended knowledge, with the certainty of that which is transmitted to all mankind by tradition. "Beatus apostolus Paulus, Corinthiis, qui juxta Laconicam Græciam habitant, scribens, cùm pronuntiavit sapientiam mundi hujus apud Deum stultitiam esse, præter rei veritatem locutus non est. Videtur enim mihi ab angelorum defectione principium repetiisse, cur philosophorum decreta inter se neque consentiant neque approbentur."

Clement of Alexandria maintains that the first principles of philosophy are obtained by faith, and

not by demonstration. "Ostensum est principii universorum esse eam, quæ fide habetur, scientiam, non autem demonstrationem." (*Stromat.* lib. 2.) He says, besides, that *common sense* should form the basis of all demonstration, and that the human mind, in all its investigations, ought to set out from an immutable principle, which can only be established by faith. "Si ejus quod est certum et extra controversiam referatur fides ad id quod omnes confitentur, illud est constituendum doctrinæ principium.... Si est demonstratio, omnino necesse est prius esse aliquid ex se credibile quod quidem dicitur primum et indemonstrabile. Ad fidem ergo indemonstrabilem reducitur omnis demonstratio." (*Ibid.* lib. 8.)

In opposition to the incredulity, that faith is the foundation of all our knowledge and movements, St. Theophilus of Antioch says, "Quid, obsecro, incredulus es? Non animadvertis actiones omnes antecedere *fidem*? Quis, cedo, agricola metere potest, nisi prius semen *credat* sulcis? Quis mare poterit trajicere, nisi prius semetipsum *credat* navi et gubernatori? Quis, morbis implicitus, sanitatem recuperare poterit, nisi semetipsum prius *credat* medico? Quam artem, quam scientiam quis discere poterit, nisi prius semetipsum tradiderit et *crediderit* præceptori? Si igitur agricola credit telluri, navigaturus navi, infirmus medico, tune refugis temetipsum credere Deo, a quo tot fidei arrhabones accepisti."

Tertullian calls philosophers the *patriarchs* of heretics.

Origen proclaims that all human things depend upon faith. Quomodo Deo credere non sit rationi consentaneum magis, cùm a fide *omnia humana* pendeant? (*Cont. Celsus*, lib. 1.)

Arnobius says, in his work against the Gentiles, that we can explain nothing without faith, which is the foundation of the social and scientific order of things. "Itaque cùm nobis intenditis aversionem a religione priorum, causam convenit ut inspiciatis, non factum; nec quid reliquerimus opponere, sed secuti quid simus potissimum, contueri. Nam si mutare sententiam culpa est ulla vel crimen, et a veteribus institutis in alias res novas voluntatesque migrare, criminatio ista et vos spectat, qui toties vitam consuetudinemque mutastis; qui in mores alios atque alios ritus, priorum condemnatione transistis."

St. Augustine wrote a book on the *utility*, or necessity, of faith. He urges that every one ought to commence by faith; for without it there can be no solid foundation for rational religion. He says that the medicine of the soul consists of two ingredients, *authority* and *reason*. Authority acts by faith, and prepares the way for reason, and by this means intellectual knowledge is created. [See *De utilit. credendi*, &c.]

In the works of Theoderet there are long and numerous passages to be found, in favour of the same doctrine.

Vincent of Lerins maintains that faith is in strict conformity with human nature. Faith is the basis upon which the natural order of things rests.

It guides us in all our actions ; is common to all men ; and it may safely be concluded, from these facts, that if it be necessary in matters of human knowledge, how much more necessary must it be in matters appertaining to heavenly things.

Lactantius establishes the necessity of attending to traditionary and revealed knowledge, as helps to reason and judgment. (*See Dicin. Inst.* lib. 1. 3. 7.)

St. Hilary says, "Non est de Deo humanis judiciis sentiendum ; a Deo *discendum* est, quod de Deo intelligendum sit ; quia non nisi autore cognoscitur." (*De Trin.* lib. 5.)

We have the principle of authority still more minutely and forcibly stated by St. Peter the Anchorite, who lived about the middle of the fifth century. This pious recluse states his case in the following manner.—

"To the ears of the enemies of our holy faith, and to those latitudinarian people who never care much about any thing serious, the authority of the Church is a matter of ridicule and mockery. But not so to the humble and intelligent Christian. It is his constant theme of exultation, the foundation of all his hopes, and the never-failing stimulant to all his exertions. Without authority, human and Divine, such a thing as a Church could not exist, any more than the human body could exist without a soul."

"But men even of intelligence and piety greatly perplex themselves and others, with abstruse speculations upon the nature of ecclesiastical authority, and from whom it derives its life and power ;

whereas the matter appears somewhat plain to me. It is quite obvious that the spiritual authority of the Church, (for I am only considering it in this light) must be involved in every revelation from heaven. This revelation must be simply the declarations or commands of the Deity to men. Authority is here implied in the very act of revelation, and arises from the relative situation of the lawgiver, and those who receive his commands or precepts. To argue, therefore, that church authority has no foundation, is in fact to argue that there was no revelation at all. And it has often appeared to me that this is the only consistent result to which a man can arrive, if he doubt at all the obligations and injunctions of ecclesiastical authority. No communication from heaven, no matter for what end, could ever be of benefit to any save those who immediately heard it, if the principle of authority be once shaken or denied. For in order to transmit the revelation from those to whom it was immediately given, to the next generation, reliance, the most perfect and unconditional, must be placed upon the words and declarations of men; otherwise the thing revealed is at an end. There is no channel for its perpetuity to succeeding races of men. Authority, which is simply faith in the declarations of a particular set of men relative to a particular matter, is the very essence of all revealed truth, and the vital principle by which alone its life can be preserved."

"Now if this be the nature of church authority, when considered in relation to those who imme-

diately receive a Divine communication, it must still retain all its leading attributes, when descending the stream of time, among succeeding ages of men. The perfect unity of its nature can never be destroyed. There is the same obligation for us to be guided by the authority of St. Athanasius or St. Augustine, as lay upon them to respect the authority of the Church under St. Justin or Irenæus; and the latter to respect the authority of the Apostles and their immediate successors. All is suspended as it were by a chain, the first link of which is fixed in the heavens, and the last touches the earth. But I think I hear a question put to me, 'Pray do you say that every thing which a number of the clergy affirm is to be the unerring rule of my faith and conduct? Is my judgment or reason to have no part in the matter?' Now I would answer to this very natural and pertinent question, that you are under no obligation to attend to what they command, if they tender you no proofs of their authority. But then the clergy of the Church always carry the instruments of their power with them; that is, the word of God, of which they are the expounders and interpreters. This word, as they now give it to you, they received from their immediate predecessors, who again received it from theirs; and so on, till they came to the Apostles and Prophets themselves, who were the recipients of the direct will of God."

"I can conceive it consistent for a man who impiously denies the existence of a divine revelation, to deny also religious authority; but for any one

to pretend to believe the divine origin of the Scriptures, and yet deny the authority and power of the Church in matters of religious opinion and belief, is to me one of the most contradictory things imaginable. Indeed, it seems to me unreasonable for men to object to Church authority, inasmuch as the same thing is to be found in ordinary life. What is called public opinion, the general voice of the world, common sense, and such like things, are nothing but modes of expression to indicate human authority displaying itself in matters of general and universal interest. Much of the everyday knowledge of the world, which we have all more or less to be acquainted with, and to put in practice, is derived from sheer acts of human authority. Men are guided in their conduct by it, and pay a hallowed reverence to its injunctions. If this were not the case, the world would be in a most lamentable condition. The analogy is complete between human authority in worldly affairs, and religious authority in matters of theology. In the concerns of life there are certain latitudes allowed for a difference of opinion and conduct; but essential and vital principles are of universal application, and objects of universal belief. So in matters of theology, a certain sphere is permitted for non-essentials; but general and vital doctrines are of paramount obligation and necessity for man's salvation."*

* *Dies y siete Coloquios y Discursos varios*, Salamanca, 1593. Vol. 1 pp. 310. 316. *Flos Sanctorum*, Madrid, 1710. 2 vols. *Origen de los Frailes Ermitanos*, Barcelo. 1628.

Every one acquainted with the philosophical doctrines zealously promulgated both on the continent of Europe and in Great Britain within the last century, will readily recognise, in these statements, the outlines or germs of some favourite theories of metaphysical theology. These will be more fully developed in another part of this Work.

CHAPTER XXX.

ON MORAL EVIDENCE, AFTER THE FULL ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIANITY.

THERE was no department of human knowledge which received such a marked accession of improvement, after the introduction and establishment of the Christian dispensation, as the principles, rules, and maxims appertaining to moral evidence. Here, in a comparatively short space of time, great alterations were effected; general principles of evidence were more firmly grounded in the minds of men; their various applications and modifications were more clearly defined; and the whole framework of reasoning, on subjects connected with human nature, was more widely and securely extended over its former foundation. All this had a weighty influence over the moral, religious, intellectual, and social condition of mankind.

The introduction of Christianity threw an important element into the arena of human disputation. Here a great number of new principles were announced; new doctrines unfolded; novel motives

to human action enforced ; a fresh catalogue of future rewards and punishments published ; an immense variety of miracles, facts, supernatural appearances, historical declarations, personal narratives, deeds, exploits, sayings, and observations, were made known ; and more full and conclusive illustrations of all those elementary and abstract principles of theology, morals, and civil institutions, which the pure light of nature had previously suggested to men's minds, were furnished to the thinking part of mankind. This immense augmentation of materials for reasoning overwhelmed the narrow framework which heathen philosophy and logic had erected, and compelled the application of a more comprehensive and accurate instrument for the investigation and establishment of truth, than had hitherto been employed.

It is quite obvious to ordinary readers, that the modes of reasoning generally prevalent amongst the heathen sages, were marred and disfigured by a perpetual inclination for sophistical wrangling and ingenious trifling. These were their great logical besetting sins. When, therefore, Christianity took a firm hold of men's minds, these imperfections were gradually removed. Men disputed and argued under the influence of more powerful and lofty motives than hitherto. Truth was not *now* a mere toy or plaything, but a matter of deep and universal concern ; and on this account it was to be enforced and promulgated with becoming seriousness, and under the most weighty and binding obligations. Hence it is, that we perceive the great

change which men's minds underwent by reason of the Christian faith, and how firmly and judiciously were important bulwarks erected, to preserve men from falling again into the sea of universal scepticism and doubt.

It is a difficult matter to give a full and precise definition of what is meant by *moral evidence*. It is not confined to matters of mere morals, but embraces a wider range, and is commonly understood to comprehend all those topics connected with the nature of man as a moral, an intellectual, a religious, and a sociable being. It is in this acceptation that we employ the term *moral evidence*. It must be obvious, that the principles connected with subjects so important and varied must be very numerous, and would require, for their full development, a space far beyond what can be allotted. Our remarks must, therefore, be of a very general nature; but, it is confidently hoped, they will not be altogether unsuitable or unprofitable.

The first principle which was firmly established, relative to the nature of moral proof, at the period of the establishment of Christianity, was the defining of the nature of moral evidence from other kinds and descriptions of evidence. This was a most important matter; not only to the moral, intellectual, and social interests of mankind, but also to their religious welfare and interests. This distinction lay at the foundation of all theological discussions, and proved of incalculable value to the Ancient Fathers in their disputes with the heathen philosophers, and in their systematic expositions of

Gospel truth. It was clearly pointed out that moral evidence differed essentially from demonstrative evidence. That no facts or arguments grounded on human nature, stood in the same relation to abstract truth, as arithmetical numbers or mathematical forms.

Moral evidence, at this period, was considered to consist of two leading parts or divisions; namely, *observation* or *experience*, and *testimony*.

Experience was considered as particular and general; particular when applied to a man's own observation, and general when derived from the common observation of mankind. These two kinds are mixed and blended together in a variety of proportions; and this amalgamation gives rise to a vast portion of our knowledge, and to the diversified means of applying it to our circumstances in life.

Testimony was considered of two kinds, divine and human. Divine testimony was looked upon as the highest degree of moral evidence; for nothing could be considered as untrue, if revealed from God himself. This was, in all its leading features, a new species of evidence, arising out of revealed religion, of which mankind had no conception till the introduction of the Christian system.

Human testimony is of various kinds; single and compound, direct and indirect, written and unwritten. But all human testimony must be modified by experience; and it is only when taken in conjunction with it, that this species of evidence can lead us to safe conclusions.

• This mixture of experience with testimony gives

rise to a multitude of rules respecting the evidence of things in general. The nature of the matters submitted to our judgment ; the character and number of the observers ; what were their opportunities for careful observations ; are all important elements arising out of this combination.

Besides these there is analogy, which is often mistaken for experience. It is an important branch of moral evidence. In addition, we have the *presumptive*, or *internal evidence* of things, which forms a considerable portion of what goes under the denomination of moral evidence.

Certain rules of application arise out of these general principles. These are very numerous, and of infinite utility for the advancement of truth. There is, 1st. The necessary personal qualifications to discuss any particular question. A man may be wholly incapable of discussing a question, from ignorance, the force of prejudice, interested views, and many other causes. 2nd. We must be guided in all our inquiries by strict rules of evidence ; these must not, on any account, be lost sight of. 3rd. We should in all discussions endeavour to look out for, and make our observations and illustrations subservient to, some general principle, on which the whole question may rest. This is of singular importance ; as it strengthens the mind, and gives it a just confidence in its own movements.

These were some of the leading principles respecting moral evidence, which are conspicuously illustrated by the writings of the learned, after the introduction of Christianity. From its first an-

nouncement, till its firm establishment in all the seats of learning and science, we find a gradual progress was made towards rational and enlightened principles of discussion. The peculiar nature of the Gospel aided this; because it contained every variety of fact and doctrine which were calculated to excite profound and interesting disputes amongst the learned men of the day, whether Christian or heathen.

CHAPTER XXXI.

ON THE OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS OF THE
CHURCH, ON THE LIBERTY AND NECESSITY OF
HUMAN ACTIONS.

THE doctrine of the necessity or liberty of the human will, decidedly belongs to the science of metaphysics. It is not only a very curious and interesting question, when considered in reference to the variety and forcible nature of opposing arguments involved in it; but it is also of the highest importance to our welfare as moral and religious agents. It cannot therefore be considered out of place, in a history of this kind, to give a succinct outline of the sentiments of the Philosophical Fathers of the Church, on this interesting topic; a topic which it requires no keen prophetic powers to divine, will ever remain a standing subject of discussion amongst mankind. As the question is so intimately blended with theological and moral doctrines and principles of the utmost moment, it cannot but prove of use to students of theology and the kindred science of morals, as well as to the general reader, to have an epitome of the opinions of the

early sages of the Christian dispensation, on a doctrine of such importance and interest.

It is a common, but a very superficial notion, that the doctrines of free-will and necessary connexion, are purely speculative crotchets, and have little or no legitimate bearing, either directly or indirectly, upon any portion of really useful human knowledge. Now, it so happens, that these doctrines are vitally interwoven with all natural and revealed religion; and there has not been a single controversy about the principles of either, or their application to human conduct, that has not arisen directly out of these philosophical doctrines. And a moment's consideration must prove sufficient to convince us that this could not be otherwise. Religion is a system of duties and obligations, and of rewards and punishments. This must of course relate to a code of laws, and to beings who have to attend to it, and to reap the fruits of their observance or neglect of it. Here the elements of *power* in the lawgiver to enact and enforce, and in the agent to obey, are at once appealed to, and our constitutional notions of the nature and limits of both, become the subject of eager discussion and intense interest. This is the prolific germ of all the different systems and views of religious truth; and a firm foundation is here laid, as long as the human mind is constituted as it now is, for an extensively varied outline of religious doctrine and belief.

It would necessarily lead us too much into detail, were we to illustrate this position by a reference to all the religious controversies for the last eighteen

hundred years. The bare enumeration of them would be scarcely possible within the limits of an ordinary volume. But we may be allowed to glance at some of the more prominent ones, with which every theological student is supposed to be familiarly acquainted.

On the very first introduction of Christianity, we find that the doctrines of *grace*, *original sin*, and *predestination*, were eager topics of discussion in the religious community. Dr. Priestley, in his "Corruptions of Christianity," boldly affirms that these doctrines were scarcely known until the *fourth* century, but this is evidently a great mistake. Though they might not have at first assumed that precise form and character with which they have, in recent times, been invested, yet the *principle* on which these doctrines rest, as on a common centre, were debated by the early Christians with keen pertinacity. The *Gnostic* heresy, introduced into the Christian church in the first century, did in fact embrace, in point of *principle*, the whole of these doctrines within itself. Here we distinctly find that the *principle of evil* was necessarily confined to, and formed a component part of, all material objects; that the divine influence upon man's life and conduct, was under the direction of this mechanical association; and that all diseases, troubles, wars, devastations, and vices, were necessarily under the control of a certain species of malignant demons or spirits. The doctrines of Simon Magus were essentially the same as those of the Gnostics. He held the *eternity of matter*, and the influence

of the *evil principle* over the minds of men. The systems of philosophical theology advocated by Menander and Cerinthus, who lived a little after Simon Magus, are precisely similar to his in all their leading features. The Gnostic Theory was the parent of this entire and numerous brood of heretical notions.

The famous Pelagian controversy, in the fourth century, related to the powers of the human will. This celebrated dispute branched out into various ramifications, and kept the minds of speculative disputants in full activity for some centuries afterwards. Some took a certain portion of human liberty, and others took a little less, into their respective systems, and this discretionary licence gave rise to numerous distinctions, which the lapse of ages has buried in forgetfulness.

Then follow the fierce and long continued contests of the Schoolmen. Here we find the doctrines of liberty and necessity fully entered into and discussed in all their bearings and dependences. The learning and genius employed on this occasion, have been the theme of admiration of all the speculative theologians of modern times.

The Protestant Reformation brought the doctrines of free-will and necessity again into the field of controversy, with all the stirring interest which belonged to this singular and important event. The Roman Catholic notions of human merit, and the discipline of the Church founded upon them, were the especial topics of opposition by all the leading Reformers ; and this circumstance naturally

led them to advance principles of an opposite complexion. Religious controversies of a very extended nature were the fruits of this conflict.

The writings of Luther, Calvin, Erasmus, Zuñglius, Melancthon, and others, as well as the proceedings of the Council of Trent, go to prove the deep interest involved, at the time of the Reformation, in the doctrines of free-will and fate, and the intimate relationship conceived to exist between these doctrines and the principles of natural and revealed religion.

From the period of the Reformation to the present hour, theological controversies have run in the same channel. There may have been a change of names amongst them, and subtle and refined distinctions made in modern times; but the essentials of discussion are precisely similar to those which have gone the round of the Christian world for the last eighteen hundred years. The doctrines of justification, redemption, faith, election, the influence of the Holy Spirit, &c. &c. are to be received on the authority of Holy Scripture. A spirit of true philosophy should lead us at once to embrace whatever the Sacred Record teaches; while the disputes which have ever agitated mankind upon these subjects are obviously grounded, to a very great extent, upon peculiar and partial views of the doctrine of human freedom and necessary connexion: and owe their very existence to the deep-rooted hold these philosophical speculations have on the primary elements of the human mind.

We shall now give a short account of the opinions

of the Christian Fathers of the Church as to their conceptions of free-will. These quotations will clearly show that there was but one opinion amongst them as to the intimate connexion which exists between this doctrine, and man's moral and religious obligations to obey the divine commands.

IGNATIUS.—"I do not speak of two natures of men, but that the one man is sometimes of God, sometimes of the devil. If any one be pious, he is a man of God; but if any one be impious, he is a man of the devil, being made so, not by nature, but by his own will."

JUSTIN MARTYR.—"God foreknows some who would be saved by repentance, and some, perhaps, who are not yet born. But lest any one should imagine that I am asserting that things happen according to the necessity of fate, because I have said that things are foreknown, I proceed to refute that opinion also. That punishments and chastisements and good rewards are given according to the worth of the actions of every one, having learned it from the prophets, we declare it to be true; since if it were not so, but all things happen according to fate, nothing would be in our own power; for if it were decreed by fate that one should be good and another bad, no praise would be due to the former, or blame to the latter. And again, if mankind had not the power, by free-will, to avoid what is disgraceful, and to choose what is good, they would not be responsible for their actions. But that man

does what is right, and what is wrong, by his own free choice, we thus prove : we see the same person passing from one thing to that which is contrary to it ; but if it were fated that we should be either bad or good, he would not be capable of doing contrary things, or so often change ; but neither would some be good and others bad, since we should so declare fate to be the cause of bad things, and to act contrary to itself. Or that which was before mentioned would appear to be true, that neither virtue nor vice is in reality anything, but is only imagined to be good or bad ; which in truth is the highest impiety and injustice. But we say that there is this immutable fate, namely, to those who choose what is good, a worthy reward ; to those who choose the contrary, a worthy punishment. For God has not created man like other things, as trees and four-footed beasts, incapable of acting by choice ; for then he could not desire reward or praise, not having chosen good of himself, but being made so ; nor if he were bad, would he deserve punishment, not being such of himself, but unable to be anything except that which he was made."

TATIAN.—"The Word, before the formation of men, created angels. But each species of these created beings was endowed with power over themselves, not having natural goodness except only from God, being perfected by men through the freedom of choice ; that he who is wicked may be justly punished, being made wicked by himself ;

and that he who is just may deservedly be praised on account of his good actions, not having, through his power over himself, transgressed the will of God. Such is the nature of angels and men. But the power of the Word having in itself the foreknowledge of what would happen, not according to fate, but by the determination of free agents, foretold future events, and guarded against wickedness by prohibitions, and commended those who should persevere in goodness.

“Free-will destroyed us. Being free we became slaves; we were sold because of sin. No evil proceeds from God. We have produced wickedness, but those who have produced it have it in their power again to renounce it.”

IRENÆUS.—“John the Baptist, speaking of Christ, says, ‘He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire: whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.’ He therefore who made the wheat, and who made the chaff, are not different persons, but one and the same person, judging, that is, separating them. But the corn and chaff being inanimate and irrational, are made such by nature. But man, being endowed with reason, and in this respect like to God, being made free in his will, and having power over himself, is himself the cause that sometimes he becomes wheat and sometimes chaff. Wherefore he will also be justly con-

demned ; because being made rational, he lost true reason, and living irrationally, he opposed the justice of God, delivering himself up to every earthly spirit, and serving all lusts."

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.—"Neither praise, nor dispraise, nor honours, nor punishments, would be just, if the soul had not the power of desiring and rejecting, and if vice were involuntary.

"As, therefore, he is to be commended who uses his power in leading a virtuous life, so much more is he to be venerated and adored who has given us this free and sovereign power, and has permitted us to live, not having allowed what we choose or what we avoid to be subject to a slavish necessity.

"That thing is in our own power, of which we are equally masters, as of its opposite ; as, to philosophize or not ; to believe or not.

"'For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith.' The Apostle therefore seems to announce two faiths, or rather one which admits of increase and perfection ; for a common faith is laid as a foundation.

"Since some are without faith and others contentious, all do not obtain the perfection of good. Nor is it possible to obtain it without our own exertion. The whole, however, does not depend upon our own will, for instance our future destiny ; 'for we are saved by grace,' not indeed without good works. But those who are naturally disposed to good, must apply some attention to it.

"Faith, although it be a voluntary consent of

the soul, is, however, the worker of good things, and the foundation of a right conduct.

“His will is, that we should be saved by ourselves. This then is the nature of the soul, to move by itself. Then we who are rational, philosophy itself being rational, have some relation to it. Fitness, indeed, is a tendency to virtue, but it is not virtue. All men then, as I said, are qualified by nature for the acquisition of virtue. But one man makes a greater progress, another less, both in knowledge and practice. Therefore some men have attained even to perfect virtue, but others have gone only a certain length; and again others, being neglected, though they had otherwise a good natural disposition, have turned in an opposite direction.

“Wherefore, when we hear ‘Thy faith hath made thee whole,’ we do not understand him to say that men will be saved, however they have believed, unless good works also shall follow.”

TERTULLIAN.—“Every one has a right belonging to man, and a natural power, to worship that which he shall think right; nor is any one injured or benefited by the religion of another. Nor is it any part of religion to force religion, which ought to be taken up spontaneously, not by force.

“I find that man was formed by God with free-will, and with power over himself, observing in him no image or likeness to God more than in this respect; for he was not formed after God, who is uniform, in face and bodily lines, which are so va-

rious in mankind ; but in that substance which he derived from God himself, that is, the soul, answering to the form of God ; and he was stamped with freedom and power of his will. The law also itself, which was then imposed by God, confirmed this condition of man. For a law would not have been imposed on a person who had not in his power the obedience due to the law ; nor again would transgression have been threatened with death, if the contempt also of the law were not placed to the account of man's free-will. The same thing also you may find in the subsequent laws of the Creator, when he sets before men good and evil, life and death, and likewise the whole order of discipline, arranged by precepts ; God dissuading, and threatening, and exhorting, and man being free and at liberty to obey or to despise. For it was necessary that the image and likeness of God should be formed with a free will in his own power, in which this very thing, namely, freedom of will and power, might be considered as the image and likeness of God. He who should be found to be good or bad by necessity, and not voluntarily, could not with justice receive the retribution of either good or evil.

“Therefore, though we have learnt from the commands of God both what he wills and what he forbids, yet we have a will and power to choose either, as it is written, ‘Behold I have set before you good and evil ; for you have tasted of the tree of knowledge.’ Therefore that which is subject to our own will, we ought not to refer to the will of God ; he who wills no evil, wills that we should

have a will. Thus it is our own will, when we will evil, contrary to the will of God, who wills that which is good. Moreover, if you ask whence that will comes by which we will anything contrary to the will of God, I will tell you ; it comes from ourselves. And not without reason ; for you must resemble the origin from which you sprang, since Adam, the author both of our race and of sin, willed that in which he sinned. For the devil did not communicate to him the will to sin, but supplied matter for the will. But the will of God directed him to obedience. Wherefore if you do not obey God, who having given you a command, has formed you with a free power, you will voluntarily fall, by the freedom of your will, into that which God does not will. And thus you think that you are destroyed by the devil, who although he wills you to will that which God does not will, yet he does not cause you to will : because neither did he compel our first parents to the will of sin ; nor were they unwilling, nor ignorant of what God forbade ; for he forbade it to be done when he made death the consequence of doing it. Therefore the only work of the devil is, to tempt that which is in you, whether you will. But when you have willed, it follows that he turns it to his own purpose (*sibi subjungit*,) not having caused the will in you, but having taken an opportunity to work upon your will. Therefore, since the will is in ourselves only, and by it our disposition towards God is proved, I say that we must deeply and earnestly consider the will of God."

ORIGEN.—“Moreover, because the soul, having substance and life in itself, when it departs out of this world, will be disposed of according to its merits, either enjoying the inheritance of eternal life and bliss, if its conduct shall have procured this for it, or suffering eternal fire and punishment, if the guilt of its sins shall have thrust it into that condition; and because there will be a time of the resurrection of the dead, when this body, ‘which is sown in corruption, will be raised in incorruption; and that which is sown in dishonour will be raised in glory;’ this also is settled in the doctrine of the Church, that every rational soul has free-will, and that it has to contend against the devil and his angels, and the powers which oppose it, because they strive to burden it with sins: but we, if we live rightly and prudently, endeavour to rescue ourselves from this kind of burden. Whence, consequently, we may understand that we are not subject to necessity, so as to be compelled by all means to do either bad or good things, although it be against our will. For if we be masters of our will, some powers, perhaps, may urge us to sin, and others assist us to safety; yet we are not compelled by necessity to act either rightly or wrongly.

“I assert that man is endowed with free-will, declaring that this is the greatest gift conferred upon him by God, because all other things are by necessity obedient to the command of God. For if you speak of the heaven, it stands bearing the Lord,

not moved from its appointed place. And if you choose to speak of the sun, it performs its appointed motion, not refusing its course, but by necessity serving the Lord. And in like manner you see the earth fixed, and bearing the command of him who ordered. In like manner other things by necessity serve the Creator, not any one of them being able to do any other thing than that for which it was made. Wherefore we do not praise these things which are thus obedient to the Lord; nor is any hope of better things laid up for them, because they have voluntarily observed what they are commanded. But it is the will of God that man should obey the understanding, and he has received power to subject himself, not being governed by the necessity of nature, or destitute of power; which I say is being endowed with free-will, for the sake of better things, that he may receive better things from Him who is more excellent (which is the consequence of obedience), and moreover, as it were, a debt from the Creator. For I do not say that man was thus made to his injury, but for the sake of better things. For if he had been made like one of the elements, or any thing of that kind, there would have been a necessity that he should serve God; he would no longer receive a suitable reward of his choice, but man would be as an instrument of his Creator, and he who uses it would be the cause of these things. But neither would man have arrived at superior knowledge, knowing nothing else but that only for which he was formed. I say therefore that God

has thus honoured man ; it being his will that he should know better things, he has given him the power to be able to do what he chooses."

CYPRIAN.—"That a man has free-will to believe or not to believe, we read in Deuteronomy, 'I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing ; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live!' Also in Isaiah, 'If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land ; but if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.' Also in St. Luke's Gospel, 'The kingdom of God is within you.'"

EUSEBIUS.—"So that it must be altogether acknowledged that we have liberty, and the free-will of a rational and intelligent nature.

"The Creator of all things has impressed a natural law upon the soul of every man, as an assistant and ally in his conduct, pointing out to him the right way by this law ; but, by the free liberty with which he is endowed, making the choice of what is best worthy of praise and acceptance, and of greater rewards, on account of his good conduct, because he has acted rightly, not by force, but from his own free-will, when he had it in his power to act otherwise. As again, making him who chooses what is worst, deserving of blame and punishment, as having by his own motion neglected the natural law, and becoming the origin and foundation of wickedness, and misusing himself, not from any

extraneous necessity, but from free-will and judgment. The fault is in him who chooses, not in God. For God has not made nature, or the substance of the soul, bad; for he who is good can make nothing but what is good. Every thing is good which is according to nature. Every rational soul has naturally a good free-will formed for the choice of what is good. But when a man acts wrongly, nature is not to be blamed; for what is wrong takes place not according to nature, but contrary to nature; it being the work of choice and not of nature. For when a person who had the power of choosing what is good, did not choose it, but voluntarily turned away from what was worst, what room for escape could be left to him who is become the cause of his own internal disease, having neglected the innate law, as it were his Saviour and physician?"

ATHANASIUS.—“For the knowledge and accurate comprehension of the way of truth, we have need of nothing but ourselves. Not, as God is above all things, so is the way which leads to these things, remote or extraneous to ourselves; but it is in ourselves, and it is possible to find its beginning of ourselves.”

CYRIL OF JERUSALEM.—“God requires nothing else of us but a good will. Do you say, How are my sins blotted out? I say to you, by willing, by believing. What can be more concise than this? But if your lips declare a willingness,

and your heart does not, he who judges knows the heart. From this day, therefore, cease from every evil work. Let not your tongue utter irreverent words; let not your eyes sin; let not your thoughts wander about vain things."

HILARY.—"What, therefore, we are, is rather our own gain than His who formed us what we are; because God, not grudging his own eternal goodness, takes us into the perception and use of his own blessed goodness. But he who is perfect and good used his goodness towards us, and his blessedness, not without reason and method. For he permitted to every one of us the liberty of life and sense, not fixing necessity either way, so that the law should compel every one to be by nature good or bad; but he who had benevolently created us to enjoy his blessedness, appointed us a qualification for it, through the merit of an innocent and honest life. For what honour and reward could the necessity of goodness deserve, when a certain force, interwoven in our nature, would not suffer us to be bad? Goodness, therefore, is permitted to the will; that the will of goodness might obtain to itself a reward; and that there might be a gain and enjoyment of this eternal blessedness from merit, and not an indiscriminate necessity by law. And though he invited us to the will of goodness, that is, to live well and honestly by the hope of deserving and experiencing his goodness, yet he added a punishment for shunning and despising it; so that when he had left us a liberty of

will to deserve goodness, because a necessity of nature did not admit of desert, the terror of punishment threatened on the other hand proved this very liberty. And thus liberty was permitted for the deserving of reward, with a due reward to equity and justice; and the power of liberty is, through the goodness of God, restrained by the fear communicated to us; that the hope of deserving might admonish us to a good will, and the punishment of appointed revenge might dissuade us from a bad will."

EPIPHANIUS.—"How does he seem to retain the freedom of his will in this world? For to believe or not to believe is in our own power. But where it is in our power to believe or not to believe, it is in our power to act rightly or to sin; to do good good or to do evil."

BASIL.—"These things are in our own power, as to subdue the passions, or to indulge in pleasures; as to restrain anger, or to attack him who provokes us; to speak truth or falsehood; to be meek and gentle, or proud and overbearing. Do not then seek the origin of those things, of which you are yourself the master, from any other quarter; but know that that which is in itself evil, derived its origin from voluntary lapses. For if it had been involuntary, and not in our own power, those who act unjustly would not have had so great fear of the laws hanging over them."

"If the origin of vicious and virtuous actions be

not in ourselves, but there is an innate necessity, there is no need of legislators to prescribe what we are to do and what we are to avoid; there is no need of judges to honour virtue and to punish wickedness. For it is not the injustice of the thief or of the murderer, who could not restrain his hand even if he would, because of the insuperable necessity which urges him to the action."

GREGORY NAZIANZEN.—"The good derived from nature has no claim to acceptance; but that which proceeds from free-will is deserving of praise. What merit has fire in burning? For the burning comes from nature. What merit has water in descending? For this it has from the Creator. What merit has snow in being cold? Or the sun in shining? For it shines whether it will or not. Give me a virtuous will. Give me the becoming spiritual, from being carnal; the being raised by reason, from being depressed by the weight of the flesh; the being found heavenly, from having been low-minded; the appearing superior to the flesh, after having been found to the flesh."

GREGORY OF NYSSA.—"Since man was made in the likeness of God, and was blessed in being honoured with free-will, (for to have power over himself, and to be subject to no master, is peculiar to the blessedness of God), to be forcibly impelled to anything by necessity, would have deprived him of his dignity. For if voluntarily, according to the motion of free-will, they directed the human

nature to anything improper, and were driven from it forcibly and by necessity, such a proceeding would have taken away from them the pre-eminent good, and would have deprived them of the honour of being like to God. For the free will is likeness to God. Therefore, that both power might remain to human nature, and that evil might be done away, the wisdom of God devised this mode, to suffer man to pursue those things which he wished ; that having tasted the evils which he desired, and learned by experience what exchange he had made, he might voluntarily return by his own desire to his former blessedness, shaking off from his nature everything which disturbs the passions or is inconsistent with reason, as a burden."

AMBROSE.—"We are not constrained to obedience by a servile necessity, but by free-will, whether we lean to virtue, or are inclined to vice.

"No one is under any obligation to commit a fault, unless he inclines to it from his own will."

JEROME.—"Do not think that there are only good or only bad things in the world, since this world consists of different things, contrary to each other, hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft, dark and light, bad and good. But God has done this, that wisdom may be displayed in choosing good and avoiding evil, and that free-will may be left to man.

"If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land ; but if ye refuse and rebel, ye

shall be devoured with the sword ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.' He preserves free-will, that either way there may be punishment or reward, not from an antecedent decree of God, but according to the merit of every individual.

"He gave them free-will ; he gave them the liberty of their own mind, and that every one might live, not under the absolute command of God, but under his own direction ; that is, not by necessity but by will, that there might be room for virtue, that we might be distinguished from other animals, while, after the example of God, it was permitted us to do what we will. Whence both the judgment against sinners is equitable, and a just reward is given to the holy or just."

AUGUSTINE.—"Free-will is given to the soul, which they who endeavour to weaken by trifling reasoning, are blind to such a degree, that they do not even understand that they saw those vain and sacrilegious things with their own will.

"Every one is author of his own sin. Whence, if you doubt, attend to what is said above, that sins are avenged by the justice of God ; for they would not be justly avenged, unless they were committed with the will.

"Lastly, if we do not act wrongly with the will, no one is to be reprov'd at all, or admonish'd ; and if you take away these things, the Christian law and the whole discipline of religion must necessarily be destroyed. Therefore sin is committed by the will. And because there is no doubt

but sin is committed, I perceive that not even this is to be doubted, that souls have free-will. For God judged that his servants would be better if they served him freely ; which would be impossible if they served him not with the will, but from necessity."

CHRYSOSTOM.—"God, from the first formation of man, implanted in him the law of nature. And what is the law of nature? He framed it for his conscience, and enabled us to know from ourselves the difference between good and evil.

"Since he has made us masters of the choice of bad and good actions, and wishes us to be voluntarily good ; therefore if we be not willing, he does not force, he does not compel ; for to be good by force is not to be good at all.

"When you hear these things, do not imagine that the calling carries with it necessity, for God does not compel, but leaves men masters of their free-will, even after they are called."

THEODORET.—"God created the whole nature of incorporeal things, making it rational and immortal. Free-will is peculiar to what is rational. But of these some have preserved a good disposition towards the Creator, but others have fallen into wickedness. This we may also find among men. For some indeed are lovers of virtue, but others are workers of wickedness. If, therefore, any one complains of the creation of wicked persons, he deprives the champions of virtue of the prizes of victory. For

if they had not the desire of virtue in the choice of the will, but were unalterably fixed by nature, those who successfully struggle for piety would be unknown. But since the will has the choice of what is good, and of the contrary, some justly obtain the crown of victory, and others suffer punishment for their voluntary offences."*

* See the Author's work on "Free Will," second edit., 1848, published by Saunders, Charing Cross; and also the writings of Drs. Copplestone, Hampden, and Whately, who have treated the bearing of the doctrine of Necessity on Theological doctrines, at considerable length.— See also Note G. at the end of the Volume.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL NOTIONS OF THE
ARABIANS.

WE shall now take a retrospective view of the state of metaphysical knowledge amongst the Arabians, soon after the introduction of Christianity. This does not promise to be a very fruitful field of inquiry; but still the subject is well worthy of a particular notice. We shall also allude to the notions of the Jews on mental subjects; at least that portion of this ancient and interesting people, who resided in the East, and mingled with the Arabs and other kindred oriental tribes.

The Arabs, in point of philosophy, must always appear a curiously constituted people. In the early parts of their history, they were the bold, courageous, and fierce conquerors of the East; and it was a considerable time after these successful invasions had been made, that the attention of the people was directed towards the cultivation of letters and philosophy. Wandering in arid deserts, and leading a pastoral life, their minds seem to have been

insensibly trained to severe habits of inward contemplation; and the charms of poetry, and the mental mechanism of numbers, appear to have formed the primitive elements of their early learning. This habit of inward reflexion, however, produced other fruits in the due course of time. It led the Arabs to dwell upon the nature and powers of their own understandings; to scan all the peculiarities of their actions; to watch all their subtile movements; and to pourtray the divers important ends and purposes which the inward machines were so admirably fitted to accomplish. The intellectual history of this people is still buried in comparative obscurity; although there are, in many of the public libraries throughout Europe, an immense number of Arabian manuscripts, which, if brought to the light of day, would undoubtedly tend materially to dissipate the thick clouds which at present envelop the philosophical opinions and acquirements of this singular race of mankind.

All the modes of life and intellectual habits of the Arabs peculiarly fitted them for entering into the subtile questions connected with metaphysical disquisitions. This is strikingly conspicuous in all their writings. They invariably manifested a decided preference for abstract forms of disputation, and rigid rules of investigation. Aristotle, on this account, proved their great master, their guide, the object of their most devoted veneration and attachment. His dry and formal rules accorded admirably with the genius of their minds. Plato, and his commentators and disciples, were never,

consequently, relished, if we except Plotinus and Proclus. The Platonic system abounded too much with imaginative and lively theories and sentiments, and breathed moreover too ardently the spirit of liberty and freedom, to suit the taste of the slavish worshippers of the Koran.

It is remarked by a French writer of great learning and genius, "That there is, between the philosophical productions of the Greeks and Arabs, the same difference, or rather the same contrast, which exists between the literary works, the manners, genius, and civil institutions of the two peoples. The philosophy of the Greeks had in it something brilliant, fascinating, and lively, like the beautiful views in Attica and Asia Minor; that of the Arabs had something grave, monotonous, and arid, like the deserts they inhabit. Full of charms, even in its errors, the former excited an enthusiasm similar to that which inspired it; the latter, dull and malancholy, even whilst they seized hold of truth, breathed the habit of resignation, and the influence of fanaticism. The Greeks displayed an easy elevation and spontaneity of thought, though a certain restlessness of spirit; while the Arabs displayed indomitable patience, and bore upon them the imprint of rigorous formalities. The Athenians prided themselves on harmonious co-ordinations; the inhabitants of the desert on complicated combinations. The genius of poetry seemed to preside in the meditations of the Greeks; the laws of calculation in those of the Arabs. The Greeks imagined, invented, created matter; the Arabs laboured at

what was placed in their hands, and imprinted form upon it. Intellectual light seemed to spring up among the Greeks as by enchantment; among the descendants of Ishmael, it was the fruit of painful conquest.

We shall mention here the three famous Arabian Caliphs who exercised such a marked influence over the intellectual progress of their countrymen; namely, Almanzor, Alraschid, and Almamon. Historians described the first, Almanzor, as having been a very enlightened and intelligent prince. He was passionately fond of learning and philosophy. He studied politics in conjunction with intellectual learning and astronomy; and he translated into the Syriac and Arabic languages several treatises of Grecian literature. Alraschid was equally distinguished for his wisdom and love of knowledge; and in addition to his taste for the abstract doctrines of philosophy, he had a thorough knowledge of poetry and the belles lettres. Almamon, who flourished in the 9th century, was still more renowned than either of his two predecessors. He endeavoured to obtain knowledge from all parts of the then known world. He invited learned men to his Court, without any reference to their religious opinions. He penetrated into all the abstruse doctrines of the Chaldeans, the Persians, and the Greeks. Public schools of philosophy were established, and those of Bagdad and Bassora obtained especial distinction. The doctrines of Aristotle were taught and expounded within the walls of Tunis, Tripoli, and other African cities.

ALKENDI.

Alkendi, who attended the Court of Almamon, was a distinguished philosopher. He inspired the Arabs with an enthusiastic veneration for the doctrines of Aristotle, and furnished them with translations and commentaries upon several of his works. Alkendi published a "*Treatise on the Study of Philosophy*;" containing questions on logic and metaphysics. He also cultivated mathematics and physics with singular success. There is besides a book ascribed to his pen, "*Upon the Compositions of Medicines*."

ALFARABI.

Alfarabi obtained well merited fame at the school of Bagdad. His mind embraced a wide range of study. He was a mathematician, an astronomer, a physician, and a philosopher; and devoted his whole life to study and learning. "He penetrates" says Albufarage, "into the most profound points of logic; but in his endeavours to revive them, he renders them difficult of comprehension. He suggested ingenious but subtle speculations; and completed the investigations of Alkendi upon the arts of analysis and method." Alfarabi added very useful commentaries to Aristotle's art of thinking, and made the Arabs acquainted with his rhetoric.

We must also notice here two tracts of Alfarabi, the first "*Upon the Sciences*" and the second "*Upon*

the Understanding." The first is a sort of dictionary or methodical classification of various branches of knowledge; embracing the leading and fundamental principles of these sciences, and their relative connexion with one another. At the head of all these departments of knowledge, he places divine wisdom, which he divides into three parts, the last of which embraces immaterial objects. "This science," says he, "demonstrates that these objects, in their aggregate number, are gradually elevated to the height of perfection. The ascending scale terminates at the first principle anterior to all things; this is that primordial unity, which confers existence and design upon every thing we see. Truth flows from it as its source."

In Alfarabi's work, "*On the Understanding*," we find, in substance, the following propositions and principles laid down. These form the latent germs of several subsequent abstract systems of mental philosophy, which enjoyed considerable notoriety in the East. This philosopher took Aristotle for his guide. The former maintains that the human understanding is that faculty of the soul by which men acquire the certainty of universal and necessary truths and propositions. These are not, as commonly imagined, obtained by labour or attentive meditation, but arise out of the native resources of his own mind, without his knowing from whence they came, or from what derived. The understanding is, however, itself composed of three distinct powers or faculties; namely, *the understanding of power, the understanding in action, and the active*

understanding. It is by this machinery that all its important functions are performed. The *understanding of power* separates the *forms of substances* from those things in which they reside, and transfers them to itself. These forms are distinguished from corporeal forms in this, that the former is imprinted only upon the surface, but the latter penetrates into the very depth of things. When the understanding has received these *forms*, it then becomes the *understanding in action*, and the forms are *perceived in reality*, and become the forms of the understanding itself. In this new state these *forms* are not what they were when they resided in their substances. There they were bound to certain conditions which are now removed. Here they are considered under new relations, and received into the *understanding in action*; they enter into the universality of existing things, which become the exclusive province of intelligence. When then the soul embraces all intelligent things, by a glance of the *understanding in action* it perceives itself, it perceives its own act, and recognises its own proper essence. It has here acquired nothing *from without*, but only from an inward act of reflexion.

The province of the *active understanding* is, to recognise that which is most perfect in itself. It grasps, in an abstract manner, the forms which belong to substances; not such, however, as resided in them previously to their being detached from these substances, but, penetrating into the nature of all substances, the *active understanding* imprints these forms on itself, such as they really are

in their abstract natures. These forms are indivisible. The *active understanding*, so to speak, *substantializes itself in man*; its essence, action, reality, are identical. There is here no need of the common substances of bodies; no need of assistance from any corporeal organs; no need of either senses or imagination; for its own action embraces all bodies, and the powers which manifest themselves in them are simply the materials upon which the *active understanding* exercises itself.*

AVICENNA.

Avicenna was another most distinguished Arabian metaphysician. A great part of his life was spent in public turmoils and engagements; but still he was enabled to devote a considerable portion of his time to the cultivation of learning and science. He also studied medicine; and gained such celebrity in this important branch of knowledge, as induced some historians to call him the *Hippocrates* of the Arabs.

Avicenna was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, and lost no opportunity of inculcating and expounding his doctrines. Professor Tiedemann makes the following remarks upon him. "We find in the views of Avicenna a remarkable clearness and precision; in all his reasonings a profound acuteness; and in all his thoughts a natural and pleasing connection."

In Avicenna's Treatise on Logic, we find he adopts the principles of Aristotle, but does not fol-

* Alfarabi, *De Scientia*. Paris, 1638. pp. 35. 62.

low him slavishly in every abstract doctrine. The Arabian philosopher maintains that "All knowledge consists in representation and conviction. We may represent things to ourselves very well, without, however, persuading ourselves of their truth. Representation is acquired by definition, or some similar thing; but conviction is derived from reasoning."

Avicenna qualified the doctrine of Aristotle respecting his division of the negative, sensible, and rational soul. The former remarks that those distinctions indicate rather three modes of action, than three distinct things. "The vegetable soul has three faculties; nutrition, augmentation, and generation; the sensitive has two faculties, those of apprehension and motives; the latter excites or produces motion, and creates appetites. The faculty of apprehension is a compound one. It exercises itself both externally and internally. We commonly attach to it five external senses, and five internal ones. The bodily or external senses embrace hearing, seeing, touching, tasting, and smelling; the five internal ones are, first, vision or *fantasy*, the second, imagination, the third, cogitative, the fourth, *estimative*, and the fifth, memory. The rational soul is divided into two grand parts; the one embraces the faculty of knowledge, and the other of activity. These two rule and guide the whole inward man.

Avicenna points out, in few words, the process by which children learn to distinguish one object from another. "The first image," says he, "which is traced in the mind of an infant, is the particular

form of a man or a woman. But it cannot distinguish between the man who is its parent, and him who is not ; nor between its mother and a stranger. Nevertheless it soon learns to recognise this difference, and to make proper distinctions amongst particular objects. For a short time after its birth it has only very confused notions of single objects.”*

ALGAZELI.

Algazeli, in the eleventh century, obtained great honour as a philosopher at Bagdad and Alexandria. He was a person of great penetration and sagacity, and his powers of imagination were far above the common order. He cultivated theology with unremitting ardour ; and his work on the “*Religious Sciences*” enjoyed unrivalled popularity throughout the whole Eastern republic of letters.

In all his disquisitions on mental subjects, he followed a most independent course, and manifested a becoming anxiety to examine everything for himself, and to take nothing on trust. As might naturally be expected, from this turn of mind, and from the nature of philosophy herself in this age and country, he differed in many respects from his contemporaries. He combatted the new Platonists upon the eternity of the world, a universal emanation, absolute identity, perfect unity, the non-existence of matter, and the migration of souls. The general proposition of this school, that “In-

* See *Logique d'Avicène*, translated by Vattier, Paris ; *Metaphys. Trait. 2. chap. 1.* ; and also Note II. at the end of the Volume.

telligence can only know itself," he argued against with great zeal and effect.

On the intricate question of *cause and effect*, Algazeli made some remarkably subtle and curious observations. It is quite evident that the theory of Hume is here anticipated.

On the general nature of the human understanding we find the following is, in substance, an epitome of the system of Algazel. The human soul has two faces, the one by which it directs its attention to the wide region of superior things, there extracts the light of knowledge, and, by virtue of its own distinctive character, receives the emanations from this superior light. The other face is directed towards inferior things, under the government and guidance of proper organs. Sensibility and imagination can only exercise themselves upon material objects; they can seize only individual things; they perceive or conceive them under certain conditions, as time, place, figure, &c. The faculty of estimation depends then upon substances or external things, since it derives from this source the perceptions on which it rests. But we have also another faculty which seizes the essential properties of things, and strips them, as it were, of their particular qualities or accidents. This is summary or general abstraction. This faculty differs from the preceding; it is the understanding; and it gradually elevates and develops itself, in proportion as it is exercised.

The following remarks display the judicious and accurate observer of mental habits and phenomena. "The understanding can perceive itself; it can

perceive its own perception ; it can perceive what it produces ; it can pass from the strong to the weak, from the obscure to the luminous, without any essential change of its nature. It is strengthened, instead of being weakened, by years. The derangement of the organs of sensation may, it is true, act upon the intellectual faculties in two modes ; viz. by causing a distraction of the mind, when accompanied by pain ; and by depriving the mind of the assistance of these organs for the investigation of external objects. But our intellectual power can, by virtue of its own innate energy, emancipate itself from this double dependance."*

AVICEBRON.

This was a very acute and distinguished Arabian philosopher. The only account of his writings is from Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Paris. We gather from these three sources, the following short outline of the leading views entertained by this writer.

He attempted to penetrate into the original cause of all things. He wished to investigate what was the quality of the *first matter*, and the *first form*, which produced all things. The quality of the *first matter* is to receive, to be the subject, to contain *form* in itself, to exist by itself ; that is to say, not to exist in anything else. The nature of the *first form* is to be in another thing, to give *reality* to matter, to determine its power, and to

* Logica et Philos. Cologne. 1506.

form a portion of its essential nature in this compound state. Matter is thus maintained to reside in intellectual things, comprised under quantity, combination, and contrast. The author attempts then to prove that this *first* or *primary* matter is purely spiritual, as it expresses the highest and most refined abstraction, after being stripped of all its variety of particular forms. The Supreme Being is not, however, included in this spiritualised matter, for He is above all forms or qualities.

The *primary form* is *intellectuality*. Intelligence occupies the first rank in the order of beings; it is itself composed of *matter* and *form*; its form, then, presides in all things. The *primary form* imposes limits to the modifications of matter. Intellectuality is such, that it comprehends all things; it is that from which all forms proceed, and from which every thing in heaven or in earth takes its rise.

These two elementary principles being laid down, there is an *agent* to carry them into operation. This is termed the *primary agent*. His act constitutes the *light of intelligence*. It resides in *perfect simplicity* or *absolute unity*. It cannot act *immediately*; because the will is the instrument of action. This will contains within itself the *reason* or *word* for everything which exists. It chooses out of the general treasure those figures or types it wishes to act with. It determines the *first* or *primary matter*; it imprints upon it the first act of intellectual light. This intellectual light is varied according to the variety of figures or types.

- It produces, by degrees, matter, under the relations of quantity, combination, and contrariety. It is

thus that the will always proceeds from unity ; for intellectuality penetrates all things by virtue of its own simplicity. All form is, at the commencement, the author of its own archetype.

AVERROES.

This was, without doubt, one of the most able and subtile of all the Arabian philosophers. He had studied the philosophy of Aristotle with peculiar care and attention, and became enthusiastically enamoured of his doctrines. By unwearied zeal, great learning, intense application, and a profound subtility, he imprinted his mind upon his own age ; and long after his death, retained the distinction of being one of the most able and original commentators on the Aristotelian philosophy.

We find, in his remarks upon Aristotle's metaphysics, that he was an admirer of the doctrine of an intelligent hierarchy and universal emanation. He remarks, " that motion can be imparted only by intelligence ; all motion presupposes a motive which appertains to a spiritual or immaterial being. The celestial spheres have their intelligent attributes, derived from the Supreme Power, the first principle of all things. This motion is communicated successively into all regions ; from the highest degree of creation, even into our own sublunary world, this motion is conducted and transmitted by a succession of intelligent agents."

On the spiritual or immaterial nature of mental perception, this metaphysician entertained some very refined notions. He conceives that our organs of sensation only perceive the sensible qualities of matter, detached from matter itself. This constitutes, in his opinion, the act of perception, a spiritual or immaterial act. Some of these qualities of matter are universal, and some particular and individual. But these two kinds of qualities are not perceived in the same manner. The mind seizes hold of general or universal ideas, without any direct communication, so to speak, with matter itself; there is no intermediate agency requisite to obtain these ideas. On the contrary, to obtain individual or particular qualities, there must be an intermediate agent to communicate with matter, for without this intermediation, the mind would not be able to distinguish these particular, from general or universal, qualities. Nature has provided *forms*, to act as these agents, which hold a middle station between corporeal and material; these *forms* are material relatively to objects, but spiritual relatively to the soul. As interposing instruments they are thus of a mixed character. Now these intermediate agents are the instruments of the senses; those things which perception requires, to detect or seize hold of universal or general qualities. The act of perception is so much the more perfect, in exact proportion as the intermediate agent is refined and subtile. This mental operation may be illustrated, more particularly, by a reference to the senses of sight, hearing, and smelling. The air, by

the aid of light, receives the forms of objects, and bears them to the retina of the eye; from thence they are transmitted to the common *sensorium*, which also receives the forms of the objects. From there these forms are again transported to the imagination, where a new and spiritual character is given to them. Here, then, are three successive orders of these *forms* of external objects: the first is corporeal; the second resides in the organs of sensation; and the third is the faculty of the imagination. The second is spiritual, and the third is still more so; and this is the reason why the imagination has need of the presence of external objects, in order that this form should be presented to itself. This process is what Aristotle wished to illustrate by the mirror with a double face. If the spectator place this mirror opposite to him, he will see, on one of its faces, his own image; and if he place the mirror in such a position that this image it retains may be reflected upon the surface of the water, he will perceive a second image similar to the first. Now in the process of sensation the *form* perceived is like the image of the spectator; the mirror is like the air which transmits the form; the water is the eye or the organs of sense. One of the faces of the mirror is the sensitive faculty; and the other face is the imaginative one. If the spectator turn the mirror and consider only the second face, then the reflected part will not be upon the water, and there will, consequently, be no more than one image. Similar phenomena take place in the process of perception in reference to both hearing

and smelling. But this faculty of perception is not the same in all animals ; man alone is able to seize hold of the proper qualities of objects, with all their shades and degrees, resemblance and contrariety. He can extract the juice from the fruits, whilst the brute creation have to stop and peel off the bark. As a proof of this, man is the only animate creature who can appreciate fully the harmony of sounds in all their multiplied variety.

The way in which we obtain abstract notions, is described by Averroes in this manner. In our common organs of sense reside the images, the character of which is precisely the same here as in sensible objects ; and the relation of these images to the *material understanding* is the same as these sensible objects are to the senses themselves. This may be comprehended more distinctly by saying, that this image is to reason, what the sensible object is to sensation. The soul can then conceive nothing without the assistance of the imagination ; nor the *material understanding*, without the help of sensation. Here we perceive two images associated together, and our intelligent notions become corrupted through the influence of this contagious contact. As to these intelligent notions, they are the qualities of the *forms* of imagination detached from matter ; and must needs have different qualities from the latter.

The *material understanding* is a notion peculiar to this Arabian philosopher. He explains its nature and operation in the following manner. The faculty of imagination retains the forms which have

been made upon it ; these forms are transmitted to the material understanding, there to become the objects of thought. But an agent is requisite to impress them upon the latter, and that agent appertains to the *active understanding*. This *material understanding* conceives abstract notions, so that the abstract understanding makes one with it. To conceive abstract notions or ideas, is no other thing than simply to conceive a thing subsisting by itself.*

THEOPHILUS.

This author was a native of Seville, and a physician and philosopher. His work entitled *Philosophus Autodidactus*, is a very curious one, and has been translated into French, English, German, and Dutch. He obtained great reputation and respect amongst all the leading tribes of the Arabs, and also among the Jews. The learned Leibnitz declared he had perused this publication with delight, and found it abounding with elevated and just conceptions of human nature in general.

This philosopher remarks, that man possesses three relations of similitude or affinity ; namely, one with the animal creation, another with celestial beings, and the third with the necessary and divine Being. To these three orders of relationship appertain three modes of action. The first exercises itself upon our material organs ; the second upon the *vital spirit* ; and the third upon its own essential essence.

The first mode of action is directed towards sen-

* Comment. in Aristot. Metaph. lib. 4. cap. 2. See also Note I. at the end of the Volume.

sible objects. Far from acquiring instruction here, we often meet with great obstacles; for external things are a kind of veil which envelops true science and knowledge. The second only obtains an imperfect intuition, or a confused assemblage of objects; but when directed upon its own essence, it then confers knowledge. By the third action we acquire complete and perfect intuition. Its attention is absorbed in the contemplation of necessary existence. It annihilates itself; it vanishes like a vapour. Its own essence, and all other essences of things, disappear before that one Being, who at once possesses unity, truth, grandeur, sublimity and power.

Celestial bodies have three attributes; one by which they throw light, heat, and rarefaction over inferior substances; the second relates to their own nature, their happiness, holiness, purity, and power of rapid motion; and the third refers to the Supreme Being, whose will they execute, whose power they recognise, and whose presence they perpetually enjoy. Man ought to imitate these three kinds of attributes. To conform himself to the first, he ought to extend a benevolent protection to all animal natures, and to all plants, and endeavour to preserve them in a perfect condition. To bring himself under the influence of the second attribute, he should preserve himself from all impurities; practise ablutions; pay great attention to the proprieties of the body and of dress; and use suitable exercise, and even circular movements, though he should thereby experience giddiness of the head.

In reference to the third attribute, he should

shun all obstacles from sensible objects; shut his eyes and ears; repress all flights of imagination; and reduce all his faculties to a certain state of languor, until he approaches a state of pure intellectuality.

Arrived at this high state of perfection, man will learn that his own essence does not differ from the essence of the Supreme Being; that there is really but one universal essence. The Divine Essence is like the rays of the material sun which expand over opaque bodies, and which appear to proceed from the eye, though they are only reflected from its surface. All beings distinct from mere matter, which possess this knowledge, are identified with the divine essence; for knowledge is nothing but this essence itself. These beings are, therefore, not different, they are only one and the same. Multiplicity, variety, and aggregation appertain only to bodies. The sensible world is only the shadow of the Divine world.

Theophilus further remarks, "In considering the number of his organs, and the variety of their functions, man would appear to be a compound being; but in looking again at the secret tie which unites all these organs, and their principle of action, man shows himself to be truly but an individual being. This unity is derived from the unity of the *vital principle*."

This philosopher led a life of singular abstraction, and enjoyed fits of pure intellectual ecstacy. In one of these he affirms that he saw the supreme and celestial sphere, in which the essence of im-

materiality resided. All joy and beauty dwelt here, and the sight was the most ravishing imaginable. He perceived a spiritual Being, who was neither the first of beings, nor the sphere itself; without, however, its being different from both. It was like the image of the sun produced in a mirror, which is neither the sun itself, nor the mirror.*

. See Geor. Elmacinus, *Historia Saracen.* Lugd. 1625; Asemani, *Historia Arabum.* Rome 1719; Bayle—articles, *Alchabitius*, *Alchindus*, *Averroes*, *Almacin*; Peringer, *Historia Linguae et Erudit. Arabum*, Alpini, 1694; Ludovicus, *De Historia Rationalis Philos. apud Arabos et Turcas*; Nagel, *De Studio Philos. Græcæ inter Arabos*; Fabricius, *Bib. Græc. De Viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabos*; *The Histories of Philosophy* by Brucker, Tiedemann, and Tennemann; Rodriguez de Castro, *Bibl. Espagnole*, book 1st.

* *Theoph. Philosophus Autodidactus*, edition by Pocock.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS.



THE metaphysical notions of the Persian Sophists are but very imperfectly known. They are shrouded and enveloped in a mighty maze of ecstatic rapture and frantic abstraction. Their philosophy is but a jumble of most of the opinions of the Oriental nations, with a few slight peculiarities belonging to the Persian nation.

The Sophists considered the human mind to be under the direct influence of the Divine nature. This influence they designated by the terms *emanation, call, proclamation, attraction, &c.* They declared that the path which conducted to God, was the commencement of that which introduced you to the bosom of the Eternal himself, and which placed you in full possession of the *true spiritual absorption.*

The doctrine of absolute unity, maintained and enforced by the New Platonists, was also a favourite philosophical dogma of the Persian Sophists. They affirmed that every man whose heart

was free from doubt, know, with the most perfect certainty, that there was but one Being in all nature. *I* and the Divinity are the same thing. The Sophists also represented the body as a sort of prison-house for the mind or soul. "Do you wish to enjoy true liberty?" say they, "then disengage yourself from the vain illusions which obstruct you, and take refuge in the Divine essence, where truth exclusively resides." On the doctrine of Divine emanations they remark that "This universe is only a small meandering rivulet from the ocean of Divine Beauty and Perfection." Four species of Divine manifestation are distinguished; namely, first, the contemplative mind sees the *absolute essence*, under the figure or representation of some corporeal being; secondly, he sees this *absolute unity* under one of its attributes of action, as the *giving of what is needful*; the third appears under the form of one of the attributes which constitute its own essence, *as science or life*; and in the fourth, the contemplative spirit loses its consciousness in its existence.

The Sophists enveloped their disquisitions on the mind of man with a crowd of fables and allegories. To assist the flights of contemplative ardour and ecstasy, they recommended the practice of abstinence, watchings, silence, restraint of the appetites; a renouncement, in fact, of all bodily pleasures. They urged that men should bring themselves to a state of apathetic insensibility, in order that they might fully realize the delights of celestial beatitude.

AVENPACE.

Little is now known of the metaphysical speculations of this author. He was a physician, cultivated mathematical learning, and had studied the works of Aristotle with great zeal and attention.

His peculiar ideas on the mind of man are contained in a letter entitled "*The Conjunction of the Understanding with Man.*" In this fragment he supposes that all intelligent things are produced or created; and that everything which is produced of this intellectual nature, is possessed of *an essential character or quality*. The understanding has the power, by virtue of its own peculiar nature, to detach this essential character from things, and make it an object of abstraction. He concludes that the human understanding is a uniform thing in all mankind; and that it is a separate and independent thing from matter in all its forms and modifications. It may be remarked here, that this writer's notions are but very imperfectly expounded, and seem shrouded in a more than usual portion of mysticism.*

* See Malcolm's History of Persia; Journal des Savans, 1821 et 1822; Sufismus, sive Theosophie Persarum Pantheistica. Berlin, 1821; and Note J. at the end of the Volume.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS.

THE origin of those speculative opinions, which sprang from the minds of what are termed the Cabalistic Philosophers, is enveloped in great obscurity. Several learned and lengthened controversies have arisen out of their history, relative to their precise opinions on many important doctrines which they profess to discuss. It seems, however, to be pretty generally considered at the present day, that their speculative views are a compound of theological, philosophical, and mystical opinions; and that a great portion of the attention which this sect excited in their own day, as well as that which they have subsequently obtained from modern historians, arose from the allegorical, mysterious, and symbolical language in which they clothed all their thoughts and principles.

The chief divisions of the Cabalistic doctrines are the following.

Out of nothing, nothing can be produced; because the distance between existence and non-exist-

ence is infinite. Matter, though admitted to be something, is an imperfect thing, and cannot be self-existent. The Creator of all things is a Spirit, eternal, uncreated, and of infinite intelligence, having within itself all life and motion, as attributes of its nature. This Creative Spirit fills all space, and is called EN-SOPH, the Infinite Deity. This spiritual power is the fountain of all created existences, which emanate from it, but are nevertheless united with it. The universe, and everything we behold in it, is an emanation, which displays the attributes and properties of this First Cause to human intelligence.

Anterior to creation, all space was filled with the OR HAEN-SOPH, or Infinite Intellectual Light. When the Divine volition willed the creation of nature, the eternal light hitherto diffused through infinite space, withdrew to an equal distance, in every direction, from a central point, as a sphere of operations where all things were to be created. There are traces left in this vacated space of the existence of the Divine essence, and these traces or detached portions of Infinite Intelligence are to become the seeds of future worlds. From a certain point in the concave surface of the eternal light which envelops the opaque sphere, the creative emanation is first exerted, and the rays of intelligence or mind emerge in straight lines into the abyss of darkness or non-entity. This beam of light effected a communication between creative agency and non-entity, through the means of which future worlds can be produced. Through the

opening caused by this beam of light, various streams of intelligence flow, in divers distances from the centre, and are separated from each other by dark portions of space. There are ten of these circles of light, which are called **SEPHIRÆ** or **SPLENDORS**.

The first emanation from the Living Fountain, is the rectilinal beam, and this is the source of all other emanations, or creative existences. This rectilinal emanation is designated by the name of **ADAM CADMUS**, the first man, the primary effect of Divine power, the **SON OF GOD**. These Sephiræ are fountains from which flow every created thing subordinate to this Adam Cadmus, and are named in the following order: Intelligence, or the Crown, Knowledge, Wisdom, Strength, Beauty, Greatness, Glory, Stability, Victory, Dominion. These must not, however, be considered in the light of mere agents or instruments of the Divine operations, but simply *media* through which creative energy manifests its power. They are not detached portions of the Divine Essence, but purely attributes, virtues, or powers, possessing an individual but dependent existence, through the mediation of Adam Cadmus, the primary emanation.

In the Ensophic world, or world of infinity, there are four inferior worlds or emanations, depending, however, upon the superior one. These have appropriate designations. **AZILUTH**, is the world of emanation which produces the Sephiræ; **BRISH**, embraces certain spiritual natures or forms which derive their essence from the Sephiræ; **JEZIRAH**,

or the world of forms; and **ASIAH**, or the visible and material world, comprehending every thing susceptible of motion, composition, division, or decomposition.

These derivative or secondary worlds may be considered as evolutions or expansions of the Divine nature, and possess more or less splendour, in proportion to their distance from the centre of Eternal Light. The last and most remote emanation is **MATTER**, which is produced by a species of re-action of the divine light, in receding from the fountain, whereby it becomes so attenuated as to be absorbed in darkness, and nothing but an opaque substance is left as a residue. This matter or residue is only one degree removed from non-entity.. It has no separate or independent existence, but is purely a modification of the emanative power of the Eternal Light.

These derivative or secondary worlds have various orders of creative beings. Those in **Aziluth**, are superior to spirits, and are denominated **PERSONS**. The beings of the second world are called **THRONES**, on account of the authority they exercise over other natures of an **ANGELIC** order, which inhabit the third world. The fourth region is that devoted to evil spirits, the refuse of emanation. These are the Authors of evil; but they are always aspiring towards the **Sephiræ**, and will, in the revolution of ages, return once more into the fountain of Eternal Light.

The human soul, which proceeds by emanation, is of the same order as the Eternal Mind. When

united with the body, it forms a complex creation, endowed with reason, and capable of action. This soul consists of four parts, the principle of vitality, the principle of motion, the power of intelligence, and the divine principle by which it can contemplate, and hold intercourse with, the Ensophic world.

All souls were created at once, and existed in the first emanation, Adam Cadmus. Every human soul has two guardian angels, created by emanation at the time of the production of souls. The human mind is connected with the Divine nature, like the radii of a circle with their centre.

The Divine energy upholds all things. When this energy is exerted, new forms of life and being are produced; when it is withheld or lies dormant, the streams of life return again to their proper fountain from whence they came.*

* See Enfield's *His. Philo.* Vol. 2. p. 220; Menasseh Ben Israel, *De Creat.* p. 27; Reimann, *His. Theol. Jud.*; Budd, *Introd. Philos. Heb.*; Burgonovo, *Select. Cabb. Dogm.*; Basnage, *Hist.*; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philos.*; Wolf, *Bibliotheca Hæbr.*; Hottinger, *Biblioth. Orient.*; Morus, *Fundamenta Philos. sive Cabbal.*; Helmont, *Dialogi Cabalistici.*

CHAPTER XXXV.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS.

THE metaphysical opinions of the Jews after their complete dispersion over almost every civilized country in the world, are not of very great importance. The principal service they rendered to mental philosophy, was their diffusing the knowledge of many of the speculative opinions of the Greeks, among those nations they visited for the purposes of mercantile traffic and gain. This tended in many cases to keep alive an interest in those ancient mental theories and systems, even among a class of but comparatively learned people, and very incompetent to appreciate, to the full extent, their nature and worth.

At what precise time the Jews became acquainted with the speculative philosophy of other eastern nations, it is a difficult matter to determine. But certain it is, that there were learned persons among the Jews who obtained considerable notoriety for their knowledge of foreign speculation, and for their amalgamation of it with their own Hebrew notions. Simon Magus, Dositheus, and Menander,

are instances of this. It is commonly affirmed that they were all three well acquainted with Oriental opinions as to the nature of Deity and the human soul; and that they zealously laboured to form something approaching to systematical theories, out of the miscellaneous and scattered fragments of philosophy they had collected together, from divers eastern nations.

It is well known that the Jews were, at a later period of their history, divided into several sects, who grounded their differences in rites and ceremonies upon certain speculative tenets. The chief of these sects were the Sadducees, the Karæites, the Pharisees, and the Essenes. The Sadducees maintained the materiality of the human soul. It died with the body. Neither had angels or spirits any separate existence from the corporeal frames or vestments in which they were enveloped. They believed in the existence of the true God, the supreme and intelligent Governor of the universe. His perpetual and providential care was also a tenet of their creed. The human will was, however, free from any interference or control from this cause; and this was the reason for the obligatory nature of all moral and religious institutions. The homogeneous nature of man was a point they zealously maintained, without any conditions or compromise whatever.*

The speculative tenets of the Karæites were somewhat different from those of the Sadducees. The former affirmed that all created existences derived their

* Josephus. De Bell. J I 2 c. 12.

Through the influence of the Arabians and Christians, the Jews became acquainted with the Greek philosophy, particularly the works of Aristotle. This gave, in some measure, a new impulse and direction to their speculative labours and views. Several learned men sprang up amongst them, who displayed great natural aptness for general philosophical and mental speculations.

EBEN EZRA.

This was a very learned and talented Jew, in Spain, who flourished about the middle of the twelfth century, and who cultivated an acquaintance with many branches of philosophy. He was a native of Toledo, and his contemporaries conferred upon him the name of the "admirable," on account of his varied and profound acquirements. In his writings, he treats of philosophy, astronomy, medicine, poetry, grammar, theology, and the interpretation of the sacred books of the Cabalistic Science.

MOSES MAIMONIDES.

This philosopher was a native of Cordova, in Spain, and had studied all the Grecian metaphysics, with great attention and success. Among his own sect of the Jews, he excited a spirit of opposition ; and a charge was brought against him of having imbibed some of the doctrines and opinions of Islamism. On this account, he fled from Spain to Egypt. He established a philosophical school at

Cairo, where his fame soon procured him a large crowd of students and admirers.

A very just remark was made by this learned man, relative to the study of theology, which has called forth unqualified approbation from sound thinkers of almost every age since his day. "Theology," says he, "ought to be preceded by the study of other philosophical branches of knowledge. God can be known only by his works, and the investigation of the laws of nature is the route which will conduct our reason to Him."

Maimonides was the author of a work on Logic, called *Miloth Higayon*. This treatise was originally written in Arabic, but was afterwards translated into Hebrew, by Moses Eben Tibbon. Maimonides follows Aristotle's method, though he endeavours to make it applicable to his own peculiar theological views.

This learned Jew was also the writer of a work *On Psychology*, in which the various powers and faculties of the mind are examined and commented on. This work presents a curious medley of notions; and is, on the whole, the most unintelligible of all Maimonides' speculations.*

* See Zeltner, Diss. de Beruria, Altdorf, 1714; Rabbi Moses Mikkosi; Zemach David, Hist. Mishn. and the writings of Wolf, Basnage, Rowland, Lightfoot, Hottinger, Buddeus, and Prideaux.

See also "Psychology of Maimonides," Frankfort, 1845.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND, AS RECOGNISED BY PHILOSOPHERS UP TO THE NINTH CENTURY.

AT this point of the history of mental philosophy, we shall make a few remarks upon the different faculties of the mind, which metaphysicians have noticed, and attempted in their writings to define. The number and names of these faculties have occasionally undergone changes, in accordance with divers general theoretical systems; but still we shall be able to give such an outline, as will answer the purpose of fixing the reader's attention upon the more obvious divisions of our intellectual structure.

The operation which has generally been recognised by almost all previous writers, is that of perception. There has been great uniformity in the language employed, to describe the nature and limits of this faculty. There can be no act of perception unless the mind receives an impression from external objects. This seems to have been

unanimously agreed to by all reasoners. This power has sometimes been considered under two aspects; the one *mediate* and the other *immediate*. When, for example, we read a book, the letters are what we perceive *immediately*; while the ideas which are signified by them are what may be considered as perceived *mediately*.

It is clear from the speculations of almost every writer on the mind, up to this stage of history, that perception claimed and obtained priority of consideration before any other mental power. It is also well known, that whatever opinion there might be entertained by different sects of philosophers, as to the evidence which perception affords us to arrive at truth, or to form a decision as to a knowledge of things, there never was any doubt but that it was really and truly through the influence of our organs of perception, that we owed all the information we had of external nature.

The next important faculty of the mind noticed and discussed by the ancient philosophers was that of memory. This fills an important office in their ideas of the mental economy. It consists in retaining those simple and complex ideas or notions, which we receive from sensation and reflexion. Aristotle and others paid great attention to this power. Its mode of operation was well observed by nearly all the ancients; and the various degrees of retention enjoyed among men, were accurately noticed, in the very early periods of intellectual history. Memory was seen under two phases; the one merely keeping the idea for some time before

it, dwelling upon it, and turning it, as it were, over on every side. This was called *contemplation*; and the same term is used now to express this phenomenon of memory. We have again another form of memory, namely, the power of reviving certain past ideas or trains of thought, after they have been for a long period absent from the mind's perception. The Grecian philosophers dwelt often on this exhibition of memory; and seem to have marked the laws of recurrence with great accuracy. They considered memory as a kind of *store-house* or *repository* of ideas or notions. Our language of the present day, is strikingly expressive of the same thing.

What are called the *laws* of memory were accurately and scientifically investigated by the ancient metaphysicians. The modes in which they discussed their philosophical principles led them by a direct route to pay great attention to those laws. *Attention* and *repetition* were found powerful assistants to remembrance. When *attention* becomes interestedly and intensely fixed, retention and accuracy are the necessary results; and *repetition* formed in ancient times, as it does now, an exercise of the highest importance in the divers plans of scientific and ordinary education.

In all the historical epochs of philosophy, we find certain plans and suggestions for aiding and strengthening the power of memory. The everyday practical importance of the faculty, naturally gave rise to these projects for increasing its power and usefulness. Cicero speaks of artificial means

of strengthening the retentive principle, and that he found them of service in his own case, in the delivering of his public orations. Several other distinguished men of antiquity availed themselves of these mechanical aids to remembrance.

Of all the ancients, Aristotle seems to have viewed memory in its widest signification. His rules and definitions of it became quite philosophical canons in succeeding ages; and we find, throughout all the scholastic writings, his notions of this mental power were invariably adopted by the schoolmen of all parties.

The *judgment* was an important intellectual power among the ancient philosophers. They did not define it very accurately; but it seemed to stand for that prompt internal perception of truth, which results from a calm and dispassionate consideration of evidence. Among the sceptical sects of antiquity, we seldom find suspicion thrown upon the judgment itself, but chiefly on the materials which were supposed to be submitted to its notice, through the channel of the external senses. The power itself generally escaped unscathed; and where there was doubt as to the reality of its determinations, that doubt was attributed, by the Sceptics, to deceptive elements thrown in the path of the judgment, to warp or distort its decisions.

Judgment was often denominated a *perceiving* or *discerning* of truth; just as we speak, in ordinary language, of that power at the present time. The various kinds of judgment, or rather, perhaps, the various topics on which it was exercised, were

often subjects of remark and observation among the ancients; and distinctive names or epithets were given to these efforts of the judgment, when directed to particular departments of knowledge.

Abstraction was a power of the mind which the earliest metaphysicians recognised. They considered it much in the same light as we do at present. With them, as with us, it was the withdrawal of an idea or general notion from others with which it might be accidentally or necessarily connected, and considering it apart. The mathematical studies of the ancients were highly instrumental in bringing this faculty of the mind perpetually before them, and of impressing them with a lively conviction of its great usefulness and importance.

Reasoning, in the general opinion of the ancients, was related more intimately to the dialectic art, than to the judgment. *Reasoning* was of a more light and artistic character than the latter. Gravity and circumspection were the characteristics of the judgment. Reasoning, on the contrary, seemed not to have much *necessary* connection with truth, and not by any means to possess a very lively and disinterested affection for her. Mere reasoners were always plentiful, and to be found every where, and ready armed upon all questions; but men of judgment were more rare. Reasoning often coquetted with error, but judgment showed more steadiness and fidelity. The former often brought temporary discredit upon philosophy by attempting to show "the weaker to be the stronger reason;" but the power of the judgment was a prudent and faithful

friend, whose opinion was always valuable, and carried lasting esteem and respect with it.

Imagination was a well known and universally recognised faculty of the mind among the ancients. It stands prominently out from the other faculties, and enjoys a more striking individuality of character. It is the source of many pleasures and pains, and exercises a powerful influence on the weal or woe of mankind. This the olden philosophers were not slow to perceive; but I think we have no very decided evidence to show, that they were so fully sensible of the immense power of this faculty, in contributing to our rational pleasures, as more modern speculators on the mind have proved themselves to be. The cultivation of imaginative excellencies in the last two centuries, has far exceeded anything which the ancients ever performed, or had any conception could be achieved.

But perhaps the most common division of the mental faculties which the ancient metaphysicians made, was that which placed them under two classes,—those of the *understanding*, and those of the *will*. We meet with this classification every way, in the history of philosophy. And we cannot help suspecting that this division must have presented some obvious advantages, or been considered as the most natural arrangement, when we find it so generally adopted. At bottom, the faculties of the *understanding* and the *will* stand for those which we in modern times call the *intellectual* and *active* powers of man. Our mode of treating and illustrating these does not differ from that adopted

by the ancient sages of Greece, nor from that which all the Fathers of the Church recognised.

And it may be observed, in passing, that there is nothing in nature more distinctly marked than the active and contemplative powers of the mind. There is no mistake about their respective modes of action; but there is a great variety of human character resulting from the irregular manner in which they are distributed among mankind. The active and speculative powers are never found in full perfection in any single individual. Indeed this is impossible; for it falls little short of demanding that a man should be moving and still, at one and the same moment. Wherever a mind is naturally inclined to speculation or contemplation, there is a corresponding depression of his active energies; and, on the other hand, where physical and mental activity is the prominent feature, there the speculative powers become correspondingly inert. And this is a wise and providential arrangement. It seems impossible to conceive how the affairs of the world could be carried on, were this not the case. The most profound and the most important speculative principles or systems would be a dead letter, if they were not matured and nourished by the every-day active powers of the mass of mankind. And again, if action were not regulated and guided by contemplative minds, no beneficial end could be attained.

In discussing systems of education, the active and speculative powers of individuals should be carefully studied. The active greatly preponderate

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over the passive or contemplative powers. Still they ought both to be provided for in all comprehensive schemes of instruction, either public or private. If this be neglected, or imperfectly attended to, no happy result can possibly follow.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

GENERAL REMARKS ON FACULTIES OF THE MIND,
AND OF WHAT MAY BE URGED AGAINST THEIR
INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE, NATURE, AND OPERA-
TION.

It must be obvious to every reader of the history of mental philosophy, that there were, in almost every age, a small number of persons who seemed inclined to adopt the *absolute unity, or singleness* of the mind of man. It is difficult to embody the general arguments for this opinion, principally from their extreme subtilty, and the imperfections of language. But the fact is quite clear, that the usual doctrine of separate faculties, was not very cordially embraced by some, at least, of the eminent sages of antiquity.

As this abstract question is interesting to all expounders of metaphysical doctrines, I shall state what I conceive to be the chief arguments against distinct faculties or powers of the mind. This shall be done fully, without confining myself to what may be considered as the exclusive opinions

of the ancients on this point. Allusions to modern writers and modern opinions will be made, in order that the reader may have as full a view of the arguments on each side, as I am able to furnish. I beg to state, however, that I do not wish to have the following observations considered as my own individual sentiments on this subject; but simply as conveying a few thoughts on a mental hypothesis opposite to that which is most commonly adopted by writers on the human mind.

Judging from a cursory glance, there appears to be little foundation for the doctrine of distinct or separate faculties of the mind. Were it composed or made up of parts or principles independent of each other, we should instantly be able to recognise them, and point out their specific differences, as readily as we do between an arm or a leg of our own bodies. When we attend carefully, however, to what passes in our own mind, and bring the matter in dispute to the test of consciousness, we can perceive no real difference between many mental operations which are commonly referred to distinct faculties. Let us take a case for illustration. Almost all metaphysicians agree that judgment and imagination are very different powers from each other. But in what does that difference consist? What is it that constitutes them two distinct faculties? Can their specific differences be clearly pointed out? I think not. When a person proposes, for example, a question to me, that two and three make five, I readily solve it; but I cannot do this without bringing to my recollection

(by an effort similar to that which is called imagination) what the terms two and three stand for. Now what is this effort of the mind which suggests the ideas we have attached to the words *two* and *three*? Is it not the same mental power as that which forms other combinations which are usually referred to imagination? Let any one attend to what passes in his own mind, when he goes over again any simple proposition in geometry without having the diagram before him. He will perceive that he cannot take a single step in the process of demonstration without employing what is termed the faculty of imagination. At first he will form a conception of the diagram; and then commence to show the numerous relations which subsist between the divers parts of it. But the same mental power which is here employed, may also be perceived, when a person desires me to furnish him with an account of an accident which befel a mutual friend in America, or any other distant part of the world. The ideas about which the mind is employed in these two cases are very different; but still that faculty of the mind by which I solve the geometrical problem, and that by which I give an account of the accident which befel my friend, seem, as far as the testimony of consciousness goes, to be one and the same. When the request is made to give a faithful account of the accident in question, I immediately form a conception of my friend's person, similar to what I do of the diagram; and then begin to relate the various and serious circumstances attending the accident, by the

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same mental processes, to all appearance, which were used in solving the proposition in geometry.

Shall we say, then, there is no difference between imagination and judgment; two faculties which have been distinguished by mankind in all ages? The true answer to this question, I apprehend, is, that though mankind have always made such a distinction in our mental nomenclature, yet that distinction arises solely from the circumstance that the ideas the mind is employed about, are (if I may be allowed such phrasology) true in the one case, and false in the other; or in other words, that real and fictitious representations constitute the only difference between these two mental powers. Even philosophers themselves point out no palpable distinction, save what arises from the truth or falsehood of the ideas employed in both cases. A writer, for example, who gives an account of any transaction just as it happened, without adding the slightest colourable circumstance, (if ever such a writer did exist), would be called, in the language of philosophical criticism, a writer without any imagination. Another author, however, who gives a description of the same transaction, but amplifies and distorts every incident which really took place, would be called a man of a fine and lively imagination. But what is the difference between them? Only this, that the one gives, or is supposed to give, a real representation of facts; and the other, a fictitious one, or at least a narrative mixed with a goodly portion of fictitious circumstances.

It appears, then, that the word imagination is employed by mankind to denote what has no foundation in truth; and this is all they mean when they speak about the faculty of imagination. We very frequently find, when we wish to convince individuals of the truth of any proposition in natural or moral philosophy, with which they are previously unacquainted, and which seems contrary to their experience, they will immediately charge you with dealing in fiction, and employing the faculty of imagination instead of that of reasoning. Why ought the exercise of the imagination to be so strictly guarded against in philosophical disquisitions? Why the philosopher will tell you, because it would lead you from the truth.

The word imagination may also be considered, in many cases, as only another word for invention. When a man sits down to write a novel or a play, he must be conscious, if he be capable, or in the habit, of reflecting on what passes in his mind, that he employs no other intellectual faculty than if he were to sit down and write a book on metaphysics, or any other branch of philosophy, in which invention is said chiefly to be employed. By way of illustration: to say that the one author has *invented* a novel or a play, and of the other that he has *imagined* a book on metaphysics, would be a departure from both common and philosophical language, but it would be no very absurd statement of the fact; and the phrase would enable us to form as correct notions respecting the faculty by which the former author composed his novel or play, or the latter

his treatise on the mind, as if we were to use the common phrasology that the novelist had been exercising his imagination, and the metaphysician his invention.

It may be objected to these observations, that imagination, and what in some systems of mental philosophy is called *conception*, are here confounded together. But I would observe, that their difference has not been clearly pointed out, even by those who have so ably and zealously contended they were distinct faculties. Mr. Dugald Stewart, in his chapter on Conception,* says, "The business of conception, according to the account I have given of it, is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word imagination to express this power; and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of the word, if imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It pre-supposes abstraction, to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations. If they are made wholly at random, they are proofs of insanity." A little farther on in the chapter he says, "A talent for lively description,

* Philosophy of the Human Mind. Vol. 1. p. 135.

at least in the case of sensible objects, depends chiefly on the degree in which the describer possesses the power of conception."—"Nor is it merely to the accuracy of our descriptions that this power is subservient; it contributes more than any thing else to render them striking and expressive to others, by guiding us to a *selection* of such circumstances as are most prominent and characteristic; insomuch that I think it may reasonably be doubted if a person would not write a happier description of an object from the conception, than from the actual perception of it. It has been remarked, that the perfection of description does not consist in a minute specification of circumstances, but in a *judicious selection* of them; and that the best rule for making the selection is, to attend to the particulars that make the deepest impression on our own minds."

Conception, according to the above, is that faculty which presents us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived; and the power of modifying our conceptions is called imagination, which is not a simple faculty, for it pre-supposes abstraction, judgment, and taste. Now, if a talent for lively description arises from possessing the power of conception in a high degree, and this power is said to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived, how can we consistently say that, in exercising this faculty, we make a "*judicious selection*" of our feelings? Does not a "*judicious selection*" pre-suppose the exercise of abstraction, judgment, and taste? Surely.

Then wherein does the difference lie between imagination and conception?

It is said that these faculties of the mind, such as judgment, imagination, memory, and taste, never exert their power separately, but are always more or less combined with one another. There is no reasoning without memory; and there can be no taste without imagination, judgment, and memory. If this be the case, how can we ascertain the existence of any mental faculties at all? If these faculties are never perceived in a simple form, we can never be certain that there are any independent faculties whatever. What should we think of a chemist who should strenuously maintain that a certain substance was composed of a number of other substances, which he might call primary ones, when the substance in question had resisted all the chemical processes hitherto known to decompose it?

Mr. Locke appears to have been fully aware of the impropriety of talking about the faculties of the mind, and of the difficulty of proving their existence. In one place he says,* “But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents; for it being asked, what it was that digested the meat on our stomachs, it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say, that it was the *digestive faculty*. What was it that made anything come out of the body?

* *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Vol. 1. book 2. chap. 21.

The *expulsive faculty*. What moved? The *motive faculty*. And so in the mind, the *intellectual faculty*, or the understanding understood; for *faculty*, *ability*, and *power*, I think, are but different names for the same things; which ways of speaking, when put in more intelligible words, will, I think, amount to thus much;—that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest; motion, by something able to move; and understanding, by something able to understand.”

It may be alleged, that though we can form no abstract notion of the faculties of the mind, any more than we can form an abstract notion of the principle of gravitation, or of the screw or the lever, yet the hypothesis, which is founded on the existence of independent mental faculties, may be favourable to a proper classification of intellectual phenomena, and may assist us in our researches of the mind, in the same way as the principle of gravitation, of which we have no conception, has been instrumental in aiding us in our physical investigations. To this it may be replied, that it is a very doubtful proposition that gratuitous principles can ever be instrumental in the discovery of truth—the end and object of all philosophy. It is an established maxim with those philosophers who maintain the doctrine of mental faculties, that we ought to be very cautious in reasoning from material phenomena to those of the mind, for we may fancy there is an analogy in a case where, for any thing we can tell, there may not be the slightest resemblance. Therefore, if we have taken a principle for granted

in our physical researches, of which we have no idea, we are not fully warranted in doing the same in investigating the human mind; for such a mode of proceeding would lead to the grossest absurdities. Why are Hartley's System of Vibrations and Aristotle's Ideal System rejected by many modern philosophers? Because in the one case, we cannot perceive any vibrations; and in the other, are not conscious of any images, or forms, or species of external objects being transmitted by the channel of the senses to the immediate seat of thought. Upon the same principle of reasoning, why ought we to say that there are distinct faculties of the mind, when these faculties cannot be perceived.

The fact seems to be, that philosophers in general have called certain kinds of ideas, and their various combinations, by the name of faculties, without ascertaining the existence, or informing us of the nature of those faculties or powers, by which these ideas are generated, and their combination effected. A knowledge of the faculties and powers seems evidently above the reach of human sagacity. The great progress the science of natural philosophy has made, is chiefly ascribed to that mode of reasoning which, recommended by Bacon, commences with an examination of facts, and gradually mounts up to the more general laws of nature. But the philosophy of the human mind does not seem to be capable of receiving much aid by a similar mode of investigation. We can only view the mind in a naked state. We are beings that are conscious of ideas, or feelings, or perceptions, and this is all

we know of our minds ; and whatever may be urged in favour of general laws or principles of the mind, the existence of such laws or principles must be always problematical at best ; for we can never be conscious of their mode of operation ; and what we are not conscious of, we have little grounds to believe can have any existence.

There is a great difference in prosecuting the study of natural or experimental philosophy, and the philosophy of the human mind. In the former, a person may be put in possession of the various improvements and discoveries that have been made during many ages, without undergoing a hundredth part of the bodily and mental toil that was found necessary before the original inventors could bring these improvements and discoveries to light. But in the science of the human mind there has no method been yet found to facilitate, in an equal degree, the knowledge of discoveries in this department of human inquiry. As much time and attention are frequently necessary to enable us to form correct notions of intellectual appearances, treated of by metaphysical writers, as would bring these appearances to our view by our own individual and unassisted efforts.

There are many causes of this difference. One of the principal, however, is, that no one can understand what another writes on metaphysics unless he has previously learned the art of scrutinizing his own thoughts ; or, as some say, of exercising his own consciousness. This art bears, in a great measure, the same relation to the science of the

mind, as experiment does to natural philosophy. To many it is an art both difficult in its attainment and difficult in its practice. But it is necessary; and until a person has learned it, and can practise it with ease and dexterity, he cannot reasonably hope to reap much pleasure or improvement from perusing treatises on the human mind. Without this preliminary knowledge, such writings must necessarily appear almost unintelligible, and will speedily disgust the reader with a constant repetition of words and phrases to which he can attach no clear or definite notions; and which cannot fail to produce disappointment, inasmuch as they pretend to be descriptive of mental operations, whose existence, for want of reflecting on his own mind, he is unable to perceive.

To those, however, who are in the habit of exercising their consciousness, I submit the few following observations on abstraction. I know they will differ from the opinions of many eminent philosophers of the present day; but in inquiries of this nature, authority considered merely as such, however great and weighty, must go for nothing, where not supported by the evidence of consciousness. It is to this power that all appeals must be made for determining the truth or falsehood of propositions in metaphysics; for without such a tribunal, this science would soon relapse into that state of comparative confusion, from which it has so lately been rescued.

It appears to me that general principles, which are said to be formed by the faculty of abstrac-

tion, are nothing but certain words representing a number of individual thoughts, perceptions, or, if you will, observations; and that it requires no other faculty to speak or think of such general principles, than to speak or think of any one of the individual thoughts or perceptions that compose them. All projected bodies, for example, have a tendency to fall to earth again. This is a general principle in natural philosophy, and is formed, it is commonly said, by abstraction. But when we come to examine how the mind arrives at this conclusion or general principle, we shall see there is nothing that ought to induce us to attribute its formation to any other operation of the mind than that by which we perceive and speak about individual objects. Let us suppose a being possessed of all the susceptibilities of knowledge which we possess, to make his appearance on this globe. The first time he saw a stone thrown up into the air, he would *perceive* that after a certain time had elapsed, it would fall again to the ground. A second time he would *perceive* the same result; and if similar experiments were made with projected bodies a thousand times with different substances, and with different velocities, he would *perceive* the same effect, that all these bodies would ultimately return to the earth from whence they were thrown. Hence he would conclude, that all projected bodies would return to the earth again: which is nothing more than an expression of a number of individual perceptions.—The first time he saw the stone fall, it was, agreeably to the common theory, by the faculty

of perception; and is there not every reason to believe that the last time, as well as the intermediate ones, were perceived by the same power?

In like manner, it may also be shown, that general principles in morals and politics are formed in the same way as the preceding. When we say that all men are more or less influenced in their actions by self-love, we only mean that we, as well as others, have always *perceived* that the greater part of the exertions of mankind tend to the gratification of some passion or appetite. Unless the individual observations, on which general principles are founded, have come under our view, we cannot be said to understand them, or give a rational assent to them. On the contrary, in proportion to the number of our individual observations, the truth of such moral principles will be more universally acknowledged.

The resemblance and disagreement among the objects of nature form the foundation on which all abstract or general reasoning is built. But the mere circumstance of the mind expressing a resemblance or analogy among a number of individual objects, cannot warrant us in maintaining there is any other faculty employed for this purpose, than that which enables us to affirm or deny any thing about any individual object of thought or perception. Here is certainly a difference of effect, but if we attend to our consciousness, no difference of cause is observable. The perception of resemblance of colour, for instance, between two or more objects, is perceived as quickly, and is

as much an individual object of thought, as the figure, density, or any other quality of the objects. That faculty by which we perceive the figure and other qualities, and that by which we perceive the resemblance of colour, must, I think, be considered as one and the same.

The manner in which general terms are said to originate, throws no light upon the faculty of abstraction. The commonly received theory of the origin of these terms is that mentioned by Locke, Condillac, and Adam Smith. The last author, in a Dissertation on Languages, prefixed to his Theory of Moral Sentiments, says; "The assignation of particular names to denote particular objects—that is, the institution of nouns substantial, would probably be one of the first steps towards the formation of language. The particular cave, whose covering sheltered the savage from the weather; the particular tree, whose fruit relieved his hunger; the particular fountain whose water allayed his thirst, would first be denominated by the words cave, tree, fountain; or, by whatever other appellations he might think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark them. Afterwards when the more enlarged experience of this savage had led him to observe, and his necessary occasions obliged him to make mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other fountains, he would naturally bestow upon each of those new objects, the same name by which he had been accustomed to express the similar he was first acquainted with. And thus these words, which were originally the proper names of indivi-

duals, would each of them insensibly become the common name of a multitude. What constitutes a *species*," he continues, "is merely a number of objects bearing a certain degree of resemblance to one another; and, on that account, denominated by a single appellation, which may be applied to express any one of them." Condillac also says,* "A child calls by the name of tree, the first tree which we show him. A second tree which he sees recalls to him the same idea, and he designates it by the same name; he gives the same name to a third, the same to a fourth. Thus we find that the word tree, applied at first to an individual object, becomes the name of a class or genus, an abstract idea,† comprehending all trees in general."

There is nothing in these passages respecting the origin of general names that requires any other faculty than that which treats of individual objects. What constitutes a *species*, says Mr. Smith, is only a single name given to a number of objects bearing a certain degree of similarity to one another. But why should we suppose that a different faculty is required to give a name to an individual

* "Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le premier arbre que nous lui montrons.—Un second arbre qu'il voit ensuite lui rappelle la même idée; il lui donne le même nom; de même à un troisième, à un quatrième; et voilà le mot d'Arbre, donné d'abord à un individu, qui devient pour lui un nom de classe ou de genre, une idée abstraite qui comprend tous les arbres en général." See also Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book ii. c. ii. sect. 9; and Book iii. c. iii. sect. 7.

† Abstract idea, or abstract term, for I am doubtful whether "idée" means, in this passage, precisely what we should understand by idea, when speaking simply of the act of perception.

object from that which gives a name to a multitude of objects that bear a certain degree of resemblance? The savage and the child, upon the assumed theory now stated, give the name of *tree* to the first tree they perceive, or that is pointed out to them; and when a number of trees of various kinds are exhibited to their view, they denominate them by the term *tree*, because they resemble, in a variety of particulars, the tree or trees they already know. But I see no reason for creating a faculty for the purpose of giving this *number of trees* a common name, merely because their resemblance is not so complete as to amount to identity. To say that where the resemblance between two or more objects is so great as to constitute them of the same kind, we assign names to them by means of one faculty of the mind; and where that resemblance is not so evident, we give names to objects by means of another faculty of the mind; is, in my opinion, neither philosophical nor just. Besides, may it not be asked, that as no two objects in nature are precisely the same in all particulars, at what point of resemblance does the one faculty cease to act and the other begin?

Mr. Locke seems to have employed the word *abstraction* in a more limited sense than modern philosophers have done. He says, "The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple *ideas*, are these:—First, combining several simple *ideas* into one compound one. Secondly, bringing two ideas together, and setting them by one another; by which we come at all *ideas* of relation.

Thirdly, separating our ideas from other *ideas* that accompany them in their real existence." To this last act of the mind he gives the name of *abstraction*; to the other two acts he gives no names whatever.* I believe that most metaphysicians since Mr. Locke's time have referred all these different acts of the mind to abstraction. The distinctions, however, this philosopher has here pointed out, would certainly justify us in referring them to distinct faculties, as much as many other distinctions that are commonly referred to separate principles. It may be considered as something curious that he should say in his third and fourth books that *general ideas are fictitious contrivances of the mind*.

Mr. Stewart observes,† "This power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it, is distinguished by logicians by the name of *abstraction*." Had the celebrated author confined himself to the first part of this sentence, as conveying what he meant by the faculty of abstraction, his definition would have been intelligible enough: but being desirous to define it better, he has only rendered it more obscure. For what is meant by *combinations presented to the mind* I am at a loss to conjecture. If Mr. Stewart means that

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book 2. c. 12. sect. 1.

† Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. 1. p. 156.

certain thoughts are presented to the mind in a complex or compounded state, and that the mind has the power of analysing them into their elementary parts, then I differ from him. The thoughts of man must be considered as individual objects, apparently incapable of analysis. If they can be analysed, they can be subdivided; and what is capable of subdivision, may be divided *ad infinitum*. Then if thoughts are infinitely divisible, they must be infinitely extended; and what is infinitely divisible and extended, can have no elementary parts; consequently thoughts must be nothing at all.—What a fine doctrine for the *Sceptics*!

BUT if the first part of this sentence be a definition of what Mr. Stewart calls abstraction, viz. the power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest, then I say that the mind never does anything else but abstract;—with this qualification, however, that the mind only considers one quality or attribute of an object at the same instant, and not more than one, as Mr. Stewart here affirms. It is a commonly received maxim, that the mind can only be occupied with one idea at the same time. When a tree comes before my view, I do not in the same instant of time contemplate its height, its thickness, its figure, its extension, the colour of its bark and leaves, and the disposition of its branches. If I attend to one of these qualities or attributes, the rest must be excluded from my mind at the moment the other is under contemplation. These attributes must come into my mind in succession, and cannot all

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be present to it, so to speak, at the same individual point of time. This is sufficient, I think, to shew, that the human mind is always employed about individual objects, and that what are called complex or general ideas have really no existence, in the sense in which they are commonly considered.

Such phrases as *compounding and decompounding our ideas, separating the combinations of sense*, and many others of a like description, have absolutely no meaning when applied to the mind. When confined to the science of chemistry, they may be very correctly and very usefully employed; but there is not the slightest analogy to justify their application in mental philosophy. Are we ever conscious of this composition and decomposition among our ideas? Sulphate of iron and nut-galls are two distinct substances; but when joined together they make another substance very different from either, and which much resembles, in its properties and appearance, the ink I write with. Do we ever see a simple idea, A, for example, entering into combination with another simple idea, B, and forming, by their union, another totally different idea, C? I think every one who has paid the slightest attention to his own mind, must answer this in the negative. Yet, unless there be appearances of this description observable in our mind, such phrases, making every allowance for metaphorical language, ought to be employed only in a qualified sense; for instead of enlightening and guiding our judgment, they are apt, in such inquiries, to darken and lead it astray.

If we examine the system of mental faculties a

little more narrowly, we shall find, that instead of its proving conclusive, it is pregnant with difficulties, which are apparently insurmountable. There are very few, if any, of the faculties, according to the received theory on the subject, which can be considered as acting simply; for we find by appeals to our consciousness, that they seem to be incapable of being conceived in a single state. What is called the faculty of *attention* is defined to be that by which we simply think of a particular thing or object. The faculty of reason is also said to be that by which we are able to draw inferences from premises. This is considered a simple faculty, not a compound one. Now, it is utterly inconceivable how a man would draw an inference from premises, without paying attention to that inference and those premises; or, in other words, without thinking of them. Again, perception is defined to be the faculty by which we perceive things. Now, we cannot draw inferences from premises, unless we perceive these inferences and premises. Here, then, we have the faculty of reason, considered a simple faculty, compounded of attention and perception. How many questions arise from these considerations, which it would be very difficult to solve? Might we not ask, What is the nature of this faculty of reason, when influenced by these faculties of attention and perception? What effects would it produce if acting by virtue of its own inherent power? And by what means shall we be able to perceive in what respect it differs from the other powers combined with it?

For the sake of further illustration, we will take another faculty, memory for instance, and we shall find that we cannot look upon it as a simple faculty. It implies perception, attention, and consciousness. When a past idea is present to the mind, we must perceive it, and we must also attend to it, otherwise the words perception and attention have no meaning. And there appears to be so close a connection between consciousness and memory, that we might, without producing an ambiguity, define this latter faculty, *that by which we are conscious of a past idea*. This definition would be in unison with the established mode of speaking among the generality of mankind; for when their memory is taxed to remember any past event, they say, "I am not conscious of having said or done such a thing." A phrase can mean nothing more or less than, "I do not remember having said or done such a thing."*

It must appear evident, upon the slightest consideration, that distinct mental faculties can in no way be useful in explaining mental appearances, until the nature of these faculties themselves is well understood, and we are able to furnish a satisfactory explanation of those laws which regulate the simple powers of which they are said to be

* It may be worth while to remark here in passing, that Mr. Stewart, in treating of attention as being a distinct faculty of the mind, says, though several authors have spoken of attention in general terms, he was not aware that any author, ancient or modern, had spoken of it as a separate faculty. But if he will look into Condilliac's "*Précis des Leçons Préliminaires*, vol. 8 of his works, he will find attention not only enumerated among the mental faculties, but an attempt is made to resolve several other faculties into it.

compounded. This is absolutely necessary as a preliminary step. That which is to serve as an explanation, ought to be clearer and more evident than the thing to be explained, otherwise no explanation can be effected. It certainly cannot be considered as an infallible method of arriving at truth, to take a principle for granted, and afterwards prove the truth of the inferences drawn from it. We should demonstrate the truth of the principle first, and the truth of the inferences will consequently be established. Now, has any metaphysician ever undertaken to show in what manner the faculties of abstraction, judgment, and taste, act upon the faculty of imagination, so as to make it form imaginary appearances? Or in what way the faculties of consciousness, perception, and attention act upon memory, by which we are capable of bringing to our recollection past events? No one, as far as my information goes, has ever undertaken any such thing.

If by mental faculty is simply meant, the power the mind has to do any particular thing, then no one will deny that the mind has faculties who does not deny the active state of the mind. But then the faculties of the understanding must in consequence be multiplied to an enormous degree, for every distinct act of the mind. I see a table before me, which I am said to perceive by the faculty of perception; I look out of my room window and see a man standing in the street; but can any one produce a single argument to prove that I perceive the man in the street by the same faculty by which

I perceived the table? Again, when I have meditated on the properties of a triangle, and have come to the conclusion, that the three angles are equal to two right ones; how do I know that I come to this conclusion by the same mental faculty by which I determined that the square of four is sixteen? It may be said there is a difference in the processes of the mind in the two cases; but then, I reply, that these processes are not discoverable by consciousness, and consequently the only test of their existence is wanting. The mind can be conscious only of its ideas; and therefore it follows clearly, that if we were conscious of any such mental processes, they must necessarily be themselves composed of ideas, otherwise they could not be objects of our consciousness. Here, then, upon this position, that we are conscious of these processes, when we are endeavouring to prove that ideas are the result of certain distinct and individual powers or faculties inherent in the mind, we are only all the time striving to prove, that one set of ideas are the cause of the existence of another set: a principle that fact and experience declare we know nothing about.

The system of faculties appears to have been established with a view of satisfying one of the most powerful propensities of the human mind, viz. a desire to know the true cause of every event which falls under its notice. But those who have correct views of mental and material philosophy, know that philosophers do not set out in their inquiries with a view of ascertaining the causes of

the phenomena which fall under their observation, but to observe those laws which regulate their constant conjunction.

We shall here give a quotation from a very acute writer on mental subjects, relative to distinct faculties of the mind. "If," says he, "the mind possesses powers, it may be asked, upon what they are exercised? The answer must be, upon the objects of mental perception; which are sensations and ideas. Now, in what manner are we to understand the action of the intellect, by means of its powers upon ideas? Nothing seems more obvious, though nothing be really less so, than the action and reaction of bodies; but when we argue in this instance analogically from the material to the immaterial world, it must be confessed that we are utterly forsaken by the light of reason. To suppose the existence of power at all, may perhaps be nothing else than the hypothesis of men who admit the occult assertion of something, which is no object of the understanding, for the purpose of accounting for events. In attributing powers to the mind, it would be well to consider what we mean by the mind; and, before we assert that this acts by its powers upon ideas, how our souls can be shown to be different from our thoughts and feelings. It is yet more embarrassing to conceive what is meant by the action of powers upon ideas. Bodies are said to impinge upon and to impel each other, to transmit powers and to communicate motion; but, when this mode of reasoning is applied to our intellectual nature, a very little reflec-

tion may suffice to convince us that the analogy is altogether inadmissible.”*

To put what may be further urged against the faculty of abstraction in as small a compass and in as clear a light as possible, we shall just state the following. Suppose a certain piece of matter to be possessed only of four qualities, namely, extension, hardness, colour, and figure; and that we designate our ideas corresponding to those qualities by the letters A, B, C, and D. In former times, and particularly among the Schoolmen, it was a prevailing opinion, of a numerous party of them at least, that besides the four simple and individual ideas denoted by these four letters, which composed all substances, we had another idea (which we call E) made up of, or comprehending, the other four simple ideas; and this idea E was called substance in general, or an abstract general conception. The faculty of abstraction was confined almost exclusively to the producing of these general notions. But it is long since this doctrine of abstract general conceptions began to lose ground in England, and at the present day its advocates are few in number. In consequence of this, the province of abstraction is considerably curtailed; and is now, I believe, generally understood to be that faculty by which we think of one quality or part of an object, distinct from the rest of the qualities or parts which compose it. Now, when we talk about considering a quality of an object separately

* *Academical Questions* by Sir William Drummond.

from the other qualities which belong to it, we evidently go upon the principle, that we are able to think of all the different qualities of an object at the same moment of time; a mere gratuitous assumption, unsupported by one single argument from an appeal to mere consciousness. But waving this objection, nay, let us even take it for granted that we can pay attention to many things at a time, still this does not by any means go to prove that the faculty by which we attend to several things is different from that by which we attend to an individual thing. If we can perceive and attend to A, B, C, and D at the same moment, there is the highest possible probability that we perceive and attend to them by the same faculty by which we perceive and attend to either A, or B, or C, or D, separately. There is nothing to lessen this probability, unless one thing can be shown, and that is, if we are conscious of a difference in the perceiving faculties in the two cases here mentioned. If when we perceive and attend to A, B, C, and D, jointly, we are conscious that the same faculty does not enable us to perceive and attend to any of them separately; then we ought to come to the conclusion, that a number of things are not perceived and attended to by the same power by which we perceive and attend to an individual thing. This is the only way by which the question can be settled.

These observations will not, I hope, be considered out of place, when we remember, that upon this question of distinct and independent mental facul-

ties, many important conclusions in philosophy depend. It must ever vary the complexion of metaphysical theories. It forms a point of departure for abstract speculation ; and systems diverge or approximate to each other, in exact proportion as we consider the mind as being constituted of a collection of faculties or powers, or as merely displaying a series of states, operations, or phenomena. It is contended by some philosophers, that the dispute is only a dispute about words ; but this, I apprehend, is an erroneous opinion. The question lies deeper than verbal ambiguities. It rests upon the very nature of things ; and from the first moment of our being able to contemplate, by consciousness, the operations of our own minds, and to draw conclusions respecting them, we are presented with this knotty controversy in all its complicated difficulties.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ON SAXON METAPHYSICS.

THERE are but very few writers on mental philosophy, in Saxon literature, of whom we have any authentic accounts. There are only three of whom we shall take any notice; namely, *Alfred*, *Alcuinus*, and *Bede*.

ALFRED THE GREAT.

ON CHANCE.—“It is nought when men say any thing happens by chance, *because every thing comes from some other things or causes*, therefore it has not happened from chance; but if it came not from any thing, then it would have occurred from chance.

“Then said I, Whence first came the name? Then quoth he, My darling Aristotle, mentioned it in the book that is called *Phisica*. Then said I, How does he explain it? He answered, Men said formerly, when any thing happened to them unexpectedly, that this was by chance. As if any one should dig the earth, and find there a treasure

of gold, and should then say that this happened by chance. But yet, I know that if the digger had not dug into the earth, and no man before had hidden the gold there, he would by no means have found it. Therefore it was not found by chance."

ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.—"I would ask thee, whether we have any freedom or any power, what we should do, or what we should not do? or does the divine pre-ordination or fate compel us to that which we wish?"

"Then said he, We have much power. There is no rational creature which has not freedom. He that hath reason may judge and discriminate what he should will, and what he should shun; and every man hath this freedom, that he knows what he should will and what he should not will. Yet all rational creatures have not a like freedom. Angels have right judgments and good will, and all that they desire they obtain very easily, because they wish nothing wrong. But no creature hath freedom and reason, except angels and men. Men have always freedom, and the more of it as they lead their minds towards divine things. But they have less freedom when they incline their minds near to this world's wealth and honours. They have no freedom, when they themselves subject their own wills to the vices; but, so soon as they turn away their mind from good, they are blinded with unwiseness."

WHY MEN HAVE FREEDOM OF WILL.—"I said, I am sometimes very much disturbed! Quoth he, At what? I answered:

“It is at this which thou sayest, that God gives to every one freedom to do evil, as well as good, whichsoever he will; and thou sayest also, that God knoweth every thing before it happens; and thou also sayest, that nothing happens, but that God wills, or consents to it; and thou sayest that it shall all go as he has appointed. Now, I wonder at this: why he should consent that evil men should have freedom that they may do evil, as well as good, whichsoever they will, when he knew before that they would do evil.

“Then quoth he, I may very easily answer thee this remark. How would it now look to you, if there were any powerful king, and he had no freedom in all his kingdom, but that all were slaves?

“Then said I, It would not be thought by me right, nor also reasonable, if servile men only should attend upon him.

“Then quoth he, It would be more unnatural, if God, in all his kingdom, had no free creature under his power. Therefore he made two rational creatures free; angels and men. He gave them the great gift of freedom. Hence they could do evil as well as good, whichsoever they would. He gave this very fixed gift, and a very fixed law with that gift, to every man unto his end. The freedom is, that man may do what he will; and the law is, that he will render to every man according to his works, either in this world or the future one; good or evil, whichsoever he doeth. Men may obtain

through this freedom whatsoever they will; but they cannot escape death, though they may by good conduct hinder it, so that it shall come later. Indeed, they may defer it to old age, if they do not want good will for good works.

“Then said I, Thou has well removed that doubt.”

ON THE DIVINE FORE-APPOINTMENT.—“But I am yet grieved with much more trouble, even to sadness.

“What is thy grief about?

“It is about the Divine pre-ordination. Because we heard it, some while since, said, that all shall happen as God, at the beginning, had appointed, and that no man can change it. Now me-thinketh, that he errs, when he honoureth the good, and also when he punishes the evil; if it be true, that it was so shaped by him, that they cannot do otherwise. We labour unnecessarily when we pray, and when we fast, or give alms, if we have no more merit from it, than those that in all things proceed according to their own will, and run after their bodily pleasures.

“I tell thee, if this be true, we ought to say, that it was an unnecessary commandment in the divine books, that God should order man to forsake evil and do good; and, again, the saying which he expressed, that the more a man laboureth the greater reward he shall receive. I wonder why thou hast forgotten all that we spoke about before. We said before, that the Divine Providence wrought

every good and no evil, nor appointed any to be made, nor ever made any; but that indeed we are directed to good.

"It is thought evil by common people that He should avenge or punish any one for his evil.

"But did we not also say in this same book, that God had appointed freedom to be given to men, and made them free; and that if they held this freedom well, he would greatly dignify them with everlasting power; and if they misused this freedom, that he would then punish them with death?

"He has appointed that if they sin in any thing through this freedom, they shall, by penitence, compensate for it, to recover that freedom; and if any of them will be so hard-hearted, that he will do no repentance, that he shall then have a just punishment. He has appointed all creatures to be servants, except angels and men, and hence they are the servants of these other creatures. They have their ministerial duties till doomsday. But men and angels, they are free. He dispenses with their servitude.

"What! can men say, that the divine Providence has appointed this, that they should not fulfil their duties, or how? May they neglect them; that they may not do good? Now it is written that God will render to every man according to his works. Why then should any man be idle, that he work not?"

"Then said I, It is obvious enough to me, that

God knew it all before, both good and evil, before it happened. But I know not, whether that shall all happen unchangeably, which he knows and has appointed.

"Then, quoth he, *There is no need that all should happen unchangeably* : though some of it shall happen unchangeably. This will be that, which will be best for our necessities ; and that will be his will. But there are some so directed that there is no necessity for this ; and though its being done would neither injure, nor benefit, nor be any harm, yet it will not be done.

"Think now, by thyself, whether thou hast appointed anything so firmly, that thou thinkest that it shall never be changed by thy will, nor that thou canst be without it ; or whether thou again art so divided in opinion on any thought, whether it shall happen to help thee, or whether it shall not. Many are the things which God knows before they happen, and he knows also whether it will hurt his creatures that they should happen. But he knows not this for the purpose of willing that they should happen, but that he may take previous care that they should not happen. Thus a good ship-steerer perceives many a stormy wind before it occurs, and folds his sail, and awhile also lays down his mast, and then abides the beating, if, before the threatening of the adverse wind, he can guard himself against the weather."

ON HUMAN NATURE AND ITS BEST INTERESTS.—

"Then said I, Thou hast very well helped me by this

speech. I wonder why so many wise men should have laboured so much on the subject, and have found out so little that was wise.

“Then quoth he, Why wonderest thou so much? Is it so easy to be understood? How knowest thou not, that many things are not understood so as they exist; but according to the quality of the understanding of him that inquires after them. Such is wisdom. No man from this world can understand it, such as it really is; though every one strives according to the quality of his understanding, that he may perceive it if he can. Wisdom may entirely comprehend us, such as we are, though we may not wholly comprehend that, such as it is in itself; because wisdom is God. He seeth all our works, both good and evil, before they are done, or, for this purpose, thought. But he compels us not to this, that we must necessarily do the good, nor prevents us from doing evil; because he has given us freedom. I can teach thee also some examples, by which thou mayest the easier understand this speech. What! thou knowest the light, and the hearing, and the taste: they perceive the body of man, and yet they perceive it not alike. The ears perceive so that they hear, but they perceive not yet the body entirely as it is; our sense of feeling must touch it, and feel that it is the body. We cannot feel whether this be black or white, fair or not fair; but the light at the beginning turns to these points; and as the eyes look on things, they perceive all the appearance of the body. But I will give thee some further explanation, that

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thou mayest know that which thou wonderest at.

"Then said I, What is this ?

"He said, It is that man understands only that which he separately perceives in others. He perceives separately through his eyes ; separately through his ears ; separately through his nostrils ; separately by his reason ; separately by his wise comprehension. There are many living things that are unmoving, such as shell-fish are ; and these have yet some portion of perception ; or they would not else live, if they had no grain of perception. Some can see, some can hear, some taste, some smell ; but the moving animals are more like man, because they have all that the unmoving creatures have, and also more too. This is, that they obey men. They love what loves them, and hate what hates them ; and they fly from what they hate, and seek what they love. But men have all that we have before mentioned, and also add to them the great gift of reason. Angels have a still wiser understanding.

"Hence are these creatures thus made, that the unmoving shall not exalt themselves above the moving ones, nor contend with them ; nor the moving ones above men ; nor men above angels ; nor angels strive against God.

"But this is miserable, that the greatest part of men look not to that which is given to them, that is, reason ; nor seek that which is above them, which is what angels and wise men have ; this is a wise understanding. But most men now move with cattle, in this, that they desire the lusts of

the world like cattle. If we now had any portion of an unhesitating understanding, such as angels have, then we might perceive that such an understanding would be much better than our reason. Though we investigate many things, we have little ready knowledge free from doubt. But to angels there is no doubt of any of those things which they know, because their ready knowledge is much better than our reasoning; as our reasoning is better than the perceptions of animals. Any portion of understanding that is given to them, is either to those that are prone, or to those that are erect. But let us now elevate our minds as supremely as we may towards the high roof of the highest understanding, that thou mayest most swiftly and most easily come to thine own kindred, from whence thou camest before. There may thy mind and thy reason see openly that which they now doubt about;—every thing, whether of the Divine prescience, which we have been discoursing on, or of our freedom, or of all such things.

ON THE DIVINE NATURE.—“I would ask thee first one thing, Whether thinkest thou that any thing in this world is so good as that it may give us full happiness? I ask this of thee; I do not wish that any false likeness should deceive you and me, instead of the true comfort; for no man can deny that some good must be the most superior, just as there is some great and deep fountain from which many brooks and rivers run. Hence men say of some advantages, that they are not entirely with-

out. Yet every thing would go to nought, if it had not some good in it.

“From this you may understand, that from the greatest good come the less goods; not the greatest from the less; no more than the river can be the spring and source, though the spring may flow into a river. As the river may return again to the spring, so every good cometh from God, and returns to him; and he is the full and the perfect good; and there is no deficiency of will in him. Now you may clearly understand that this is God himself.

“Then answered I, and said, Thou hast very rightly and very rationally overcome and convinced me; I cannot deny this, nor indeed think otherwise, but that it is all so as thou sayest.

“Then said Wisdom, Now I would that thou shouldest think carefully till thou understand where true happiness is. How! knowest thou not, that all mankind are with one mind consenting that God is the beginning of all good things, and the governor of all creatures? He is the supreme good. No man now doubts this, because he knows nothing better, and indeed nothing equally good. Hence every reasoning tells us, and all men confess the same, that God is the highest good. Thus they signify that all good is in him; for if it were not, then he would not be that which he is called; but something has existed before him or is more excellent. Then that would be better than he is; but nothing was ever before him, nor more excel-

lent than he is, nor more precious than himself. Hence he is the beginning, and the fountain, and the roof of all good. This is clear enough. Now it is openly shown, that the true felicities are in no other existing thing but in God.

“Then said I, I am consenting to this.

“Then he answered, I conjure thee that thou rationally understand this; that God is full of every perfection, and of every good, and of every happiness.

“I then replied, I cannot fully understand it. Wherefore tell me again, the same that didst mention before.

“He said, Then I will say it again. I would not that thou shouldest think this, that God is the father and the origin of all creatures, and yet that his supreme goodness, of which he is full, comes to him from any where from without. I also would not have thee think that any other can be his good and happiness but himself; because, if thou supposest that the good which he hath comes to him any where from without, then that thing from which it comes to him would be better than he, if there were such. But it is very silly, and a very great sin, that men should think so of God; either to suppose again, that anything were before him, or better than he is, or like him. But we should agree that he is the best of all things.

“If thou believest that God exists so as men are, either he is a man that hath soul and body, or his goodness is that which gathereth good elsewhere, and then holds it together, and rules it. If

thou then believest that it is so with God, then shalt thou necessarily believe that some power is greater than his, which it so unites as that it maketh the course of things. But whatever thing is divided from others is distinct,—is another thing, though they may be placed together. If, then, any thing be divided from the highest good, it will not be that highest good. Yet it would be a great sin to think of God, that there could be any good without him, or any separated from him. Hence nothing is better than He is, or even as good. What thing can be better than its creator? Hence I say, with juster reason, that He is the supreme good in his own nature, which is the origin of all things.

“Then I said, Now thou hast very rightly convinced me. Then quoth he, Did I not before tell thee that the supreme good and the highest happiness were one? I answered, So it is. He replied, Shall we then say that this is any thing else but God? I said, I cannot deny this; because I assented to it before.

“He is the stem and foundation of all blessings. From him all good cometh, and every thing tends to Him again. He governs them all. Thus He is the beginning and the support of all blessings. They come from Him so as the light and brightness of the planets come from the sun; some are brighter, some are less bright. So also the moon: she enlightens as much as the sun shines on her. When he shineth all over her, then is she all bright.

“When I heard these observations I was then astonished, and much awed, and exclaimed, This is a wonderful, and delightful, and reasonable observation, which thou expressest to me.

“He answered, It is not more pleasant nor wiser than the thing that thy discourse was about. We will now talk about that; because me-thinketh it good that we connect this with the former. Then replied I, What is that?

“What I expressed to thee before was, that God was happiness; and that from this true felicity come all the other goods that we discoursed about before; and return to Him. Thus, from the sea the water cometh into the earth, and there freshens itself. It proceedeth then up into a spring; it goeth then into a brook; then into a river; then along the river till it floweth again into the sea. But I would now ask thee how thou hast understood this assertion? Whether dost thou suppose that the five goods which we have often mentioned before, that is, power, dignities, celebrity, abundance, and bliss: I would know whether you suppose that those goods were limbs of the true felicity, so as a man’s limbs are those of one person, and belong all to one body? Or dost thou think that some one of the five goods makes the true felicity, and afterwards that the four others become its goods; as now the soul and body compose one man?

“The one man hath many limbs, and yet to these two, that is, to the soul and the body, belong all this man’s comforts, both spiritual and corporeal. It is now the good of the body that a man be fair

and strong, and long and broad, with many other excellencies besides these. Yet they are not the body itself; because, though he should lose any of these good things, he would still be what he was before. Then the excellencies of the soul are, prudence, moderation, patience, righteousness, and wisdom, and many such virtues; and yet, as the soul is one thing, so the virtues are another.

"I then said, I wish that thou wouldest explain to me yet more clearly, about the other goods that belong to the true felicity.

"He answered, Did I not inform thee before, that the true happiness is God? Yes, I replied, Thou hast said he was the supreme good. Then quoth he, Art thou now consenting that power, and dignities, and fame, and plenty, and joy, and happiness, and the supreme good, are all one; and that this one must be the Deity?

"I said, How should I now deny this? Then he answered, Whether dost thou think that those things which are the limbs of the true felicity is that felicity itself?

"I replied, I know not what thou wouldest say; but it will please me better that thou should speak to me some while about it than ask me. He then said, How! couldest thou not reflect that if these goods were limbs of the true felicity, they would be somewhat distinct from it as a man's limbs are from his body? But the nature of these limbs is, that they make up one body, and yet are not wholly alike.

"I then remarked, Thou needest no more speak about it. Thou hast explained it to me clearly

enough that these goods are no whit separated from the true felicity.

“Then quoth he, Thou comprehendest it right enough. Thou now understandest that all good is the same that happiness is, and this happiness is the supreme good, and the supreme good is God, and God is always inseparably one.

“I said, There is no doubt of it. But I wish you now to discourse to me a little on what is unknown.

“Well ! O men ! Every one of you that be free tend to this good, and to this felicity ; and he that is now in bondage with the fruitless love of this world, let him seek liberty, that he may come to this felicity. For this is the only rest of all our labours. This is the only port always calm after the storms and billows of our toils. This is the only station of peace ; the only comforter of grief after all the sorrows of the present life. The golden stones and the silvery ones, and jewels of all kinds, and all the riches before us, will not enlighten the eyes of the mind, nor improve their acuteness to perceive the appearance of the true felicity. They rather blind the mind’s eyes than make them sharper ; because all things that please here, in this present life, are earthly ; because they are flying. But the admirable brightness that brightens all things and governs all ; it will not destroy the soul, but will enlighten it. If, then, any man could perceive the splendour of the heavenly light with the pure eyes of his mind, he would then say

that the radiance of the shining of the sun is not superior to this; is not to be compared to the everlasting brightness of God."

DESCRIPTION OF THE DEITY.—"Hence we should with all power inquire after God, that we may know what he is. Though it should not be our lot to know what He is, yet we should, from the dignity of the understanding which he has given us, try to explore it.

"Every creature, both rational and irrational, discovers this, that God is eternal. Because so many creatures, so great and so fair, could never be subject to less creatures and to less power than they all are, nor indeed to many equal ones.

"Then said I, What is eternity?

"He answered, Thou hast asked me a great and difficult thing to comprehend. If thou wilt understand it, thou must first have the eyes of thy mind clean and lucid. I may not conceal from thee what I know of this.

"Know thou that there are three things in this world; one is temporary; to this there is both a beginning and an end; and I do not know any creature that is temporary, but hath his beginning and his end. Another thing is eternal, which hath a beginning, but hath not an end: I know not when it began, but I know that it will never end: such are angels and the souls of men. The third thing is eternal, both without end, and without beginning; this is God. Between these three there is a very great discrimination. If we were to in-

investigate all this subject, we should come late to the end of this book, or never.

“But one thing thou must necessarily know of this previously, Why is God called the Highest Eternity?

“Then said I, Why?

“Then quoth he, Because we know very little of that which was before us, except by memory and by asking; and yet we know less of that which will be after us. That alone exists rationally to us which is present; but to Him all is present, as well that which was before as that which now is, and that which after us will be. All of it is present to Him.

“His riches increase not, nor do they ever diminish. He never remembers anything, because he never forgets aught; He seeks nothing, nor inquires, because He knows it all; He searches for nothing, because He loses nothing; He pursues no creature, because none can fly from Him; He dreads nothing, because He knows no one more powerful than himself, nor even like him. He is always giving and never wants. He is always Almighty, because he always wishes good, and never evil. To Him there is no need of anything. He is always seeing; He never sleeps; He is always alike mild and kind; He will always be eternal. Hence there never was a time that He was not, nor ever will be. He is always free. He is not compelled to any work. From His divine power He is every where present. His greatness no man can measure. He is not to be conceived bodily,

but spiritually, so as now wisdom is and reason. But He is wisdom; He is reason itself."*

ALCUINUS, OR ALBINUS FLACCUS.

This was an English prelate, and a disciple, some say, of Bede's. He went on an embassy from Offa to the court of Charlemagne, and was the principal agent in the formation of the public schools established by the Emperor. Alcuinus was considered one of the most learned men of his time; though some historians have maintained that he knew little of philosophy in general; and even in theology itself he was by no means a proficient. His narrow views have been ascribed as the reason why these schools were limited in their scope, and so unproductive of real knowledge. An Italian historian, Father Andrea, makes the following remarks upon these early seminaries of learning. "They learn there to read, to sing, and to calculate, and nothing more. The schools have regularly established masters, but it is sufficient if they know grammar. If any of them pretends to a little knowledge of mathematics or astronomy, he is considered an oracle. Books are given to consult, but they are all ecclesiastical ones. If in some schools the fine arts are cultivated, it is only with the view of making them subservient to the illustration of the sacred books."†

The opinions of Alcuinus on the human soul are

* Turner's Anglo-Saxon History, pp. 41—51.

† Dell' origine, progresso e stato att. d'ogni letter. tom. 1. c. 7.

well entitled to notice. He divides it into three parts, the *appetites*, the *rational* part, and the *irascible*. Two of these appertain to the inferior creation as well as to ourselves. But reason belongs alone to men; and it is by this power that he judges, counsels, and excels in wisdom. The faculty of reason is that which directs and governs the whole moral nature of man; and all our virtues, as prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, pre-suppose its active vigilance. When these virtues are sanctified by a holy and pure benevolence, they bring the soul nearer to the Divine nature.*

Memory, will, and intelligence are all distinct powers, but are, nevertheless, united into one. Unity does not destroy their individuality. "I perceive that I perceive, will, and remember; I will to remember, perceive, and will; and I remember that I have willed, perceived, and recollected."†

"We may remark the wonderful swiftness of the soul in forming things which it has perceived by the senses. From these, as from certain messengers, it forms figures in itself, with inexpressible celerity, of whatever it has perceived of sensible things; and it lays up these forms in the treasury of its memory.

"Thus, he who has seen Rome figures Rome in his mind, and its form; and when he shall hear the name of Rome, or remember it, immediately the

* Opera, pp. 770.

† Ibid. p. 773.

animus of it will occur to the memory, where its form lies concealed. The soul there recognises it, where it had hidden it.

"It is yet more wonderful, that if unknown things be read or heard of by the ears of the soul, it immediately forms a figure of the unknown thing; as of Jerusalem. When seen it may be very different from the figure of our fancy; but whatever the soul has been, in other cities that are known to it, it imagines that it may be in Jerusalem. From known species it imagines the unknown. It does not fancy walls, houses, and streets in a man; nor the limbs of a man in a city, but buildings, as are usual in cities. So in every thing the mind from the known forms the unknown.

"While I think of Jerusalem, I cannot, at that moment, think of Rome; or when I think of any other single thing, I cannot then think of many; but that thing only is present to my mind which I deliberate upon, till, sooner or later, this departs and another occurs.

"This lively and heavenly faculty, which is called mens, or animus, is of such great mobility that it does not even rest in sleep. In a moment, if it chooses, it surveys heaven; it flies over the sea, and wanders through regions and cities. It places in its sight, by thinking, all things that it likes, however far removed."

"The mind, or soul, is the intellectual spirit, always in motion, always living, and capable of willing both good and evil. By the benignity of its Creator it is ennobled with free will. Created to

rule the movements of the flesh, it is invisible, incorporeal, without weight or colour, circumscribed, yet entire in every member of its flesh. It is now afflicted with the cares, and grieved with the pains of the body; now it sports with joy; now thinks of known things; and now seeks to explore those which are unknown. It wills some things; it does not will others. Love is natural to it.

“It is called by various names; the soul, while it vivifies; the spirit, when it contemplates; sensibility, while it feels; the mind, when it knows; the intellect, when it understands; the reason, while it discriminates; the will, when it consents; the memory, when it remembers; but these are not as distinct in substance as in names; they are but one soul. Virtue is its beauty; vice its deformity. It is often so affected by some object of knowledge, that, though its eyes be open, it sees not the things before it, nor hears a sounding voice, nor feels a touching body.

“As to what the soul is, nothing better occurs to us to say than that it is the spirit of life; but not of that kind of life which is in cattle, which is without a rational mind. The beauty and ornament of the human soul is the study of wisdom. What is more blessed to the soul than to love the Supreme Good, which is God? What is happier to it than to prepare itself to be worthy of everlasting beatitude, knowing itself most truly to be immortal.”

BEDE.

The history of this singular and learned man, is well known to most readers. We shall here transcribe a few remarks upon some of the metaphysical topics he discusses in his works.

He compares the three inseparable essences of the Trinity to the circularity, light, and heat of the Sun. The globular body of the Sun never leaves the heavens; but its light, which he compares to the Filial Personality, and its heat, which he applies to the Spiritual Essence, descend to earth, and diffuse themselves everywhere, animating the mind, and pervading and softening the heart. Yet, although universally present, light seems never to quit the sun, for there we always behold it; and heat is its unceasing companion. As circles have neither beginning nor end, such is the Deity. Nothing is above; nothing is below; nothing is beyond him; no term concludes him; no time confines him.

He pursues the same analogies in other parts of nature. In water he traces the spring, its flowing river, and terminating lake. They differ in form, but are one in substance, and are always inseparable. No river can flow without its spring, and must issue into some collecting locality.

“His view of nature is not unpleasing. “Observe how all things are made to suit, and are governed; heat by cold, cold by heat; day by night; and winter by summer. See how the heavens and the earth are respectively adorned:

the heavens by the sun, the moon, and stars; the earth by its beautiful flowers, and its herbs, trees, and fruits. From these mankind derive all their food; their lovely jewels; the various pictures so delectably woven in their hangings and valuable cloths; their variegated colours; the sweet melody of strings and organs; the splendour of gold and silver, and the other metals; the pleasant streams of water, so necessary to bring ships, and agitate our mills; the fragrant aroma of myrrh; and, lastly, the interesting countenance peculiar to the human form."*

. The preceding pages have been taken chiefly from Mr. Sharon Turner's History, and the Literature of the Middle Ages in Lardner's Cyclopaedia. As the authors of both these works have paid great attention to every thing connected with the Saxon period of our history, what is here stated may be fully relied on; and contains, in fact, every thing which can be found associated with the names of those ancient worthies, which bears upon the philosophy of mind.

We have now sketched out the history of the philosophy of mind, for nearly fifteen centuries, and traced its ramifications and bearings among the crash of empires and the mouldering remains of mighty kingdoms. We saw it in Greece as a grain of mustard seed. In the days of Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle, it was a plant of gigantic growth, and its shade long formed a philosophical retreat for the ardent and speculative minds of men. The Grecian metaphysics for some ages retained their compactness and system; but as

* Bede de Subst. vol. ii. p. 308.

time rolled on, they were split into detached fragments, and gave birth to various and contending sects, who vied with each other in giving new colourings to old truths and antiquated doctrines. The rage for novelty became strong; and men racked their minds to give old theories in a new form. Every philosopher was ambitious of forming a school of his own, which might establish his present fame, and hand down his name with honour and applause to future generations. Still, however, the divergency from the olden system of Grecian speculation, was not so great among the multitude of new sects, as what at first sight might lead one to imagine. The frame-work of Plato and Aristotle was never essentially broken or disjointed; nor were their leading views and doctrines of mind supplanted by other original systems. The various sects and parties were merely commentators and expounders of the two great champions of Grecian intellect; and though, on many occasions, they displayed consummate genius and skill, they never could make any considerable inroad upon the philosophical arrangements of these two wonderful expounders of abstract thought.

Through the influence of political changes and vicissitudes, we find the Grecian philosophy of intellects transplanted to the Roman capital, among minds of a bolder and fiercer stamp. Here it enjoyed an exotic existence but for a short period. It then found its way to Alexandria, where it came in contact with some novel systems, and was gradually subjected to many transformations and changes of

character. It became enveloped in the mysterious cosmogony of the East ; and that regular and consolidated system of Grecian thought, which had common sense and the every-day feelings of mankind for its basis, became so corrupted and debased, as scarcely to present a single feature of its original grandeur and simplicity. Everything became crude, unintelligible, fanatical, and childish.

Christianity, however, came to the rescue ; and gradually, though slowly, stripped off the mysterious allegories of the East, and took the "divine Plato" and the erudite Stagirite under her guidance and protection. There was an active and living sympathy between them that no adverse circumstance could weaken, nor time destroy. They imparted mutual light and strength to each other. And as the Christian system became more firmly rooted in the minds of men, and more widely extended, in the same proportion do we perceive the champions of the Church embrace with cordiality all the leading principles of Grecian speculation on human nature. The cause of this is obvious ; the great truths involved in both bore a striking affinity or relationship to each other. They both took man as they found him ; they analyzed his nature and powers ; they laid down rules for his government ; and both aimed at the permanent refinement and amelioration of his condition. These constituted the secret and powerful bond of union between human and divine knowledge ; between the sages of Greece and the disciples of the Cross.

NOTES
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NOTE A.—Page 4.

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NOTE B.—Page 12.

“The reason why Anaximander regarded the primary substance as infinite, finds a natural explanation in the infinite variety of the evolutions of the world, which have their ground in it. He is represented as arguing that the primary substance must have been infinite, to be all-sufficient for the limitless variety of produced things with which we are encompassed. Now although Aristotle expressly characterises this infinite as a mixture, we must, not, nevertheless, think of it as a mere multiplicity of primary material elements; for to the mind of Anaximander it was a unity, immortal and imperishable, an ever-producing energy. This production of individual things was derived by Anaximander from an eternal motion of the infinite; from which it would appear that he ascribed to it an inherent vital energy, without, however, employing the terms *life* and *production* in any acceptation except the only one allowable by the character of his philosophy,—in the sense, i. e. of motion, by which the primary elements of the infinite separate themselves one from another.

“According to Anaximander, it was not by any continuous transmutation of the primary substance into a variety of secondary states,

that the sensible qualities of things begin to be ; but by separation, according to their kind, of opposite elements, which in the infinite are confusedly and separately combined into unity ; which accretion is effected by the eternal motion. According to this, the primary being of Anaximander is undoubtedly a unity ; but it comprises within itself the multiplicity of elements out of which things are composed ; and these need only to be divided, in order to their appearing as separate phenomena of nature. Thus on the decomposition of the infinite, the kindred elements were attracted together ; so that what in the All was gold, without, however, appearing to be such, in consequence of being blended with its opposite, now appears gold ; and what was earth, earth ; for nothing new is produced, or assumes other qualities different from those it previously had ; but all was antecedently the same as subsequently it exhibited itself to be. This is evidently founded on the grand principle of the mechanical theory of physics, that nothing alters its qualities, but ever remains identical, and only moves among the other elements, whereby, in the altered mixture, the same element appears different at different times. We shall see these same conceptions occurring again in the more detailed explanations of nature given by Anaximander, and thereby his whole theory placed in direct opposition to that of the Ionian dynamicists.

"The issuing of individual things from out of the infinite All was thus explained by Anaximander : The central point in the *cosmopœia* was the earth ; for, being of cylindrical form with a base in the ratio 1 : 3 to its altitude, it was retained in the centre by the air, and by the equality of its distances from all the limits of the world ; the stars, on the other hand, moved round it at equal distances from each other,—the planets and fixed stars lowest, then the moon, and ultimately the sun ; each one of these bodies being borne on wheel-like ring (its sphere). According to this view of the system of the world, the motion of the infinite productive unity, which comprises within itself all opposites, appears to have suggested first of all the opposition the centre and circumference, and then again to have referred this to a further opposition between the earth and the heavens, of which the former indicated to his mind the cold, the latter the warm : so that in the first place the cold elements separate themselves from the warm, the former constituting the centre, and the latter the circumference

of the world. This representation is everywhere paramount with Anaximander ; all formation, either of the universe or individualities, must necessarily evolve itself in the contrariety of the inner and the outer, inasmuch as the outer surrounds and encloses the inner, as the bark does the tree. The earth, therefore, in its first formation, was supposed to be a mixture of cold, watery, and earthy elements, which had been separated out of the infinite from the warm and fiery, by means of the eternal motion. The heaven, on the contrary, he considered as a hollow fiery sphere, which contains the atmospheric air. The system of the world, however, after this first formation, proceeded to evolve itself to a further degree ; and whilst the earth was improved by the force of fire, occasioning the division of the land and the waters, the heavens likewise experienced a further separation. The revolution by which this was brought about, is described by Anaximander as a disruption of the heavenly sphere, by which means several single fiery systems were formed—the present heavenly bodies—which, being thereupon enclosed in acrial spheres, are only visible through certain apertures. Here again we meet with the opposition between the outer and the inner, the enclosing air and the enclosed fire ; only the fire in the compass of the world presents itself differently from what it does in the centre, or rather in the world itself,—for with respect to the latter, the inner core of the world, in its narrow sense, is the cold ; and the water, or the heaven, is the warm ; but contrariwise, in the heavenly bodies the inner is the warm, and the enclosing integument the cold. It is impossible not to see in all this an intentional pursuit of contrariety, which again is further evident from the mode in which, attached to the polytheist conceptions of his countrymen, he designates the universe and the heaven—by which latter term he understands the stars—as gods. When, however, he speaks of an infinity of co-existent worlds, he must, consistently with his entire theory, employ the term *world* in a subordinate acceptation, for the oneliness of the world or universe was a staple point in all his speculations,—since he supposed, on the one hand, an influential action of the heavenly bodies on the formation of the earth, and on the other, that the earth and the heavenly bodies, maintaining certain definite distances, constituted one orderly system.

“ In all these formations the mode of production is evidently me-

chanical; thus it is the eternal motion which separates the contraries, and collects the warm elements in the circumference, and the cold elements in the centre. Again, the opposition of heavy and light seems to have played its part in the system of Anaximander, and to have been looked upon by him as the cause of motion. And the mathematical laws also, which are so naturally allied to the mechanical physiology, are employed in his theory to determine the ratio of the earth's altitude and base, to calculate the distance of the intervals between the subordinate worlds, and to compare the size of the earth with that of the sun.

"But there is yet another point which displays still more remarkably the close affinity of his whole view with the mechanical theory of nature; which indeed—as we shall see the same point occur in an exactly similar manner with all the mechanical philosophers of the Ionian school, and nothing similar being to be found among the dynamicists—affords a test whereby to recognise in the details the historical connexion of the various expositions of this theory, which is, however, otherwise sufficiently manifest from the general view. The greatest difficulty for the mechanical theory of nature must have been to account for the organical construction of living beings, since this view does not recognise an original vital energy really capable of transmuting itself into other changeable states. Hence we invariably find the mechanicians occupied in framing hypotheses which might serve to explain on mechanical laws the phenomena of animal and vegetable life. Those put forward by Anaximander for this purpose have been very inaccurately reported to us; sufficiently, however, for us too see that they completely coincide with his whole notion of a progressive formation of the world by means of the gradually evolved contrarieties of heat and cold; and also bear the greatest resemblance to a very ancient representation of the origin of men and brutes, which in its general features has been transmitted by Diodorus Siculus."—*Ritter, Hist. Phil.* Vol. 1. pp. 163—172.

NOTE B.—Page 66.

"As, however, in the midst of these logical or dialectical disquisitions, we have fallen upon that which, from of old, has ever been

considered at once the centre and the difficulty of the Platonic system—his theory of ideas, it is indispensable to ascertain precisely the true Platonic sense of the term *idea*. This is the more necessary, the greater the disposition that has been evinced in modern times to take a very partial view of the subject, and to explain the ideas either by the general properties of objects, or by the general notions of genus and species, and even to confine them exclusively to the ideal conceptions of the good, the beautiful, and the just. The expressions of Plato, however, far transcend all these narrow limitations, and there is no species of being which he does not comprise within his *idea*. In order, however, to determine from his own writings the extent of the term as employed by him, it is necessary to bear in mind that he speaks in the same sense of his *idea*, and of the permanent essence, unity, or absolute being, which, to his mind, indicated the objective of the ideas. Now we find that he comprises therein not merely the highest and most perfect within his own knowledge, the beautiful and the good, justice and science, but even their contraries—every species of vice, evil, and injustice. Moreover, he speaks of ideas of resemblance and difference, of the one and the manifold, of magnitude, of health, and strength, and even of speed and slowness; so, too, of the unity of man and of beast, of the sphere, in and by itself, the circle, in and by itself; of a bed and a stable, even of the name or the noun. And lest, perchance, this should be misunderstood to refer merely to the general character of genus and species, the individual soul is represented as an idea; and what Socrates is, and what Simmias is, is distinguished from what is common to both. What, however, is still more calculated to excite surprise, is the attribution of an essence even to the sensible and the inchoate, so that it is requisite to consider as an *idea* that which to all appearance is the most to its nature. Thus an essence is attributed to a colour and a sound, and prototypes are given to the different species of life, and a permanence of essence is ascribed, not merely to things, but also to their actions and activities. This is, however, perfectly consistent with the comprehensive and searching character of Plato's mind, which would not allow of science being limited to any close and narrow domain, or of aught being excluded from the sphere of right knowledge. This extensive view of science is exhibited in a manner truly philosophical, in the reproof which the young Socrates is made to receive from Parmenides,

for evincing a disinclination to recognise, as possible, the reality of the ideas of man, fire, water, nay, even of hair and of clay, and other equally mean and paltry objects; for Parmenides observes, it is unbecoming a true philosopher to defer to the opinion of the many, and to consider any object as wholly despicable. In another sense, the Platonic acceptance of *Idea* is still more extensive; for among the ideas after which the sensible world was formed, he even reckons the tribes of mortal creatures; which, however, to his mind, indicate nothing more than different grades in the development of one and the same living essence; since the soul, in its migration, passes from one to the other. Hence we may clearly infer, that the Ideas may indicate certain natural grades of development—and not merely the essence of things, which, in every possible relation, invariably remains identical with itself. We have, however, from Plato himself, as general a determination of the province of Ideas as could be desired; for he expressly declares, that an Idea may be attributed to whatever, as a plurality, may be indicated by the same name. It must be manifest to all, whose notions of the theory are tolerably clear and precise, that this expression cannot be understood as exclusively referring to species and genera, which, in the individual, appear as the manifold, but also to such individuals as, expressed by one common name, exhibit themselves in many phenomena. Furthermore, it could not escape Plato's observation, that every property, every condition, and every relation of things, expressed by a term, can be valid by many; and finally, that even the variable activities, as also generation or becoming, can be expressed by a noun, and combined with many verbs; so that, in fact, it must be admitted that according to him there is nothing which does not participate in Ideas, or may not be comprehended in an Idea."

"Now, that the term Idea should have been used by Plato in this wide and general sense, will surprise no one who has considered, however slightly, the basis on which his whole theory rests. This, indeed, is the Idea of science, for the reality of which that of the Ideas is indispensable. If, then, Plato maintained that there must necessarily be Ideas to exhibit the unalterable and eternal truth of the objects of every science, in order that the science itself should be possible, he was constrained to find Ideas wherever there is a true essence, and scientific investigation is possible. But what

was there to which, in Plato's opinion, scientific inquiry might not attach itself, or in which some truth might not yet be found? For consistently with the comprehensive view he entertained of science, he must have clearly seen that there is a truth to be discovered, even in individuals, even in the qualities and properties of things, and in all that comes into being, and that consequently an idea must be found for them all. We must, therefore, dismiss all narrow views of the Platonic *Ideæ*, and understand by them whatever exhibits an eternal truth,—a persistent something which forms the basis of the mutability of the sensible. As the ideal theory was the conjoint result of the controversy against the sensuous presentation interpreted by the Sophists, and against the denial of all distinction to which the Eleatic theory manifestly tended, there were two points principally which it is of importance to it to establish clearly and firmly,—first, that the sensible is not the true, but that science alone, which teaches that there is an unchangeable truth, can adequately express the unchangeable essence of things; and secondly, that truth, or the real and true being, is not indistinguishably one and identical, but that it comprises a multitude of separate notions, every one of which expresses, in a manner peculiar to itself, the eternal essence of things; and although it constitutes in itself a true unity, nevertheless, in reference to others, it appears as a multiplicity.

“ But there is yet a third point which is immediately implied in the Ideal theory, viz. that the true and the real are exhibited in general notions as elements of science, which are so related to each other that every higher notion embraces and combines under it several lower; consequently, that the elements of truth cannot be so separated from each other as not to be nevertheless held together by some higher bond. Now, as Plato maintained this coherency of ideas to be indispensable to science, he naturally proceeded to show that all those theories are subversive of it, which consider any special truth to exist absolutely in and of itself. This connexion of the individual essences he supposed to be similar to that by which individual ideas are comprehended under the more general; which in his mind is a true and a real connexion, and not merely conceptual. Here, then, we have the reality of the general expressly asserted, which however is not a mere abstract generality, but one in which the special and the individual are comprised.

That this must possess a verity, and consequently reality, needs not, according to Plato, any other voucher than the truth and reality of science, of which the general is the constituent."—*Ritter, Hist. Philos.* Vol. ii. p. 170—172.

NOTE C.—Page 96.

"But, although Aristotle agreed with Plato in thinking that the essences of things are expressed in the notions, he nevertheless impugned the Platonic theory of ideas, in so far as it taught that this essence is to be found in the general ideas. This controversy is carried on by Aristotle in very different ways. At times he attacks the manner in which Plato attempts to gain, by means of ideas, and of the mathematical notion of numbers, a transition from the becoming, to the eternal verity. In this attack Aristotle confines himself to bringing forward a variety of doubts, which the vagueness of Plato's views, and those of his disciples, on this subject, naturally give rise to, and which, although they do not enter deeply into the spirit of the doctrine, are nevertheless well fitted to awaken attention to its weakness. This mode of the controversy does not, however, concern us in the present place, where our first object is that which relates to the notion of essence. In this respect Aristotle objects to the ideal theory, that it possesses an essence which has no part in motion or change; for the ideas are said to indicate the eternal alone, and that, consequently, it renders all investigation into nature impossible. This objection was in some measure connected with his conviction, that the ideal theory had its origin in logical, as opposed to physical, researches. Similarly, Aristotle urged that ethical investigations also are impossible in the ideal theory, since these investigations are not concerned about the good in itself, but the good which is the end and result of human conduct and actions. From admitting such grounds of science Aristotle was prevented, by his doctrine that we must rise from the better known to us, or from that which is more nearly allied to the sensible, to the knowledge of what is better known in and by itself. On this ground he likewise shews, that if the ideas are contained, or ought to be, in us, that they must be moveable, or sensible, since there is in the soul a movement and perception of

forms. Herein is apparent the endeavour of Aristotle to find such an essence as would facilitate the explanation of experience, and the sensuous phenomenon of becoming; for he regards it as the great defect of the ideal theory, that it rends the universal from the material, in order to make the sole ground of the special. It did not indeed escape Aristotle, that Plato's doctrine does not altogether neglect phenomena, but that, on the contrary, it attempts to reconcile sensation with the ideal; but he considered that it accomplishes this not only very vaguely, but even very strangely. Thus he says, that what the Platonists call a participation of objects in the ideas, is a mere vague, idle talk; and he designates as absurd the position of the ideal theory, that even general notions indicate an essence, or entity, since, according to such a view, a single essence might be composed of several different essences; a consequence which would imperil the legitimacy of the principle of contradiction. At times, indeed, he evidently misinterprets the Platonic doctrine, and is of opinion that Plato considered the ideas to be altogether separate from sensible things, to which he may perhaps have been misled by the fact, that Plato does not assign a place to the ideas, but evidently looks upon them as existing wholly without the relations of space. But the principal defect which he imputes to Plato's theory is, that it confounds the grounds of all things, and, by a necessary consequence, teaches concerning things, doctrines which do not coincide with phenomena. In opposition to this view, Aristotle observes, that it is necessary to assume different grounds of entity, a sensible for the sensible, a perishable for the perishable, and an eternal for what is eternal, and generally to admit for every class of objects a peculiar and correspondent ground. From this confusion of the grounds of Plato it has necessarily resulted, that he could not assume any properly supra-sensible grounds of things, but believed that, by adding to the sensible ground the words "in and by itself," he could elevate it into the supra-sensible. In this respect Aristotle compares the ideal theory to humanizing representations of the Deity; for, in the same manner that these form at most but eternal men, the Platonic doctrine makes the sensible species of things conceived as eternal, to be the ground of things. The great absurdity of the doctrine is, that it assimilates in species, things, like the perishable and imperishable, which are generically different.

"It cannot be denied that, by following out these consequences, Aristotle did not attack Plato in the true spirit of his theory. This spirit Aristotle misunderstood, in consequence of following a very different notion of essence from that which Plato did. While the latter viewed the essence of things in a very general light, and without any proximate determination, as that which exhibits itself in sensible phenomena as the abiding law, which admits of being apprehended in a scientific notion, Aristotle sought to discover some ground which, as absolutely subsisting, should furnish the ground of all things. The principal object of Plato was to discover and to trace the true and the real in all sensible objects, and this he considered to be the essence; Aristotle, on the contrary, sought to explain the origin of sensations by the mutual action and passion of things on their essences. And if Plato looked upon the true not merely as individual, but also as universal, still Aristotle does not deviate from him in this respect; he only objects to Plato's giving to the universal the term essence. Moreover, he took too narrow a view of the ideal theory, when he believed that Plato did not admit ideas of individual objects as well as of the universal. Here again he was probably deceived by the language of Plato, who, in truth, does consider every particular idea as a universal, but at the same time regards every individual entity as universal or general, since it also comprises under itself a multiplicity of sensuous determinations. That on this point there subsisted nothing more than a verbal misunderstanding between Plato and Aristotle is clear from the fact, that the latter even looked upon the general, although it may be predicated of many things, as something which, not merely in name, but also in being, is one and the same, and as only cognizable by the intellect indeed, but still actually present in the sensible. Aristotle found it necessary to maintain this, because, otherwise, any inference from a universal truth would be impossible. He held that science, as Plato had previously shewn, is dependent on the universal, only this universal is not something extrinsic to things. We cannot deny that this account still leaves a difference of view between Aristotle and Plato; which, however, does not consist in this, that while one denied the existence of the general, the other denied that of the individual; but merely in the different directions they respectively followed in their attempts to explain phenomena. Plato sought to deduce the individual from the uni-

versal ; but Aristotle, on the contrary, believed that the universal has its grounding in the individual. Logically, the tendency of the latter is mainly expressed in his endeavour to find an ultimate subject of the proposition, an "hypostasis" of which all else may be predicated ; such are individual objects, for ideas are merely idle words, and the general is not anything subsisting absolutely in and for itself, but it is invariably predicated of something else."—(*Ritter*, Vol. iii. p. 108.)

NOTE D.—Page 171.

" Il fut aussi le prince des philosophes romains, ce citoyen illustre, qui fut le prince des orateurs. Le premier, il éleva sur cette terre nouvelle un monument à la science de la sagesse ; et quel monument ! C'est un portique majestueux qui introduit à toutes les branches de la science. —Cicéron est historien et peintre tout ensemble ; il fait revivre les écoles diverses en même temps qu'il en raconte l'origine. S'emparant ensuite de leur héritage, il élève la philosophie à la plus haute dignité, lui assigne son véritable but, lui prête le plus noble langage, l'arrache aux subtilités des écoles pour la transporter sur la scène de la société, l'anime d'une vie toute nouvelle. Ce n'est pas à l'intelligence seule qu'il s'adresse, c'est l'âme tout entière qu'il intéresse à ses doctes leçons. Comment les anciennes préventions qui repoussaient les études philosophiques ne se seraient-elles pas dissipées, lorsque leur cause obtenait un tel apologiste, lorsqu'elles recevaient de la bouche de ce grand homme les plus magnifiques éloges, lorsqu'on apprenait de lui qu'elles avaient été sa lumière dans les affaires publiques, son délassement dans ses travaux, sa consolation dans l'adversité ; qu'il avait trouvé en elles et un guide pour son génie, et une source inaltérable de bonheur, et le vrai fondement de la vertu ; lorsque Cicéron lui-même, si justement fier des services qu'il avait rendus à son pays, plaçait au premier rang de ces services le bonheur d'avoir pu introduire ces concitoyens à l'étude de cette science ? Il nous apprend qu'avant lui divers écrivains s'étaient déjà exercés sur le même sujet ; mais ils étaient restés dans une obscurité dont l'orateur romain croit inutile de les tirer. Il est cependant singulier qu'il ne fasse jamais mention du poëme de Lucrèce. Cicéron nous confie lui-même qu'il

s'est proposé quatre vues principales : faire connaître aux Romains les doctrines des Grecs, y puiser librement ce qui lui paraissait digne d'estime, les revêtir des ornements du style et de tout l'éclat qu'elles peuvent emprunter à l'art oratoire, et les rapporter aux résultats de l'utilité la plus relevée et la plus étendue ; aussi trouvons-nous dans la philosophie de Cicéron les quatre caractères essentiels qui distinguent les travaux des philosophes romains pendant le cours de cette période ; une science empruntée aux sages de la Grèce, mais composée d'un choix de matériaux fait dans les différentes écoles, une science rendue accessible, attrayante, mise à la portée de tous les hommes instruits, une science éminemment pratique et appliquée aux besoins généraux de la société, comme à ceux de la morale privée ; en sorte que Cicéron n'a pas été le vrai fondateur de la philosophie à Rome, mais qu'il est en quelque sorte pour nous comme le représentant de tous ceux qui l'ont cultivée après lui. En traçant rapidement ici le résumé de ce qu'il a fait pour elle, nous expliquerons donc mieux que par une froide nomenclature bibliographique, le point de vue dans lequel les Romains sont placés pour l'étude de cette science, et l'esprit dans lequel ils l'ont traitée.

“ L'école d'Epicure est la seule à laquelle Cicéron n'ait voulu payer aucun tribut, et l'éloignement qu'il montra pour elle est justifié en partie par l'abus qu'on commençait à en faire, par le pressentiment de celui qu'on en ferait par la suite. Il loue Pythagore, il rend à Socrate une sorte de culte, il professe pour Platon l'admiration la plus constante ; il associe Aristote aux hommages dont il environne le fondateur de l'Académie, il se plaît à voir dans ces deux philosophes plutôt deux alliés que deux rivaux ; il s'est pénétré des austères maximes de Zénon, il s'est rangé à la suite de Carnéade et de Philon dans les rangs de la moyenne Académie ; mais ce qu'il y a surtout cherché, c'est l'avantage qu'offre cette école de pouvoir comparer, discuter librement toutes les doctrines, les opposer entre elles, et faire un choix judicieux. Il cherche lui-même comment on peut composer, de l'enseignement des sages de la Grèce depuis Socrate, un système unique ou du moins principal, modifié seulement par les additions ou les corrections de ses successeurs ; il va quelquefois jusqu'à forcer ce rapprochement, et jusqu'à supposer que la doctrine des Stoïciens ne diffère que dans les termes de celles de Platon et d'Aristote. On est forcé de reconnaître toutefois

que, dans ses vastes recherches, il n'a pas toujours exactement saisi, fidèlement rendu, la véritable pensée des auteurs dont il se rendait l'interprète.

"En général, Cicéron suit la moyenne Académie dans les questions spéculatives, Platon dans la psychologie ; Aristote et Zénon surtout le guident dans la morale ; il s'attache de préférence à Aristote dans la politique ; mais c'est Platon qu'il prend constamment pour modèle dans sa méthode ; il se plaît à imiter la forme de ses dialogues : s'il ne l'égale pas dans l'extrême délicatesse de ses analyses, il l'égale souvent en élévation, il le surpasse en clarté, et offre lui-même à l'éloquence philosophique un modèle qui n'a jamais été égalé jusqu'à ce jour."—*De Gerando, Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie*, Vol. ii. p. 178.)

NOTE E.—Page 197.

We shall here cite a few passages from the writings of some of the Greek and Roman sages, on the nature of a Deity. Plato, on Cause and Effect, reasons thus :—"Whatever is produced, must be produced by some cause ; for it is impossible that anything should be produced or made without a cause." (*Timæus*, p. 28). "The Universe received its origin, not from any fortuitous concurrence of atoms, but from a prudent potent first cause." (*Tim.* p. 265.) "We must take it for granted that nothing can make itself." (*Theætetus*). "God is the primary and principal mover in nature, (like the soul to the body) who moves himself, and all things that are, were, or shall be, in the world." (*Leg.* x. p. 894). Plato states the argument for a Deity, drawn from the order, harmony, and beauty of the world, in the following words : "The admirable order of the universe, and the regular motion of the stars and other celestial bodies, ordered by the Divine mind, demonstrate an intelligent cause. For no mortal man who shall look into these things with a diligent, inquisitive eye, can so far be an Atheist, as not to acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being." (*Leg.* xii. p. 966). Cicero says, "that Nature herself has impressed a notion of a Deity on the minds of all men." (*De Nat. Deor.* lib. 1). "For God is the first Being and Cause of things." (*Simplicius in*

Epict. c. 1, p. 9). Seneca, although he speaks of a plurality of gods, asserts the existence of a supreme Deity in language which cannot be mistaken: "The Framer and Forner of the universe; the Governor, Disposer, and Keeper thereof; Him upon whom all things depend; the Mind and Spirit of the world; the Artificer and Lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose Spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustains himself by his own power; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and guided in all its movements; by whose decree all things are done; the Divine Spirit that is diffused through all things, both great and small; the God whose power extendeth to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who supports himself and maintains all things; who is present everywhere; the God of heaven whom we worship and adore." (Nat. 2, lib. 2.).

NOTE F.—p. 241.

Exposition of Theology by Proclus.

Prop. 1. All multitude participates in a certain respect of the ONE.

Prop. 2. Everything which participates of *the one*, is both one and not one.

Prop. 3. Everything which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of *the one*, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of *the one*.

Prop. 4. Everything which is united is different from *the one itself*.

Prop. 5. All multitude is posterior to *the one*.

Prop. 6. Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.

Prop. 7. Everything productive of another is more excellent than the nature of the thing produced.

Prop. 8. That which is primarily good, and which is no other than *the good itself*, is the leader of all things that in any way whatever participate of good.

Prop. 9. Everything which is sufficient to itself, either according

to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended from another cause.

Prop. 10. Everything which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is simply good.

Prop. 11. All beings proceed from one first cause.

Prop. 12. The principle and first cause of all beings is *the good*.

Prop. 13. Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and *the good* is the same with the *one*.

Prop. 14. Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself, it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Everything, therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

Prop. 15. Everything which is converted to itself is incorporeal.

Prop. 16. Everything which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from all body.

Prop. 17. Everything which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself.

Prop. 18. Everything which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with existence.

Prop. 19. Everything which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings, is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that nature, and this conformably to one reason and after the same manner.

Prop. 20. The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and *the one* is beyond all intellectual hypostases.

Prop. 21. Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude of every order, and is referred to one monad.

Prop. 22. Everything which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.

Prop. 23. Every imparticipable gives substance from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

Prop. 24. Every thing which participates is inferior to that

which is participated ; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable.

Prop. 25. Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.

Prop. 26. Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are successive.

Prop. 27. Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

Prop. 28. Every producing cause gives substance to things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

Prop. 29. Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to first natures.

Prop. 30. Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

Prop. 31. Everything which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is converted to that from which it proceeds.

Prop. 32. All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that which they are converted.

Prop. 33. Everything which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it, has a circular energy.

Prop. 34. Everything which is converted according to nature, makes its conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its proper hypostasis.

Prop. 35. Everything caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns or is converted to, its cause.

Prop. 36. Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively.

Prop. 37. Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow ; but the last are the most perfect.

Prop. 38. Everything which proceeds from certain numerous causes, is converted through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and all conversion is through the same things as those through which progression is effected.

Prop. 39. Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also quoadmodum.

Prop. 40. Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence, are the leaders.

Prop. 41. Everything which is in another, is alone produced by another ; but everything which is in itself is self-subsistent.

Prop. 42. Everything self-subsistent is convertive to itself.

Prop. 43. Everything convertive to itself is self-subsistent.

Prop. 44. Everything which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also converted to itself essentially.

Prop. 45. Everything self-subsistent is unbegotten.

Prop. 46.

Prop. 47. Everything self-subsistent is incorruptible.

Prop. 48. Everything which is not perpetual, is either a composite, or subsists in another.

Prop. 49. Everything self-subsistent is perpetual.

Prop. 50. Everything which is measured by time, either according to essence, or according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured by time.

Prop. 51. Everything self-subsistent is essentially exempt from the natures which are measured by time.

Prop. 52. Everything eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once present, nor will it have *this* thing pertaining to itself now subsisting, but *that* afterwards which as yet is not ; but as much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution and without extension ; or whether it has its energy as well as its essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding in the same measure of perfection, and, as it were, fixed immoveably and without transition, according to one and the same boundary.

Prop. 53. Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior to everything which subsists according to time.

Prop. 54. Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the measure of things in time ; and these are the only two measures of life and motion in beings.

Prop. 55. Everything which subsists according to time, either subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time,

Prop. 56. Everything which is produced by secondary natures,

is produced in a great degree by prior and more casual natures, by whom such as are secondary were also produced.

Prop. 57. Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it.

Prop. 58. Everything that is produced by many, is more compounded than that which is produced by fewer causes.

Prop. 59. Everything which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than composite natures.

Prop. 60. Everything which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the other gives subsistence.

Prop. 61. Every power which is imparticipable is greater, but when divided is less.

Prop. 62. Every multitude which is nearer to *the one*, is less in quantity than things more remote from it, but is greater in power.

Prop. 63. Everything which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes participate, but the other in things which always and connascently participate.

Prop. 64. Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a two-fold number; one indeed of self-perfect hypostasis, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.

Prop. 65. Everything which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists according to cause, so as to have the form of a principle, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an image.

Prop. 66. All beings, with reference to each other, are either wholes, or parts, or the same, or different.

Prop. 67. Every wholeness (*ὅλον*) is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or is in a part.

Prop. 68. Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists of parts.

Prop. 69. Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness which is prior to parts.

Prop. 70. Everything which is more total among principal, illuminates participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still continues to impart its illuminations.

Prop. 71. All things which, among principal causes, possess a more total and a higher, in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications of more partial causes. And the illuminations indeed, from higher causes, receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter are established in the former. And thus some participations precede others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, but such as are more partial, supplying their participants with their communications posterior to the energies of more total causes.

Prop. 72. All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject, proceed from more perfect and total causes.

Prop. 73. Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of being, but not every being is a whole.

Prop. 74. Every form is a certain whole, for it consists of many things, each of which gives completion to the form; but not every whole is a form.

Prop. 75. Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.

Prop. 76. Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause has an immutable hyparxis; but every thing which is generated from a moveable cause has a mutable hyparxis.

Prop. 77. Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy. And that which is in capacity proceeds into energy. That also which is in a certain respect in a capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things in energy.

Prop. 78. Every power is either perfect or imperfect.

Prop. 79. Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.

Prop. 80. Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially efficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, suffers through its communion with body; just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals.

Prop. 81. Every thing which is participated in a separable

manner, is present with its participants by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in it.

Prop. 82. Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, when it is participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner.

Prop. 83. Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is entirely converted to itself.

Prop. 84. Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power.

Prop. 85. Every thing which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, (*αι γινόμενον*,) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.

Prop. 86. Every thing which is truly being, (*οντως ον*.) is infinite, neither according to multitude nor according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

Prop. 87. Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.

Prop. 88. Every thing which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity.

Prop. 89. Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

Prop. 90. The first bound and the first infinity subsist by themselves, prior to every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.

Prop. 91. Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power indeed derives its substance from infinite power. And infinite power subsists from the first infinity.

Prop. 92. Every multitude of infinite powers is suspended from one first infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

Prop. 93. Every infinite which is in (true) beings, is neither infinite to the natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.

Prop. 94. Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity is perpetuity.

Prop. 95. Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is multiplied.

Prop. 96. The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal.

Prop. 97. In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.

Prop. 98. Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no where.

Prop. 99. Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive its existence from another cause: but it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series is unbegotten.

Prop. 100. Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle of all things.

Prop. 101. Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of life, and imparticipable being of all things that participate of being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to intellect.

Prop. 102. All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound, and the infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.

Prop. 103. All things are in all, but appropriately in each.

Prop. 104. Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its energy eternal.

Prop. 105. Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is immortal.

Prop. 106. The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal, both in essence and energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.

Prop. 107. Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is, at one and the same time, being and generation.

Prop. 108. Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in a two-fold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior order, viz., either through its own wholeness,

or through that which is partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series.

Prop. 109. Every partial intellect participates of the unity which is above intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of the soul, which is a whole through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul.

Prop. 110. Of all things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the natures which are proximately established in the superior series, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.

Prop. 111. Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects, receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects alone. And of every physical series, some things are intellectual souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.

Prop. 112. Of every order, those things that are first have the form of the natures prior to them.

Prop. 113. Every divine number is unical.

Prop. 114. Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a God.

Prop. 115. Every God is super-essential, super-vital, and super-intellectual.

Prop. 116. Every deity except *the one* is participable.

Prop. 117. Every God is the measure of beings.

Prop. 118. Everything which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and super-essential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and super-essentially.

Prop. 119. Every God subsists according to super-essential goodness, and is good neither according to participation nor accord-

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ing to essence, but super-essentially ; since habits and essences are allotted secondary and manifold orders from the Gods.

Prop. 120. Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.

Prop. 121. Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued, and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

Prop. 122. Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of his providential care, providence neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

Prop. 123. Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its super-essential union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures ; but it is comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, *that which is first* is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable.

Prop. 124. Every God knows participable natures imparticipably, temporal natures without time, things which are not necessary necessarily, mutable natures immutably ; and, in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of the things known.

Prop. 125. Every God, from that order from which he began to unfold himself into light, proceeds through all secondary natures ; always, indeed, multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving the peculiarity of his own hypostasis.

Prop. 126. Every God who is nearer to *the one* is more total, but the God who is more remote from it is more partial.

Prop. 127. Every thing divine is especially primarily simple, and on this account most sufficient to itself.

Prop. 128. Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is participated without a medium ; but when participated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or greater number of media.

Prop. 129. Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of itself a God ; intellect is most divine ; soul is divine ; but body is deiform.

Prop. 130. In every divine order, such things as are first are in a greater degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than these latter are from beings subsequent. And secondary natures in a greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than following natures to those.

Prop. 131. Every God begins his own energy from himself.

Prop. 132. All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.

Prop. 133. Every God is a beneficent unity, or a unific (*ἰσο-
νομος*) goodness; and each, so far as a God possesses this *huparxis*. The first God, however, is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain unity.

Prop. 134. Every divine intellect intellectually perceives indeed as intellect, but energizes providentially as God.

Prop. 135. Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the participating genera of beings.

Prop. 136. Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine unity to another.

Prop. 137. Every unity in conjunction with *the one* gives subsistence to the being which participates of it.

Prop. 138. Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is *being itself*.

Prop. 139. All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

Prop. 140. All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and proceeding through an appropriate medium, extend as far as to the last of things, and to places about the earth.

Prop. 141. Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with them.

Prop. 142. The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But everything participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some

things uniformly, but by others manifoldly ; by some things eternally, but by others according to time ; and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally.

Prop. 143. All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Everything foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

Prop. 144. All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their progressions as the orders of the Gods.

Prop. 145. The peculiarity of every divine order pervades all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings.

Prop. 146. The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, through conversion to their principles.

Prop. 147. The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the natures (proximately) situated above them.

Prop. 148. Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold manner, from the summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end.

Prop. 149. Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number.

Prop. 150. Everything which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor, in short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings themselves.

Prop. 151. Everything paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is pre-established in the rank of *the good*, according to all divine orders.

Prop. 152. Everything which is generative in the Gods, proceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing indications in the progressions of secondary natures.

Prop. 153. Everything which is perfect in the Gods, is the cause of divine perfection.

Prop. 154. Everything which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves everything in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt from secondary, and established in primary nature.

Prop. 155. Everything vivific in the Gods, is a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific.

Prop. 156. Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But, on the contrary, not everything of a guardian order is the same with the purifying genus.

Prop. 157. Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order and division according to number, and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the more partial genera of things.

Prop. 158. Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, and from the convertive genera.

Prop. 159. Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, another from infinity.

Prop. 160. Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of *the one*, and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and produces other intellects.

Prop. 161. Everything which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

Prop. 162. Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity; but intelligible, as participated by being.

Prop. 163. Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable intellect, is intellectual.

Prop. 164. Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul, is supermundane.

Prop. 165. Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain sensible body is mundane.

Prop. 166. Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane souls.

Prop. 167. Every intellect intellectually perceives it. But the first intellect indeed perceives itself alone; and in this, intellect and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent in-

tellects perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the intelligible to each of these is partly that which it is, and partly that from which it is derived.

Prop. 168. Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of another to perceive that it perceives.

Prop. 169. Every intellect has its essence, power, and energy.

Prop. 170. Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But imparticipable intellect indeed simply perceives all things. And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things, according to order.

Prop. 171. Every intellect is an imparticipable essence.

Prop. 172. Every intellect is proximately the producing cause, being perpetual and immutable according to essence.

Prop. 173. Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and posterior to itself.

Prop. 174. Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by intellection; and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its intellection or intelligence in fabrication.

Prop. 175. Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual, both according to essence and according to energy.

Prop. 176. All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest.

Prop. 177. Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain in a more total manner such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially such things as those that are prior to them contain more totally.

Prop. 178. Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.

Prop. 179. Every intellectual number is bounded.

Prop. 180. Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts and is united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But imparticipable intellect indeed is simply a whole, as containing all parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole as in a part, and thus in all things partially.

Prop. 181. Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from the Gods, or is intellectual only.

Prop. 182. Every (divine) participated intellect is participated by divine souls.

Prop. 183. Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

Prop. 184. Every soul is either divine or is changed from intellect, or always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to divine souls.

Prop. 185. All (divine) souls are indeed Gods psychically. But all those that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.

Prop. 186. Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, and separate from body.

Prop. 187. Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.

Prop. 188. Every soul is both life and vital.

Prop. 189. Every soul is self-vital.

Prop. 190. Every soul is a medium between imparticipable natures, and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

Prop. 191. Every participate soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy accompanies by time.

Prop. 192. Every participable soul ranks among the number of (truly existing) beings, and is the first of generated natures.

Prop. 193. Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

Prop. 194. Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

Prop. 195. Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, and after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or after the manner of an image.

Prop. 196. Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual body which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.

Prop. 197. Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise subsist in, at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest.

Prop. 198. Everything which participates of time and is always moved, is measured by periods.

Prop. 199. Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to its former state.

Prop. 200. Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls indeed by a certain time ; but that of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.

Prop. 201. All divine souls have triple energies ; some indeed as souls ; but others as receiving a divine intellect ; and others are suspended from the Gods. And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods ; but they know all things through an intellectual life, and they move bodies through a self-moved hyparxis.

Prop. 202. All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior to divine, but more eminent than particular souls.

Prop. 203. Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

Prop. 204. Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods ; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this order.

Prop. 205. Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the other.

Prop. 206. Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and to ascend from generation to real being.

Prop. 207. The vehicle of every partial soul is fabricated by an immoveable cause.

Prop. 208. The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially indivisible, and impassive.

Prop. 209. The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an abolition of everything material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous to the soul that uses it.

Prop. 210. Every connascent vehicle to the soul, always possesses both the same figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be

greater and less, and of dissimilar figure, through the additions and abolitions of other bodies.

Prop. 211. Every partial soul descending into generation, descends wholly, nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.

NOTE G.—Page 339.

The controversy between the Calvinists and Arminians, grounded on a particular view of the doctrines of necessary connexion and free will, seems, at the present day, to be as far removed from a settlement as ever. Indeed, an agreement on the point is almost hopeless. This arises not from sectarian or party feelings, but solely from some leading metaphysical ideas, of opposing character and influence, which lie at the bottom of the dispute. We shall hazard, however, a few general observations on the subject, chiefly with the view of directing the attention of the reader to the leading principles and difficulties involved in this interesting, though perplexing, theological question.

It is common with Calvinistic writers to maintain, that their theory is altogether different from the principle of necessary connexion, advocated by many philosophers. Let us see how this is. The Calvinists affirm, that the Deity must have foreseen all events, and by virtue of His Omniscience nothing could have happened otherwise than it has done, or will do in future. The doctrine which is called philosophical necessity may be defined to be that which asserts that all the phenomena of the moral world, like that of the physical, are regulated by fixed and immutable laws; or, in other words, the human mind is first excited to action, and continually influenced by *motives*; that these motives originate from, and depend upon, the circumstances in which man is placed, and over which circumstances he has not the least absolute control.

Now then, taking these two doctrines as thus explained, may it not be asked, what difference is there between every thing being done by the immediate agency of the Almighty, and every thing being done by necessary and fixed laws which He has created and ordained? In both cases the freedom of the human will is completely excluded; so that, as far as it is concerned, these two doc-

trines are one and the same. Yet it does seem somewhat strange that Calvinists should look upon the first doctrine, that every thing is regulated by the immediate interposition of Almighty power, as the very foundation of Christian orthodoxy; and that the other doctrine, that God governs the world by fixed laws, is to be considered as atheistical and dangerous to the interests of morals and religion. There is a great apparent inconsistency in this. It is not in the power of the most subtle theological disputant to point out any difference between Calvinism and necessity, (*so far as both relate to the human will, which is the only point which can render them interesting,*) that seems not purely arbitrary and absurd. The only perceptible difference is, that the two doctrines in question are designated by different names.

Calvinists would, we conceive, stand upon firmer ground, if they would take their main principle in all its sweeping fulness and integrity, and not fritter it away, with useless illogical qualifications. They complain that Arminians reason disingenuously with them, by *drawing inferences* from their doctrines, which they are not warranted to do. But then the Calvinists do the very same thing with their antagonists, the philosophical necessarians; and even with the Arminians too. The doctrine of predestination is this, that certain individuals will be doomed to everlasting punishment, and a certain number to everlasting life. So far there is no ambiguity nor inconsistency in the principle laid down. But when Arminians or others *draw inferences* from this maxim of theology, that such a view of the Divine procedure, appears inimical to correct notions of the attributes of the Deity, such as justice and mercy, the Calvinistic complains that the proceedings are unfair and illogical. Now the only way in which Calvinists have argued against both philosophical necessarians, and Arminians is, by urging the force of *inferences against the truth of a principle*. This has been the invariable practice followed in every stage of this keenly contested point, for many hundreds of years.

Most Calvinistic writers meet their opponents with such qualifications of Divine decrees as the following: "So far as the Divine government is concerned, the *rational mind is in all its deliberations and decisions voluntary, and even free*, in the more common and less accurate sense of the words. The secret purposes of the Divinity have no influence in determining the human will, and of

consequence can never destroy a responsibility to the Divine law. "That the soul always chooses that which, all things considered, is the most agreeable, is an identical truth." "The will is ultimately governed by the understanding." "The activity of mind implies a general capacity of volition." "The mind is chiefly regulated by its own innate predilections."*

These admissions, which are merely a repetition of what has been over and over again said, show how difficult a matter it is, to get rid of the freedom of the human will; and how impossible it is for Calvinists to carry out their main principle to all its logical consequences.

On the Arminian side of the dispute we again meet with the same difficulty viewed under another aspect. To make the human will independent of the Divine omnipotence and government, is another stumbling-block. The advocates of this theory, like their antagonists, shrink from the inferences of their own principle, and take shelter in qualifications and compromises. The only course, therefore, which is left to both parties, is *to agree to differ*.

NOTE II.—Page 349.

It has been noticed by some historians, that there are some parts of the writings of Avicenna which would seem to countenance a recent theory, maintained by Drs. Gall and Spurzheim. We shall here quote a few sentences from the fifth volume of Avicenna's works, which may be considered to bear such an interpretation.

"Virium autem apprehendentium, occultarum, vitalium, prima est fantasia, quæ est sensus communis, quæ est vis ordinata in prima concavitate cerebri, recipiens per seipsam formas omnes, quæ imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. Post hanc, et imaginatio, vel quæ est etiam formans, quæ est vis ordinata in extremo anterioris concavitatis cerebri, retinens quod recipit sensus communis a quinque sensibus, et remanet in ea post remotionem illorum sensibilium. Post hanc, est vis quæ vocatur imaginativa, comparatione animæ humanæ, quæ est vis ordinata in media concavitate cerebri, ubi est nervus, et solet componere aliquid de eo quod est in imaginatione cum alio, et deinde aliquid ab alio, secundum quod vult. Deinde est vis estimativa, quæ est vis ordinata in

* Sermons on Election. London, 1822.

summa media concavitate cerebri, apprehendens intentiones, non sensatus, quæ sunt in singulis sensibilibus, sicut vis quæ est in ove dijudicans quod a lupo fugiendum est; videtur etiam hæc vis operari in imaginationis compositionem et divisionem. Deinde est vis memorialis et reminiscibilis, quæ est vis ordinata in posteriore concavitate cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit vis æstimationis, de intentionibus non sensatis singulorum sensibilibus."—*De Anima*.

NOTE I.—Page 357.

Mr. Hallam observes that the general doctrine held by Averroes was, "that there is one common intelligence, active, immortal, indivisible, unconnected with matter, the soul of the human kind; which is not in any one man, because it has no material form, but which yet assists in the rational operations of each man's personal soul, and from those operations which are all conversant with particulars, derives its own knowledge of universals. Thus, if I understand what is meant, which is rather subtle, it might be said, that as in the common theory particular sensations furnish means to the soul of forming general ideas, so, in that of Averroes, the ideas and judgments of separate human souls furnish collectively the means of that knowledge of universals, which the one great soul of mankind alone can embrace. This was a theory built, as some have said, on the bad Arabic version of Aristotle which Averroes used. But, whatever might have first suggested it to the philosopher of Cordova, it seems little else than an expansion of the Realist hypothesis, urged to a degree of apparent paradox. For if the human soul, as an universal, possesses an objective reality, it must surely be intelligent; and, being such, it may seem no extravagant hypothesis; though incapable of that demonstration, we now require in philosophy to suppose that it acts upon the subordinate intelligences of the same species, and receives impressions from them. By this also they would reconcile the knowledge we were supposed to possess of the reality of universals, with the acknowledged impossibility, at least in many cases, of representing them to the mind." (*Lit. Middle Ages*, Vol. 1, p. 196.)

NOTE J.—Page 363.

Le Liore des Conocils, par Ferideddin Attar, quoique essentiellement destiné à offrir un recueil de Préceptes moraux et de Conocils pratiques, renferme aussi quelques vues sur la connaissance de Dieu, suivant le langage des Arabes, sur la vie spirituelle et contemplative. C'est en effet par la contemplation que cette connaissance s'acquiert. Celui qui connaît véritablement Dieu par la contemplation, est convaincu que la véritable existence consiste dans l'anéantissement. Si tu connais bien ton âme sujette aux passions, tu connaîtras le Dieu Très-Haut et véritable dans ses dons. Celui-là seul possède la science qui connaît Dieu. La contemplation consiste à disparaître et à s'anéantir devant Dieu. La contemplation ne s'occupe ni de ce monde, ni de la vie future ; toutes ses facultés sont absorbées dans le désir de son union avec Dieu. Ce monde est semblable à un fantôme que voit un homme durant son sommeil ; lorsqu'il est éveillé, il ne lui reste aucun profit de ces douces illusions."

"Quoi que cette théosophie mystique se soit particulièrement, nous la voyons se produire aussi parmi les Maures d'Espagne ; elle trouve, au milieu du douzième siècle, un sectateur dans Iban Baïah, que S. Thomas a appelé Avenpace, et qui est plus connu sous ce dernier nom. Avenpace, disciple du philosophe et médecin Avenzoar, avait écrit des lettres philosophiques et théologiques, au nombre desquelles il en est une *sur le détachement des choses humaines et l'union de l'amour avec Dieu*. Ses opinions lui attirèrent, de la part des docteurs musulmans, une accusation d'hérésie. Il avait cultivé les sciences mathématiques ; car il avait commenté Euclide. Il avait également travaillé sur Aristote ; Averrhoës le cite souvent, et c'est par ces citations seules que nous connaissons aujourd'hui ses idées philosophiques. Avenpace, dit Averrhoës, s'occupa beaucoup de l'entendement, et particulièrement dans la lettre qu'il intitula : *De la Conjonction de l'entendement avec l'homme*, et dans son *Traité de l'Âme*. Voici le fondement qu'il établit : d'abord il supposa que les intelligibles sont produits ou créés ; que tout ce qui est produit à une *quiddité* (une qualité essentielle ;) que l'entendement est capable par sa nature de détacher cette *quiddité* ; qu'il en abstrait ainsi les formes des intelligibles, en quoi il concorde avec Alfarabi. Il ajouta que les intelligibles ne

comportent point la pluralité, si ce n'est à raison de la réunion des *formes spirituelles* par lesquelles elles subsistent dans chaque individu ; d'où il suit que l'intelligible dépouillé de ces *formes*, est un pour tous les hommes. La *quiddité*, l'intelligible, et la forme, n'ont point elles-mêmes de *forme spirituelle* ; elles ne subsistent dans aucun individu ; elles ne sont point la *quiddité* d'un individu particulier, d'où il conclut encore que l'entendement est unique chez tous les hommes, et qu'il constitue une substance séparée et distincte."—*Histoire Comparée par De Gerando*. Tom. 4, p. 286.

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